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Better never means better for everyone, he says. 
It always means worse, for some.
Margaret Atwood, The Handmaid’s Tale, 1985
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1 Introduction and General
Background
In this first chapter, I will introduce my thesis, focusing on its aims,
core areas and theoretical and methodological frameworks. This chap-
ter is divided into three main parts. In the first part, Chapter 1.1,
I outline the aims of this thesis, which are to analyze the background,
content and implementation of some of the dominant strategies for
equality between the sexes applied within the UN human rights
framework during the 1990s. In the second part, Chapter 1.2, 
I provide a background for and a general overview of the UN
human rights framework and, in the third part, Chapter 1.3, I -
introduce the principle of equality and the different strategies for
equality applied within the UN human rights framework.
1.1 Introduction
1.1.1 Introductory Remarks
The explicit objective of international human rights as developed within
the United Nations (UN) is to protect the rights of all human beings
equally. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Universal Declara-
tion, 1948) states that “[a]ll human beings are born free and equal in
dignity and rights” and that everyone is entitled to the rights set forth in
the declaration “... without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour,
sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin,
property, birth or other status”.1 The International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (ICCPR, 1966) and the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR, 1966) both include
similar principles of equality and non-discrimination and affirm, with
respect to the rights set forth in the Covenants, that “... States Parties to
the present Covenant[s] undertake to ensure the equal right of men and
women” with respect to the rights in the Covenants.2
1 Universal Declaration, Arts. 1–2.
2 ICCPR Art. 3 and ICESCR Art. 3.
15
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While the UN included both women and men as subjects of interna-
tional human rights law, the means for inclusion did not address the in-
equalities and discrimination resulting from the historical exclusion of
women and large parts of the world community from the sphere of
rights. Hence, in UN human rights history the exclusion of women and
the exclusion of the rights crucial for women’s well being have been less
the results of any kind of explicit law-based exclusion, than the results of
politico-legal interpretations and silences.3 In order to ensure equal rights
between women and men and a better protection of women’s human
rights the UN began adopting women’s human rights treaties parallel to
the International Bill of Rights, which includes the Universal Declaration,
the ICCPR and the ICESCR. The early women’s human rights treaties,
such as the Convention on the Political Rights of Women (1952) and
the Convention on the Nationality of Married Women (1953) codified
the rights already established in the Universal Declaration but with a
focus on women. Later, women’s human rights treaties, such as the Con-
vention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women
(CEDAW, 1979) included attempts to interpret and transform human
rights in order to adapt it to women’s diverse realities. Women’s inequality,
however, has not only been addressed as part of the UN human rights
agenda, but also as part of the UN social and development agendas.
The adoption of general human rights and women’s human rights
treaties have been important steps in the standard setting of the UN-
based human rights regime. However, the adoption of treaties only means
going halfway or less to changing practices in actuality. Within the frame-
work of the world conferences regarding human rights and socioeconomic
issues that have been organized by the UN since the 1960s and, especially,
during the 1990s, different strategies for the implementation of human
rights, generally, and women’s human rights, particularly, have been
developed. The World Conference on Human Rights held in Vienna in
1993 (Vienna conference) stressed the importance of a dual strategy for
the promotion of women’s human rights and equality between the sexes.
In accordance with the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action
(Vienna Programme), women’s human rights and equality between the
sexes should be promoted by strengthening women’s human rights regimes
and by integrating women’s human rights into the UN system-wide
activity and especially as the strategy has been interpreted, into the UN
human rights system. The Fourth World Conference on Women held in
16
3 Early feminist legal scholars emphasized the need to identify law’s silences or, as defined
by Stang Dahl (1988), a Nordic pioneer of women’s law, law-empty spaces (in Swedish
rättstomma rum). See Nousiainen, Gunnarsson, Lundström and Niemi-Kiesläinen 2001
and Svensson 2001a–b.
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Beijing in 1995 (Beijing conference) promoted a somewhat different
dual strategy. In accordance with the Beijing Declaration and Platform
for Action (Beijing Platform), equality between the sexes should be pro-
moted by strengthening the women’s advancement regimes already in
existence, including the women’s human rights regime and by integrating
a so-called gender perspective into the UN system-wide activities, includ-
ing into the UN human rights system. In accordance with the Beijing
Programme, “... an active and visible policy of mainstreaming a gender
perspective into all policies and programmes should be promoted so that
before decisions are taken an analysis is made of the effects of women
and men respectively”.4 That is, while both dual strategies emphasize
both specialized woman-centred schemes and integrative schemes, they
differ vis-à-vis the framework in which they developed and vis-à-vis
what should be integrated. To a large extent, the focus of this thesis will
be on the Vienna strategy’s emphasis on the integration of women’s
human rights and the Beijing strategy’s emphasis on the mainstreaming
of a gender perspective. It is already worth noting two points. First, that
very little is evident about the notions of women’s human rights and gender
and, secondly, that the aforementioned strategies and concepts are far
from being one-dimensional.
1.1.2 Background and Objectives
This thesis is a thesis in international law with a special focus on interna-
tional human rights and, especially, on the response of the UN human
rights framework to women’s demands for equality and equal rights. I will
provide a general background for the exclusion of women from the rights’
sphere and the gradual inclusion of women as human rights subjects be-
ginning in the late 18th century up to contemporary discussions. The
focus of the lens of my thesis, in particular, will be held over two areas:
over post-Cold War developments and over the different strategies for
achieving equality between the sexes adopted within the UN human
rights framework during the 1990s. In this thesis the notion of “strate-
gy” is used for dominant trends of currents within equality politics,
which give priority to certain law-based and policy-based forms for the
promotion of equality. I am especially interested in the development,
content and fluctuating meanings of the two divergent dual strategies
adopted at the Vienna and Beijing conferences. Their integrative parts
especially intrigue me. The first dual strategy adopted at the Vienna
conference emphasized the importance of strengthening and integrating
17
4 Beijing Platform, Arts. 79, 105, 123, 141, 164 and 229.
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women’s human rights. The second dual strategy adopted at the Beijing
conference emphasized the importance of strengthening the UN schemes
for the advancement of women and integrating a gender perspective, 
viz., gender mainstreaming.5 The first parts of both the dual strategies
consist mainly of reaffirmations of the earlier woman-centred equality
strategies and it is the integrative parts that are the 1990s add-ons to the
UN equality discourses. I am interested mainly in the add-ons. Ques-
tions that have guided the thesis are: Why were the strategies adopted?
What conceptual and operative content is given to the strategies? How
do the strategies interact? And how have the strategies been interpreted
when implemented within the UN human rights system?
My interest in the integrative parts of the dual strategies for women’s
human rights and equality between the sexes began while doing an
internship at the Women’s Rights Section at the Division for the Advance-
ment of Women at the Department of Economic and Social Affairs at
the UN headquarters in New York in 1998. At the time, there was much
talk at the Division about the importance of rights-based approaches to
women’s advancement and about gender mainstreaming.6 The UN staff
that I encountered seemed convinced about the necessity of rights-based
approaches and fluent in using a language of gender and gender main-
streaming.7 The terms, however, lacked any clarity at all for me. Ques-
tions that have begun to interest me rather belatedly are: How should the
notion of women’s human rights be interpreted when they are to be in-
18
5 The subtitle of this thesis is Mainstreaming Women’s Human Rights and a Gender Per-
spective. The subtitle refers to the two integrative strategies, i.e., the Vienna strategy that
emphasized integration of women’s human rights and the Beijing strategy that promoted
mainstreaming of a gender perspective. When the Vienna strategy was adopted the
language of “integration” was used for what later became “mainstreaming”. For example,
during later years, as will be noted in Chapters 5 and 6, the UN has increasingly begun
to discuss mainstreaming of women’s human rights. Depending on what strategy I dis-
cuss and with reference to what time frame I use either the term integration or main-
streaming, but I give largely the same meaning to the two terms. Note, however that I in
Chapter 4 have chosen a slightly different approach, due to references to other literature,
see Chapter 4, footnote 1.
6 The 1998 discussions about rights-based approaches, however, were probably less a
result of the Vienna strategy for the integration of women’s human rights than the UN
Secretary-General’s policy strategy for mainstreaming human rights launched around
1997 as part of the UN reform programme. See Annan 1997 and Chapter 4.6.2.
7 It should be noted that my impressions about the conviction and the fluency of the
staff at Division for the Advancement of Women was certainly influenced by the fact
that I did not understand the notion of rights-based approaches or how rights-based
approaches could be operationalized. At the time, the notion of gender was for me, pri-
marily a contested analytic category (ab)used by feminist theorists. See Chapters 4.2–3.
For analysis of operationalization and law, see Gipperth 1999.
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tegrated into the UN-based human rights system? Does the notion of
women’s human rights refer mainly to the rights codified in CEDAW or
are there other possible interpretations? How should the analytic category
of gender be understood in the UN strategy for mainstreaming a gender
perspective? How does the largely law-based strategy of integrating
women’s human rights relate to the policy-based strategy of mainstream-
ing a gender perspective?
There are three main objectives for this thesis: the first objective of this
thesis is to analyze the integrative parts of the dual strategies against the
background of the development of different human and women’s human
rights regimes. That is, by providing a general background of the develop-
ment of human rights, and by analyzing the sex-neutral human rights and
woman-centred human rights within the UN human rights framework,
this thesis aims at situating and giving a context to the contemporary
dual and integrative strategies for equality between the sexes.
The second objective of this thesis is to analyze and unpack the integrative
parts of the dual strategies and to bring some clarity to their contents, mean-
ings and intentions. The Vienna conference proposed a dual strategy that
aimed at strengthening the existing women’s human rights regime and at
integrating women’s human rights into the core of the human rights sys-
tem. The Beijing conference proposed a dual strategy that aimed at
strengthening woman-centred equality measures and at mainstreaming a
gender perspective within the UN system, including within its human
rights system. Hence, the conceptual and operative contents of the 
strategies are fairly different, though the shared developmental and im-
plementation processes of the strategies have led to ambiguities. 
The third objective of this thesis is to analyze the integrative strategies by
examining how they have been institutionally implemented through key initi-
atives by a number of the UN human rights institutions. In this thesis,
however, I am not interested in the implementation efforts by the UN
Member States, but specifically in how different UN human rights in-
stitutions have approached the strategies. The integrative parts of the dual
strategies are often described as victories of the international women’s
movement. The women’s organizations and networks gathered under
the Women’s rights are human rights slogan at the Vienna conference en-
sured women’s human rights their elevated place in the Vienna Program-
me. The Beijing conference has ensured that the focus has shifted from
women only policies at the margins of the UN system to gender policies
at the core of UN system-wide activities. As part of the unpacking of the
integrative strategies, the current representation of the integrative parts
of the dual strategies will be questioned, i.e., from strategies that attempt
to promote equality through focusing primarily on women. Feminist
19
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history has shown or, at least, a feminist perspective suggests, and so,
perhaps, does common sense, that all too easy victories should be ques-
tioned: What has happened really? What was the actual victory? Who
won? What price was paid? Where did the possibilities and power go
again? That is, this thesis aims at moving in behind the scenes of what
some commentators already choose to call the human rights industry and
the gender industry: to analyze the content and meaning of these dis-
courses, especially the intended and unintended transformations of the
content and meaning of these discourses. The unintended transforma-
tions refer to how the strategies have changed when used and implemen-
ted by different actors, i.e., the unintended consequences that, at times,
are counterproductive to the aim of the strategies.
1.1.3 Material and Method
This thesis is a thesis in international law with a special focus on inter-
national human rights. The focus of analysis, however, is not primarily on
international human rights law, but rather on the interactions between
and among law, politics and policy in the processes of development,
transformation and implementation of certain strategies for women’s
human rights and equality between the sexes within the UN-based human
rights regime. Hence, the choices regarding theoretical and methodo-
logical approaches and what material to use have been less guided by the
disciplinary limitations of international law than by the demands placed
on theory, method and material, given the focus on law, on soft law and
on certain UN processes under formation .8
The main theoretical inspirations for this thesis are feminist interna-
tional legal studies and feminist theory. Common denominators for femi-
nist international legal studies are the emphasis on the interconnections
between law, politics and institution building and the emphasis on in-
ternational law as inseparable from and entrenched in the, often, contra-
dictory ideas, ideologies and values that govern international politics
and the global community. A common denominator for feminist theory
is the emphasis that academic knowledge-production should not be per-
ceived of as non-situated and objective, but it is situated (our age, sex,
race, sexuality, culture, religion, class and geographic location et cetera
affects our research) and it is partial (complex realities cannot be fully
explained).9 The notion of situated knowledges, however, is not an excuse
20
8 Svensson 1997, p. 21.
9 Kennedy, for example, in his article An Autumn Weekend (1995) questions his role as
an international law professor in producing and reproducing ideas about international
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for incomplete research, but, at its best, it implies self-reflective question-
ing about the researcher’s own presumptions and about how these pre-
sumptions affect the research.10
Methodologically, I am inspired by what Hilary Charlesworth and
Christine Chinkin have defined as feminist methods in international
law and by Carol Bacchi’s so-called What is the problem approach? devel-
oped for feminist policy analysis. Both of these approaches view theory
and method as interconnected. They emphasize that the focus of the re-
search or the questions asked should guide the research in greater extent
than explicit theories and methods or disciplinary boundaries.
The UN produces a lot of official documentation. Although equality
and human rights and the dual strategies remain fairly marginal within
and not core issues of the UN agenda, I have encountered no difficulties
in finding material and it has been necessary to distinguish, in different
ways, important material for the thesis as well as to delimit the material
used. Because I use more than just legal material and because I also rely
on different kinds of soft law and policy-based material, the process of
identifying key documents, following them through or having them play
hide and seek with me in the labyrinth-like institutional structure of the
UN, has been demanding. I have decided to limit the material to UN
official documents produced during the years 1992–2002 on human
rights and on women, focusing especially on material implied in the pro-
cess of developing, promoting or implementing the dual strategies.11
The time frame chosen relates to the time frame during which a language
of integration and gender has been promoted within the UN system. I
have occasionally included material from 2003 when I considered that a
document or equivalent suggests that there has been a shift in focus in
how, for example, a specific institution approaches the integrative strat-
egies. With some exceptions, I have also limited myself to material that
addresses women’s or gender issues or that specifically addresses the in-
tegrative strategies. This delimitation seems counterproductive, i.e., how
can the integration of women’s human rights or the mainstreaming of
gender be analyzed if I only focus on material regarding women and/or
gender? I have, however, had to realize when going through UN docu-
mentation, that the process of integration is still so new and so much
21
law. Otto (2000) asks similar questions with regard to international law teaching and
Buchanan and Pahuja (2002) analyse, self-consciously, the relationship between interna-
tional legal scholarship and teaching and the joys of belonging to a globetrotting cosmo-
politan class.
10 See Flax 1987, Haraway 1991 and Svensson 1997.
11 For an overview of the institutions chosen for the analysis and of how different institu-
tions have implemented the integrative strategies, see Chapter 5.
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under development that it has not moved out of the what can be called
the woman margins. The UN official documents include:
• Human rights treaties adopted by the UN General Assembly, as well
as travaux préparatoires, including declarations, resolutions and sum-
mary records and interpretive statements, including general comments
and, sparingly, concluding observations adopted by the human rights
treaty bodies.
• Official documents adopted at UN World Conferences, including
material from the preparatory and follow-up processes.
• Resolutions, annual reports, policy documents, manuals and briefing
kits adopted by UN human rights and woman-centred institutions.
As a complement to the academic sources and the UN official documen-
tation, I have conducted fourteen qualitative interviews or discussions
with persons working on issues relevant for the integration of women’s
human rights and mainstreaming of a gender perspective within the
UN.12 The interviews were conducted in 2001 and aimed at providing
me with background information for this thesis. The interviews were
confidential and I do not disclose the names of the persons interviewed.
The fact that the interviews are confidential does have an impact on how
I use the material from the interviews. That is, I do not rely on the mate-
rial from the interviews, but I use it in support of other material.
1.1.4 Outline
This thesis is divided into six chapters. After having outlined the main
aims and core areas of this thesis in Chapter One, I will further develop
the theoretical and methodological approaches of this thesis in Chapter
Two, focusing on feminist perspectives on international law and human
rights and on Carol Bacchi’s social constructivist and discursive method
for feminist policy analysis. Thereafter, in Chapter Three, I will provide
a historical background to and analyze the development of the integrative
strategies. In Chapter Four, I will provide a closer analysis of and unpack
the concept of gender and the integrative strategies. In Chapter Five, I
will analyze how different UN human rights institutions have approached
and implemented the integrative strategies. Chapter Six rounds up and
concludes this thesis.
22
12 The confidential list of persons interviewed is held by the author of this thesis. The
persons interviewed have been chosen using the so-called snowball method, i.e., each
contacted person has recommended one or two other persons that they thought could
contribute to the thesis. 
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1.2 Introduction to the UN Human Rights
Framework
1.2.1 The Development of the International Human Rights
Regime
Although the idea of rights has long-standing roots in philosophical and
political thought, it has mainly been since the late 18th century that the
notions of human rights and citizens’ rights have been part of Western
politics and law. The internationalization of human rights began in the
late 19th century with the international actions taken to abolish slavery
and the slave trade. The process of the internationalization of rights was
continued, although moderately and mainly with regard to economic
and social rights, after the First World War, by the League of Nations
and especially the International Labour Organization.13 The efforts to
internationalize human rights were intensified after the Second World
War, when not only the UN and its human rights framework was estab-
lished, but also, when the European and Inter-American human rights
frameworks were initiated.14 The international human rights framework
and practice, however, have changed considerably during their nearly six-
decade long UN-centred history. The UN Charter includes human rights
as one of the areas of UN competencies.15 When the Universal Declara-
tion was adopted in 1948, many UN delegates rejoiced, perceiving both
the establishment of the UN and the adoption of a universal declaration
on human rights as a second chance for the international community.16
Others, such as philosopher Hannah Arendt, criticized the newly found
23
13 For further discussion, see Chapter 3.2.2.
14 For an overview of the international human rights framework, see, for example, Alston
and Steiner 2000, Donnelly 1998 or Smith 2003. For an overview to the European
human rights system, see, for example, Cameron 2002 and Ovey and White 2002. For
an overview of the African human rights system, see, for example, Hellum and Stewart
1999 and Österdahl 2002. For an overview of the Inter-American human rights system,
see, for example, Eriksson 1994.
15 The UN Charter Art. 1(3) states that the purpose of the UN is to promote and encour-
age respect for human rights. Art. 55(c) underlines the UN’s responsibility to promote
“... universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for
all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion”. The UN Economic and Social
Council (ECOSOC) has been given the mandate to set up commissions in the economic
and social fields for the promotion of human rights (Art. 68). For an analysis of the devel-
opment of the UN system and its human rights framework, see Chapters 3.2.2 and 3.3.
16 For further discussion, see Morsink 1999 and McDougal, Lasswell and Chen 1980.
See also Chapter 3.2.2.
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belief in human rights as nothing but a way for idealists in the so-called
civilized nations to ease their conscience.17 The contemporary postcoloni-
al, post-Cold War and the post-September 11 international human
rights frameworks and debates reproduce these aforementioned argu-
ments, both pro and con, as well as many in-between kind of arguments.
During the 1990s, human rights have moved from the margins of public
international law towards its centre. There has been an increased aware-
ness about the inter-linkages between international legal, political and
economic concerns and the well being of human beings and peoples.18
The new interventionism and the changing political climate after the
bombings of the Twin Towers in New York on 11 September 2001, how-
ever, have shown a downside to the increased focus on human rights as
human rights, including women’s human rights, have been used to erode
the principle of national sovereignty and to enable, albeit implicitly, mi-
litary attacks, such as the attacks on Afghanistan and Iraq.19
The partial erosion of the principle of sovereignty through the inclu-
sion of human rights into public international law constituted a radical
shift in post-Second World War international law and politics. During
the last decades, the scope of state obligation under international human
rights law and the questions of whether and how states can be made ac-
countable for actions committed by non-state actors have been highly
debated issues. Scholars interested in issues such as male violence against
women, including so-called domestic violence, have been interested in
making states responsible for their non-action regarding male violence
against women and they have attempted to break down the private/
public distinction in international law.20
24
17 Arendt 1967, p. 279. The Arendtian criticism of human rights has been developed by
Agamben 1998 and Douzinas 2000.
18 The human rights positive climate has empowered different advocacy groups and
non-governmental organizations, which increasingly rely on a human rights language for
framing their demands for equality, justice and recognition. Human rights scholars, such
as de Sousa Santos (1995), have highlighted the increased non-governmental organiza-
tion activism and the positive impact of it in the human rights field. Others, such as
Chinkin (1996) and Otto (1996a–c and 1999), have stressed that, while important,
non-governmental organizations are not necessarily democratic and their impacts re-
main largely dependent on the good will of states. For further analysis, see Gallagher
2000a, Jochnick 1999, Lempinen 1999, Segerlund 2002, Smith, Pagnucco and Lopez
1998 and Stammers 1999. See further the discussion about the UN world conferences
on human rights and on women in Chapters 3.4–3.5.
19 For further discussion see, Orford 1997, 1999 and 2002.
20 For further discussion about the private/public distinction, see Chapter 3.2.1. For a
discussion about violence against women as a human rights violation, see, for example,
Chapters 5.3.2 and 5.4.6.
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Issues that remain a focus of attention within the international debate
on human rights are the historical, political and ideological biases of
international human rights and in contemporary human rights practice.
The biases within the framework and how the increased focus on human
rights has overturned simple problem representations within the field of
human rights, can all be exemplified by the debates about the genera-
tions of rights and about how human rights should be approached in a
heterogenous world.21
According to Asbjørn Eide and Allan Rosas, the generational approach
was put forth by Karel Vasak in 1979.22 The distinctions among three
generations of rights, viz., a first generation of civil and political rights, a
second generation of economic, social and cultural rights and a third
generation of development rights, have traveled well. While criticized,
such an approach or conceptualization is reproduced in most human
rights textbooks.23 As many scholars have pointed out, the generational
approach does not correspond to the historical development of interna-
tional human rights law at all, but rather, is a largely Western invention
for giving preference to civil and political rights at the cost of economic,
social and cultural rights and other alternative frameworks of rights.24 The
generational approach that distinguishes among a first generation, blue
and negative rights as opposed to a second generation red and positive
rights and a third generation green and collective rights however, remains
interesting as it discloses the bias for the Western-style liberal democratic
state model and for individual rights within the UN human rights sys-
tem.25 While efforts have been made throughout UN human rights his-
tory to emphasize the indivisibility of rights, preference is given to civil
and political rights in the Universal Declaration, for example, and the
25
21 For the question of group-specific rights see Chapter 3.3.
22 Eide and Rosas 1995 p. 16. For a discussion about the hierarchy of international
human rights’ norms, see Hirschl 2000. For attempts to undo the hierarchical approach
to human rights and especially attempts to assign a higher value to economic, social and
cultural rights, see, for example, Cançado 1998, Chapman 1996, Eide, Krause and
Rosas, eds. 2001, Gustafsson 2003 and Leckie 1998. For discussions about and attempts
at the revaluation of economic, social and cultural rights, see Apodaca 1998, Gomez
1995 and Otto 2002.
23 See, for example, Alston and Steiner 2000 and Charlesworth and Chinkin 2000.
Occasionally, a fourth generation of rights is distinguished, represented, for example, by
indigenous peoples’ rights.
24 Charlesworth and Chinkin 2000, Scheinin 1999 and Tomas˘evski 1998a.
25 See, for example, Alston and Steiner 1996, pp. 258–9, Clark 1999 and Morsink
1999.
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state obligation is stronger in the ICCPR than in the ICESCR.26 The
Vienna Programme, however, did reaffirm the idea that all human rights
are indivisible, interdependent and interrelated and that this characteri-
zation not only applies to the rights contained in the International Bill of
Rights, but also, for example, to women’s, children’s, indigenous peoples’
and minorities’ rights.27 During the post-Cold War period, human rights
scholars have increasingly pointed out that the generational approach is
counter-productive to the development and implementation of rights.
Martin Scheinin, for example, stresses that different rights should not be
approached as separate from each other, but that rights should be appro-
ached as “multi-party structures” or “bundles of binary relationships”.28
Boaventura de Sousa Santos notes that “[t]he often voiced cautionary
comment against overloading human rights politics with new, more ad-
vanced rights or with different and broader conceptions of human
rights, is a latter day manifestation of the reduction of the emancipatory
claims of modernity to the low degree of emancipation made possible or
tolerated by world capitalism”.29 The supporters of overcoming the
generational approach to human rights however, as has been argued by
Dianne Otto, experienced a backlash, for example, during the Beijing
conference at which the economic and social rights relating to women in
development agenda took a climb backwards, leaving place for a fairly
conservative human rights agenda in its stead.30 That is, while the core of
the human rights framework emphasizes indivisibility, the generational
approach might be reproducing itself at the margins.
The Universal Declaration promoted the idea that human rights were
universal, i.e., that human rights were the birthright of every human
26
26 For references to the indivisibility of rights, see, the Proclamation of Teheran, the pre-
ambles to the ICCPR and the ICESCR and the Vienna Programme, part I, para. 5. See
also, however, the different state obligations defined in ICCPR and ICESCR Arts. 2.
The ICESCR Committee, however, in its General Comment No. 3, made attempts to
reinterpret the ICESCR’s notion of state obligation.
27 Vienna Programme, part I, para. 5.
28 Scheinin (1999, pp. 2, 8–9) also notes that “[i]t is no coincidence that the economic
and social rights became accepted as human rights simultaneously with the process of
giving recognition to women as subject of human rights. Much of what is fundamental
to economic and social rights is related to gender issues in society, real and fundamental
social problems and challenges that are critical in the lives of most women, but which
could easily be taken for granted by the small group of free men the 17th and 18th cen-
tury philosophers had in mind when they discussed rights”. See also Charlesworth and
Chinkin 2000, p. 206 and Scheinin 1992 and 1998.
29 De Sousa Santos 1995, p. 340.
30 See Otto 1999, see also Chapter 3.5.2.
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being, no matter where he or she was born. Whether the rights contained
in the Universal Declaration were adapted to everybody’s needs every-
where were already discussed during the drafting process. The American
Anthropological Association, for example, commented on the cultural
bias of the Universal Declaration, arguing that an international declara-
tion for human rights must acknowledge that the personality of the indi-
vidual can develop only in terms of the culture of his society. Further,
the Association commented that what the Western world has defined as
the white man’s burden, i.e., his quest to civilize the colonized world, has
all too often led to the disintegration of culturally-based human rights.31
In the exchange between North and South, women of the South, as
Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak claims, have become “a particularly privileged
signifier”.32 “She”, argues Spivak, meaning a woman from the South is
“... as object and mediator [...] the favored agent-as-instrument of trans-
national capital’s globalizing reach”.33 The popular 1980s and 90s debates
about whether human rights were absolute and universal or equally ap-
plicable in all states, societies and cultures or, alternatively, whether human
rights were contingent or dependent upon and relative to the norms and
values of different states, societies and cultures, have also, to a large
extent, focused on the so-called other woman as carrier of culture.34 The
universalist/relativist debate has been especially heated regarding harm-
ful traditional practices affecting especially girls and women, such as
female genital mutilation, widow-burning and the so-called honor crimes,
where proponents for universal human rights standards have condemned
these practices as violations of women’s human rights. Proponents for a
relativist position, on the other hand, have argued that human rights is a
form of Western imperialism that violates ancient custom, cultural values
and religious laws.35 The universalist/relativist debates mediated through
questions regarding these harmful cultural practices have placed women,
27
31 For a discussion about contemporary Asian values debate in light of the American
Anthropological Associations’ comments, see Engle 2000 and Charlesworth 1998.
32 Spivak 1999, p. 200.
33 Spivak 1999, pp. 9–10.
34 For an introduction to the so-called universalist/relativist debate, see, for example,
Alston and Steiner 2000, Chapter 5–6, An-Na’Im, ed. 1992, Perry 1997, Pollis 1996
and Warner, ed. 1997.
35 The female genital mutilation debate has been used to shed light on, but also to create
and reproduce the dichotomy between Third World and Western feminists, see, for ex-
ample, Gunning 1991–2, Lewis 1995 and Obiora 1997. For an overview of the related
so-called honour crimes debate, see the Honour Crimes project’s bibliography at www.
soas.ac.uk/honourcrimes/ (23-09-2003) and for discussions about other harmful cultural
practices, see, for example, Hassan 2000 and Sikkink 2001.
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viz., agent-as-instrument, at the very heart of the debate.36 The contem-
porary debate both among human rights scholars and within the UN
human rights framework is less dichotomized and promotes what I have
chosen to call universal rights in quotes. That is, it is recognized that human
rights are a historical construct and that they are, to some extent, biased,
but also changeable or mutable. Hence, cultural difference is welcomed,
but culture is not accepted as an excuse for human rights violations.37
Gunning notes for example:
[o)ne is not stuck between choosing ‘universal standards’ and ‘everything is
relative’. It is not that there are ‘universals’ out there waiting to be discovered.
But through dialogue, shared values can become universal and be safe-
guarded. The process by which these universal standards are created is im-
portant. A dialogue, with a tone that respects cultural diversity, is essential.
From a dialogue, sensus may be reached, understanding that as people and
cultures interact they do change and learn from each other.38
De Sousa Santos argues that both relativism and universalism are wrong
and that “[a]gainst universalism, we must propose cross-cultural dialogues
on isomorphic concerns. Against relativism, we must develop cross-cul-
tural procedural criteria to distinguish progressive politics from regressive
politics, empowerment from disempowerment, emancipation from re-
gulation”.39 According to de Sousa Santos, a “... cross-cultural, mestiza
conception of human rights is called for, implying that all cultures are
problematic vis-à-vis human rights”.40 In their analyses of representations
of women, for example, in the Beijing Platform and in the UN Security
Council’s discussions about women and war, Otto and Anne Orford
argue, however, that the UN institutions and instruments have, still,
forced women into traditionalist roles.41
28
36 Higgins (1996) notes that “[c]ultural relativists have targeted feminism itself as a
form of Western imperialism. Ironically, cultural relativists have accused feminist human
rights activists of imposing Western standards on non-Western cultures on much the same
way that feminists have criticized states for imposing male-defined norms on women”.
For further discussion, see, for example, Afkhami 2000, Bayefski 2001, Brems 1997,
Mayer 1995, Hernández-Truyol 1996, Howe 1994, Orford 2002, Pollis 1996, Preis
1996 and Rao 1995. For discussions from regional perspectives see Ali 2000, Coomara-
swamy 1994, Hildson, MacIntyre, Mackie and Stivens, eds. 2000, Oloka-Onyango and
Tamala 2000 and Samuels 1999.
37 The contemporary debate will be further addressed in Chapters 3.4 and 5.3.2.
38 Gunning 1991–2, p. 238.
39 De Sousa Santos 1995, p. 339.
40 De Sousa Santos 1995, p. 340. For further discussion, see, for example, Gustafsson
2003, Chapter 6.3.
41 Otto 1999 and Orford 2002, see also Chapters 2.2, 2.3.2, 3.5.2 and 5.2.2.
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The developments described above through the unpacking of the
generational approach and the increased cultural sensitivity of the inter-
national human rights framework, which is also very much implied in
feminist approaches to international human rights, can be seen as steps
towards promoting human rights as a cosmopolitan politics. There is,
however, a downside to the positive developments. For example, Costas
Douzinas, criticizes the developments of the last decades and notes that
“[a]s human rights start veering away from their initial revolutionary and
dissident purposes, as their end becomes obscured in ever more declara-
tions, treaties, and diplomatic lunches, we may be entering the epoch of
the end of human rights and the triumph of monolithic humanity”.
Further, he proclaims that “[t]he end of human rights come when they
loose their utopian end”.42 Douzinas might have exaggerated the potential
of a revolutionary and utopian rights’ discourse, but he does point to one
of the paradoxes found especially in the international human rights
framework. These rights, as a legacy of Western modernity, were created
to protect the individual from violations by the nation-state, but they
seem to triumph at a time when both liberal individualism and the
nation-state are under siege and, as it seems, are losing the battle. Similarly,
scholars have begun to question whose game are human rights playing
in an era of economic globalization and, to what extent, if any, hidden
agendas are promoted through human rights.43 Feminists have also
begun to question the dominant strategic positivist approach often used
in the human rights field, which demands loyalty towards the system.44
There is an ongoing struggle between, on the one hand, how to analyze
human rights and the international human rights system critically and,
on the other hand, how to attempt to save the international human
rights project, which is the only human-centred part of international law,
by patching it up where needed and, at times, turning a blind eye to
shortcomings. This struggle is at the heart of much human rights scholar-
ship, but, in this thesis, will be discussed mostly with respect to feminist
international human rights scholarship.45
29
42 Douzinas 2000, p. 380.
43 See, for example, Bob 2002, Falk 2002, Milner 2002, Orford 2002 and Twining
2000.
44 For a discussion, see Chapters 2 and 6.
45 See Chapter 2.
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1.2.2 UN Human Rights Law, Soft Law and Policies
During the post-Second World War era, the character of the international
legal system shifted from being a system of coexistence, governed by the
principle of national sovereignty to being a system of cooperation, 
governed by an increased interdependence among states.46 This shift to-
wards an increasingly global political and legal order and the growing im-
portance of non-state actors in the new global community are two factors
which have created multiple and often conflicting levels of governance
and have led to the need for a renegotiation of the increasingly non-
transparent and interdependent relationship between politics and law.47
According to Inger-Johanne Sand, the relationship between politics and
law can no longer be described hierarchically and one-dimensionally:
when politics and law take place on several levels and engage several actors
at the same time, the two functions become dependent upon each other
in new, diverse and, at times, unintended ways.48 Sand argues that be-
cause the decision-making process no longer legitimizes law and because
the distinction between politics and law has become blurred, new con-
ceptualizations of decision- and law-making processes are needed. Sand
proposes that the legislative processes in the era of globalization be
approached as “... crucial meeting places and crossroads for the cor-
responding and functionally different institutional actors – political
authorities, experts as well as private organizations and corporations”.49
Approaching law-making processes as crossroads and meeting places
means moving from viewing only the end product, i.e., the adopted or
enacted law, as important, to viewing the on-going discussion between
the different agents and “... the discursive, information-gathering and
argumentative functions preceding the decisions” as important as the end
product.50 De Sousa Santos argues that the shift within the international
human rights framework has changed international human rights from a
Western localism to a cosmopolitan politics.51 International human rights
were universalized as a “globalized Western localism”, but because human
rights are out there, they have changed and “[a] counterhegemonic human
30
46 Cramér 1998, pp. 39–44. For discussions about changes in international law, see
Koskenniemi 1989 and 2001.
47 Sand 2001, p. 17.
48 Sand 2001, p. 5.
49 Sand 2001, p. 5.
50 Sand 2001, p. 5.
51 De Sousa Santos 1995, p. 339. For an interpretation of de Sousa Santos approach, see
also Twining 2000, Chapter 8.
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rights discourse and practice of human rights conceived as a cosmopoli-
tan politics has been developing”.52
The process-oriented approach to international human rights law
emphasizes the importance of not only law, but also the law-making and
different political and institutional processes. This approach has become
common in contemporary human rights scholarship. In part, the shift is
due to changes in international politics and, in part, to a shift of focus
within the UN and international human rights frameworks from codifi-
cation to implementation via not only legal, but also soft law and policy-
based methods. Within the human rights sphere and, especially within
its women’s human rights margins, the shift can be exemplified by a
focus, not only on treaty-based international human rights, but an equal
focus on the world conference processes and preferences for soft law and
policy-based instruments. Hence, when approaching the different law-
and policy-based strategies developed within the UN-based human
rights regime to promote women’s human rights and equality between
the sexes, the representations of international law as a crossroads and a
meeting place for transforming a universalized western localism into a
cosmopolitan politics are useful.
The core of the UN human rights law project consists of the seven
human rights treaties to which supervisory mechanisms are tied, i.e.,
ICCPR and ICESCR are grouped together with CERD (1965), CEDAW
(1979), Convention against Torture (CAT, 1984), Convention for the Rights
of the Child (CRC, 1989) and the International Convention on the
Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their
Families (1990).53 The forerunner to the human rights treaties, the Uni-
versal Declaration is only a soft law document, but some of the rights
contained in the Declaration are promoted as part of customary law or
as having ius cogens status.54
The world conferences organized by the UN since the 1960s have
contributed to the growing knowledge and international dialogue about
human rights for the UN system because of the relatively inclusive world
conference processes that include national and regional preparatory con-
31
52 De Sousa Santos 1995, p. 339.
53 For a comprehensive overview of the UN treaty body system, see Alston and Craw-
ford, eds. 2000. See also the UN treaty body database www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf (23-
09-2003). For an overview of existing human rights treaties, declarations and other im-
portant documents, see Brownlie and Goodwin-Gill 2002.
54 Cassese 2001, pp. 119–22.
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ferences and extensive non-governmental participation.55 The outcome
documents from the conferences are not legally binding, but they can
have a considerable impact on the development of international, regio-
nal and national law and politics as political platforms or soft law.
Feminist international legal scholars have contributed to the increased
focus on both hard and soft law or, as stressed by Charlesworth and
Chinkin citing Harold Koh, on international law as a “... complex blend
of customary, positive, declarative and soft law”.56 The feminist focus 
on different politico-legal actors, different decision-making structures
and potential alternative sources of law has been necessitated by the lack
of hard law solutions regarding issues falling within feminist spheres of
interest, such as women’s reproductive rights, violence against women,
harmful traditional practices, et cetera57 That is, while the UN has adopt-
ed women’s human rights treaties, these treaties have not necessarily been
transformative. Hence, soft law solutions have been added to the codified
women’s rights framework.
At times the process-oriented and integrated approaches to law, soft
law and policy seem to lead to tendencies to forget that law, soft law and
policy create different state obligations. It is often forgotten as well that
whether soft law and policy obligations are upheld is largely dependent
on the engagement of governmental and non-governmental organizations
and on the good will of states.58 With regards to the Beijing conference,
feminist legal scholars, such as Chinkin and Otto, however, have pointed
out that states rejected efforts to make the conference a “conference of
commitment” and that there was a preference for using a language of
women’s rights instead of women’s human rights, i.e., efforts were made
to downplay any illusions about a legal status of the Beijing Platform.59
Feminists have also noted the difficulties with maintaining the outcomes
of the world conference and of ensuring that a progressive outcome is not
32
55 For an overview of UN world conferences, see www.unhchr.ch/html/confs.htm (23-
09-2003).World conferences on human rights were organized in Teheran in 1968 and in
Vienna in 1993. World Conferences on women were organized in Mexico in 1975, in
Copenhagen in 1980, in Nairobi in 1985 and in Beijing in 1995. See also Chapters 3.4–3.5.
56 Charlesworth and Chinkin 2000, p. 67.
57 Charlesworth and Chinkin 2000, p. 67. The ambiguities and difficulties with uphold-
ing the disciplinary boundaries between international law and politics in international
law scholarship and practice I have been extensively analyzed, for example, by Kennedy
2000 and Koskenniemi 1989 and 2000.
58 Kennedy (2000, p. 354) distinguishes between legislation, i.e., treaty and custom and
administration, i.e., civil service and civil society as two contemporary strategies in build-
ing international law.
59 See Chinkin 1996 and Otto 1996c and 1999.
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eroded at a later conference. Hence, while law, soft law and policy have
become increasingly interdependent, they are not indistinguishable from
each other.
The main sources of international law are considered to be internatio-
nal treaty or customary law.60 Treaties become legally binding for Mem-
ber States after having been signed and ratified. In accordance with the
1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties Arts. 19–23, states
can make reservations when ratifying or acceding to a treaty in case
reservations are not expressly prohibited by the treaty or incompatible
with the object of the treaty.61 The question of reservations to the UN
human rights treaties is a much debated problem. Considerable tension
exists between, on the one hand, the interest of having as many states as
possible participate in the UN human rights project and, on the other
hand, refraining from undermining the project with reservations contrary
to the purpose of the human rights treaties. Reservations have especially
been discussed in the context of CEDAW. CEDAW Art. 28 addresses
the issue of reservations emphasizing the aforementioned principle that
“[a] reservation incompatible with the object and purpose of the present
Convention shall not be permitted”. However, while the CEDAW
Committee has repeatedly requested states not to submit reservations or
to withdraw their reservations, the problem of reservations persists.
Many authors have stressed that many of the reservations to the CEDAW
are contrary to the object and purpose of CEDAW and undermine the
work of the CEDAW Committee, the implementation of CEDAW in
Member States and the status of CEDAW within the UN treaty body
system.62
According to the International Court of Justice Statute Art. 38(1b),
customary law is defined as the “... evidence of a general practice accep-
ted as law”. The two elements of customary law are considered to be usus
or state practice and opinio juris or a state’s conviction that the practice
amounts to international law. Since the Second World War treaty law
33
60 The International Court of Justice Statute Art. 38 (1) includes what is considered to
be the most authoritative list of sources of international law. The list includes “(a) inter-
national conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressively recog-
nised by the contesting states; (b) international custom, as evidence of a general practice
accepted as law; (c) the general principles of law recognised by civilised nations; (d) sub-
ject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly
qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of
rules of law”.
61 Cassese 2001, pp. 350–1.
62 See, for example, Charlesworth and Chinkin 2000, pp. 102–13, Eriksson 2000,
Chapter 3.3.2 and Tomas˘evski 1998b.
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has become increasingly important and customary law has lost impor-
tance, to some extent, largely because treaty law is more useful for creat-
ing distinct legal obligations than customary law.63 An exception has been
created through the construction of ius cogens or peremptory norms.64 A
ius cogens norm is defined in the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties Art. 53 as “... a norm accepted and recognised by the international
community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is
permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general
international law having the same character”.
According to Antonio Cassese, soft law includes “... a body of standards,
commitments, joint statements, or declarations of policy or intention
[...], resolutions adopted by the UN GA [General Assembly] or other
multilateral bodies, etc”.65 As noted, Cassese does not distinguish between
soft law and policy, but includes at least some policy documents in his
definition of soft law. The documents listed by Cassese have three things
in common:
[f ]irst, they are indicative of the modern trends emerging in the world
community, where international organizations or other bodies have the task
of promoting action on matters of general concern. Second, they deal with
matters that reflect new concerns of the international community, to which
previously this community was not sensitive or not sufficiently alert. Third,
for political, economic, or other reasons, it is, however, hard for States to
reach full convergence of views and standards on these matters so as to agree
upon legally binding commitments. As a consequence, the standards, state-
ments, and other instruments at issue do not impose legally binding obliga-
tions.66
How much like law proper, to use Cassese’s term, soft law is allowed to
become and how legal soft law obligations are held to be depend, accord-
ing to Cassese, on the intentions of the authors of the specific docu-
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63 Charlesworth 1991, Charlesworth and Chinkin 2000, Cassese 2001, Chapter 6.2
and Gunning 1991.
64 Ius cogens was introduced into international law by socialist and developing states as a
safeguard against colonialism and for peaceful coexistence between states. Norms that are
considered to have ius cogens status are, for example, the right to self-determination of
peoples, the prohibitions of aggression, genocide, slavery and racial discrimination and
respect for basic human rights, see Cassese 2001, p. 139 and Eriksson 2000, pp. 137–8.
65 Cassese 2001, p. 160. See also Hillgenberg 1999. The distinction between hard and
soft law is sexed or gendered, as has been noted by, for example, Charlesworth (1996a)
and Eriksson. The softening of international law has largely occurred in areas such as
human rights and environmental law. The currently used term soft law can be seen as a
variation of the earlier common term gentlemen’s agreements.
66 Cassese 2001, pp. 160–1.
04-02 Iustus, Sari 8/3  04-03-08 15.30  Sidan 34
ment.67 Soft law documents can “... lay the ground, or constitute the
building blocks, for the gradual formation of customary rules or treaty
provisions” and they can gradually turn into law proper.68 Among the
reasons for choosing a soft law form Hartmut Hillgenberg highlights:
the need to build confidence, the need to stimulate on-going processes,
the need for a flexible regime, the need for an impetus for a coordinated
national legislation, the need to relieve international law of the burden
of hard law obligations and the need for simpler procedures.69 David
Kennedy argues that attempts to uphold a distinction between hard and
soft law has already imploded.70 He further notes a distinction between
formal law and anti-formal law. On the one hand, there is formal law,
which is distinguished by sharp distinctions between law and politics
and different levels of governance, i.e., national and international. On
the other hand, there is anti-formal law, distinguished by soft distinctions
between law and politics and different levels of governance. The distinc-
tion between these two kinds of law has shifted to a distinction where
the formal side contains rules, including custom and treaty and it also
contains norms, including rules and hard and soft principles. The anti-
formal side includes policy. According to Kennedy, this shift has come
about because some international lawyers have become drawn to a less
formal international law focused more on matters of policy, asking what
arrangements fulfilled a desired political or institutional function best,
rather than what arrangements were normatively persuasive.71 Within
the framework of international human rights law, and especially women’s
human rights law and other relatively marginalized spheres of interna-
tional human rights law, the shifting and imploding boundaries between
law/politics, hard law/soft law, legislation/administration, national/in-
ternational, et cetera might also be due to the fact that working within
these areas is not solely the prerogative of lawyers, but also the prerogative
of political scientists and social scientists in general.
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67 Cassese 2001, p. 161.
68 Cassese 2001, p. 161. Within the UN human rights framework declarations are often
used as a step on the way to drafting a treaty, the Universal Declaration predated, for ex-
ample, the ICCPR and the ICESCR, the Declaration on the Elimination of Discrimina-
tion against Women (DEDAW), predated CEDAW.
69 Hillgenberg 1999, p. 501.
70 Kennedy 2000, pp. 365–8.
71 Kennedy 2000, pp. 365–8.
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1.2.3 The UN Human Rights System
The UN human rights system has grown considerably since its inception
and the legal, political and policy-based developments have affected the
UN’s institutional structure for human rights. In the 1950s and 60s, UN
activities in the area of human rights were mostly promoted by the
ECOSOC which is the UN’s main intergovernmental organization in
the economic ans social fields, and its functional commissions, such as
the Commission on Human Rights, and the Commission on the Status
of Women. Since the 1960s the UN treaty body system, i.e., the system
of committees established through the human rights treaties for moni-
toring Member States compliance with the treaties, has had a growing
importance. During the last few decades, different extraordinary human
rights institutions, such as the Commission on Human Rights special
procedures, have been added to the UN human rights framework. Today,
especially since the adoption of the strategy for the mainstreaming of
human rights as part of the Secretary-General’s UN reform programme,
human rights have been integrated into the mandates of most UN insti-
tutions.
John Quinn has defined the UN system as a labyrinth.72 Alston notes
that the development of the UN human rights system and institutional
structure has not been accidental, rather the overlapping and poorly
delineated institutional mandates is the “... inevitable result of a variety
of actors seeking to achieve diverse, and perhaps sometimes even irre-
concilable, objectives within the same overall institutional structure”.73
Within the UN human rights system there are according to Alston,
tendencies to create new policy agendas and new institutional structures,
each time an agenda or structure shows itself to be incompetent or is
hampered by political intransigence.74 The UN human rights system has
been criticized for its inability to respond quickly to human rights viola-
tions, for its inability to respond at all to human rights violations com-
mitted by certain states and for its slow processes. Some authors, however,
have noted that the UN is only as strong as its Member States want it 
to be and that a system that is constantly strained by lack of financial
and human resources cannot be expected to act adequately in any crisis,
36
72 Quinn 1996, p. 55.
73 Alston 1996a, p. 2.
74 Alston 1996a, p. 2. For overviews and discussions about the UN system, including its
human rights system, see Alston, ed. 1996, Alston and Steiner, eds. 2000, Cohen 1996,
Müller, ed. 2001, Taylor and Groom, eds. 2000, Pace 1998 and Roberts and Kingsbury,
eds. 1994. See also Chapter 5.
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or carrying an ever-increasing workload. The UN reform programme
initiated in 1997 has made some attempts to streamline UN activities
and to minimize the doubling of its work.75
Since its establishment the UN was intended to be an international
or global institution and its membership has grown from 51 in 1945 to
191 in 2002.76 In order to ensure an equitable representation of the dif-
ferent regions of the world among its staff and in its intergovernmental
institutions, the UN has promoted a principle of equitable geographical
distribution.77 Although other interests of representation have emerged,
the principle of equitable geographical distribution remains a dominant
principle when employing staff and dividing chairs within the UN. Any
comparable principle has not been included with regard to the equal or
equitable representation of the sexes. The need for an increased repres-
entation of women has been a continuing topic of discussion.78 Such
increased representation is not only needed at the lowest levels of UN
administration but also within the UN human rights inter-governmental,
expert and judicial institutions and even within the Member State per-
manent delegations to the UN.
The issue of an equal or equitable representation between women and
men has been a debated issue in political and social sciences. While it is
not evident that a woman will represent women’s interests, especially not
all women’s interests, studies have shown that a critical mass of an under-
represented group is necessary to change priorities made within an admin-
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75 For overviews of the UN reform programme, see www.un.org/reform/ (12-01-2004).
For further information see for example the UN Dag Hammarskjöld Library’s UN
Reform Bibliography, at www.un.org/Depts/dhl/reform.htm (13-01-2004). The reform
programme is with respect to the UN treaty bodies discussed in Niemi and Scheinin
2002.
76 www.un.org/Overview/growth.htm (23-09-2003).
77 The principle is codified in the UN Charter Art 101(3). What an equitable geograph-
ical distribution means and how the principle should be applied are issues of debate, i.e.,
should, for example, equitable geographical distribution be defined on the grounds of
regional representation or on the grounds of individual state representation. To what
extent do small UN Secretariat institutions have to comply with this rule. See, for ex-
ample, Bouayad-Agha and Herández 1996, Charlesworth 1994b and Hernández-Truyol
1996.
78 Women’s representation within the UN Secretariat has been an issue on the Commis-
sion on the Status of Women agenda since the establishment of the UN. Women’s parti-
cipation in UN intergovernmental bodies and in Member State delegations has been dis-
cussed since the adoption of the UN Convention on the Political Rights of Women
(1952), and women’s participation and representation constitute one issue that has been
discussed as one of the 12 Strategic Objectives of the Beijing Platform. See Charlesworth
1994b, Eriksson 2000, Gallagher 1997 and Pentikäinen 1999.
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istrative, political or equivalent organizational structure. Maja Eriksson
notes that:
[w]omen’s issues have simply been “at the periphery of international human
rights”, and international treaty bodies have ignored and “continue to ig-
nore” the fact that human rights violations often have a gender dimension,
by and large because woman have been and are still underrepresented at
the governmental and intergovernmental level, in international human
rights law-making and in supervisory mechanisms.79
When articulating recommendations for the integration of a gender per-
spective into the UN human rights system, Anne Gallagher underlines
that “[a]n increase in the number of women from all parts of the world
(particularly at strategic/managerial levels within the Secretariat, on treaty
bodies, and in investigative roles) is a crucial step in the process of im-
plementing a genuine gender perspective”.80 As will be shown, the “gen-
der turn” in equality politics, i.e., the 1990s shift from using a language
of women and sex to using a language of gender in the context of equality
politics, to some extent, has contributed to the downplaying of the
question of representation. Further, the gender turn has promoted the
idea that everyone can and should do gender equality work and that
equality issues are uncontroversial.81 Promoting equality should certainly
be everyone’s concern, but it would be deluding oneself to think that every-
one cares about equality politics and that no one feels threatened by it.
1.3 Introduction to the Equality Strategies Applied
within the UN Human Rights Regimes
1.3.1 The Principle and Aim of Equality
The principle of equality, including equality between the sexes, is consid-
ered a core principle in international human rights law.82 However, the
status, the aims and the necessary strategies for implementing the prin-
ciple of equality have been and continue to be debated. While the status
38
79 Eriksson 2000, p. 3.
80 Gallagher 1997, p. 331. See also Pentikäinen 1999.
81 For further discussions, see Chapters 4.5.2 and 6.3.
82 The contemporary principle of equality in international law is not exclusively focused
on equality between women and men. However, this chapter will focus exclusively on the
principle of equality between the sexes within the UN human rights framework and the
different strategies adopted to implement the principle. While this focus reproduces a
distinction between equality as a general principle and equality between the sexes as a
specific principle, it nonetheless will allow me to limit the material used. For substantial
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and the aims of the principle of equality are important, with respect to
the questions asked in this thesis, they are less important than acknow-
ledging that the notion of equality within the international human
rights framework is under constant renegotiation as new knowledge
emerges and as new claims for equality are being advanced by previously
excluded groups. However, I will begin by briefly addressing the issues
of the status and the aims of the principle of equality.
With regard to the status of the principle of equality between the sexes,
the debates have concerned whether or not the principle is a ius cogens
norm, a fundamental principle of customary law, an independent right
in treaty-based international human rights law, or an interpretive rule in
treaty-based international human rights law.83 During recent years, the
question of the legal status of the principle of equality has been over-
shadowed by questions regarding the aim of the principle. The shift in
focus from status to aim is presumably due, in part, to a growing feminist
unease with the so-called strategic positivist approach chosen for inter-
national human rights law scholarship. While it certainly can be strategic-
ally useful to claim that the ius cogens doctrine is biased and to attempt to
advance an argumentation that not only racial discrimination, but also
sex discrimination has ius cogens status, this argumentation can also back-
fire.84 That is, the question of legal recognition can come to overshadow
issues of substantial change.
39
discussions about the legal notions of equality. See for example, Eriksson 2000, Chapter
2.2, McCrudden, ed. 1991, McKean 1983, Lerwall 2001, Chapter 3, Nousiainen and
Pylkkänen 2001 and Svensson 2001.
83 While the principle of equality has been approached as a fundamental principle of in-
ternational law, the principle of equality between the sexes has not until recently been
interpreted as an independent right. See, for example, European Convention on Human
Rights Art. 14 and Protocol 12 and ICCPR Art. 26 and Human Rights Committee Ge-
neral Comment No. 20.
84 Charlesworth and Chinkin 2000 have argued that the ius cogens doctrine is biased
and that issues, which are important for women and for women’s enjoyment of basic
human rights, have been excluded from the doctrine. According to Eriksson (2000,
p. 160), the principle of non-discrimination between the sexes “... constitutes a principle
of general international law and [...] there are some indications or a growing support for
the emergence of a peremptory prohibition of discrimination on the grounds of sex in
international law”. Eriksson (2000, p. 162) favours giving non-discrimination between
the sexes ius cogens status because it discusses the principle of non-discrimination be-
tween the sexes as a candidate for ius cogens status, as the upgrading of the principle of
non-discrimination between the sexes in the hierarchy of international law norms would
have both important practical implications and be of symbolic significance.
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The debates concerning the aim of the principle have related to
whether the principle should aim at formal equality, substantial equality
or gender equality or whether the objective of equality between the sexes
can break out of its comparative framework and allow for an alternative
interpretation of equality between the sexes.
The aim of formal equality, which is the main aim of equality within
the liberal legal framework, means that everyone should be treated equ-
ally and that law should not differentiate between people. Feminists and
women’s advocates argued for formal equality when law was used as a
means for direct discrimination against women. The aim of formal equal-
ity remains a fundamental building block of international human rights
law, but it has been criticized by feminists and others representing the in-
terests of disadvantaged groups for being a “... very blunt tool when deal-
ing with cases of long-term, structural disadvantage and inequality ...”.85
However, as Carol Smart has noted, the principle of formal equality is a
necessary principle, because it sets a minimum standard.86
The aim of substantive equality has been added to the aim of formal
equality in order to enable different forms of positive or affirmative
action for different groups that have suffered from long-term structural
disadvantages and inequalities. Next to the aim of formal equality, the
aim of substantive equality today is the dominant aim of equality in dif-
ferent equal treatment laws. Although the term “affirmative action”
seems banned, the aim of substantive equality has also been accepted as
the aim of UN human rights law. Both the aims of formal and substant-
ive equality, however, are closely linked to the principle of non-discrimi-
nation and, while the linkage between equality and discrimination
might even be useful with respect to formal equality, it becomes difficult
with respect to substantial equality, as real life references in debates
about equality tend to defy comparisons.87
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85 Charlesworth and Chinkin 2000, p. 32. Compare Eriksson 2000, p. 30 and Niemi-
nen 1990, p. 309. Feminist legal scholars and other critical legal scholars have argued
that while law might seem equal and while statements such as the statement included in
the Universal Declaration Art. 1 that “[a]ll human beings are born free and equal in dig-
nity and rights” promote the idea that law is objective and neutral, law is not value-free,
but it is transgressed by the same hierarchical and power-laden principles as society in
general. This reality is also hinted at in the Universal Declaration as the last sentence of
Art. 1 states that human beings should treat each other in a “spirit of brotherhood”. For
feminist discussions about formal equality and the so-called male bias in law, see Ker-
ruish 1990, MacKinnon 1989, Nousiainen and Pylkkänen 2001 and Svensson 1997.
See also Chapter 3.3.
86 Smart 1989, see also Chapter 2.3.1.
87 For an analysis of different forms of discrimination, see, for example, Bader Ginsburg
and Merritt 1999, Eriksson 2000, Fransson 2000, Hannikainen and Nykänen, eds.
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Within the liberal tradition, the principles of equality and discrimina-
tion have become so closely linked to each other that they are represented
as the opposites of each other. The presumption that where there is equal-
ity, there is no discrimination has added the comparative element in the
conceptions of both the aims of formal and substantial equality. The
idea that equality and discrimination are each other’s opposites and that
both equality and discrimination may be measured in symmetrical terms
are ideas which have created problems in national equality legislation.
Difficulties have emerged: when, for example, groups cannot be compared
or when no evident group to compare with exists, i.e., in wage discrimina-
tion; when a lack of equality is evident, but when it is difficult to phrase
that lack of equality in terms of discrimination, i.e., violence against
women; or when it is difficult to define the reason for inequality in one-
dimensional terms, i.e., multi-dimensional discrimination.88
To some extent, the aim of gender equality has developed as a result 
of the relative failure of the notions of formal and substantial equalities,
especially when viewed as the opposites of discrimination and as a means
to frame a more complex approach to equality. Gender equality does not
presuppose, nor should it, that equality and discrimination can be mea-
sured in terms of symmetry and asymmetry, at least not in the same extent
as the other equalities do. The notion of gender equality, however, is
seldom used in legal frameworks, but it has become the dominant aim
of equality strategies within contemporary policy-based equality dis-
courses.89 Gender equality has been defined by the UN Office of the
Special Advisor to the Secretary-General on Gender Issues (OSAGI) as
referring to the “... the equal rights, responsibilities and opportunities of
women and men and girls and boys”:
Gender equality implies that the interests, needs and priorities of both
women and men are taken into consideration – recognizing the diversity of
41
1995, Koukoulis-Spiliotopoulos 1999, Lerwall 2001, Lundström 1999 and Numhauser-
Henning, ed. 2000.
88 For a discussion about the comparative element in conjunction with wage discrimi-
nation, see Fransson 2000. For an analysis of so-called multi-dimensional discrimina-
tion, see Makkonen 2002 and Chapters 3.3.1 and 5.4.2.
89 The goal of the 1990s integrative strategies and especially of the strategy of main-
streaming a gender perspective, has been gender equality. In many gender mainstreaming
manuals, the goal of the gender mainstreaming strategy, i.e., gender equality, remains
undefined. See, for example, the ECOSOC Agreed Conclusions 1997/2 on gender
mainstreaming, Chinkin 2002b and Lorentzi 2001. The lack of definition might be due
partly to the fact that with the inclusion of difference and diversity perspectives and the
right to a subjective voice in conceptions about equality, perspectives that are supposed
to be intrinsic to the idea of gender equality, the very idea of a definition has become
counter-productive. The term gender is problematized in Chapters 4.2–5 and 6.3.
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different groups of women and men. Gender equality is not a ‘women’s
issue’ but should concern and fully engage men as well as women.90
That is, aiming at gender equality should not only serve as a means to
overcome the comparative element, but it can also be used to overcome
some of the shortcomings of other notions of equality with regard to
dealing with difference. However, while the principle of gender equality
is an attempt to introduce non-symmetric and, in some cases, difference-
oriented and diversity-sensitive thinking into the equality framework, as
shall be shown, it is not an easy aim or concept to use.91
I have found Judge Tanaka’s opinion on the principle of equality,
Drucilla Cornell’s argumentation for justice as a post-equality ideal, Eide’s
and Torkel Opsahl’s definition of freedom and Etienne Balibar’s concept
of egaliberté interesting for thinking beyond the distinctions between
and among formal, substantive and gender equality. However, I also use
these approaches to point out that while definitions are important, espe-
cially for legal scholars, the process of working towards and renegotiating
definitions are just as important when working for equality.
According to Judge Tanaka “[e]quality being a principle and different
treatment an exception, those who refer to the different treatment must
prove its raison d’être and its reasonableness”.92 This definition provides
for the primacy of the principle of equality, i.e., those persons, advocates
who want to derogate from the principle need to explain why such de-
rogation is necessary.93 Judge Tanaka, however, acknowledges that de-
rogation from the formal principle of equality is necessary and that the
necessary derogations cannot necessarily be made within the language of
substantial equality, but can be wielded beyond a comparative perspective.
[A]ll human beings are equal before the law and have equal opportunities
without regard to religion, race, language, sex, social, groups, etc. [...] On
the other hand, human beings being endowed with individuality, living in
different surroundings and circumstances are not all alike, and they need
in some aspects politically, legally and socially different treatment. Hence
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90 OSAGI, Fact Sheet 1, 2001.
91 See Chapters 4.5 and 6.3.
92 Eriksson 2000, p. 29. Judge Tanaka’s standpoint is expressed as a dissenting voice in
the South West Africa cases (Second Phase), see International Court of Justice, Reports
and Judgements, Advisory Opinions and Orders. Judgement of 18 July 1966, p. 464, see
Brownlie and Goodwin-Gill, eds. 2002, p. 782.
93 With reference to the principle of equality, Eriksson (2000, p. 29) argues that “[i]t is
presumed that equality in the sense of uniformity, regularity, similarity and symmetry
needs no reasons, whereas difference and unsystematic behaviour need as a rule justifica-
tion”.
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[...] [e]qual treatment is a principle but its mechanical application ignoring
all concrete factors engenders injustice.94
In her criticism of the notion of equality, Cornell argues that to endorse
a “white-knuckling” feminism that insists that because we “asked for
equality we must live with its consequences seems a cruel response”.95
That is, what equality is and what the principle of equality entails will
and must be allowed to change during the struggles for equality, which
are ongoing in different contexts and at different levels. However, Cornell
recognizes the difficulties with this struggle and asks:
[b]ut then what standards should a post-egalitarian feminism employ to
address the justices they take so seriously? Could we not replace formal
equality with substantive equality and so take into account the inequality
found in family life? Maybe, but we would still be taking an idealized re-
presentation of men as our measure of comparison. Clearly, the gender
comparisons inherent in formal equality confine us to traditions insepar-
able from the view that women are unequal to men, while excluding in-
numerable forms of sexual difference from the reach of justice.96
Cornell suggests that feminists instead of aspiring toward equality, which,
then always falls back on a comparison between women and men, should
aspire toward justice. Moving from equality to justice can also be a means
to approach the challenge of difference. Feminist analysis of the content
of the principle and the goal of equality between the sexes have has, es-
pecially during the last decades, been complicated by a growing acknow-
ledgement of difference amongst women and of how, not the least, glo-
bal scale inequalities and injustices interact with the principle and goal
of equality between the sexes. However, because most models of equality
treat difference as derogation from the main rule, the equality and equal
rights discourses have construed difference as the despised other.
Eriksson uses Eide’s and Opsahl’s definition of freedom, noting that
the three components of freedom are central for the understanding of
genuine (de facto) equality.97 Eide and Opsahl argue that freedom for
the individual includes: (1) to have available an equally wide range of
significant opportunities as others; (2) to be equally independent of
others in deciding on the use of the options; and (3) to be equally free to
determine her/his own values and priorities. I find the idea of defining
equality through a notion of freedom interesting, but the forementioned
version is dependent on a comparative framework.
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94 Brownlie and Goodwin-Gill, eds. 2002, p. 802.
95 Cornell 1998, p. 5.
96 Cornell 1998, p. 6.
97 Eriksson 2000, p. 48.
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Renata Salecl does a similar attempt drawing on Balibar’s concept of
egaliberté.98 According to Salecl, sexual difference, which is intrinsic to
conceptions of human rights, has contributed to the creation of a differ-
ence between equality and freedom within the human rights framework.
According to Salecl, freedom and equality, as rights, are distinguished
from each other through three sets of contrasts, viz.,
[f ]irst, while equality concerns primarily the social and economic domain,
freedom belongs to the domain of law and politics. Second, the realization
of equality demands the intervention of the state (as long as equality con-
cerns some kind of redistribution of goods), but the preservation of free-
dom demands the limitation of state intervention. Finally, equality con-
cerns society as a whole, viewed as a collective entity, whereas freedom is
primarily a right pertaining to individuals.99
Salecl argues, however, that equality and freedom have become intercon-
nected and should be interconnected, that it is possible to speak as
Balibar does about egaliberté. What Salecl wishes to highlight with the
notion of egaliberté is both the impact and the expected impact of the
ideas of the interdependence and indivisibility between economic, social
and cultural rights, on the one hand, and civil and political rights, on
the other hand. The notion can also be viewed as a means for making
interconnections between the growing gender-sensitivity of the human
rights discourse and the promotion of what I have called universal rights
in quotes.
1.3.2 Three Strategies for Equality
In order to implement the principle and aim of equality, different strategies
have been developed. Within the international human rights framework,
the debates about what strategies to use have concerned whether to use
sex-neutral, woman-centred or different dual and integrative or main-
streaming strategies. The strategies, however, are not mutually exclusive,
but rather exist, in a parallel manner to each other, both in human rights
instruments and institutions.100 In accordance with the deficit that it is
easier to come up with new ideas than to get rid of old ones, the strategies
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98 Salecl 1994, p. 128.
99 Salecl 1994, p. 128, see also Balibar 1992.
100 Bacchi 1999. For different approaches to women’s human rights, see the large num-
ber of mainly edited volumes addressing the issue, published during the last decade, As-
kin and Koenig, eds. 1999, 2000 and 2001, Byrnes, Connors and Bik, eds. 1997, Char-
lesworh and Chinkin 2000, Cook, ed. 1994, Dallmeyer, ed. 1993, Pentikäinen, ed.
2000, Peters and Wolper, eds. 1995, Tomas˘evski 1993, Walter, ed. 2000 and Wood
Wetzel 1993.
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tend to be blended with each other and, at times, even watered down or
diluted by each other. It is primarily when a new strategy is adopted that it
is explained through its difference from the previous strategy; the adoption
of a new strategy is legitimized by the failure of the previous strategy and
the new strategy is supposed to bridge the gaps left by the shortcomings
and eliminate the blind spots of the old strategy. The new strategy might
also come to overturn some of the advances made with the previous
strategy as well as might even create a number of new shortcomings.
While the failure of a strategy tends to be explained by conceptual or
methodological problems inherent to the strategy, it could just as often
be explained by a number of other factors, viz., the lack of political will
and high level support for the implementation of the strategy and insuf-
ficient financial and humanitarian resources for implementing the strategy
throughout the UN human rights system. There is an approach that I
call the blame the strategy approach. The application of this approach to a
failure to implement the principle of equality successfully might actually
hide other, more persistent reasons for perpetuating the inequality.
Sex-neutral equality strategies were designed to implement the principle
of mainly formal equality, but also, to some extent, to implement the
principle of substantial equality. Sex-neutral equality strategies are used,
for example, in the International Bill of Rights and they include the use
of inclusive legal language and general or specific non-discrimination and
equal rights clauses. That is, concepts such as all, everyone, and every
human being are used to communicate the idea that human rights are
the birth-right of every human being. The terms all, everyone and every
human being are also used as means to avoid using the term “man” and
to avoid implicitly excluding women. The inclusive language is used 
together with general non-discrimination clauses. These types of clauses
forbid discrimination, as do, for example, ICCPR and ICESCR Arts. 2,
which bans discrimination on the grounds of race, colour, sex, language,
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property
birth or other status. Then, there are sex-specific equal rights clauses, such
as those in ICCPR and ICESCR Arts. 3, which ensure men’s and women’s
equal rights to human rights.
Since the adoption of the Universal Declaration, sex-neutral equality
strategies have become the dominant law-based equality strategy that
other strategies relate to. It can be suggested that the sex-neutral equality
strategies have become so commonplace in international human rights
instruments that they do not even seem to be strategies at all, but rather
as fundamental preconditions for international human rights texts.
When the Universal Declaration was adopted, however, the sex-neutral
equality strategies were viewed as an example of the UN’s and the inter-
45
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national community’s sensitivity to the so-called woman question be-
cause they provide a necessary foundation for treating everyone equally,
including women and men and because they ensure that law is not used
for discriminatory purposes. Sex-neutral equality strategies, however, have
later been criticized for presuming that law is neutral and objective and
for excluding acknowledgment of the historical and societal structures
that have made sex a marker of difference. That is, sex-neutral strategies
promote the idea of equality as déjà fait.
The main alternative to sex-neutral equality strategies has been woman-
centred equality strategies. Over the years, the UN has developed different
types of woman-centred equality strategies.101 The early women’s human
rights resolutions, declarations and treaties were mainly attempts to em-
phasize that women really are entitled to the same rights as men, i.e., the
early women’s human rights instruments were mainly a restatement,
with an emphasis on women as rights holders, of the rights included, for
example, in the Universal Declaration. Later, women’s human rights
resolutions, declarations and treaties have made some attempts to re-
interpret human rights and to integrate new issues onto the human rights
agenda, i.e., to highlight that women’s rights are human rights. However,
it has only been after the adoption of CEDAW and mainly in soft law
instruments that attempts have been made to introduce new issues and
new points of focus onto the human rights agenda. These new issues in-
cludes violence against women, and these new points of focuses include
the focus on the private sphere.
The woman-centred strategies are still viewed as a necessary strategy
for bringing and keeping the focus on women and for enabling targeted
intervention for women. Nonetheless, the woman-centred strategies have
also been criticized for adding to the marginalization of women’s human
rights and women within the overall human rights system and for pro-
moting stereotypical images of women. During the 1990s, the UN came
to promote different, largely soft law and policy-based dual strategies for
achieving equality between the sexes. The dual strategies aim at consoli-
dating and developing the woman-centred equality strategies at the
same time as also being aimed at integrating women’s human rights or at
mainstreaming a gender perspective into the overall human rights frame-
work. Hence, the dual strategies are constituted by the woman-centred
strategies together with the 1990s add-ons, i.e., the strategies for inte-
grating women’s human rights or mainstreaming a gender perspective. It
is the add-ons that are analyzed in this thesis.
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101 The distinction between human rights and women’s human rights will be discussed
at a later point in this thesis vis-à-vis the notion of the paradox of feminism, see Chap-
ters 3.2.1, 3.3 and 6.4.
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1.4 Summary and Conclusions
The purpose of this introductory chapter has been to provide a back-
ground for and to introduce the core areas addressed in the thesis. This
thesis focuses on the post-Cold War renaissance of international human
rights and on the attempts to promote a more just human rights frame-
work through dual strategies for equality between the sexes. Against the
background of the development of human rights and of the UN-based
human rights framework, which includes the women’s human rights
framework, the specific aim of this thesis is to analyze the content and
implementation of the integrative strategies within the UN human rights
framework.
The title chosen for this thesis is Making Just Rights. The title should
communicate both a sense of the finiteness of rights – rights can be use-
ful and empowering, but they are not always useful and empowering –
and a sense that the processes of making just rights and of adapting and
readapting rights to the needs of different people and different contexts
are on-going ones. Rights have been used because the notion of rights is
empowering. Excessive use tends to lead to abuse. As Paul Hunt has
pointed out, there is no need anymore for rights sloganism.102 Instead,
there is an urgent need to provide substance to and operationalize rights-
based approaches. There is a need to ensure that excessive and halfhearted
use of rights does not turn into abuse, but that rights are given substance.
I disagree with the claim by Douzinas that the Déclaration des droits de
l’homme et le citoyen (1789) corresponds to the contemporary international
human rights framework, just as a Jane Austen novel corresponds to its
period costume adaption for television.103 It is a question about different
contexts, different audiences and different media. However, just as the
French declaration, which will be addressed in Chapter Three, was adapt-
ed to the needs of different strata, sections of French society, including
its colonies, through additional legislation, so is the contemporary inter-
national human rights framework adapted to the needs of the con-
temporary world through additional treaties, non-treaty agreements and
policies. This project is a tricky one and there are constant dangers of
counter-effects and hidden agendas.
I am hoping that this thesis might contribute to the research on inter-
national human rights and to the research on the possibilities and chal-
47
102 Paul Hunt referred to rights sloganism in his statement during the launching seminar
Global Challenges to Human Rights for the Centre for the Study of Human Rights at the
University of Göteborg on September 26th 2003.
103 Douzinas 2000, p. 116.
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lenges of adopting and attempting to implement human rights-based
strategies within the international community. I also hope to add to the
largely feminist research agenda about the woman-, gender- and sex-
centred aspects of human rights and about the possibilities and challenges
of adopting and attempting to implement women’s human rights- and
gender-based strategies within the international community. However, I
am also hoping that the questions asked in this thesis contribute to an in-
creasingly critical research agenda, especially a feminist one, with regard
to international human rights and the productive space of rights. While
I do not think that the international human rights framework has played
out its role on the international, national or local scenes, I am convinced
that it is necessary to ask questions about what all this women’s advance-
ment is really about and to analyze the strategies that are used to attain
“gender equality” in a critical manner.
48
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2 Theoretical and Methodological
Reflections
The second chapter outlines the theoretical and methodological
framework of this thesis. After a brief introduction, Chapter 2.1, I
will discuss in Chapter 2.2 feminist approaches to internationalism,
focusing on the rise in the early 1990s of feminist internationalism
and on the criticism mounting over the last years towards inter-
national solutions. Thereafter, in Chapter 2.3, I discuss feminist
perspectives on rights, especially vis-à-vis international human rights,
and suggest that Carol Bacchi’s so-called What is the problem?
approach might serve as a tool for unpacking the bundled up and
long taken-for-granted knowledge about international human rights.
Theoretical and methodological reflections, to a very great extent,
are interlinked in this thesis, and they are addressed side by side
throughout this chapter.
2.1 Introduction
In Chapter One, I defined three main objectives for this thesis, each
objective contributing to a contextualization for and an elucidation of
the integrative parts of the dual strategies, i.e., the strategies of integrat-
ing women’s human rights and mainstreaming a gender perspective.1
I am interested in situating the UN international human rights and
women’s advancement and gender equality agendas in(to) historical
contexts. I am also interested in analyzing why and how the integrative
strategies have developed, what their contents are and how they have
metamorphosed during the process of implementing the strategies within
the UN human rights institutions.
In Chapter One, I also began outlining the theoretical and methodo-
logical approaches of this thesis.2 The aim of this chapter is to provide
49
1 See Chapter 1.1.2.
2 See Chapter 1.1.3.
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deeper insights into the theoretical and methodological approaches
chosen for this thesis. The main theoretical and methodological sources
of inspiration for this thesis are feminist international law scholarship,
feminist theory and gender studies.3 This thesis has also been inspired
by social constructivist and discursive methods.4 In this chapter, I will
focus mainly on the aforementioned main sources. It is evident, however,
that the list of theoretical and methodological sources of inspirations is
non-exhaustive. However, focusing on mainly feminist and social con-
structivist and discursive methods provides sufficient insights into the
theoretical and methodological concerns explored and the decisions
made regarding this thesis. My choices of sources of inspiration as well
as my theoretical and methodological decisions have been guided less by
discipline than by the demands imposed by the objectives defined and
the questions asked in different parts of this thesis.
The early feminist international legal studies scholarship, to a large ex-
tent, built upon the theoretical and methodological framework developed
within Western feminist legal studies scholarship. Feminist scholars applied
both these theories and methods in the international framework, thereby
excluding, to a certain extent, both non-Western women’s experiences
and the specific complexities of international law.5 Feminist perspectives
50
3 Feminist international legal studies are a latecomer to the feminist studies family, as
well as in the critical legal studies family. It has only been since the late 1980s that feminist
perspectives on international law have developed. While feminist perspectives have
abounded with respect to specific areas of international law, such as human rights and
humanitarian law, the area of study still remains a fairly under-theorized one. Feminist
international legal scholars avail themselves of the theories and methods developed
within other feminist and critical disciplines. For example, Charlesworth and Chinkin
(2000) highlight feminist legal scholars’ use of methods developed by poststructurally-
inspired feminist theorists. Otto and Orford rely on postcolonial and poststructural
theories and methods in their research. For overviews of feminist theory, see Kemp and
Squires, eds. 1997, Segal 1999 and Weedon 1999. For overviews of gender studies, see
Glover and Kaplan 2000 and Gould, ed. 1997, for overviews of third world and post-
colonial feminist perspectives, see Alexander and Mohanty, eds. 1997, Bulbeck 1998,
Jabri and O’Gorman, eds. 1999 and Moghadan, ed. 1994, for overviews of critical race
feminism, see Wing, ed. 1997 and 2000 and for overviews of queer and lesbian femin-
isms, see Rosenberg 2002.
4 For an introduction to social constructivist approaches, see Barlebo Wenneberg 2001
and Hacking 2000. For an introduction to discourse theory and discursive methods, see
Bacchi 1996 and 1999.
5 For early feminist analysis of international law, see Charlesworth, Chinkin and Wright
1991, Engle 1992a–b Fraser 1987 and Hevener 1983. See also, Chapters 2.2.1 and 2.3.2.
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within most fields seem to develop on the trajectory of first adding women
to areas where, earlier, their stories had been silenced. After that initial
thrust, the throwing of these new perspectives into the cauldron, feminist
scholars then stirred the pot, noticing that, while the addition of women
does create new knowledge about women’s lives, there is no explanation
as to why or with what consequences women’s stories have been left out
from the mix in the first place. There is no explanation for this lacuna.
Having added and stirred, feminist scholars then tended to realize that
they have added representations of women that are too unitary or too
uniform or that they really did not stir the pot enough. Charlesworth and
Chinkin, for example, note that “[s]imply ‘adding and mixing’ is, in and
of itself, inadequate because the international legal system is, in itself,
gendered. Its rules have developed as a response to the experiences of the
male elite. Feminist analysis, thus, must explore the unspoken commit-
ments of the apparently neutral principles of international law and the
way male perspectives are institutionalized within it”.6 Contemporary
feminist international legal scholarship seems to be at that post-adding
and post-stirring phase, observing uncomfortably that women from
many parts of the world and some core issues, still, remain absent from
the analysis brew.7 However, the exclusions produced by the failure of
feminist international legal scholarship to include different women’s
experiences, different sexed relations and different issues do not signify,
as some scholars claim, the end of feminism. On the contrary, it is a
recognition of the continuing importance of asking critical questions, of
being self-reflective and of being prepared, when necessary, to alter and
adapt theories, methods and what we think we know.
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6 Charlesworth and Chinkin 2000, p. 50. Charlesworth’s and Chinkin’s analysis of what
is beyond adding and mixing, however, has been challenged by Howe (1994), for example,
who argues that their perspective is a white, Western feminist perspective and, as such,
excludes the perspective of most the world’s women. See also Nesiah 1993 and Stark
1996 and 2000a.
7 The feminist international legal scholarship, however, has developed considerably not
in the least by questioning its own shortcomings. For overviews of contemporary femin-
ist international legal studies, see Charlesworth and Chinkin 2000 and Orford 2002. For
overviews of contemporary feminist international human rights law, scholarship see Ago-
sín, ed. 2001 and Askin and Koenig, eds. 1999, 2000 and 2001, Cook, ed. 1994. See also,
for example, Ashworth 2000, Binion 1995, Bunch 1995a, Charlesworth 1996, Dolgopol
1995, Holt 1991, Poe, Wendel-Blunt and Ho 1997, Stark 2000b and Sullivan 1997 and
1999.
04-02 Iustus, Sari 8/3  04-03-08 15.30  Sidan 51
2.2 Sexing the International8
2.2.1 Feminist Perspectives on International Law
Sex matters. Feminism is the acknowledgment of this claim, at least that
is one way feminism is being defined for the purposes of this thesis.
Whether we may be a woman or a man is a factor which, together with
an array of other often intertwined aspects, tends to matter to the oppor-
tunities we, as individuals, enjoy and the constraints we have to tackle in
our everyday lives as well as in our local, national and global communities.
Power, in all its varied analytical, symbolic, material and institutional
forms, is integral to most feminist understandings of sex, as is engage-
ment in fighting, the discriminatory or unjust effects of sex. However,
there are ongoing discussions about what sex is, how sex matters, how
sex interacts with other social categories and what should be done about
the social consequences of sex. Charlesworth, Chinkin and Shelley Wright
have defined feminism as “... a mode of analysis, a method of approach-
ing life and politics, a way of asking questions and searching for answers,
rather than a set of political conclusions about the oppression of women”.9
Feminist method has been defined by Charlesworth, Chinkin and Wright
as “... taking women seriously, believing that what we say about oursel-
ves and our experience is important and valid, even when (and maybe
especially when) it has little or no relationship to what has been or is
being said about us”.10
While feminist legal scholarship has lost much of its initial enthusiasm
about the possibilities of promoting equality between the sexes by legal
means, feminists, engaged in international law and, maybe especially in
international human rights law, have come to reproduce that lost enthu-
siasm.11 The feminist project within international law has been defined
52
8 The title of this section is a paraphrase of the volume edited by Naffine and Owens,
Sexing the Subject of Law (1997). According to Naffine and Owens (1997, p. 8), the sexing
project, recognizing how sexual difference is reflected in and mediated through law,
should not be understood in essentialist terms, as connoting ideas about men’s and wo-
men’s natural characteristics. The postmodern and poststructural feminist criticism of
the sex/gender distinction has undone the distinction between sex as “biological raw
material” and gender as a product of culture. See Chapters 4.2 and 4.3.
9 Charlesworth, Chinkin and Wright 1991. pp. 614.
10 Charlesworth, Chinkin and Wright 1991, p. 634. Compare with Flax’s emphasis on
the importance of self-reflection in Chapter 2.2.2 and Bacchi’s emphasis on the import-
ance of questioning the evident and neglected truths, i.e., truths taken for granted, in-
cluding the evident and taken-for-granted truths about ourselves and our social group in
Chapter 2.3.3.
11 For overviews of feminist legal studies, see Barnett 1998, Bartlett and Kennedy, eds.
1991, Chammallas 1999, MacKinnon, 1989, Naffine, 1990, Naffine and Owens, eds.
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by Charlesworth and Chinkin as a two-stage project: first, feminists
need to deconstruct12 the explicit and implicit values of the internatio-
nal legal system, challenging their claims to objectivity and revealing the
blind spots of international law and its exclusions as concerns women
and women’s experiences. Secondly, feminists need to reconstruct an
international law that does not support men’s oppression of women.13
This project can also be framed in terms of the dual commitment of
feminist scholarship, i.e., on the one hand, a commitment to a theoretical
aim, the production of academic knowledge and, on the other hand, a
commitment to a practical aim, the promotion of equality between the
sexes.14 Charlesworth and Chinkin calls this fine balancing act strategic
deconstruction. They note that the two goals of feminism co-exist un-
easily. Karen Engle and Orford, a decade apart, have captured the feminist
dilemma within the international legal field.15 According to Engle:
[w]e [feminist international legal scholars] sense that our work at the
periphery can only succeed if we can save the core and so, for the most part,
we defend it. Sometimes, we defend it by pretending that we are actually a
part of it and just have not been noticed yet. Other times we clearly and
proudly situate ourselves outside the core and talk about what it would have
to do to make us a part of it. We tell the core that as long as we are on the
periphery, the core is disingenuous; it needs the periphery to be complete.
No matter how hard we push on the core, though, we never attack its
essence. We are afraid that if we push too hard, it might dissolve and become
useless to us. We do not look too closely at the core, for the fear that we
might realize that we are not on the periphery at all or that the chasm be-
tween us cannot be filled.16
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1997, Lacey 1998 and Smart 1989 and 1995. Alternative feminist legal schools have de-
veloped, for example, within the Nordic context through the work of Tove Stang Dahl
(1988) and the Nordic feminist legal studies network, see, for example, Nordborg, ed.
1995 and Nousiainen, Gunnarsson, Lundström and Niemi-Kiesläinen, eds. 2001. Feminist
perspectives on international law, however have largely been developed within and
remains dominated by, an English language framework.
12 The term, deconstruction, is not used with reference to Derridean or poststructural
notions of deconstruction, but with reference to a more popular understanding of de-
construction as merely seeing beyond the evident and detecting the underlying values.
13 Charlesworth and Chinkin 2000, p. 61.
14 This dual commitment has become increasingly difficult to uphold during the last
ten to fifteen years through the input from poststructural theories and identity-based
analysis, see Gunning 1991-92, Howe 1994 and Spivak 1999.
15 Compare with discussion about the paradox of feminism in Chapters 3.2.1, 6.1 and
6.4.
16 Engle 1992a, p. 605.
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A decade later, Orford expressed similar concerns about the feminist
mission in international law, noting that “I see the invitation to participate
in the humanitarian mission of international law as one that carries with
it old dangers”.17 The old dangers, feared by Orford, include a new
feminist imperialism. Orford draws a parallel between how “[t]he con-
stitution of the native women in the texts of imperial feminism served to
found the individuality of European women, and to make possible their
participation in the larger project of soul-making through civilizing mis-
sions” and how “[i]n the texts of international law, the feminist individu-
alist is again able to constitute herself in shifting relationship to what is
at stake over the bodies of her sisters who function as material evidence”.18
Further, she notes that
... feminist theory threatens merely to facilitate and enable neo-colonialism
if it stages the key struggle in this globalized world in terms of the ‘mesmer-
ising model’ of ‘male and female sparring partners of generalizable and
universalizable sexuality’. Paying attention only to the protagonists in this
drama blinds us to the way in which the Third World is staged as a back-
drop, with a cast of nameless extras imagined as playing a part that they
have not written. A feminist analysis of international law that focuses on
gender alone, without analysing the exploitation of women in the economic
‘South’, would operate to reinforce the depoliticised notions of ‘difference’
that founds the privileged position of the imperial feminist.19
The citations exemplify the feminist dilemmas concerning international
law as regards both the relationship between what is perceived as the fe-
minist periphery and the core of international law and the relationship
between the dominant feminisms and the exclusion of the Other woman,
i.e. the exclusion of the women who do not fit or who are described as
not fitting into the dominant woman model. The two citations also ex-
emplify the shifting focus of feminist international legal scholarship be-
tween 1992 and 2002. In 1992, feminist international legal scholarship
focused on two conundra: showing that women and women’s experien-
ces had been excluded from the at first glance sex-neutral international
legal framework and analyzing how feminists could make women visible
in international law and promote women’s emancipation through inter-
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17 Orford, 2002, p. 283.
18 Orford 2002, p. 284.
19 Orford 2002, p. 285, references to Spivak 1999. While eloquently outlining how
feminist international legal scholarship serves the projects of militarized economic global-
ization and while outlining how feminist international legal scholarship, with the help of
postcolonial theory, should avoid the imperialist and sexist traps of woman-saving,
Orford omits to mention that sex matters.
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national law. A decade later, feminist international legal scholarship is
focused now on two main problems, the first, the exclusion of Other
women from both the by now occasionally sex-sensitive international
legal framework and from feminist international legal scholarship and,
the second, an analysis of whether the feminist international law project
is even worthwhile.
According to Rosi Braidotti “[i]t is urgent [...] before feminists let
themselves go to joyful celebrations of our ‘International’ outlook to pay
attention to some crucial questions: is Internationalism not a convenient
pre-text, masking our inability to come to terms with national politics
and local realities? Are women sufficiently present as citizens in our
respective countries to start thinking seriously in an international perspec-
tive? Does the overemphasis on International or ‘cross-cultural’ perspec-
tives not come to fill the lack of internal national dynamics that marks
many women’s movements [...] today?”.20 Braidotti uses the configura-
tions, viz., the exile, the nomad and the migrant to capture the feminist
dilemmas and shifting focuses of feminist internationalism. The three
configurations show how seductive the international realm can be, or how
useful or mortal, depending on how the subject is situated. The exile has
been a feminist configuration and a metaphor for the woman subject.
Women as exiles configure women as non-citizen and as not belonging.
The exile is an outsider who does not yet master the dominant cultural
codes of the country in which she resides, which makes her an awkward
non-citizen. The exile, however is also the privileged foreigner, who,
through her not belonging, is in a position to analyze, criticize and re-
interpret the dominant cultural codes of the country in which she resides
without, at the same time, being responsible for upholding certain ideas,
values or structures. The nomad has been a well-used metaphor, especially
for the intellectual subject. It is for Braidotti a configuration of the intel-
lectual woman.21 According to Braidotti, “... the point of being a nomad
is the crossing over boundaries, the act of going, independently of a given
destination. Transitions without a final goal”.22 The nomad could pos-
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20 Braidotti 1992, p. 7. See also Klabbers 2001. For further discussions about interna-
tional feminist scholarship, see Ashworth 1995, Charlesworth 1993b, Enloe 1990, Men-
doza 2002, Pettman 1996 and Rai, ed. 2000.
21 Gustafsson (2002, p. 449) suggests, for example, with references to Carnera Ljung-
strøm 2000-01, p. 76, that the nomad might be a useful image for the future lawyer or
at least, for future legal studies and education.
22 Braidotti 1992, p. 8. It is worth noting that, while Braidotti criticizes the feminist
configuration of the exile as being the privileged feminist subject, as the exile, at least in
our imagination, has chosen hers or his exile, she views her feminist intellectual nomad’s
not belonging not as an privilege, but as an asset.
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sibly be described as the postmodern exile, i.e., while the configuration
of the exile was used by early feminists, such as Virginia Woolf and Juli-
et Mitchell and in the writings of Luce Irigaray and Helène Cixous, the
nomad is the configuration favored by Braidotti. The contemporary pri-
vileged subject does not reside in a place, but she is cosmopolitan. The
migrant is a configuration of the other woman or the subaltern woman.
The migrant, then, is the configuration of the unprivileged woman. The
migrant did not choose to leave. She is often not heard from and not gi-
ven the space to speak in her new home. All hues and good intentions
notwithstanding, the migrant is the woman subject whose capacities, ex-
periences, knowledge and individual subjectivity still remain marginalized.
The feminist international law project, defined by Charlesworth and
Chinkin as a sort of a strategic deconstructive project, is not pitfall-free.
Feminist international law scholarship or feminist internationalism, still
moves within the rather inconvenient space limited by having to explain
to much of what Engle calls the “core” that law is not neutral and that
“women” do not necessarily fit into or want to fit into the roles that inter-
national law has designed for them. At the same time as our emancipatory
project, as Orford and Braidotti have noted, runs the risk of reproducing
the distinction between the nomad or the postmodern, cosmopolitan,
intellectual female subject and the migrant, a female configuration of
many names, viz., third world woman, the rural poor woman, the urban
poor woman, the extremely poor woman, the woman victim of armed
conflict, the woman victim of military violence, the woman victim of
trafficking, the woman victim of harmful cultural practices, the woman
victim of domestic violence, et cetera.23
2.2.2 Feminisms’ Analytical Categories
As was noted above, feminist scholarship did, in its early forms, focus
mainly on the relationship between women and men, on how femininity
and masculinity were construed and on what effects the power-impreg-
nated, hierarchical and structural construction of femininity and mascul-
inity had on women’s lives and on society.24 The sex/gender distinction,
as a distinction between biological sex and socially construed gender,
served both as the object of study and as the analytical tool kit for post-
1970s feminist scholarship. In 1987, Jane Flax defined the goal of
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23 See Chapter 1.2.1 for references to Arendt’s and Agemben’s analysis of inclusion/ex-
clusion in the sphere of human rights. See Chapter 6.1 for an analysis of feminists inter-
national legal scholarship and its critiques.
24 See also Chapters 4.2 and 4.3.
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feminist theory as “... to analyze gender relations: How gender relations
are constituted and experienced and how we think or, equally impor-
tant, do not think about them. The study of gender relations includes
but is not limited to what are often considered to be distinctively feminist
issues: the situation of women and the analysis of male domination”.25
Gender relations, as analytic categories, are meant to capture a complex
set of social relations that refer to a changing set of historically variable,
gender- and power-impregnated social processes.26 The study of gender
relations should result in “... a critical distance on existing gender arrange-
ments. This critical distance can help clear a space in which re-evaluating
and altering our existing gender arrangements may become more pos-
sible”.27 Flax notes that it is by no means self-evident that feminist
thinking about gender relations results in a cleared or critical space for
the reevaluation of existing gender structures:
In order for gender relations to be useful as a category of social analysis we
must be as socially and self-critical as possible about the meanings usually
attributed to those relations and the ways we think about them. Otherwise,
we run the risk of replicating the very social relations that we are attempting
to understand. We have to be able to investigate both the social and philo-
sophical barriers to our comprehension of gender relations.28
Sally Haslanger has analyzed the different meanings of the concept of
gender in feminist scholarship, focusing especially on the different
meanings given by feminist and gender studies’ scholars to the claim that
gender is socially construed.29 Haslanger has identified five types of social
construction, viz., generic construction, causal construction, constitutive
construction, discursive construction and pragmatic construction. She
argues that gender, as an analytical category and as an object of study,
has been understood in all five different ways. Generic construction refers
to the definition of all intended or unintended products of social practices
as social constructs. Claiming that gender is a causal construct implies
claiming that “... insofar as women are feminine and men are masculine
this is due (at least in part) to social causes and is not biologically determ-
ined”.30 Claiming that gender is a constitutive construction implies claim-
ing that “[g]ender should be understood as a social category whose defi-
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25 Flax 1987, p. 622. The importance of focusing on gender relations or the genus rela-
tion has also been emphasized by Svensson 1997.
26 Flax 1987, p. 628.
27 Flax 1987, pp. 622–3.
28 Flax 1987, p. 634.
29 Haslanger 1995.
30 Haslanger 1995, p. 98.
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nition makes reference to a broad network of social relations, and it is not
simply a matter of anatomical differences”.31 Hence, causal construction
refers to what we wish to explain, while constitutive construction refers
to with what we want to explain it. In other words, causal construction
implies objective knowledge production that tells truths while constitutive
construction implies an interaction between knowledge production and
the subjective realities it attempts to explain. Gender, as a causal con-
struction, is what we wish to explain, while gender, as a constitutive con-
struction, is the analytic category or tool with which we wish to explain
a social phenomenon. The feedback loop between causal and constitutive
construction is defined by Halsanger as discursive construction. Haslanger
notes that “... our classificatory schemes, at least in social contexts may
do more than just map preexisting groups of individuals; rather our
attributions have the power to both establish and reinforce groupings
which may eventually come to fit the classifications”.32 According to Has-
langer, something is discursively constructed when it is or becomes the
way it is owing to how it is defined and what attributes are assigned to it.
A discursive construction is defined by Haslanger as a pragmatic construction
if social factors determine, at least in part, how a classificatory apparatus,
conceptual distinction or descriptive term is socially construed. Haslanger
distinguishes between weak and strong pragmatic constructions depend-
ing on whether a classification or distinction is partly or fully determined
by social factors. A distinction, according to Haslanger, is a strong prag-
matic construction if social factors wholly determine our use of it and it
fails to represent accurately any “fact of the matter”33. Claiming that
gender is a strong pragmatic construction would imply claiming that
gender, as an explanation, is created through gender as a means for ex-
plaining. A distinction, according to Haslanger, is a weak pragmatic con-
struction if social factors only partly determine our use of it. Haslanger
suggests that “[i]n cases of weak pragmatic construction our choices of
descriptive terms, classificatory schemes, etc., are conditioned by social
factors (values, interests, history, etc.) but of course this is compatible
with those terms’ and classifications’ capturing real facts and distinc-
tions”.34 Claiming that gender is a weak pragmatic construction implies
claiming that while gender exists as a social construction, it is also created
by how we explain it as a social construction.
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31 Haslanger 1995, p. 98.
32 Haslanger 1995, p. 99.
33 Haslanger 1995, p. 5.
34 Haslanger 1995, p. 101.
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Because the concept of gender and the claim that gender is a social
construction assumed so many different meanings and have been used
for so many analytical and political reasons, there is currently a growing
confusion about how, in fact, gender can be used. Some feminists, such
as Margaret Davies, have suggested that the concept of gender has lost its
analytical potential.35 The meanings of gender and sex and whether either
of these concepts still serve feminist scholarship as analytical frameworks
has been subject to lengthy discussion within feminist theory during the
last decade. Feminist scholars who do sex- and/or gender-related re-
search tend, still, to have a preference for a language of gender. However,
with the increased insecurity over what gender actually stands for, what
it represents, gender has ended up becoming a shorthand term for a num-
ber of phenomena and processes. It is not always easy to know what
exactly gender is a shorthand term for.36 It is not uncommon to begin
with statements such as Charlesworth’s and Chinkin’s emphasis that
“[s]exing draws attention to body and nature while gendering emphasises
mind and culture. The two approaches are in this sense complementary
...” to legitimate the use of both a language of sex and gender.37
Margaret Davies argues that the language of gender and gendering
cannot be used without an acceptance for the sex/gender distinction
and, hence, implicitly accepting the idea of a natural sex existing before
law.38 According to Davies, the language of gender should be discarded
for the benefit of a critical language of sex and sexing. A critical approach
implies that the languages of sex and sexing is not used with an essenti-
alist connotation but, rather, “[i]t implies that sex is not a ‘natural’ phe-
nomenon – it is not outside language, culture and perception”.39 With
Davies’ approach, sex and nature become political categories and she
argues, with references to Monique Wittig, that the category of sex, i.e.,
the division into two sexes, is a socio-political act based on the idea of
dominance:40
So to say that the subject of law is sexed, rather than gendered, indicates
that there is a social law – not a natural law – which forces sex upon us. As
subjects of this law, we must be sexed, we cannot escape being one thing or
the other.41
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35 Davies 1997.
36 Braidotti 1995, Butler 1990 and 1993, Davies 1997, Haraway 1991 and Harding
1987.
37 Charlesworth and Chinkin 2000, p. 4.
38 Davies 1997, pp. 31–2. See also Wittig 1992.
39 Davies 1997, p. 32.
40 Davies 1997, p. 32.
41 Davies 1997, p. 33.
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As evidenced by my choice of the title of Chapter 2.2, I prefer the langu-
age of sexing to a language of gendering and, thus, also a language of sex
and sexual difference to a language of gender. This preference does not
mean that I believe that gender cannot be a useful analytical category or
relation in feminist or gender studies scholarship. No, indeed. However,
because the feminist notion of gender has traveled from feminist scholar-
ship to gender scholarship and then on to public equality discourses, the
gendering project has been obscured and the concept of gender has
become shorthand for much too much. Hence, I prefer a language of
sexing, sex and sexual difference in part because I agree with Davies and
scholars such as Braidotti, Donna Haraway and Toril Moi, who argue
that the language of gender obscures our understanding of sex as a
power-impregnated category, both materially and socio-politically, inter-
related to other difference-producing social categories. It is noteworthy
that in much of their work, Charlesworth and Chinkin rely on the
sex/gender distinction and, as noted above, view sex and gender as com-
plementary. However, in their article, Sex, Gender and September 11,
while, still, relying on the distinction, the two authors turn to a language
of sex, proclaiming that:
[i]n sum, our argument is that sex has been a crucial aspect of the events of
September 11 and [in] the response to them. Men have been the major
players in all contexts and women have been cast as victims without real
agency to affect the future. The public and political debate has largely
ignored the considerable initiatives and activity of Afghan women aimed at
contributing to the design of their future. The exclusion of over half the
world’s population from the formal decisions of great international signi-
ficance is more than a question of justice and human rights; it is also a great
strategic mistake [emphasis added ].42
In other words, although viewing the notions of sex and gender as “com-
plementary”, Charlesworth and Chinkin turn to a language of sex when
wishing to add a critical and political edge to their argumentation. I have
also tried, in part, to avoid the use of gender as an analytic tool because
the analytical focus of this thesis is largely on the shift from woman-cen-
tred to gender-based strategies for equality and on the changing meaning
of gender within the UN-based international human rights framework. I
want to avoid mix-ups and ambiguities between UN references to gender
and gender mainstreaming and the analytical categories used in this thesis.
Thus, I have chosen to minimize the use of gender as an analytical category.
60
42 Charlesworth and Chinkin 2001, p. 604. See also Wylie 2003.
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2.3 Discussing and Unpacking Feminist
Perspectives on International Human Rights
2.3.1 Feminist Perspectives on Rights
The idea of human rights is embedded in Western political and philo-
sophical history and rights can be viewed as one of the more persuasive
constructs of Western modernity.43 Intimately intertwined with this history
and construct are the exclusion of women as rights holders and the crea-
tion and constantly changing notion of sexual difference.44 The history
of rights has resulted in women’s advocates and feminists having a fairly
ambivalent relationship vis-à-vis rights. Feminist perspectives on rights
and on international human rights range from a defence of the liberal
rights regime to a radical reconceptualization of rights.45 Where on this
trajectory, different scholars situate themselves, is largely dependent on
how the idea of rights is viewed: are rights viewed as intrinsically and in-
escapably and immutably male? Or are rights viewed as having the
potential of transcending the initial exclusions in symbolic, politico-legal
and institutional terms. The rights’ criticism, however, has seldom
amounted to a rejection of rights. Instead, attempts have been made to
define the productive space of rights for women. The notion of the male
norm or the male objective standard was frequently used by feminist
legal scholars during the 1990s as a way to describe, as has been noted by
Catherine MacKinnon, that “[t]hrough legal mediation, male dominance
is made to seem a feature of life, not a one-sided construct imposed by
force for the advantage of a dominant group” and that “[f ]rom a feminist
perspective, male supremacist jurisprudence erects qualities valued from
the male point of view as standards for the proper and actual relation bet-
ween life and law”.46
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, there were ongoing feminist debates
about the usefulness of the liberal rights’ regime. As it seems, however,
this feminist rights’ debate, was, to some extent, exhausted by the feminist
engagement in international human rights. In other words, the rather
critical feminist debate about the liberal rights’ regime, which below will
be exemplified through the work of Carol Smart and Luce Irigaray, was
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43 See Chapter 1.2.1.
44 See Chapter 3.2.1.
45 See Nussbaum 1999 and Schneider 1991.
46 MacKinnon 1989, p. 238. For further discussion and criticism, see also Lacey 1998,
Naffine 1990, Naffine and Owens, eds. 1997 and Spivak 1999. The feminist approach
to men and masculinities, especially in relationship to masculinity studies, will be further
analyzed in Chapter 4.3.2
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silenced by the engagement by feminists in the 1990s in the booming
“human rights industry”. In order to capture the change over time in
feminist perspectives on rights and on international human rights, in
particular, I will, below, first address feminist perspectives on rights and,
thereafter, in Chapter 2.3.2, address feminist perspectives on international
human rights.
According to Smart, using the concept of equal rights was necessary
when law de facto preserved rights for men that women did not have,
but using similar arguments when law no longer openly privilege men is
problematic.47 Smart suggests that:
... the rhetoric of rights has become exhausted, and may even be detrimental.
This is especially the case where women are demanding rights which are
not intended (in an abstract sense) to create equal rights with men, but
where the demand is for a ‘special’ right [...] for which there has been no
masculine equivalent.48
Hence, that rights amount to legal and political power resources should
not, argues Smart, be denied, but rather “... the value of such resources
seems to be ascertainable more in terms of losses if such rights diminish,
than in terms of gains if such rights are sustained”.49 While questioning
whether rights’ claims can be useful for women outside and beyond the
existing liberal equal rights’ framework, Smart acknowledges that rights’
claims are appealing and that using a rights’ language to frame an argu-
ment can make a claim popular.50 While Smart supports feminist rights
claims in areas where women have an equal rights protection or where
they lack rights, she has doubts as to whether rights-based strategies are
useful beyond the existing liberal rights framework. Smart distinguishes
four major problems with rights: rights oversimplify complex power re-
lations; the acquisition of a right in a given area gives the impression that a
power difference has been solved; a rights’ claim may be effectively count-
ered by resorting to a competing right, and the rights’ framework provides
very little guidance in how to solve rights’ conflicts; rights are formulated
to correct a social wrong, yet it remains up to the individual to claim the
62
47 Smart 1989, p. 139.
48 Smart 1989, p. 139.
49 Smart (1989, p. 143) exemplifies her claim with the right to abortion, noting that
“[t]he denial of rights in a given area like abortion will have the definite consequence of
forcing women to go through with pregnancies which are unwanted. The provision of
abortion rights does not however, guarantee that any woman who wants an abortion can
have one. The law may concede a right, but if the state refuses to fund abortions or
abortion clinics, it is an empty right”.
50 Smart 1989, p. 143.
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right; and rights that were devised to protect individuals against the state
may be used by stronger individuals against weaker individuals.51
An, at first sight, opposing perspective has been developed by Luce
Irigiray, who disregards the existing rights framework for being inherently
male and for excluding women and women’s specific experiences and
needs. Irigaray’s sexuate rights’ project is a radical feminist project through
which she attempts to re-imagine the notion of rights.52 Through her
project and through re-imagining both the contemporary conceptions of
sexual difference and of rights, Irigaray wishes to reinject what she per-
ceives as Antigone’s civilité into contemporary Western life. Referring to
the myth about Antigone, Irigaray argues that, when burying her brother
and, thus, defying Kreon’s law, Antigone obeyed the basic laws of human
existence, laws based on the respect for the genealogy of the mother.
Antigone had to bury her brother because burials are manifestations of
respect for the genealogy of the mother: a respect that includes equal
care for all bodies born of a mother. Irigaray argues that the basic laws of
human existence have been forgotten in the contemporary Western world,
human beings have become incivils. Neither an increase in legal rights
nor in material wealth can cure the incivilité between people. Irigaray
wishes to introduce an alternative to the current patriarchal notion of
rights. Her proposed rights project is one that is based on a respect for a
re-imagined sexual difference: a rights project that teaches civilité.
The rights that Irigaray wishes to include in her sexuate rights’ project
include, for example: the right to human dignity, including no commer-
cial exploitation of women’s bodies, no civil or religious exploitation of
motherhood and women’s reproductive capacities and the right to re-
cognition; the right to human identity, including the right to decide
over one’s own virginity and the right to motherhood; the rights of mutual
responsibilities between mother and child; women’s right to defend them-
selves, their children, their homes, their traditions and their religions
against men’s decisions, including military decisions and decisions with
ecologically devastating consequences; economic rights for solo mothers
and the right to media that respects sexual difference; the right to systems
of exchange that ensure women and men equal rights to exchange; and
women’s rights to equal representation in all instances where societal and
religious decisions are made.
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51 Smart 1989, p. 144–6. For the question of rights conflicts, see also Svensson 1995
and Kouvo and Svensson 2000.
52 Irigaray 1993, Chapter 10 and 1994, pp. 107–34.
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While Smart questions the use of rights beyond the liberal equal rights’
framework, her project is not a liberal defense of rights, but rather her
criticism of women’s rights should be read as part of her attempts to re-
direct the feminist engagement in law from constructing “... legal policies
which only legitimate the legal forum and the form of law” to question-
ing law’s definitions of women’s rights.53 That is, according to Smart, the
rights framework has been exhausted since women have been included
as rights holders, and the main reason for a feminist engagement with
rights is to provide alternatives. Irigaray’s project has been criticized by
Cornell for universalizing sexual difference and for denying women the
possibility to live their biology in infinitely different ways.54 Penelope
Deutcher notes, however, in defence of Irigaray, that the sexuate rights’
project needs to be interpreted in the context of Irigaray’s proposed re-
forms to language, religion, economic reform, love, daily interpersonal
relations, intergenerational relations between parents and children and
relations between persons in differential power relations.55 Hence, while
Smart’s and Irigaray’s projects, at first glance, each seem radically dif-
ferent from each other and, while Smart and Irigaray probably would
not agree on feminist strategy, both scholars seem to define the productive
space of rights beyond rights.
2.3.2 Feminist Perspectives on International Human 
Rights 
Similarly, as the above text referred to feminist approaches to rights,
feminist scholars engaged in an analysis of international human rights
move in the space between a liberal defence of rights and a re-imagina-
tion of rights. However, until recently, feminist international human
rights scholars, to a greater extent, have attempted to preserve and per-
petuate the existing international human rights’ discourse, instead of re-
imagening it.
In her early analysis of the feminist international human rights’ dis-
course, Engle noted that, while she had had a skeptical approach to
rights, her engagement in women’s human rights made her suppress her
doubts about rights, because “[i]t seemed impossible to reject human
rights and to promote women’s rights. The latter issue took priority”.56
64
53 Smart 1989, p. 165.
54 Cornell 1998.
55 Deutscher 2000.
56 Engle 1992a, p. 603.
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Engle identifies three main feminist approaches to international human
rights: a doctrinal or legal positivist approach, an institutional approach
and an external approach. Further, she notes that, while each approach
is different, like her, these approaches all end in a defence of women’s
human rights. The doctrinal and institutional approaches build on pos-
itivist assumptions about international human rights law. They attempt
to find the women’s rights project within the international human rights
project. Proponents for the external approach initially situate themselves
outside the human rights project, asking whether it is worthwhile to
embark on a quest for women’s rights within the human rights project.
Their answer is a reluctant, but, nevertheless, unanimous yes.
The proponents for a doctrinal approach frame their arguments within
liberal and positivist accounts of international human rights law, arguing
that women’s rights are human rights per se.57 The main task for these
advocates and scholars is to convince States and other human rights
agents to take women’s human rights seriously and to work towards their
realization.58 Within the contemporary feminist international human
rights scholarship, this approach is deployed to convince the international
human rights community that a certain violation, such as, for example,
domestic violence, is a violation of international human rights law. By
referring to principles of international human rights law, feminist human
rights scholars hope to convince national governments, for instance, that
a certain national legal, political or other practice amounts to a violations
of international human rights law. The doctrinal method for defining
certain violation as women’s human rights violations entails three steps:
first, buttressing the claim that a certain right exists by locating support
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57 Some of the texts that Engle analyzes and refers to as using a doctrinal approach are
Boulware-Miller, Kay. 1985. Female Circumcision: Challenges to the Practice as a
Human Rights Violation. Harvard Women’s Law Journal, Vol 8; Khushalani, Yougindri.
1982. Dignity and Honour of Women as a Basic and Fundamental Human Rights; Cook,
Rebecca and Maine, Deborah. 1987. Spousal Veto over Family Planning Services.
American Journal of Public Health, Vol. 77; and An-Na’im, Abdullahi. 1987. The Rights
of Women and International Law in the Muslim Context. Whittier Law Review, Vol. 9.
The doctrinal approach remains well-represented within feminist international human
rights scholarship. It can be argued that it is used in different forms, for example, in
Bunch 1995b, Coomaraswamy and Kois 1999, Eriksson 1990 and 2000, Fitzpatrick
1994 and Pentikäinen 1999. However, most feminist international human rights’ scholars,
to some extent, use a doctrinalist or strategic positivist approach, usually mixed up with
an institutionalist approach. See, for example, the edited volumes on women’s human
rights Askin and Koenig, eds. 1999, 2000 and 2001, Cook, ed. 1994, Herrlin, ed. 1998
and Peters and Wolper, eds. 1995.
58 Engle 1992a, p. 531–2.
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in mainstream and specialized human rights documents, most often by
resorting to what Engle calls the method of overkill;59 secondly, identifying
gaps between the rights they claim are guaranteed through international
human rights law and the real situation of women; thirdly, shifting from
a doctrinal mode to an enforcement mode doctrinal advocates and scholars
turn to what Engle calls strategic positivism, i.e., after listing all the rights
they believe are being violated, they strategically decide which rights to
pursue by determining which rights’ rubric governments and women are
most likely to accept. The doctrinalists grapple, according to Engle, with
general issues regarding doctrinalist and positivist approaches to inter-
national human rights law, not the least of which are problems regarding
how to approach cultural difference and whether to base their arguments
in general or woman-specific human rights documents.60
The proponents that take the second approach, defined by Engle as
the institutional approach, focus less on positive law than on the institu-
tions set up to turn positive law into constructive action.61 Within con-
temporary feminist international law scholarship, this approach is used
by feminists for targeting the shortcomings of the international system
and for proposing international human rights law and its institutional
avenues as solutions to problems faced by women in different national
contexts. The problems dealt with by institutionalists include how to
address the gap between the human rights doctrine and women’s realities
and whether to support either mainstream or specialized human rights
institutions.62 Hence, the institutionalists begin where the doctrinalists
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59 Engle 1992a, p. 535. In accordance with the method of overkill, doctrinal advocates
and scholars try to find as many international human rights instruments as possible to
support their claims. They usually begin the list with references to the UN Charter and
Universal Declaration, continuing with references to ICCPR and ICESCR, thereafter,
turning to CEDAW, and to more often than not to regional documents that are applic-
able. Since 1992 references to the Vienna Programme, the Beijing Platform and to other
semi-legal and policy-based documents are also usually added to the list. 
60 Engle 1992a, p. 554–5.
61 Engle 1992a, p. 555. Some of the texts Engle analyzes and refers to as using the institu-
tional approach are Galey, Margaret E. 1984. International Enforcement of Women’s
Rights. Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 6; Reanda, Laura. 1981. Human Rights and Wo-
men’s Rights: The United Nations Approach. Human Rights Quarterly, Spring 1981;
Burrows, Noreen. 1986. International Law and Human Rights: The Case of Women’s
Rights. In Human Rights: From Rhetoric to Reality, edited by Tom Campbell, et al.; and
Meron, Theodor. 1986. Human Rights Law-Making in the United Nations. More recent
examples of a similar approach are found in Byrnes 1997, 2000a–b, and Gallagher
1997.
62 Engle 1992a, p. 556.
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leave off, by identifying a gap between positive law and women’s realities,
but they end, according to Engle, in a paradox. The institutionalists
... can argue that mainstream institutions are flawed, but not inherently so;
rather they [the mainstream institutions] can only be flawed to the extent
that they do not assimilate women’s rights or take into account women’s
special status or issues. The specialized institutions are flawed, not because
they do not aim to assimilate women’s rights, but because they do not have
the same enforcement power as the mainstream institutions. The paradox
emerges through the moves the advocates make as they both attack and
sustain the mainstream institutional framework in a call for change in the
specialized institutions.63
The institutionalists, however, are more critical of human rights than
those scholars or advocates who adopt a doctrinalist approach, but they
do so, according to Engle, by ignoring two things: first, they continually
bump into, encounter new problems, to be addressed through new pro-
cedures, but few of them suggest that the problem might lie in the inter-
national legal framework itself and might be part of a larger problem-
atic; secondly, when they turn to specialized institutions after having
confronted the failure of the mainstream institutions to integrate women’s
rights, they ignore the interrelatedness of the mainstream and the special-
ized institutions.64
The proponents of the third approach, defined by Engle as the external
approach, address the international human rights system by initially situ-
ating themselves outside the system and analyzing its discourse.65 In her
article, Engle defined the externalists as either radical or cultural femi-
nists. Within contemporary feminist international human rights schol-
arship, the external position is taken by poststructural or postcolonial
feminists and by the emerging queer criticisms.66 The main task of the
externalists is to analyze whether the international human rights system
and discourse have the potential of including and assimilating into their
67
63 Engle 1992a, pp. 556–7.
64 Engle 1992a, p. 575.
65 Some of the texts Engle analyzes and refers to as taking an externalist position are
Hosken, Fran P. 1981. Toward a Definition of Women’s Human Rights. HRQ; Eisler,
Riane. 1987. Toward and Integrated Theory of Action. HRQ, Vol. 9; Holmes, Helen.
1983. A Feminist Analysis of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. In Beyond
Domination: New Perspectives on Women and Philosophy, edited by Carol Gould; and
Holmes, Helen and Peterson, Susan. 1981. Rights Over One’s Own Body: A Woman-
Affirming Health Care Policy. HRQ.
66 See, for example Buchanan and Pahuja 2002, Orford 1998a–b, 1999 and 2002, Otto
1996b, 1997a–b and 1998, Walker 2001 and Wright 2002.
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bodies, their systems, their doctrines, women’s rights and a substantial
concern for women’s issues. However, while both doctrinalists and insti-
tutionalists argue that women’s rights may be integrated through changes
in the legal or institutional structures of human rights, the externalists
believe that lawmakers, law enforcers, et al., need to wake up and ac-
knowledge and accommodate women’s concerns.67 The proponents of
postmodern and postcolonial approaches to international human rights
law tend to, as, for example Otto does, acknowledge that human rights
are biased, but they also believe that the human rights framework can be
transformed.68 Since 1992, when Engle produced her aforementioned
categories, the feminist discourse on international human rights has de-
veloped considerably. In addition to the post-turn, much knowledge has
also been produced about regional, national and local differences in
women’s experiences and needs of human rights protection.
In recent feminist international human rights scholarship, a more
sceptical approach to human rights can be detected. In her introduction
to the three-volume edition of Women and International Human Rights
Law, Charlesworth signals the need for a more skeptical approach, noting
that the contributors to the volumes “... generally accept, explicitly and
implicitly, that women’s international human rights are worth pursuing”
and that “[i]t is interesting that there are few doubts expressed about the
value of the whole enterprise”.69 An even more skeptical approach is also
suggested in Charlesworth’s and Chinkin’s discussion about the potential
68
67 Engle (1992a, p. 576–99) identifies three main types of external critiques. The first
approach is the integrationist approach, according to which a truly human human rights
discourse is possible, if women reclaim the discourse and change its current male focus.
The second approach is the reconceptualist approach, according to which human rights
are fundamentally flawed as they are based on a male definition and human rights dis-
course must be reconceptualized by women if it is ever to accommodate women’s experi-
ences and needs. According to Engle (1992a, p. 584), “[p]roponents of this position argue
that human rights theory must be reconceptualized and redefined, largely, by women,
for women’s rights to be accommodated”. The third approach views human rights lan-
guage and discourse as inherently male and question whether it is worth using at all. Ac-
cording to Engle, some of the representatives of this approach come closer to a feminist
critique of rights than any of the other feminists engaged in an analysis of international
human rights. The concept of rights is viewed as masculinist and patriarchal, conceived
with the rise of capitalism and of little use for women. Hence, unlike the other feminist
approaches referred to by Engle, the radical externalists refrain from assuming that the
human rights discourse was meant to integrate women’s rights or to accommodate
women’s concerns. Nevertheless, the radical externalists do not hereby reject the human
rights system, but, rather, turn to it, as it seems, for lack of anything better.
68 Otto 1998, p. 47.
69 Charlesworth 1999b, p. xxii.
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of a feminist international human rights project.70 However, while Charles-
worth and Chinkin question the value of the human rights project,
whether it is worthwhile or whether it is not merely “creating new sites
for the subtle oppression of women”, they, still, end up in a defence of
rights.71 Charlesworth and Chinkin argue that the significance of rights
discourse outweighs its disadvantages. They continue by saying that
“[b]ecause human rights discourse is the dominant progressive moral
philosophy and a potent social movement operating at the global level,
it is important for women to engage with, and contest, its parameters”.72
Their main arguments for human rights include:73
• The human rights framework provides, although not perfectly drafted,
a normative legal basis;
• Human rights law is not optional for states, but obligatory;
• A human rights entry point brings the entire human rights structure
to bear;
• International human rights can be matched up with corresponding
legal bases within States;
• Human rights have an empowering potential; rights might be naïve,
but to individuals who have been marginalized and excluded from po-
litics and public dialogue, rights are still quite “deliciously empower-
ing”;74
• The symbolic power of international law prevails; international law
not only has regulative, but also, symbolic functions, i.e., the realms
of international law and the United Nations are, still, laden with sym-
bolic force that can be used to reshape women’s lives.75
Many scholars engaging in a feminist analysis of international human
rights seem to be bargaining with the human rights system, i.e., they are
willing to support the human rights system, but only as long as the
69
70 Charlesworth and Chinkin 2000.
71 Charlesworth and Chinkin 2000, p. 210.
72 Charlesworth and Chinkin 2000, p. 212.
73 Charlesworth and Chinkin 2000, p. 210.
74 Williams 1991.
75 Charlesworth and Chinkin 2000, p. 337. Charlesworth and Chinkin (2000, p. 212).
The critique of welfare regimes as presenting women as victims and dependents is a
critique that has been contested by Nordic feminist legal scholars. See Nousianen, Gun-
narsson, Lundström and Niemi-Kiesiläinen, eds. 2001.
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system engages with and responds to women’s quests for rights, recogni-
tion and good enough lives. The international human rights system, as
noted in Chapter One, is a system under construction. It is a system that,
having found its legal forms, is, still, looking for its political and institu-
tional forms. Hence, the position that “let’s see where this is going and
try to help where we can” is a defensible position. However, when sup-
porting and engaging within the parameters of human rights, it is easy
to forget to recognize how supporting and engaging within human
rights changes the feminist analysis and to forget to contest the same pa-
rameters.76 Feminist international legal scholars increasingly share their
analytical and methodological tools and language with the UN-based
women’s advancement and gender equality discourses. The shared tools
and language have probably contributed to the positive approach of
feminist international legal scholars to international law, especially to in-
ternational human rights law. The shared tools and language is easily
transformed into what is presumed to be shared goals, although it is not
evident that what feminist international legal scholars mean, for ex-
ample, by the notion of gender equality corresponds to what, for example,
the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) means when it asserts the
importance of working for the goal of gender equality. Otto has shown
how the language of equality and human rights used in the Beijing Plat-
form functioned to prevent transformative changes because the Beijing
Platform distinguishes between human rights, which are law-based and
universal and women’s rights which are neither. Hence, the Beijing Plat-
form reproduces the “gendered hierarchy of human rights orthodoxy”
and excludes references to issues regarding development and post-Cold
War economic globalization.77 I will below refer to Bacchi’s so-called
What is the problem? approach as a means to unpack both the strategic
positivism of the feminist international human rights discourse and the
international legal framework’s ongoing reproduction of what Charles-
worth and Chinkin call the “sites of subtle oppression of women”.78
2.3.3 Unpacking Strategies and Concepts
Social constructivist approaches in the form of discourse theory and ana-
lysis have become popular as means for showing the historical, cultural
and social contingency of how social issues are represented. Such ap-
proaches are also popular now for analyzing the shaping of issues and
70
76 Smart 1989, p. 5.
77 Otto 1999, p. 132.
78 Charlesworth and Chinkin 2000, p. 210.
04-02 Iustus, Sari 8/3  04-03-08 15.31  Sidan 70
problems in the interaction within knowledge-power-language systems.79
The attraction of these approaches lies in their unpacking of what has
been normalized, the taken-for-granted truths of modernity. A critical
approach to what has been perceived of as evident knowledge includes an
awareness that the knowledge that we acquire about the world is deter-
mined by what our context, culture and language allow us to articulate
and that the acquired knowledge does not exist in a social vacuum, but
rather, is part of, contributes to and affects social processes.80
Social constructivist and discursive theories and methods, which, in
this thesis, are approached through the work of Bacchi, provide an analyt-
ical framework and a tool kit that enable the questioning of the seemingly
shared goals between feminist and public equality agendas or, as is the case
in this thesis, between feminist international human rights scholarship
and the equality agendas of the UN human rights’ framework. Bacchi’s
work and, especially, her so-called What is the problem? approach are
significant as she focuses on the development, content and changing
meanings within public equality discourses and as the approach has been
developed to question the taken-for-granted truths and evident know-
ledge produced and reproduced within public equality discourses. Bacchi
also emphasizes the interaction between academic scholarship, on the
one hand, and public and policy-based equality discourses, on the other
hand. While Bacchi’s analysis focuses mostly on the shaping of public
and policy discourses, her analytical framework is also applicable to legal
frameworks. Bacchi is interested in how social issues or social problems
evolve and take shape in public discourses and how issues are affected
and given shape by public discourse. The term, discourse, is defined by
Bacchi as “... the language, concepts and categories employed to frame an
issue”.81 According to Bacchi, public policies regarding, for example,
women’s human rights should not be approached as solutions to pro-
blems, but rather as one among many different problem representations.
She proposes a shift in focus from viewing public policies as solutions to
seeing them as implied in the construction of competing problem repre-
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79 For introductions to social constructionism, see, for example, Berger and Luckman
1966. For more recent accounts of social constructionism as a philosophical posture and
the implications of social constructionism for contemporary social sciences, see, for
example Bacchi 1999, Chapter 3, Glavå 2003, Hacking 2000, Haslanger 1995 and
Wenneberg Barlebo 2001.
80 Winther Jørgensen and Phillips 2000, pp. 11–2.
81 Bacchi 1999, p. 2. The notion of discourse, however, is defined very differently by
different scholars. For discursive approaches, see Howarth, Norval, Stravrakakis, eds.
2000 and Wetherell, Taylor, Yates, eds. 2001.
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sentations. In other words, the objects of study should not be problems,
but problematizations. Or as Bacchi argues:
[i]t is impossible to talk about any social condition without putting an in-
terpretation to it. Hence, all we as analysts have access to are, the interpre-
tations. So, while I believe that there are a multitude of disturbing social
conditions, once they are given the shape of an interpretation, once they
are characterised as a ‘problem’ or as a ‘social problem’, they are no longer
‘real’. [...] This is what is meant by the sometimes misunderstood phrase
that people do not ‘discover’ problems; they ‘create’ them. It is the particular
shape, the problem representation, assigned to a ‘problem’ which is crea-
ted.82
Bacchi poses the question: what is the problem? which is shorthand for
what is the problem represented to be? as a means to achieve the pro-
posed refocusing. A What is the problem? approach should “... create a
space to consider competing constructions of issues addressed in the po-
licy process, and the ways in which these constructions leave other issues
untouched”.83 According to Bacchi, the approach offers a way to think
beyond single issues, to question the separation between different issues
and to analyze how the single issue approach and the separation shape
policy areas and affect “... what is talked about as possible or desirable,
or as impossible or undesirable”84.
Social constructivist and discursive approaches emphasize the mean-
ing of concepts and categories, used, for example, in equality policies and
laws. Bacchi notes that concepts and categories are core elements in the
construction and structuring of a discourse. In her earlier work, Bacchi
focused on what she calls category politics, i.e., on “... the deployment
of categories for political purposes”.85 The term “deployment” is used for
both “the imputing of meaning to concepts and analytical categorise for
political purposes; and the positioning of these categories for political
effect”.86 Bacchi relies on Allessandra Tanesini in her approach to con-
cepts and categories, noting that “... to make a claim about the meaning
of a certain word is to make a claim about how a word should be used, it
is not to describe how the word is used”.87 Bacchi suggests that the focus
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82 Bacchi 1999, p. 9
83 Bacchi 1999, p. 4.
84 Bacchi 1999, p. 3.
85 Bacchi 1996, p. 2.
86 Bacchi (1996, p. 2) distinguishes between conceptual categories and identity categories:
the first term refers to ideas, i.e., gender equality, private/public et cetera and the latter
term refers to identities, i.e., woman, African-American, African-European, et cetera.
87 Bacchi 1996, p. 2, references to Tanesini 1994.
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should be shifted from the meaning of categories and concepts to how
these meanings are construed, to the political contests over meaning.88
We should “... become aware of the fact that concepts are not descriptive
of anything, but that they are proposals for how we ought to proceed
from here” as “[t]he purpose of concepts or categorise is to influence the
evolution of ongoing practices”.89
The questions that Bacchi suggests that we ask our research material
in order to manage the refocusing from viewing the policies and the key
concepts used as self-evident to viewing them as one among many pro-
blems representations are: what is the problem represented to be? That
is, what is perceived as the cause of the problem and what is the concern?
What presuppositions are implied or taken for granted in the offered
problem representation? What effects are connected to the offered prob-
lem representation? What is excluded from or viewed as unproblematic
in the offered problem representation? How would the responses be dif-
ferent if what has been defined as the problem was represented differently?
I am as convinced as Bacchi that it is necessary to challenge the com-
mon presumption that “... achieving social problem status for one’s cause
is in itself a sign of success [and] a commitment to important change”.90
The What is the problem? approach should not be interpreted as a means
to questioning whether or not social problems are real, in the sense of
questioning whether, for example, so-called honour crimes exist and
whether or not they are a problem. What the What is the problem?
approach suggests, however, is that it is impossible to talk about honour
crimes, for example, “... outside of their representations, and their repre-
sentations hence become what is important – because of the shape they
give to the problem, and because of what they imply about what should
be done or should not be done”.91 Honour crimes, in this respect, are an
interesting example because, in Western contexts, they have been inter-
preted as a form of a crimes existing mainly in what is described of as
fundamentalist, uncivilized and patriarchal cultures.92 In a Council of
Europe report, a distinction is made, for example, between crimes of ho-
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88 Bacchi 1996, p. 2, references to Tanesini 1994.
89 Bacchi 1996, p. 2, references to Tanesini 1994.
90 Bacchi 1999, p. 7.
91 Bacchi 1999, p. 9.
92 The question of the so-called universalist and relativist approaches to rights was briefly
addressed in Chapter 1.2.1. Questions relating to violence against women and so-called
honour crimes will also be addressed in Chapter 5 in the overviews of the work of the
Special Rapporteurs on violence against women and on extra-judicial, summary or arbit-
rary executions.
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nor, which are based on culture and crimes of passion, which are based
on individual circumstances:
‘[c]rimes of honour’ should not be confused with the concept of ‘crimes of
passion’. Whereas the latter is normally committed by one partner (or hus-
band and wife) in a relationship on the other as a spontaneous (emotional
or passionate) response (often citing a defence of ‘sexual provocation’, the
former may involve the abuse or murder of (usually) women by one of
more close family members (including partners) in the name of individual
or family honour.93
The rapporteur notes that the use of the term “honor” should be treated
with considerable skepticism “... as it is the perpetrator of a particular
crime who is allowed to define the meaning of honour”.94 The rapporteur
also notes that “‘[c]rimes of honour’ are an ancient practice sanctioned
by culture rather than religion, rooted in a complex code that allows a
man to kill or abuse a family relative or partner for suspected or actual
‘immoral behaviour’”.95 This approach, which attempts to uphold a dis-
tinction between, on the one hand, crimes committed towards women
by non-Western and Western men and, on the other hand, between
non-Western ancient, authentic and backward cultures and Western
heterogenous, civilized and individualized cultures has been criticized.
Feminist scholars have demonstrated the similarities between so-called
domestic violence committed by husbands or male partners towards wives
and female partners and so-called honor crimes committed by fathers
and brothers towards daughters and sisters.96
Bacchi’s What is the problem? approach and the questions relating to
the taken-for-granted knowledges and the inclusions/exclusions repro-
duced by the taken-for-grated knowledges enable the unpacking not only
of the human rights discourse, but also the expected positive results of
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93 Crimes of Honour 2002, para. 3.
94 Crimes of Honour 2002, para. 4.
95 Crimes of Honour 2002, para. 6.
96 The distinction between crimes of honour and crimes of passion was highlighted by
Lynn Welchman during her presentation at the workshop, Women’s Human Rights in the
21st Century: Challenges and Opportunities (IISJL, Oñati 2003). For discussions about
honour crimes, see Abu-Odeh 1997. The cultural excuse implied in the distinction be-
tween crimes of honour and crimes of passion serves largely as an attempt to highlight a
distinction between Other men and Western men. The perccived necessity to make this
this distinction became apparent in Sweden during the media discussion after the mur-
der of Fadime Sahindal by her father in the name of honour. The former spokeswoman
for the Swedish Leftist party, Gudrun Schyman, argued that there was no difference
between the crime committed by Fadime’s father and the violence of Swedish men.
Schyman’s claim was not well-received. Yvonne Hirdman argued that Schyman did not
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feminist strategic positivist approaches to rights and of the feminist re-
constructive human rights project. This enabling does not mean that a
feminist engagement in human rights is not a worthwhile project nor
does it mean that feminism will inevitably reproduce certain exclusions.
Such enabling should, however, allow for an ongoing questioning of
theory, method and content.
2.4 Summary and Conclusions
The purpose of this chapter has been to describe the theoretical and
methodological concerns that I have needed to tackle in order to analyze
the objectives outlined in Chapter One regarding the integrative strate-
gies. In Chapter One, as well as in the Introduction to this chapter, I
emphasized that I approach theory and method as interlinked. In Chap-
ter 2.2.3, I explained the decision to rely on feminist international legal
scholarship informed by gender studies scholarship. My decision is
mediated by the aims of the thesis and necessitated by a need to limit the
scholarship used. Feminist international legal studies provide an analy-
tical framework for analyzing how sexual difference or the analytical
category of sex have been implied in the history of human rights, and
how they impact on the contemporary international human rights frame-
work. Feminist scholarship also provides openings for self-reflection, and
for questioning and, when necessary, for the over-throwing of the dis-
cipline’s own discursive frames. In this thesis, feminist approaches to inter-
national law and human rights will be reviewed mostly in Chapter Three
where I provide an overview of the history of human rights and in Chap-
ter Five where I provide an overview of how the integrative strategies
have been implemented within the UN human rights framework.
Feminist international legal studies enable us to analyze how sex
and/or gender have been implied in the production of human rights and
international law. The increased overlapping of analytical and methodo-
logical frameworks between feminist international legal scholarship and
public equality discourses complicates my reliance only on feminist in-
ternational legal scholarship in my analysis of the UN-based equality
discourses. In Chapter 2.3.3, I introduced the social constructivist and
discursive approaches, as means to move behind the feminist and public
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acknowledge that through its long-standing work for equality, Sweden had elevated itself
from the patriarchal structures, still, existing in traditional societies, and Swedish men
made enraged replies to Schyman on the email debate lists of Swedish newspapers. For
further discussion, see Kouvo 2004 (forthcoming).
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equality discourses and as means to unpack the development, content
and implementation of the integrative strategies. The social constructivist
approach will be used mostly in Chapter Four where I analyze the con-
tent of the integrative strategies and in the concluding chapter.
There are a number of reasons why I am sympathetic to feminist
scholarship and to Bacchi’s project of shifting our focus from the evident
to how what is perceived as evident is discursively construed. Among
these reasons are three important ones, viz., the recognition that that
knowledge is contingent and that knowledge-production is always, to
some extent, political; that knowledge-producers need a considerable
amount of humble and humbling self-reflection when producing know-
ledge. In order for these approaches to be fruitful, it is necessary to open
the matter up for discussion and not “shy away from imposing an analy-
sis upon issues”.97 While the contingency of knowledge and the idea of
academic dialogue as an integral part of knowledge production are far
from being new ideas, it is the rare academic scholars who is willing to
expose hers or his partial vision and stuttering. I think that the incom-
plete or inchoate can be used as a strategy for getting a critical discussion
going.98 I also think that we should move away from the current politics
of consensus. Only in the best of worlds does a lack of polemic mean
engaged acceptance. Mostly, it just means disengagement and a lack of
interest.99
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97 Bacchi 1999, p. 12.
98 Bacchi 1999, Svensson 1997 and Petersen 1999.
99 Rosenberg 2002.
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3 A Historical Overview: 
Human Rights, Women’s 
Human Rights and Integration
In Chapters One and Two, I provided a general introduction to the
objectives, as well as the principal theoretical and methodological
approaches of this thesis. In this chapter, I will concentrate on the
first objective of this thesis. In other words, I will outline a historical
background for the dual strategies and, then, situate the integrative
parts of these strategies into that background. I will begin by offer-
ing my understanding of how both the rights discourse of the En-
lightenment period and the international human rights discourse
of the 20th century have resulted in fostering sexual difference and
other differences. Thereafter, I will analyze the gradual develop-
ments of the dual strategies and of the strategies for integrating
women’s human rights and mainstreaming a gender perspective
within the UN world conference frameworks.
3.1 Introduction
The general history of European modernity is closely interwoven with
the philosophical and political histories of human rights.1 During the
past few decades, however, efforts have been made to identify, infer and
extract human rights-like concepts, ideas and political platforms (from)
within the histories of other cultural, religious and geopolitical contexts.
Nevertheless, the principal controversies of human rights remain under-
stood, first and foremost, as ideas, which have emerged out of the events
and processes of European history. Not being impervious to the effects
of world political currents, the international human rights framework is
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1 For an analysis of modern European history and the history of ideas about human
rights, see, for example Bobbio 1996, Douzinas 2000, Finnis 1980, Ishay, ed. 1997 and
Strezelwicz 2001.
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indeed susceptible to change. This mutability or, perhaps, even responsive-
ness, has evidenced itself, over time, in a number of changes. I outlined
these changes in Chapter One as exemplifications of the different equality
strategies adopted within the UN human rights framework.2
The UN human rights framework, has developed on two parallel,
albeit interlinked, tracks. On the one hand, since its establishment and
since the adoption of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights (Uni-
versal Declaration), the UN has attempted to advance the codification
of human rights. On the other hand, since the 1960s, the UN has orga-
nized world conferences on human rights and other social and economic
issues of special interest for the global community.3 To a greater extent
than has been the case for the formal law-making processes within the
UN, these aforementioned world conferences serve as platforms for dis-
cussion between not only governmental, but also other agents, organiza-
tions and institutions.4
The 1990s world conferences, especially the world conferences on hu-
man rights and on women, have wielded a considerable influence on the
development of the UN dual strategies for the promotion and integra-
tion of women’s human rights and for the advancement of women and
gender equality. The Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action (Vien-
na Programme), i.e., the official final document from the Second World
Conference on Human Rights (Vienna 1993), emphasizes the need to
strengthen the human rights of women in two principal ways, viz., by
consolidating the specialized regime and by integrating the human rights
of women. Another dual strategy developed, emerged out of the Fourth
World Conference on Women (Beijing 1995). The Beijing Declaration
and Platform for Action (Beijing Platform), i.e., the official final document
from the Beijing conference, emphasizes in its twelve different critical
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2 For an introduction to the three equality strategies, see Chapter 1.3.2, for further analysis
of the sex-neutral and woman-centred equality strategies, see Chapter 3.3. The integrat-
ive strategies will be unpacked in Chapter 3.4-5 and Chapter 4.5.
3 Examples of early UN world conferences are the World Conference on Human Rights
(Teheran 1965), the World Conference on Human Environment (Stockholm 1972), the
First World Conference on Women (Mexico 1975) and the Second World Conference
on Women (Copenhagen 1980). A Third World Conference on Women was held in
Nairobi 1985. Some examples of post-Cold War world conferences are the World Con-
ference on Environment (Rio de Janeiro 1992), the Vienna conference (1993), the Cairo
conference (1994), the Beijing conference (1995), the World Social Summit (Copen-
hagen 1995), Habitat II (Istanbul 1996) and the Durban conference (2001).
4 For a discussion, see Charlesworth 1996a, Chinkin 1996, Fraser 1987 and Otto
1996c. See also Chapter 3.5.
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areas of concern the importance of targeted initiatives for women and of
integrating a gender perspective.
In this third chapter, I will analyze the development of the human
rights framework from Western localisms to an international law pro-
ject. That is, I will trace some of the core developments in the history of
human rights from the Enlightenment throughout the history of the
UN in the 20th century. The focuses will be on the initial exclusion of
women as rights holders and on the UN’s attempts to fight the exclusion
through the use of several, successive strategies, first, through a sex neutral
equality strategy, thereafter, a woman-centred equality strategy and, finally,
through integrative strategies.
3.2 A Brief History of Human Rights
3.2.1 From Men’s Rights to Human Rights
The American and French Revolutions and the Declarations of Rights
The idea of human rights can be traced back to natural law history.5 The
idea of human rights moves into the political sphere during the 18th cen-
tury as part of the bourgeois uprisings against the hegemonic hold of the
aristocracy and against feudalism. The revolutionary rights discourses
both provoked and were provoked by the institution of slavery.6 The
emergence of a human rights discourse and the triumph of the American
and French Revolutions, in particular, have been used to symbolize the
beginning of European modernity.7 The revolutionary documents – the
American Declaration of Independence (1776), the American Bill of
Rights (1791) and the French Déclaration des droits de l’homme et le citoyen
(1989) – have guided the drafters of subsequent human rights docu-
ments.8
Under the old colonial system, the British settlements in America had
largely been free to govern themselves. Towards the end of the 18th cen-
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5 For further discussions, see Douzinas 2000, Finnis 1980 and Pateman 1988.
6 For a discussion about slavery and human rights in a historical perspective, see Har-
mer 2001, Strezelewicz 2001, Trotman 2002 and Vorenberg 2001. For a discussion
about the UN and contemporary forms of slavery and human rights, see for example,
www.unhchr.ch/html/menu6/2/fs14.htm (25-09-2003).
7 Douzinas 2000, p. 85.
8 Forerunners to the American and French Declarations were the British Magna Carta
(1215), the Habeas Corpus Act (1679) and the Bill of Rights (1689). For an overview of
historical human rights documents, see Ishay, ed. 1997.
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tury, however, Britain attempted to tighten its grip on the colonies. The
American War of Independence started in 1775. In June 1776, a com-
mittee headed by Thomas Jefferson was entrusted with the task of drafting
the American Declaration of Independence. Besides American independ-
ence, the Declaration of Independence proclaimed that “... all men are
created equal; that they are endowed by the Creator with certain unalien-
able rights; that among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of happi-
ness”.9 When the United States Constitution was drafted, the ideas of
the Declaration were included in the Bill of Rights.
The French Revolution has been described by Albert Saboul as “... the
most dazzling of the bourgeois revolutions”.10 The alliance between the
French bourgeoisie and the popular masses and the unwillingness of the
aristocracy to make compromises led France on “... a truly revolutionary
path from feudalism to capitalism”.11 The French Revolution and the fall
of the ancien régime enabled the establishment of a modern state that
responded primarily to the interests and requirements of the new bour-
geoisie.12 The changes on the social, economic and political scenes were
vested in the French Declaration and in the other similarly transformative
legal changes.13
As noted by Douzinas, there are many similarities between the Ame-
rican and French Declarations in that “[b]oth declarations proclaim
their rights to be universal and inalienable. They both state that limita-
tions and restrictions on the exercise of rights must be introduced by
means of laws legislated by democratically elected bodies. Finally, they
both present similar rights: religious freedom and freedom of expression,
the security of person, due process of law and the presumption of inno-
cence in criminal proceedings”.14 However, while many of the ideas that
were codified through the declarations traveled between the different
countries, the American and French contexts are different and the declara-
tions were supposed to function in radically different contexts. For the
French, “... the Revolution was an act of supreme popular will, aimed at
radically restructuring the relationship between society and state accord-
ing to the principles of natural rights”.15 That is, the French wanted to
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9 The American Declaration of Independence 1776, Art. 2.
10 Saboul 1998 p. 32. See also Lucas 1998.
11 Saboul 1998, p. 32.
12 Saboul 1998, p. 33–4.
13 Scott (1996, p. 19) notes that when the Declaration was adopted some delegates “...
cautioned against telling people about their rights before it had decided exactly what
these were, how they were to be implemented, and for whom”.
14 Douzinas 2000, p. 86.
15 Douzinas 2000, p. 89.
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abolish a corrupted system and a corrupted government and supplant it
with a new system and government well governed by the new Constitu-
tion. The Americans were not in such a hurry to establish the forms for
a new, independent state. It was considered that some laws, much free-
dom and encouragement would lead “... inexorably to the establishment
of human rights and the almost natural adjustment between moral de-
mands and empirical realities”.16
In both North America and France, the spirit of the revolutions faded
away quite quickly, not in the least because it soon became evident how
many people had been excluded from the protective sphere established
by the rights of man. While, for different reasons, excluded from enjoy-
ing the rights and freedoms of free men, women, the working classes
and slaves, could use the language of rights, asking why they were not
among “the men”, who had been created equal and who possessed in-
alienable rights.
The Rights of Man and the Question of Women’s Rights
In the late 18th and 19th centuries, women’s advocacy for women’s right
to the rights of man was initially a bourgeois women’s movement, but it
had much in common with and used the avenues that had been created
by the Abolitionist movement.17 Some feminist scholars have argued
that men’s domination of women in contemporary Western societies is
largely a result of the late 18th century paradigmatic shift resulting from
the Enlightenment and the bourgeois revolution. These scholars have
also argued that the birth of the first wave feminist movement coincides
with the birth of women’s oppression.18 Liisa Nieminen argues that the
myth about a premodern golden age was created within the early 20th
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16 Douzinas 2000, p. 89.
17 Women on both sides of the Atlantic were active in the abolitionist movement and
were also able to use the language of slavery and the slave trade when arguing for women’s
rights. For a discussion about the feminist anti-slavery movement, see for example,
Campbell 1989, Ferguson 1993, Newman 1999 and Offen 2000. For feminist analysis
of contemporary forms of slavery, see, for example, Altink 1995, Chiang 1999, Chuang
1998 and Gallagher 2000b and Kouvo 2003.
18 Just as the American and French Revolutions have been extensively analyzed, the
question of sexual difference during this period and the late 18th and 19th century feminist
movements and rights advocacy have been targeted by feminist historians and social
scientists. See, for example, Grimshaw, Holmes and Lake, eds. 2001, Lloyd 1993, Nie-
minen 1990, Offen 2000, Offen, Roach Pierson, Randell, eds. 1991, Pateman 1988,
Scott 1996 and Stienestra 1994.
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century feminist movements and that the 1970s feminist historians
adopted this myth as fact.19 Nieminen notes that although the legal
obstacles to women’s civil and political agencies might have been less
evident before the 19th century, in political terms women’s civil and po-
litical positions were not necessarily undisputed.
While the image of the premodern era as a golden age for women 
is largely mythical, the situations of European women and American
women changed during early modernity. Thomas Laqueur’s analysis of
the emergence of the gradual shift from a one-sex to a two-sex model is
often used to describe the renegotiation of sexual difference in the shift
from the premodern to a modern era. According to Laqueur, before the
18th century, the difference between women and men had been considered
to be one of degree and not of kind.20 Gradually, however, the dominant
ideology changed: men and women were viewed as essentially different.
Bodily differences were considered as spilling over into differences be-
tween masculine and feminine genders, into masculine and feminine
spheres, their natural positions within social and cultural orders.21 Men’s
capacities included features such as rationality, intelligence and strength,
undeniably requisite in public decision-making, women’s capacities
included features such as emotionality, sensitivity and submissiveness,
apparently more suited for lives as committed wives and mothers.
Feminists have underscored that the creation and perpetuation of the
creature known as the autonomous individual would have been impos-
sible without the occurrence of two connected factors: the actual exclu-
sion of women and without, further, the “exclusionariness” of the do-
main to which they were relegated, viz., the private sphere where women
reigned as carers, wives and mothers. A prerequisite for the creation of
the autonomous individual is the separation thesis, according to which,
the “distinction between what it means to be you and me is central to
the meaning of the phrase human being and that individuals are distinct
and not essentially connected with one another” and, as feminists have
pointed out this distinction is sexed.22 The separation thesis has been
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19 Nieminen 1990, p. 316.
20 In accordance with the premodern one-sex model, argues Laqueur, women’s sexual
organs were viewed as an inward bound penis. Further, although women’s lack of an
outward bound penis affected their lives, it was believed that women could become
complete men. During the 18th century reproductive organs, argues Laqueur (1990,
p. 149) “... went from being paradigmatic sites for displaying hierarchy, resonant
throughout the cosmos, to being the foundation of incommensurable difference”.
21 Laqueur 1990, Chapter 1.
22 Salecl 1994, p. 113, in part, citing West 1991 p. 201.
04-02 Iustus, Sari 8/3  04-03-08 15.31  Sidan 82
much criticized during the 1990s by feminist theorists, inter alia. For ex-
ample, Robin West argues that “... perhaps the central insight of feminist
theory of the last decade has been that women are essentially connected,
not essentially separate, from the rest of human life, materially, through
pregnancy, intercourse, and breastfeeding, and existentially, through the
moral and practical life”.23
The distinction between the public and private spheres dates back to
classical Greece and the idea of res publica as the space where democratic
decisions were made by free men and which was separate from the oikos, a
space both for economic matters and for women, children, slaves, et cete-
ra.24 The distinction between the public and private spheres was repro-
duced and reinforced during the great revolutions by virtue of an asser-
tion that the bourgeois man was supposed to engage actively in state and
community affairs, while the bourgeois woman was supposed to be as
active, but her activities were relegated to the private sphere and to the
making of new citizens.
The revolution saw not only the triumph of the new bourgeois class in
economic and political matters, it also saw the triumph of what came to be
known as ‘bourgeois morality’, a code that put particular stress on family
life, male authority, female submission and chastity, and ‘good appear-
ances’.25
Hence, the private/public distinction results in a distinction between the
political and productive spheres and the reproductive sphere. Kevät
Nousiainen and Anu Pylkkänen examined the results of the interaction
of two developments in the early modern period, viz., the creation of
the private sphere as signifying the domain of only the most intimate of
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23 West 1991, p. 202.
24 Nousiainen and Pylkkänen 2001, p. 29–30. The thinking within Western modernity
has been criticized for being construed around dualisms such as the man/woman, self/-
other and private/public distinctions. Feminist scholars, while using and relying on the
sex/gender distinction, have criticized the public/private distinction for excluding wo-
men and women’s spheres of life from public politics. Poststructurally inspired feminists
have in included the sex/gender distinction among the criticized distinctions that they
have attempted to deconstruct, see Chapter 4.3.1. For a general feminist analysis of the
private/public distinction, see, for example, Baker and van Doorne-Huiskes, eds. 1999
and Boyd, ed. 1997, for a feminist analysis of the private/public distinction with respect
to human rights and international law, see Bock 1991, Buss 1997, Charlesworth 1992,
Chinkin 1999, Olsen 1993, Otto 2000, Romany 1993 and Sullivan 1995 and. For post-
structural criticism of dualist thinking, see Braidotti 1995, Butler 1990 and 1993, Hara-
way 1991, Moi 1997 and Spivak 1999.
25 Pope 1987, p. 142, cited in Nieminen 1990, p. 355, see also Nieminen 1990 p. 305.
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family members and the crystallizing of women’s roles as carers, mothers
and wives. According to Nousiainen and Pylkkänen, the coupling of
these factors resulted in the intertwining of the notions of personal integ-
rity and the right to a private, family life, an intertwining which, still,
persists to this day.26
The late 18th century women’s advocates and proponents of the wo-
men’s cause used different strategies to negotiate the boundaries establis-
hed by the idea of incommensurable sexual difference and the public/
private distinction. In the United States, Abigail Adams wrote a letter to
her husband, John Adams, who, as President, was active in the drafting
of the American Declaration of Independence. Before the signing of the
Declaration took place, she lamented to her husband that:
I can not say that I think you very generous to the Ladies, for whilst you
are proclaiming peace and good will to Men, Emancipating all Nations,
you insist upon retaining an absolute power over Wives.27
Adams’ indignation with the lack of interest of her husband and the lack
of interest of his peers vis-à-vis women’s inequality might be seen as an
early example of the feminist strategy to claim that the personal is politi-
cal. As she noted in many of her letters, while her husband was advancing
his political career and while she, as a political wife, was left in charge of
the farm and other family enterprises, she was unable to enter into any
contracts or sell any property without her husband’s signature.28
In France Olympe de Gouges drafted the Déclaration de la femme et
de la citoyenne (1781), arguing for women’s rights and using both basic
principles from the French Declaration and the idea of sexual difference.
According to de Gouges, women had the right to all the rights enjoyed
by men, because they were human beings, but they also had special rights
to rights, because they were women.29 De Gouges argued that women
had the same capacities as men, both in imagination and intelligence. But,
she lamented, women were not taken seriously enough.30 De Gouges also
extended her equality discourse to the slaves in the French colonies. The
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26 Nousiainen and Pylkkänen 2001, p. 30–1. For a discussion about violence against
women see for example Bunch and Reilly 1994, Coomaraswamy and Kois 1999, Cope-
lon 1994, Eriksson 2000, Fitzpatrick 1994, Phillips 1999, Romany 1993 and 1994, and
Roth 1994. See also Chapters 3.4.2, 4.6.3, 5.3.2 and 5.4.6.
27 Abigail Adams 1776, cited in Hérnandez-Truyol 1999, p. 3. See also Fraser 1999,
pp. 864–67.
28 Fraser 1999, p. 865.
29 Scott 1996, p. 20.
30 Scott 1996, p. 31.
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play, Zamore et Mizrah ou l’Esclavage des Nègres, written by de Gouges,
emphasizes the shared humanity between blacks and whites.31 In the in-
troductory text to her Déclaration de la femme et de la citoyenne. de Gouges
asks whether men dare to be just, defying men’s right to decide over
women’s rights.
Homme, es-tu capable d’être juste ? C’est une femme qui t’en fait la ques-
tion; tu ne lui ôteras pas du moins ce droit. Dis-moi ? Qui t’a donné le
souverain d’opprimer mon sexe ? Ta force ? Tes talents ? Observe le créateur
dans sa sagesse; [...] Partout tu les [les animaux] trouveras confondus, par-
tout ils coopèrent avec un ensemble harmonieux à ce chef-d’œuvre immor-
tel. L’homme seul s’est fagoté un principe de cette exception. Bizarre, aveugle,
boursouflé de sciences et dégénéré, dans ce siècle lumières et de sagacité
[...] il prétend jouir de la révolution, et réclamer ses droits à l’égalité, pour
ne rien dire de plus.
In England, Mary Wollstonecraft argued that women’s right to enjoy
civil and political rights was self-evident, but that what was needed was
a discussion about women’s socio-economic rights.32 Wollstonecraft’s A
Vindication of the Rights of Woman (1792) was written as a reaction
against the misogynistic rights and educational ideologies and policies of
her time. It is a polemic against, in particular, Jean Jacques Rousseau’s
ideas in connection with the rights of women and how girls should be
educated to become good women.33 Wollstonecraft was inspired by the
feminists and abolitionists of her time when writing A Vindication.34
Wollstonecraft used a language of slavery both metaphorically, i.e., to refer
to women as enslaved by men, viz., through passion, fashion, marriage,
et cetera and with reference to the specific conditions of colonized slaves.35
Moira Ferguson argues that Wollstonecraft “... re-emphasizes that the
historical subjugation of women is linked to male desire for sexual as
well as political and social power. In doing so she fuses the oppression of
85
31 Scott 1996, p. 30. The play was closed down after only a few performances by the
authorities owing to pressure from slave holder organizations, fearing rebellion in the
colonies.
32 Fraser 1999, p. 862–3.
33 Ferguson 1993, p. 23. See also Kaplan 1986.
34 Wollstonecraft was inspired by William Roscoe, who had offered the profits of his
poem, The Wrongs of Africa, to the Abolition Committee formed in 1787. In 1789, she
wrote a review of the self-biographical novel, The Interesting Narrative of the Life of
Olaudah Equiano, or Gustavus Vassa, the African. Written by Himself, for the Analytical
Review. Equino’s self-biographical tale tells the story about how he had been kidnapped
in Africa and subjugated into slavery. He was renamed “Gustavus Vassa”, after a Swedish
king. See Ferguson 1993, p. 13.
35 Ferguson 1993, pp. 16–7.
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white women and black female slaves as well as slaves in general”.36 Fer-
guson concludes that “[b]y theorizing about women’s rights using old
attributions of harem-based slavery in conjunction with denotations of
colonial slavery, Wollstonecraft was a political pioneer, fundamentally
altering the definition of rights and paving the way for a much wider
cultural dialogue”.37
Wollstonecraft took a different approach than the approach taken by
de Gouges. For one thing, she did not highlight women’s capacities as
women as de Gouges had done. Instead, Wollstoncraft recognized that
women are ignorant, sentimental and vane, but, she asked, can one ex-
pect women, who have been educated with the foremost task to please
men, to be anything else?38 Hence, Wollstonecraft argued for women’s
equality with men, not only in terms of political rights, but also in terms
of social, economic and cultural rights, legitimizing her claim with pub-
lic utility arguments.
To render women truly useful members of society, I argue that they should
be led, by having their understandings cultivated on large scale, to acquire
a rational affection for their country, founded on knowledge, because it is
obvious that we are little interested about what we do not understand. [...]
Let women share the rights and she will emulate the virtues of man ...39
However, while feminists had been active and remained so in the Aboli-
tionist movement on both sides of the Atlantic and while feminists
found useful arguments both within the Rights of Man and the anti-
slavery rhetoric, they did not necessarily focus on all women. Moreover,
when feminists were criticized for claiming rights for delicate, emotional
and sentimental womankind, the criticizers also focused largely on bour-
geois women. Women subdued by slavery or women who worked for
their living were not always recognized in the intellectual and political
debates of the time. Sejourner Truth’s speech at a Women’s Convention
in 1851 is often used as an example of early black feminist struggle.
Truth was a former slave who questionend white men’s reasoning behind
the exclusion of women from attaining citizenship and rights. The men’s
arguments against women’s rights put forth at the Convention dealt with
women’s fragility and lack of intellect. Truth asked “Ain’t I a woman?”,
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36 Ferguson 1993, p. 22.
37 Ferguson 1993, p. 33.
38 Through her focus on education and assertion that women would become as enlight-
ened as men given the same education as men, Wollstonecraft shared her position with
many of the post-1970s, so-called Second Wave feminists, addressed in Chapter 4.2.
39 Wollstonecraft 1792, Chapter XIII, at www.bartleby.com/144/13.html (25-09-2003)
and Wollstonecraft 1997.
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noting that she had worked all her life and had given birth to thirteen
children, most of whom had been sold off into slavery. And she continues:
Well, children, where there is so much racket there must be something out
of kilter. I think that ‘twixt the negroes of the South and the women at the
North, all talking about rights, the white men will be in a fix pretty soon.
In the United States, the ratification of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments (1868–70) resulted in the legal recognition of the citizen-
ship of black and immigrant men. White women could no longer claim
shared political status with black men. The women who had supported
the Republicans during the Civil War felt betrayed of their rights.40
Cady Stanton, a figure at the forefront of the American women’s move-
ment, proclaimed “[t]hink of Patrick and Sambo and Hans and Yung
Tung [...] who do not know the difference between a monarchy and a
republic, who can not read the Declaration of Independence or Webster’s
spelling-book”. She continued “[a]ll manhood will vote not because of
intelligence, patriotism, property or white skin, but because it is male,
not female”.41 Stanton’s statement is a reaction against the decades of
Abolitionist and suffragist struggle where black men and white women
were kept outside political rights based on similar arguments of a lack of
capability. Suddenly, women lost their male partners in the struggle and
the rationale for exclusion, very convincingly, became one of sex.42
According to Karen Offen, the European feminists of the 18th and
19th centuries lobbied for three main objectives, viz., for women’s full
spiritual and intellectual development as individuals, a goal embedded
in the language of rights; for the acknowledgement of women’s values
and reason, as opposed to masculine rationality; and, for a rethinking of
women’s societal importance as mothers and nurturers and as partners
with in the project of civilization.43 As has been noted by Joan Scott, the
18th century feminist project exemplifies the paradox of feminism.
Feminism was a protest against women’s political exclusion; its goal was to
eliminate ‘sexual difference’ in politics, but it had to make its claims on be-
half of ‘women’ (who were discursively produced through ‘sexual differ-
ence’). To the extent that it acted for ‘women’, feminism produced the ‘sexu-
al difference’ that it sought to eliminate.44
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40 Newman 1999, p. 4.
41 Newman 1999, p. 5, references to Stanton’s Address to the National Woman Suffrage
Convention.
42 Newman 1999, p. 6.
43 Offen 2000, p. 33. See also Anderson 2000 and Offen 2001.
44 Scott 1996, p. 4.
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The paradox only deepened as a result of how the early, largely bourgeois
feminists chose to relate to and make use of the institution of slavery
and abolitionist arguments. The paradox, which is embedded in the idea
of sexual difference and other differences, is reproduced in contempora-
ry feminist and public equality strategies.
3.2.2 Internationalization of Human Rights
International Debates on Human Rights prior to the Second World War
It was only towards the end of the 19th century and especially after the
Second World War that human rights issues became the subject of inter-
national agreements and international public law. The issues of slavery
and the slave trade, including the issue of so-called white slavery, i.e.,
otherwise known in contemporary discourse as trafficking in women for
sexual purposes, are among the earliest human rights issues on the inter-
national agenda. Nevertheless, before the First World War, very few agree-
ments that today would be defined as human rights documents were,
internationally agreed upon.
The proposal for the creation of a League of Nations was accepted after
the First World War at the Paris Peace Conference in January 1919.45
The foremost goal of the League was to promote international coopera-
tion and to achieve peace and security. Human rights were not included
in the League’s mandate, but the League did undertake some actions for
the promotion of human rights-related issues.46
Since the late 19th century, women had organized themselves inter-
nationally. Their status grew during the First World War. Women in
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45 The United States President Woodrow Wilson included in his list of the conditions
for peace after the First World War an item demanding that “[a] general association of
nations should be formed on the basis of covenants designed to create mutual guarantees
of the political independence and territorial integrity of States”. The League had 42
members when it entered into force in 1920. All in all, 63 governments joined the League,
although the highest number of members at any one time never exceeded the 1934 high
of 58 members, see at www.library.miami.edu/gov/intro (25-09-2003).
46 For example, the League did continue the late 19th century work against slavery and
adopted the Convention to Suppress Slave Trade and Slavery (1926). Further, it set up a
working group on women’s issues and initiated a study concerning women’s political
rights. The International Labour Organization, however, because its mandate concerned
socio-economic issues, focused, in particular, on the rights of workers and their family
members to a greater extent than the League focused on human rights. Hence, while
civil and political rights were first to gain constitutional protection, socioeconomic rights,
at least, in the specific context of workers’ rights, were the first to enjoy international
protection. Moreover, while the League did not address women’s issues to any extent, the
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many countries had to take over sectors traditionally designated as male
after the men had been sent to fight in the war. An International Con-
gress of Women, an international women’s conference, had been organ-
ized in The Hague in 1915 and a follow-up congress was organized in
Paris during the Paris Peace Conference (1919).47 Delegates from the
Women’s Congress were allowed to make presentations at the Peace Con-
ference and women managed to ensure that the Covenant of the League
made some references to women and equality.48
The League, as well as the International Labour Organization, remained
rather powerless organizations during the inter-war period because their
Member States were unwilling to surrender any of their sovereignty to
the organization. Arendt described the inter-war period as a period
when “[h]atred, certainly not lacking in the pre-war world, began to [in
the inter-war period] play a central role in public affairs everywhere, so
that the political scene in the deceptively quiet years of the twenties as-
sumed the sordid and weird atmosphere of a Strindbergian family quar-
rel”.49
Nothing perhaps illustrates the general disintegration of political life better
than this vague, pervasive hatred of everybody end everything, without a
focus for its passionate attention, with nobody to make responsible for the
state of affairs – neither the government nor the bourgeoisie nor an outside
power. It consequently turned in all directions, haphazardly and unpredict-
ably ...50
Some early 20th century feminists also questioned the relevance of inter-
national human rights, addressing certain issues related to human rights
within a legal framework. For example, Emma Goldman reacted against
the concern of the public and the League over the anathema of trafficking
in women, arguing that “[t]he papers are full of these ’unheard-of-condi-
tions’ [of trafficked women], and lawmakers are already planning a new
set of laws to check the horror”.51 She wondered how politicians and
legislators could deny the existence of a problem for so long and then be-
lieve that it could be solved with simple measures.
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International Labour Organization has always included women’s rights and non-discri-
mination issues within its mandate. See at www.ilo.org/public/english/about/history.htm,
www.ilo.org/public/english/about/mandate.htm (25-09-2003).
47 Stienestra 1994, pp. 51–9.
48 For further, discussion see Stienestra 1994, pp. 56–58, references to Shotwell 1934
and Whittick 1979.
49 Arendt 1967, p. 268.
50 Arendt 1967, p. 268.
51 Goldman 1969.
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International Human Rights in the Post-Second World War Period
The contemporary history of the international human rights project
might be seen as having started with President Franklin Roosevelt’s State
of the Union address in 1941, in which he stated that the aim of the war
was to achieve a global world order based on four fundamental free-
doms: the freedom of speech and expression, the freedom of worship,
the freedom from want and the freedom from fear. In 1944, representa-
tives from China, the United Kingdom, the United States and Soviet
Union met at the Dumberton Oaks Conference to establish an initial
framework for the UN. In February 1945, Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin
met at the Yalta Conference and conferred about the potential new
world order and the establishment of the UN was agreed upon.52 At the
San Francisco conference held in April 1945, the UN Charter was signed
by 51 nations. Women had been absent from the Dumberton Oaks and
Yalta or Crimea conferences that had preceded the San Francisco con-
ference. Women delegates, however, were included in a number of the
country delegations present at the San Francisco Conference.53 The UN
Charter included only sporadic references to human rights. At the closing
session of the San Francisco Conference, however, President Harry Tru-
man proclaimed that the UN Charter would make it possible to frame
an international bill of rights which would be acceptable to all nations
involved and which would become as much part of international life as
the United States Bill of Rights had become a part of the United States
Constitution.54
The Preamble to the UN Charter states that the peoples of the UN
“... reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and
worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and
of nations large and small”.55 The wording of the preambular text was
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52 Stienestra 1994, p. 77. See also at http://history.acusd.edu/cdr2/BYRD/COFEREN/
YALTA_CO:TXT (20-06-2003). See also Hilderbrand 1990 and Lake 1996 and 2001.
53 Stienestra 1994, pp. 77–8.
54 Morsink 1999, pp. 3–4 and Cassese 1996, pp. 25–6.
55 The UN Charter includes only sporadic references to human rights: Art. 1 states that
the purpose of the UN is to promote and encourage respect for human rights and funda-
mental freedoms, Art. 13 gives the General Assembly the mandate to initiate studies for
assisting the realization of human rights and fundamental freedoms, Art. 55 emphasizes
that the UN should promote human rights and Art. 68 gives the ECOSOC the mandate
to establish commissions in the field of human rights. Women’s rights and sex equality
issues entered onto the San Francisco agenda besides through the wording of the pream-
bular text, also through the application of rights and freedoms without distinction to sex,
women’s and men’s equal access to positions within the UN and discussions on the estab-
lishment of a UN commission on the status of women. According to Art. 8, the UN
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introduced by Field Marshal Smuts of South Africa. Smuts wanted the
preamble that would be “... a statement of ideals and aspirations which
would rally world opinion in support of the Charter”.56 Anecdotally, he
is said to have perceived of the ideal of equality between women and
men as one that would really rally the world.57 Hence, both human
rights and equality between women and men were emerging issues on
the mid-20th century international political scene.
In January 1946, after the end of the Second World War the first
session of the UN General Assembly was held in London.58 The UN
Charter’s emphases on human rights and on the equal rights between
women and men were celebrated at the session. During the first session
Eleanor Roosevelt presented to the General Assembly, on behalf of the
female delegates to the UN, an Open Letter to the World’s Women. Accord-
ing to the letter:
[t]he United Nations marks the second attempt of the peoples of the world
to live peacefully in a democratic world community. This new chance for
peace was won through the joint efforts of men and women working to-
gether for common ideals of human freedom at a time when the need for
united efforts broke down barriers of race, creed and sex.59
However, the letter also noted that women did not participate on equal
terms with men in national and international politics and it was re-
cognized that:
[w]omen in various parts of the world are at different stages of participa-
tion in the life of their community, that some of them are prevented by law
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shall place no restrictions on the eligibility of women and men to participate in UN activ-
ities. The Latin American countries took credit for the adoption of Art. 8. Bertha Lutz of
Brazil noted in her comment to the article that it is “... a Latin American contribution to
the constitution of the world”. She explained the visionary thinking of both herself and
of the other women delegates by noting that the fact that they had been able to “... play a
part in drafting of the Charter is a consequence of the fact that they are full-fledged cit-
izens in their own land”, see Stienestra 1994, p. 78. See also Fraser 1999, p. 886, Pietilä
and Vickers 1990 and Stienestra 1994.
56 Stienestra 1994, p. 78.
57 Stienestra 1994, pp. 78–80.
58 On July 16, in the New Mexico desert, the United States detonated the first atomic
bomb, named Fat Man and called the gadget or the thing. The successful detonation was
the green light for the bombing of Hiroshima with the atomic bomb, Little Boy, consid-
ered slightly less powerful than Big Boy. In the bombing of Nagasaki, the atomic bomb,
Big Boy, was again used. See seattletimes.nwsource.com/trinity/articles/part1.html. (25-
09-2003). On August 14, Japan announced its surrender and the Second World War
ended. On December 31, Time Magazine proclaimed President Truman its Man of the
Year. See history.acusd.edu/gen/20th/truman45.html (25-09-2003).
59 UN doc. A/Pv.29 (1946).
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from assuming full rights of citizenship, and that they therefore may see
their immediate problems somewhat differently.60
Agreeing to the foregoing text, the drafters of the letter advise the wo-
men of the UN:
[f ]irst, to recognize the progress women have made during the war and to
participate actively in their own countries and in the pressing work of re-
construction, so that there will be qualified women ready to accept respon-
sibility when new opportunities arise; second, to train their children, boys
and girls alike, to understand world problems and the need for international
cooperation, as well as the problems of their own countries; third, not to
permit themselves to be misled by anti-democratic movements now or in
the future; fourth, to recognize that the goal of full participation in the life
and responsibilities of their countries and of the world community is a
common objective toward which the women of the world should assist one
another.61
While many of the statements following Roosevelt’s presentation articu-
lated a strong belief in the good will of the UN and in the capacities of
women, not all in attendance were convinced about the sincerity of the
political commitment to equality between women and men. Mrs. Vervey
of the Netherlands, sardonically expressed her gratitude to the General
Assembly’s male members, who had so warmly supported the women’s
quest within the UN. She noted that perhaps there was no opposing voices
because no one in the General Assembly expected that “... a recommenda-
tion like this [for women’s equality] would result in a future Assembly
with as many women as there are men”.62 In other words, supporting the
formalized version of women’s equality with men is less effort than en-
suring equality between women and men in practice.
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60 UN doc. A/PV.29 (1946).
61 UN doc. A/PV.29 (1946).
62 The UN and the Advancement of Women 1945-1995, 1995, doc. 2, p. 105.
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3.3 The UN Human Rights Framework and 
the Sex-Neutral and Women-Centred 
Equality Strategies
3.3.1 The UN Human Rights Framework and the 
Sex-Neutral Equality Strategy
The International Bill of Rights and the Sex-Neutral Equality 
Strategy
The Universal Declaration is the first major human rights document
drafted by the Commission on Human Rights and adopted by the Gen-
eral Assembly.63 According to Johannes Morsink, the General Assembly
Plenary, at which the Universal Declaration was adopted, was taken up
by “... self-congratulatory speeches about what the delegates felt they
had done”. Morsink argues that the pride of the drafters and the delegates
over a job well done made them tempted to “... move from the inclusive
process to the claim that the product therefore had worldwide applica-
bility”.64 At the beginning of the Third Committee’s proceedings, leading
up to the plenary, Renée Cassin of France, for example, expressed his
hopes that the Universal Declaration was to be the expression of the rights
of all peoples of the world and not only of the 58 nations then con-
stituting the UN.65 The intentions and aspirations of the drafters and the
General Assembly to promote the Universal Declaration as an inclusive
and sex-neutral, instrument is well exemplified with the use of words,
such as, all human beings,66 all,67 everyone68 and no one69 in the Universal
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63 For discussions about the Universal Declaration, see, for example, Eide 1998, Marks
1998 and Morsink 1999. For feminist analysis of the Universal Declaration, see, for ex-
ample, Charlesworth 1998. For information about the Universal Declaration’s 50th an-
niversary, see www.unhchr.ch/html/50th/50anniv.htm and www.udhr50.org/ (25-09-
2003). The Universal Declaration has been translated into most of the languages of the
UN Member States, see www.unhchr.ch/udhr/navigate/alpha.htm (25-09-2003).
64 Morsink, 1999, p. 11. Compare with Douzinas 2000. Morsink (1999, p. 41) identifies
four forces at work in the drafting and adoption of the Declaration: the Holocaust, the
Cold War, the women’s lobby and the tradition of Latin American socialism. See also
Humphrey 1984.
65 Morsink, 1999, p. 11.
66 The Universal Declaration, Art 1.
67 The Universal Declaration, Arts. 7 and 16.
68 The Universal Declaration, Arts. 2, 3, 6, 8, 10, 11, 13, 14, 15, 17, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23,
24, 25, 26, 27, 26, 27, 28 and 29.
69 The Universal Declaration, Arts. 4, 5, 9, 11, 12, 18 and 20.
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Declaration. The Universal Declaration does not include any sex-specific
non-discrimination or equal rights clause, but reaffirms in the preamble
the faith in equal rights of men and women.70 A general non-discrimi-
nation clause is introduced in Art. 2. The clause includes sex among the
forbidden grounds for discrimination and the clause established a form
reproduced in later non-discrimination clauses.
The inclusiveness and sex neutrality of the Universal Declaration and
of the whole international human rights project were already questioned
at the time of the adoption of the Universal Declaration.71 Some, like
Arendt, questioned the usefulness of the human rights framework, others,
like the American Anthropological Association questioned the cultural
inclusiveness of the Universal Declaration and women’s advocates, such
as, the Chair of the Commission on the Status of Women, Bodil Bergtrup
of Denmark, questioned the sex neutrality of the Universal Declaration.
Arendt had reacted against how the use of human rights language had
become an alternative to action in post-Second World War Europe.
Arendt notes that “[n]o paradox of contemporary politics is filled with a
more poignant irony than the discrepancy between the efforts of the
well-meaning idealists who stubbornly insist on regarding as ‘inalienable’
those human rights, which are enjoyed only by citizens of the prosperous
and civilized countries, and the situation of the rightless themselves”.72
She further argued that “[t]he very phrase ‘human rights’ became for all
concerned – victims, persecutors, and onlookers alike – the evidence of
hopeless idealism and fumbling feeble-minded hypocrisy”.73 The Ameri-
can Anthropological Association reacted against the adoption of the
Universal Declaration because it imposed the Western worldview on the
rest of the world and it opposed a tolerance of difference. The drafters of
the American Anthropological Association’s statement noted that:
[t]he problem of drawing up a Declaration of Human Rights was relatively
simple in the eighteenth century, because it was not a matter of human
rights, but of the rights of men within the framework of the sanctions laid
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70 References to women are also included in the Universal Declaration, Art. 16, which
states that men and women of full age have the right to marry and to found a family and
in Art. 25 when in conjunction with economic and social rights promoting the right to
security in the event of for example widowhood, and when endowing motherhood and
childhood with the right to special care and assistance.
71 See Chapter 1.2.1.
72 Arendt 1967, p. 279.
73 Arendt 1967, p. 269.
04-02 Iustus, Sari 8/3  04-03-08 15.31  Sidan 94
by a single society [...] Today the problem is complicated by the fact that
the Declaration must be of worldwide applicability.74
Supported by the Soviet delegation, Bergtrup pointed out that the state-
ment that all men are equal used in an early draft of Universal Declaration
Art. 1 might be misleading and might invite usages that discriminated
against women.75 The version of Universal Declaration Art. 1 that was
adopted states that “[a]ll human beings are born free and equal in digni-
ty and rights”, but it still demands that human beings should “... act to-
wards one another in a spirit of brotherhood”.76 Besides its emphasis on
brotherhood, the Universal Declaration also uses male pronouns in seve-
ral articles, see for example Arts. 10, 12, 13, 17, 18, 21 and 25.
The Universal Declaration, however, was only supposed to lay the
groundwork for an international human rights treaty that would protect
on the one hand, civil and political rights and on the other hand, econo-
mic, social and cultural rights. The Commission on Human Rights de-
voted its fifth to tenth sessions (1949–54) to the drafting of the human
rights covenants.77 The drafting process, however, was held up by the
emergence of the Cold War for the reason that the area of human rights
became one of the battlegrounds of the Cold War.78 After a recommen-
dation by the General Assembly, the Commission on Human Rights de-
cided to draft two covenants instead of one, separating civil and political
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74 Cited in Steiner and Alston 1996, p. 200, for a reinterpretation of the American An-
thropological Association’s statement in light of the Association’s 1999 Declaration on
Anthropology and Human Rights, see Engle 2001 and Higgins 1996.
75 Fraser 1999, p. 888.
76 Morsink 1999, p. 37.
77 Hernández-Truyol 1999, p. 20.
78 Craven (1995, p. 9) noted that the use of rights as one of the Cold War battlegrounds
resulted in an excessively monolithic perception of the history of human rights and it
contributed to the hierarchical approach to rights. The Western states, argued Hernán-
dez-Truyol (1999, p. 20) maintained that “... social, economic and cultural rights were
aspirational goals rather than rights, as the attainment thereof was dependent upon
economic resources and economic theory and ideology”. The Cold War and the split
between so-called blue and red rights were two of the main reasons for the lengthy pro-
cess. There were other issues, however, which contributed to the delay. Some of the
other issues which hampered the process included, for example, the extent to which States
Parties should be held accountable to an international body; the desirability of both a re-
porting system as well as individual or interstate complaints procedures; the extent to
which the Covenants provisions could be applicable to non-parties; the roles of General
Assembly, the ECOSOC and the Commission on Human Rights; and the appropriate
division of competences in technical and formal jurisdictional terms between the UN
and its specialized agencies, did also hamper the process. See, also Alston 1996b, p. 476
and Opsahl 1996, pp. 372–3.
04-02 Iustus, Sari 8/3  04-03-08 15.31  Sidan 95
rights from economic, social and cultural rights.79 In accordance with
the General Assembly recommendation, the two Covenants, however,
were to overlap as much as possible and they were to be presented to Gen-
eral Assembly at the same time.80 When the two Covenants were adopted
in 1966, they only overlapped in connection with certain references in
the Preamble texts, the provisions on non-discrimination, self-determina-
tion and sovereignty over natural resources.81
While the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)
and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(ICESCR), from a rights perspective, are less inclusive than the Universal
Declaration, the Covenants aspire towards the same inclusiveness as
concerns rights holders. The Covenants include references to equality in
the Preambles and they include general non-discrimination clauses.82 In
addition, the ICCPR and the ICESCR each include in their Arts. 3 a
specific clause, according to which the States Parties of the Covenants
“... undertake to ensure the equal rights of men and women to the en-
joyment of all civil and political rights set forth in the Covenant”.83 The
attempts to use a sex-neutral language in the Covenants in order to
make them inclusive fail, because both the ICCPR and the ICESCR use
male pronouns quite extensively.84 Feminists have reacted against both
96
79 Hernández-Truyol 1999, p. 20.
80 Hernández-Truyol 1999, p. 21.
81 Hernández-Truyol 1999, p. 21. The ICCPR and the ICESCR are opened for ratifica-
tion on the 16th of December 1966, see General Assembly Resolution 2200 A (xxi). The
ICCPR entered into force on 23 March 1976 and the ICESCR entered into force 3
January 1976.
82 See, for example ICCPR Arts. 2, 4, 24 and 26, and ICESCR Arts. 2.
83 Women and men are also mentioned specifically in ICCPR Art. 23(2), regarding “...
the right of women and men of marriageable age to marry and found a family ...”. Art.
23(3) underlines that “... no marriage shall be entered into without the free and full con-
sent of the intending spouses”. Art. 6(5) is the only article that includes a specific regulation
regarding certain women. It forbids death sentences to be imposed on pregnant women
and minors. ICCPR Art. 6(5), however, was probably construed more for the protection
of the unborn child than the pregnant women. Women are mentioned specifically in a
number of articles of the ICESCR: ICESCR Art. 7 on the right to work includes a gene-
ral non-discrimination principle regarding fair wages and equal remuneration and states,
in particular, that women should be guaranteed conditions of work not inferior to those
conditions of men, with equal pay for equal work. ICESCR Art. 10 on the right to
family includes three statements worth noting, viz., that marriage must be entered into
with the free consent of the intending spouses, that mothers should be protected both
before and after childbirth and that working mothers should be accorded paid leave with
adequate social security benefits.
84 The ICCPR uses male pronouns, for example, in Arts. 9, 12, 13, 14, 17, 18 and 24.
The ICESCR uses male pronouns to a lesser extent than do the Universal Declaration
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the male bias of the rights of the International Bill of Rights, but also
against the use of a male-centered language.85 Busby argues, for example,
that “[a]ccording to the masculinist theory of marking, male pronouns
can be marked or unmarked. The context is supposed to determine
whether the referent is a male gender specific noun (marked) or a noun
that includes man and women (unmarked)”.86 Such a use of generic
male pronouns “... perpetuates and conceals male domination at all levels
of conceptualization and language”.87
When the Universal Declaration was drafted, the sex-neutral equality
strategy was innovative and even radical because women in many UN
Member States, still, lacked basic civil and political rights. The sex-neutral
equality strategy, not in the least because it has become the dominant
equality strategy, provides a necessary baseline for equality and non-
discrimination work.88 The strategy can be used as a means to block
legislation, which de jure supports inequality or which discriminates
against certain groups. However, as the sex-neutral equality strategy be-
came common practice, it also became evident that it did not suffice as a
strategy for promoting substantial equality between the sexes. With re-
spect to women, the sex-neutral equality strategy is an attempt to include
women as opposed to excluding them actively. In other words, no one
seems to have asked whether the rights’ framework, in any other way,
would need to adapt when women were included as rights holders. With
respect to women, three main shortcomings of the sex-neutral equality
strategy have been emphasized, viz., its equating of equality with non-
discrimination, its excessive focus on discrimination categories and its
insufficiency for addressing the structural reasons for and the con-
sequences of the exclusion of women and others.89 The group-specific
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and the ICCPR. Nonetheless, a male pronoun is, still, used, for example, Arts. 6, 7, 8 and
11.
85 For a discussion about language, see Busby 1989, Hevener and Lindquist 1995 and
Nousiainen 1993.
86 Busby 1989, p. 196.
87 Busby 1989, p. 196.
88 The sex-neutral equality strategy was also discussed in Chapter 1.3.2. Note also
Smart’s criticism of the rights’ discourse beyond “equal rights”, see Smart 1989 and
Chapter 2.3.1.
89 The changes and regional differences may be exemplified through the non-
discrimination clauses included in the regional human rights treaties. The African Char-
ter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (1981) Art. 2 forbids discrimination on the basis of
“... race, ethnic group, colour, sex, language, religion, political or any other opinion,
national or social origin, fortune, birth, or other status”. The Cairo Declaration on Human
Rights in Islam (1990) Art. 1(a) states that “[a]ll men are equal in terms of basic human
dignity and basic obligations and responsibilities, without any discrimination on the
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human rights instruments addressed below and the woman-centered
human rights instruments addressed in Chapter 3.3.2 have been pro-
moted as a means to overcome the aforementioned shortcomings.
Specialized Human Rights Treaties and the Sex-Neutral Equality
Strategy
Since its establishment, the UN has adopted a large number of special-
ized human rights treaties, addressing either group- or issue-specific
human rights topics.90 The specialized human rights treaties, whether
addressing the rights of a specific group or specific rights’ issues, are
adopted to put a special emphasis on the importance of within the gene-
ral human rights regime marginalized groups or issues. I will focus, here,
on the Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD)
and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC). The aim is not to
provide a substantial overview of the conventions, but to show how the
two different conventions have approached and incorporated the principle
of equality and equal rights between the sexes.
During its first decades the UN was dominated by Western states.
Some decades later, during the 1960s, the Socialist Bloc and the newly
independent African, Asian and Latin American states consolidated their
position. This consolidation of position of these varied member states
contributed to the reopening of the debate regarding the International
Bill of Rights and the adoption, for example, of the Declaration on the
98
grounds of race, colour, language, sex, religious belief, political affiliation, social status of
other consideration”. The Arab Charter on Human Rights (1994) forbids in Art. 2, after
a list equivalent with the Universal Declaration list, “... discrimination between women
and men”. The recently adopted Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union
(2000) forbids “... discrimination based on any ground such as sex, race, colour, ethnic
or social origin, genetic features, language, religion or belief, political or other opinion,
membership of a national minority, property, birth, disability, age or sexual orientation
[emphasis added]”. The inclusion of new non-discrimination categories, such as genetic
features, disability, age and sexual orientation exemplify the historical contingency of
discrimination, but also the persistence of certain non-discrimination categories such as
sex, race and birth. The Charter of Fundamental Rights is the latest entry into the family
of regional human rights documents. It is not legally binding and the extent to which its
equality and non-discrimination clauses might become binding on the European Union
or on its Member States is well circumscribed, thus, perhaps, a reason for the extensive
equality and non-discrimination clauses. For further information see europa.eu.int/
comm/justice_home/unit/charte/index_en.html (25-09-2003).
90 The OHCHR web provides an overview of UN human rights treaties, and the by the
UN addressed group- and issue-specific issues, see at www.unhchr.ch (14-01-2004).
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Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (1960)
and, of course, CERD (1965). When the CERD entered into force in
1969, nineteen of its Member States were from Third World countries,
five from Eastern Europe and only three from Western Europe.
The focus of the CERD is on different forms of racial discrimination.
Art. 1(1) of the CERD contains a definition of racial discrimination that
has become a guiding one for subsequent non-discrimination clauses,
such as, the clause in CEDAW. According to the definition, racial discrim-
ination shall mean:
... any distinction, exclusion, restriction of preference based on race, color,
descent, or national or ethnic origin which has the purpose or effect of nul-
lifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal
footing, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, econ-
omic, social, cultural or any other field of public life.
The CERD prohibits discrimination with respect to both civil and political
rights and economic, social and cultural rights. The Universal Declaration
addressed both types of rights, but as noted above, the Cold War hampered
attempts to draft one international treaty addressing both types of rights.
The CERD does however, as later both the CEDAW and the CRC do,
address both generations of rights.
The focus of the CERD is, however, as was noted, primarily on dis-
crimination related to race, color, descent et cetera, and the CERD in-
cludes only a brief reference to sex. The preamble of CERD includes
references to the UN Charter and the UN’s devotion to the promotion
and encouragement of “... universal respect for and observance of human
rights and fundamental freedoms for all, without distinction as to race,
sex, language or religion”. However, while the first part of the preamble
includes sex in the list of non-discrimination grounds, the second part of
the preamble stresses only that “... all human beings are born free and
equal in dignity and rights and that everyone is entitled to all the rights
and freedoms set out therein, without distinction of any kind, in parti-
cular as to race, colour or national origin”.
While CERD was not successful in addressing sex among other
grounds of discrimination, CERD’s definition of discrimination has gui-
ded the drafters of CEDAW. CERD’s definition has also been referred to
by the Human Rights Committee in a general comment.91 The CERD
Committee has responded, however, as shall be shown in Chapter Five,
to the post-Beijing emphasis on the importance of mainstreaming a gender
99
91 See the Human Rights Committées General Comment No. 8 (1989). See also Chap-
ter 5.5.3.
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perspective through the adoption of General Recommendation No. 25
on the gender-dimension of racial discrimination (2000), which has come
to alter the Convention’s focus slightly.92
In between the adoptions of the CERD in 1965 and the CRC in
1989, the UN’s approach to women and equality between the sexes had
changed considerably. Some of these changes will become evident when
addressing the UN world conferences for human rights and women, but
they can also be exemplified by how the CRC addresses girl-children
and boy-children and equality between the sexes. The CRC may be de-
scribed as the most successful of the UN human rights treaties partly be-
cause of its overwhelmingly swift and next to global ratification.93
The CRC Art. 2 includes a general non-discrimination clause according
to which every child has the rihts to the rights set forth in the Conven-
tion “... irrespective of the child’s or his or her parent’s or legal guardian’s
race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national,
ethnic or social origin, property, disability, birth or other status”.94 The
CRC has omitted any equal rights article equivalent to Arts. 3 in the
ICCPR and the ICESCR and it does not distinguish between violations
that are specific as to boy- or girl-children. The CRC, however, does refer
to both boy-children and girl-children throughout its text. For references
to both boy-does, and girl-children see, for example, CRC Arts. 2(1),
3(2), 7, 8, 10, 12 and 16. Two Optional Protocols to the CRC have
recently been adopted. The protocols deal with the sale of children, child
prostitution and child pornography (2000) and with the involvement of
children in armed conflict (2000). A slight shift in the language used can
be detected between the CRC and the optional protocols. The latter
while including some specific references to violations suffered by girl-
children and while using, for example, the term gender discrimination,
100
92 See Chapter 5.4.2.
93 The CRC was adopted in November 1989 and it came into force in September 1990.
By December 1999, it had been ratified by 191 states. Only Somalia and the United Sta-
tes have failed to ratify the Convention. The CRC was adopted at the end of the Cold
War, at a time when the UN, its member states and an ever-growing number of interna-
tional non-governmental organizations increasingly were focusing on human rights.
While media coverage of issues, such as, street children, child workers, child soldiers and
child prostitution and pornography has been topical, the coverage and the political
debates around these issues have led to an increasing awareness about the situation of
children around the world.
94 CRC Art. 2(1). In accordance with CRC Art. 2(2), States Parties shall take all appropri-
ate measures to ensure that children are protected from all forms of discrimination or
punishment related to activities of their parents, legal guardians or family members.
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do not consequently refer to boy-children and girl-children or use sex-
specific pronouns.95 The protocols rely largely on a sex-neutral language.
As shall be shown in Chapter Five, the CRC Committee has been one
of the treaty bodies that to the greatest extent have focused on the human
rights of the girl-child. It has also occasionally included a boy-child per-
spective. However, as I will suggest, it is a best example on decline.96
While brief, the above overview of the CERD and the CRC shows
that the UN approach has changed in between the 1960s and the 1980s.
The group-specific approach or so-called targeted interventions for a
specific group, while necessary as a short-term strategy for advancing
structurally disadvantaged groups, can also contribute to furthering the
marginalization and stigmatization of that specific group. The UN has,
moreover, in its group-specific approaches tended to focus on one so-
called group or issue at the time. The exceptions are the subgroup and
multi-dimensional discrimination approaches evolved during recent years.
A Brief Note on Multi-Dimensional Discrimination
Since the 1980s, there has been a growing trend within the UN, not only
to identify broad categories of vulnerable or structurally disadvantaged
groups, such as children, indigenous peoples or women, but also, to
identify sub-groups within these groups, that are even more likely to be
vulnerable or disadvantaged.97 An extreme example of the strategy of
identifying sub-groups within an identified category is noted by the Spe-
cial Rapporteur on education, who refers to the CRC Committee, which
has come to identify thirty-two sub-groups of children as being particul-
arly likely to be excluded from education.98 Identifying sub-groups of
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95 See for example the preamble of the Optional Protocol on the sale of children, child
prostitution and child pornography.
96 See Chapter 5.4.7.
97 For discussions regarding minority women, see, for example, Jansson, ed. 1998 and
Spiliopoulou Åkermark 1996 and 1999, for a discussion regarding indigenous women
see, for example, Bell 1992.
98 The Special Rapporteur’s list includes, in alphabetical order, “... abandoned children;
asylum-seeking children; beggers; child labourers, child mothers; child prostitutes; chil-
dren born out of wedlock; delinquent children; disabled children; displaced children;
domestic servants; drug-using children; girls; HIV-infected children; homeless children;
imprisoned children; indigenous children; married children; mentally ill children;
migrant children; minority children; nomadic children; orphans; pregnant girls; refugee
children; sans-papiers children (children without identity papers); sexually exploited chil-
dren; stateless children; street children; trafficked children; war-affected children; and
working children”, UN doc. E/CN.4/2003/9, para. 25.
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children, indigenous peoples, minorities or women as particularly dis-
advantaged or likely to be discriminated against can be a necessary strat-
egy to ensure, for example, that when implementing the right to educa-
tion, UN Member States do not omit implementing it with regard to
girl-children or immigrant children, as is often the case. The focus on a
specific group, however, can also lead to a focus on that group as a prob-
lem, rather than on the underlying reasons for the discrimination or the
marginalization. Thus, while identifying a sub-group or a specific cate-
gory of people as especially vulnerable to discrimination might be a ne-
cessary strategy to counteract exclusion, it does not necessarily lead to a
focus on the underlying reasons for discrimination or to inclusion. The
focus on groups and categories can also contribute to disempowering a
group.99 For example, by identifying a group as “minority women” or by
ascribing to the group certain characteristics and capabilities, or a lack
thereof, agencies which are hoping to be helpful might actually under-
mine the possibilities of the group, so identified, to define itself and to
find its own solutions. The fact that the strategy of identifying different
groups as particularly vulnerable can have counter-effects was also noted
by the Special Rapporteur, who suggested that “[b]ecause most of these
[groups] combine several grounds of discrimination with poverty-related
exclusion from education, the Special Rapporteur recommends merging
the conventional focus on legislative measures for elimination of discrim-
ination with measures aimed at over-coming poverty-based exclusion”.100
An alternative to identifying sub-groups is the strategy for identifying
multi-dimensional discrimination. The strategy for identifying multi-
dimensional discrimination was introduced to the UN around the time of
the Third World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xeno-
phobia and Related Intolerance (Durban conference).101 An expert group
meeting, for example, was organized by the Division for the Advance-
ment of Women, OHCHR and UN Development Fund for Women
(UNIFEM) before the Durban conference in order to address the issues
of gender and racial discrimination. In the summary of the discussion, it
was noted:
[d]iscrimination emanating from categorical distinctions on the basis of
sex and race have historically intersected in multiple and diverse ways, and
102
99 For discussions about the consequences of category politics, see, for example, Doug-
las and Hull, ed. 1992, Folkelius and Noll 1998, Hacking 1995 and Macklin 1995.
100 UN doc. E/CN.4/2003/9, para. 25.
101 For discussions about multi-dimensional discrimination with respect to human
rights, see, for example, Crenshaw 2000, Makkonen 2002, Romany 2000 and Spilio-
poulou Åkermark 1999.
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have taken specific forms during particular historical conjunctures, such as
in the context of slavery and colonialism. The dominant structures of power
often relied on violence to sustain their patriarchal and racial boundaries.102
The report also noted that while sexist and racist politics are no longer
legitimized by law contemporary states establish their “... gender and
racial regimes through the ‘unmarked’ discourse of citizenship which is
defined along the principle of individual rights”.103 In contemporary
states, the gender regime, however, is “firmly ingrained in the patriarchal
household” and the racial regime through “immigration and naturalisa-
tion laws”.104 The report also noted that processes of globalization have
made exclusion and discriminatory identity politics more prominent.
The Durban conference came to address the gender dimension of racial
discrimination in its preamble, reaffirming that “... States have the duty
to protect and promote the human rights and fundamental freedoms of
all victims, and that they should apply a gender perspective, recognising
the multiple forms of discrimination that women can face ...”.105 In the
aftermath of the Durban conference, during its 45th session (2001), the
Commission on the Status of Women discussed Gender and All Forms of
Discrimination, adopting agreed conclusions as to the intersection be-
tween gender and racial discrimination, in particular. In the summary of
the panel discussion the Commission on the Status of Women emphas-
ized
... the need to develop analytical tools to expose the intersection of gender
and race discrimination and other forms of discrimination, and to develop
gender-sensitive policies and programmes to protect and promote the hu-
man rights of all women.106
As was noted above, the CERD Committee has adopted General Re-
commendation No. 25 (2000) on the gender dimension of racial discrim-
ination.107
103
102 Gender and Racial Discrimination, Report of the Expert Group Meeting, November
2000.
103 Gender and Racial Discrimination, Report of the Expert Group Meeting, November
2000.
104 Gender and Racial Discrimination, Report of the Expert Group Meeting, November
2000.
105 Durban declaration, preamble.
106 See UN doc. E/2001/27 – E/CN.6/2001/14, Annex II, para. 16.
107 For further discussions see, Chapter 5.4.2.
04-02 Iustus, Sari 8/3  04-03-08 15.31  Sidan 103
3.3.2 The UN Women’s Human Rights Framework 
or the Woman-centred Equality Strategies
Since questions regarding women’s inequality were forced onto the UN
agenda at the San Francisco Conference and framed in human rights
language, the UN has grappled with the question of whether to address
women’s inequality as part of the core human rights agenda or, instead,
through a specialized women’s human rights agenda.108 Women are cur-
rently rights holders under all human rights treaties, viz., the ICCPR,
the ICESCR, et cetera, the group-specific and issue-specific treaties, viz.,
the CERD, the CAT and the CRC et cetera and under the specialized
women’s human rights treaties, viz., the CEDAW, et cetera. In practice,
however, women and the violations of women’s human rights are not,
equally recognized under all human rights treaties.
The tension between promoting women’s rights through general,
human human rights instruments or through targeted, women’s human
rights instruments had already been addressed by the 18th century
feminists, As Scott has noted, this tension was described by de Gouges
as the paradox of feminism.109 Laura Reanda calls this tension the familiar
dilemma.
The historical development [...] reflects a familiar dilemma in efforts to
achieve equality for women. The creation of separate institutional mechan-
isms and the adoption of specialised measures for women are often neces-
sary in order to rectify existing situations of discrimination. The danger of
creating a ‘women’s ghetto’ endowed with less power and resources, attract-
ing less interest and commending lower priority than other [...] goals is
latent in this approach.110
Besides battling over whether to address women’s human rights in general
human rights instruments or whether to focus on promoting women’s
human rights through woman-centred human rights instruments, the
UN has also grappled with what kinds of women’s human rights instru-
ments to use. As I perceive it, over the last half a century, the UN has
adopted three types of woman-centred human rights instruments. These
three types are as follows: first, women’s human rights instruments
adopted during the early years of the UN that only aim at bringing at-
tention to women, but that do not change the content or scope of the
human rights framework; secondly, women’s human rights instruments
104
108 For a discussion see for example Byrnes 2000a, Pentikäinen 1999 and Reanda 1996.
109 Scott 1996, p. 4, see also Chapter 3.2.1.
110 Reanda 1996, p. 267. See also Coliver 1989 and Gallagher 1997. The paradox or
dilemma has also been addressed by Engle 1992a, see Chapter 2.3.2.
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adopted around the time of the UN decade for women (1976–85) that
began the transformative trend of substantially adapting the UN human
rights framework to the inclusion of women as rights holders; and, third-
ly, the integrative approach adopted during the 1990s that attempts not
only to transform how human rights are conceptualized at the woman
margins of the UN human rights framework, but that aim at bringing a
new understanding of women’s human rights to the core of the human
rights system. It is noteworthy that while the different phases in how
women’s human rights are addressed develop towards approaches that
increasingly acknowledge specificities of (some) women’s lives, might also
have obscured a focus on, for example, development-related and poverty-
related discrimination.
The early woman-centred human rights instruments, such as, the UN
Convention on the Political Rights of Women were mainly reaffirma-
tions that the rights contained in the Universal Declaration were also
women’s rights.111 That is, the early woman-centred human rights in-
struments omitted any mention of rights substantially different from
those rights included in the human human rights documents. If these
instruments did include rights substantially different from those rights
found in the Universal Declaration, then, as Otto has noted, such rights
105
111 The Commission on the Status of Women had not originally been given a standard-
setting mandate, but it was inspired by the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights that had adopted an Inter-American Convention on the Granting of Political
Rights to Women (1948) to draft an International Convention on the Political Rights of
Women. The Convention on the Political Rights of Women was opened for signature by
General Assembly Resolution 640 (VII) of 20 December 1952. The Convention entered
into force 7 July 1954 in accordance with Art. VI. The Convention on the Political
Rights of Women is basically a non-discrimination convention, i.e., no additional or even
reinterpretations of the Universal Declaration rights are presented through the Conven-
tion, it only emphasizes the importance of the promotion and protection of women’s
political rights on equal terms with men. Hence, the 1952 Women’s Convention targets
women’s right to vote, be elected and hold public office “... on equal terms with men,
without any discrimination” (Arts. I-III). The aim of the convention was to promote
legislative changes in Member States, so as to eradicate any direct discrimination in
Member States’ constitutions and laws. Note that, in the late 1940s, the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights had already adopted a number of conventions focused
on women’s rights, see www.oas.org/CIM/english/Conventions.htm (26-09-2003). The
Commission on the Status of Women also drafted a resolution on the elimination of
customs, ancient laws and practices affecting the human dignity of women (1954) and
the adoption of the Convention on the Nationality of Married Women (1957). For an
overview of early UN and the Commission on the Status of Women activities in the
field of women’s human rights, see The United Nations and the Advancement of Women
1945–1995 1995 and Reanda 1996.
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were protective in their approach to women.112 As Otto noted, the pro-
blem with this type of woman-centred human rights instruments is that
their dominant conception of equality is based on a “... comparative
standard that entitles women to rights, opportunities, and benefits that
similarly situated men enjoy. Understood in this way, gender equality fo-
recloses the possibility of contesting the baseline of men’s experience
which constitutes the status quo, and glosses over the inequalities among
men that it reproduces among women. Therefore, the concept of equality
ultimately legitimates and endorses existing arrangements of power by
advocating for women’s participation in them”.113
The Declaration on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women
(DEDAW), adopted by the General Assembly in 1967 initiates a slight
shift in the UN’s approach to women’s human rights.114 DEDAW can
be defined as the second type of women’s human rights instruments, be-
cause it is not only an attempt to emphasize that human rights are really
also women’s rights, but it also acknowledges that to ensure women
rights’ protection, the rights’ framework might need to be adapted.
While DEDAW does not include any particular new rights, it does take
a holistic approach toward discrimination against women and violations
of women’s human rights. In Art. 1 DEDAW states that “[d]iscrimina-
tion against women, denying or limiting as it does their equality or rights
with men, is fundamentally unjust and constitutes an offence against
human dignity”. In the following articles, DEDAW addresses issues such
as harmful traditional practices, basic political rights, basic civil rights,
women’s position within the family, trafficking, et cetera, thereby creating
a framework of different human rights and issues, which are considered
of particular importance when opposing discrimination. DEDAW began
the trend of changing the conception of human rights by including and
new interpretations of rights into the human rights framework under
the banner of women’s human rights. CEDAW, adopted in 1979, on the
basis of DEDAW, continues this trend.
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112 Otto (1999 p. 118) argued that the dominant approach in the Cold War’s women’s
human rights conventions was protective, referring to the Convention Concerning
Maternity Protection (1952), the Convention Concerning Night Work of Women Em-
ployed in the Industry (1948), the Convention Concerning Discrimination in Respect
of Employment and Opportunity (1958) and the Convention for the Suppression of the
Traffic in Persons and the Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others (1950) and the
Convention on the Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for Marriage, and Registration
of Marriages (1962).
113 Otto 1999, pp. 118–9.
114 Rehof 1993, pp. 6–7. See also General Assembly Res. 2263(XXII), 1967.
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In 1974, eight years after presenting the draft DEDAW to the Gen-
eral Assembly, the Commission on the Status of Women decided that a
legally binding treaty was needed. The Secretary-General was requested
to invite comments from governments, specialized agencies and non-
governmental organizations on a text prepared by the Commission on
the Status of Women working group for the Convention. In 1976, the
Commission on the Status of Women considered the draft CEDAW, this
work continued in 1977, the same year in which the Draft CEDAW was
submitted by the ECOSOC to the Third Committee of the General As-
sembly.115 During the General Assembly Plenary at which CEDAW was
adopted, Mrs. Loranger of Canada noted that the draft CEDAW is a “...
result of years of efforts on the part of many people representing many
cultures and civilizations, [and it] marks an important stage in the pro-
cess of recognising the full equality of women and men”.116 However,
while many like Loranger emphasized the importance of the draft CE-
DAW, many also, including Loranger, commented on the inconclusiv-
eness of the draft CEDAW and that many of its articles were open to
much interpretation.117
Although it is one of the most ratified of UN human rights treaties,
CEDAW is also subject to a large number of reservations. Some of these
reservations conflict with the purpose of the convention.118 The question
of reservations was addressed by the Mr. Edis of the United Kingdom at
the General Assembly session when CEDAW was adopted. According to
Edis, the Third Committee had hastened through important questions
during the committee proceedings, leaving lacunae and unresolved issues,
which could only “increase the number of reservations which States will
feel compelled to enter”.119 Reservations to international treaties are jus-
tified under international law if they are not incompatible with the
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115 CEDAW was formally opened for signing at the Second World Conference on Wo-
men held in Copenhagen in 1980. Over fifty states signed and two states submitted in-
struments of ratification to CEDAW during the Conference. Today, 170 states have signed
and ratified CEDAW, which makes CEDAW the second most ratified human rights
convention after CRC, which has been ratified by 191 states. The ICESCR has been ra-
tified by 145 states, the ICCPR by 148 states, CERD by 162 states and CAT by 130 sta-
tes. See The Status of Ratification of the Principal International Human Rights Treaties as of
21 August 2002, www.unhchr.ch/pdf/report.pdf (26-09-2003).
116 UN doc. A/34/PV.107 (1979), p. 1993.
117 See, for example, the British, Canadian, Moroccan, Dominican Republic statements
in, UN doc. A/34/PV.107 (1979). A large number of states abstained from voting.
118 Charlesworth and Chinkin 2000, pp. 102–13, Lijnzaad 1995, Tomas˘evski 1998a–b
and White and Blakesley 2000.
119 UN doc. A/34/PV.107 (1979), p. 1992.
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object or purpose of the international treaty. This point was also noted
in CEDAW Art. 28 (2). Many reservations to CEDAW, however, seem
to be contrary to the object and purpose of the Convention, which has
also been noted by the CEDAW Committee. Nevertheless, general
reservations have been allowed, as well as reservations regarding core
provisions such as Art. 2 on State Parties obligation to condemn and
eliminate discrimination against women, and Art. 16 on State Parties
obligation to condemn and eliminate discrimination against women in
marriage and family relations.120
When CEDAW was drafted, some countries, including Sweden,
argued that CEDAW should not focus on women, but rather on the
eradication of discrimination based on sex.121 The discussion emanated
from the definition of discrimination against women included in
CEDAW’s Art. 1, which had borrowed its wording from CERD’s de-
finition of racial discrimination. CEDAW’s Article one reads:
[f ]or the purpose of the present Convention, the term “discrimination
against women” shall mean any distinction, exclusion or restriction made
on the basis of sex which has the effect of purpose of impairing or nullify-
ing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by women, irrespective of their
maritial status, on the basis of equality of men and women, of human rights
and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural, civil
or any other field.
Canada’s and Sweden’s proposals for a sex-neutral definition of non-
discrimination that would have been equally applicable to men and to
women, however was rejected.122 CEDAW was not supposed to be equal-
ly applicable to women and to men, but its aim was specifically to high-
light discrimination against women with respect to different human
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120 General reservations, for example, concern the incompatibility of CEDAW with Sharia
law, Arts. 2 and 16 reservations concern the obligation to eliminate all forms of discrimi-
nation against women. General reservations with reference to Sharia law has been sub-
mitted by Bangladesh, Egypt, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Malaysia, Maldives and Morocco.
Other general reservations, for example, concern the relationship between CEDAW and
domestic law and have been submitted by Lesotho, Mexico, Tunisia and Singapore. Arts.
2 and 16 reservations have been submitted by Bangladesh, Cook Islands, Bahamas,
Egypt, France, India, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Jordan, Korea, Kuwait, Lesotho, Libya, Lux-
embourg, Malaysia, Malta, Mauritius, Maldives, Morocco, Singapore, Thailand, Tunisia,
Turkey and United Kingdom. There is also a backlog in state reporting. There are cur-
rently 290 overdue reports under CEDAW, which makes CEDAW the Convention with
the second largest reporting backlog after CERD with 458 overdue reports. CAT has
150 overdue reports, CRC 181, ICCPR 159 and ICESCR 194. See Tomas˘evski 1998b.
121 Rehof 1993, p. 46.
122 UN doc. A/32/218/Add.1 (1977), p. 2, para. 6 through Rehof 1993, p. 46, footnote
92.
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rights. CEDAW recognizes that women’s disadvantage is rooted in
systematic and structural discrimination, often supported by social and
cultural patterns and customary and other practices.123 CEDAW also
thrusts the rights’ framework into the private sphere and creates new op-
portunities for new kinds of analysis regarding women’s human rights
and violations. Further, as is noted in The UN and the Advancement of
Women, “[w]hat made the Convention unique is its requirement that
Governments work to eliminate discrimination against women not only
in the public sphere but in private life as well”.124 CEDAW provides a
very useful framework that can be used both as a political and legal
tool.125 The reasons for the usefulness of CEDAW’s framework as a tool,
both politically and legally, is essentially two-fold: first, CEDAW recog-
nizes that discrimination on the ground of sex is embedded in social and
cultural patterns and, secondly, it acknowledges that these patterns are
not only present in the public sphere, but that discrimination on the
grounds of sex is just as much a private matter. The substantial articles
of CEDAW deal with both civil and political and economic, social and
cultural rights, including some specific issues, such as harmful traditio-
nal practices, prostitution and trafficking in women and the situation of
rural women.
As has been noted by, for example, Rebecca Cook, CEDAW provides
a shift from a sex-neutral norm that requires, “... equal treatment of men
and women, usually measured by how men are treated” towards a nor-
mative framework that recognizes that “... the particular nature of dis-
crimination against women merits a legal response”.126 That is, CEDAW
... progresses beyond earlier human rights conventions by addressing the
pervasive and systematic discrimination against women, and identifies the
need to confront the social causes of women’s inequality by addressing ‘all
forms’ of discrimination that women suffer.127
The adoption of CEDAW implied a shift from addressing women’s in-
equalities within the human human rights framework to addressing
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123 See CEDAW Art. 5 demands that States Parties adopt appropriate measures to “...
modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women, with a view to
achieving the elimination of prejudices and customary and all other practices which are
based on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes or on stereo-
typed roles for women and men”. See also Rehof 1993, pp. 77–81 for the drafting history
of the article.
124 The United Nations and the Advancement of Women 1945–1995 1995, p. 42.
125 See for example CEDAW art. 5b.
126 Cook 1994, p. 11.
127 Cook 1994, p. 11.
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them principally from within a women’s human rights framework.128
While woman-centred institutions have contributed to the development
of knowledge concerning different women’s concerns, experiences, needs
and priorities, the woman specific human rights instruments and insti-
tutions have also contributed to a de-individualization of women, a
“marginalization” and a “ghettotization” of women’s human rights within
the overall women’s human rights system.129 CEDAW and the CEDAW
Committee have been marginalized within the overall human rights
framework for two reasons, in particular. The first reason for its marg-
inalization stems from the nature of the subject matters dealt with and
their connection to other women’s equality matters. The second reason
for its marginalization stems from the location of the CEDAW Com-
mittee in New York, administered by the Division on the Advancement
of Women.130 While the DEDAW and CEDAW did mark the begin-
ning of a re-interpretive woman-centred equality strategy within the
UN human rights framework, they also contributed to separating women
as rights holders and women’s human rights from the core of human
rights.
The third type of women’s human rights instruments and the third
equality strategies are part of the post-Cold War renaissance for human
rights. The ideological lacunae, which resulted from the Cold War have
been filled up with human rights discourse. With respect to women’s
human rights the 1990s resulted in an increased openness towards wo-
men’s claims. These claims insisted, for example, that different types of
violence against women could and should be addressed within the hu-
man rights framework, and that women’s human rights should not only
be addressed at the margins in a “women’s ghetto”, but as part of the
core of human rights. These issues will be further addressed below.131
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128 Otto (1999, p. 120–1) noted that while CEDAW promotes “... women’s equality
with men and obligates state parties to implement measures that will counter ‘discrim-
ination against women’, it does not recognize of protect rights that are specific to women’s
gendered experience of corporeality [...][and it also] carries a raft of provisions which
privilege the homemaker as the primary female subject of international law”.
129 Gallagher 1997, O’Hare 1997 and Roth 2002.
130 See Chapter 5.5
131 The development of the integrative strategies will be addressed in Chapter 3.4–3.5
and their content in Chapter 5.
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3.4 The World Conferences on Human Rights 
and Integration of Women’s Human Rights
3.4.1 From Teheran to Vienna
The first world conference on human rights was organized in Teheran in
1968, a few years after the adoption of CERD, ICCPR and ICESCR.
At the Teheran Conference, human rights remained a battleground be-
tween East and West, North and South. Roger Clark called the Teheran
conference output something of a “damp squid” vis-à-vis issues such as,
for example, implementation, which was an issue high on the agenda of
human rights advocates after the adoptions of CERD, ICCPR and
ICESCR.132 The output on issues regarding the human rights of women
is similar; the Proclamation includes a general non-discrimination clause
and an article stating that discrimination against women must be elimi-
nated, but the emerging focus on women’s human rights within the UN
system, for example, with the adoption of the DEDAW is not highligh-
ted.133
The Second World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna in 1993
was organized, as it seems, in a completely different world political cli-
mate. The Vienna conference was organized as an attempt to celebrate
that human rights were no longer a battleground between East and
West.134 That human rights were moving into a new era was highlighted
111
132 Clark 1999, p. 312
133 The Proclamation of Teheran, the Final Act of the International Conference on Hu-
man Rights, states in Art. 1 that “[i]t is imperative that the members of the international
community fulfil their solemn obligations to promote and encourage respect for human
rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction of any kind such as race,
colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinions”. A resolution, however, was
passed during the Teheran conference recommending guidelines for a long-term UN
program for the advancement of women. See Rehof 1993, p. 7
134 The decision to convene a world conference on human rights was made by the Gen-
eral Assembly in 1990, see the UN doc. A/Res/45/155 (1990), UN doc. A/Res/46/116
(1991) and UN doc. A/Res/47/122 (1992). Some of the key issues to be addressed
included the review and assessment of the progress made in the field of human rights
since the adoption of the Universal Declaration; examine the relationship between the
development and the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights; examine ways
to improve the implementation of existing human rights standards and instruments;
evaluate the effectiveness of the UN methods and mechanisms in the field of human
rights; formulate concrete recommendations for improving the effectiveness of UN
activities in the field of human rights; and make concrete recommendations for ensuring
the necessary financial and other resources for the UN’s activities in the field of human
rights. The key issues are analyzed in UN doc. A/Conf.157/PC/60/Add.2-7 (1993). The
choice of key issues clearly shows that at the advent of the Vienna conference, the UN
had been preoccupied with issues regarding the implementation of human rights.
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in the Secretary-General’s speech at the opening of the Vienna conference.
The Secretary-General lauded the remarkable historical intuition of the
General Assembly, when, two months after the fall of Berlin Wall, it
asked its Member States whether a world conference on human rights
would be desirable. The fall of the Berlin Wall was described as “... car-
rying away with it a certain vision of the world, and thereby opening up
new perspectives”.135 The Secretary-General continued that:
[i]t was in the name of freedom, democracy and human rights that entire
peoples were speaking out. Their determination, their abnegation – some-
times their sacrifices – reflected then, and still reflect, their commitment to
do away with alienation and totalitarianism.136
As are many of the final documents emanating from UN world confer-
ences, the Vienna Programme is lengthy and non-committal.137 Never-
theless, the Vienna Programme is unique in the sense that it is the first
general human rights document agreed upon after the end of the Cold
War. In certain respects, the Vienna Programme did also advance the
position of human rights and did alter the traditional understanding of
human rights138 The draft outcome document for the Vienna Conference
was prepared by the UN Secretariat in part based on the results of the
regional meetings.139 The drafting process, however, was hampered by a
number of issues, not the least of which was the indecisiveness over the
positioning of human rights within the hierarchy of the UN system.
Other issues, which impeded progress, included determining the meth-
ods of supervising the implementation of human rights, determining
112
135 UN doc. A/Conf.157/22 (1993).
136 UN doc. A/Conf.157/22 (1993).
137 The Vienna Programme is endorsed through A/Res/48/121 (1993). Through its
Resolution Art. 11, the General Assembly also decided to include in its agenda item,
Human Rights Questions, a sub-item entitled, Comprehensive Implementation of and fol-
low-up to the Vienna Declaration and Programme for Action. Under this sub-item, the Gen-
eral Assembly has adopted resolutions, such as UN doc. A/Res/51/118, and UN doc.
A/Res/53/166.
138 See Vienna Programme, Part A, C, E and F.
139 Regional preparatory meetings for the Vienna conference had been organised in Tunis
in Africa, in San Jose in Latin American and in Bangkok in Asia. Western countries did
not hold a regional preparatory meeting in order to avoid regional polarization, but an
informal meeting was however held in Strasbourg, and the European Communities did
adopt a position paper regarding the Vienna conference. For the final documents from
the regional meetings see UN doc. A/Conf.157/PC/57, UN doc. A/Conf.157/PC/58
(1993) and UN doc. A/Conf.157/PC/59 (1993). See also Davidse 1995, Marks 1994
and UN doc. A/Conf.157/PC/87. For an overview of the UN preparation process see
the introduction to the Report of the World Conference on Human Rights, UN doc.
A/Conf.157/24 (Part I). The draft Vienna Programme was allegedly the most heavily
bracketed document in United Nations history, see UN doc. E/CN.4/1998/104.
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the universality of human rights standards and developing the right hu-
man rights agenda.140 The difficulties suggested that, while human
rights were no longer a Cold War battleground, they remained contro-
versial on the North-South trajectory and, increasingly so, especially
between the West and Asia.141 The nature of the difficulties leads one to
wonder, as Koen Davidse notes, just how universal the support for hu-
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140 Davidse 1995. Regarding the provisional agenda for the Vienna conference, see UN
doc. A/Conf.157/1. Setting the agenda for an international conference, such as, the
Vienna conference, is important because the adopted agenda largely decides what issues
will be dealt with during the conference and how these items will be prioritized. The im-
portance of the agenda is well exemplified by the large number of recommendations by
non-governmental organizations and others. See for example: The Statement by the In-
ternational Council of Jewish Women, UN doc. A/Conf.157/PC/46/Add.5, and the
Statement by the International Fellowship of Reconciliation, UN doc. A/Conf.157/
PC/46/Add.9, which drew attention to the question of anti-Semitism. The Statement by
Pathways to Peace and the Coalition for Children of the Earth, UN doc. A/Conf.157/
PC/46/Add.6, which proposed a focus on children’s rights. The Statement by the Inter-
national Federation of the Aging and the American Association of Retired Persons, UN
doc. A/Conf.157/PC/46/Add.7, which proposed a focus on older persons everywhere.
The Statement by the World Federation of United Nations Association, UN doc.
A/Conf.157/PC/46/Add.8, which proposed a focus on science, technology and human
rights. For information on the draft Vienna Programme see UN doc. A/Conf.157/2. See
also UN doc. A/Conf.157/3/Add.2 and Add.3. According to the Report of the Con-
ference, the Vienna Conference was attended by representatives of 171 states, 2 national
liberation movements, 15 UN bodies, 10 UN specialized agencies, 18 international
governmental organizations, 24 national institutions and 6 ombudsmen, 11 UN human
rights and related bodies, 9 other organizations, 248 non-governmental organizations
with consultative status with the ECOSOC and 593 other non-governmental organiza-
tions. See UN doc. A/Conf.157/24 (Part I), Chapter 1, for a complete list of the at-
tendees of the conference, see Annex II to the report.
141 Davidse 1995, p. 2. The UN preparatory committee meetings were marked by a re-
gional polarization, partly enhanced by the regional groups defined by the UN (Africa,
Asia, Latin America, Eastern Europe, Western Europe and other groups). The Western
and Asian groups were most at odds with each other. Davidse (1995) notes that the
ideological dividing line is also present in the Bangkok Resolution which stressed that
human rights should not be used as a condition in development aid or for any other
type of political pressure and that international human rights should respect national
sovereignty. See also UN Doc. A/Conf.157/PC/59. The West-Asia split is also noted in
the declaration presented by Asian human rights non-governmental organizations, UN
doc. A/Conf.157/PC/63/Add.5, which request the Vienna Conference use all of its
power against the Northern transnational corporations exploitation of the poor in Asia
and the Northern non-governmental organizations to “... l’utiliser l’espace démocratique
qu’offrent leurs sociétes pour mieux sensibiliser le public à la manière dont le contrôle et
la domination que le Nord exerce sur le système internationale répriment et limitent les
droits fondamentaux des populations d’Asie”. Iraq submitted a report on the right to
development, UN doc. A/Conf.157/PC/63/Add.2, which noted that while the Declara-
tion on the Right to Development had been adopted in 1986, the right seems to have
been lost during the post-Cold War period because most of the Third World seems to
have been forgotten due to political developments.
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man rights really are, and they opened up opposition to the conference
and suspicions about hidden agendas.142
Problems aside, the aspects that have been perceived as radical in the
Vienna Programme include the following three aspects, in particular: the
holistic perspective taken on human rights, the acceptance that the uni-
versality of human rights can be contested and the strong focus on
group-based human rights claims and on ending the marginalization 
of different groups with respect to human rights.143 Part I, Art. 5 of the
Vienna Programme states:
[a]ll human rights are universal, indivisible and interdependent and inter-
related. The international community must treat human rights globally in
a fair and equal manner, on the same footing, and with the same emphasis.
While the significance of national and regional particularities and various
historical, cultural and religious backgrounds must be born in mind, it is
the duty of States, regardless of their political, economic and cultural sys-
tems, to promote and protect all human rights and fundamental freedoms.
The paragraph highlights, as is appropriate in the post-Cold War era
that civil and political rights and economic, social and cultural rights
and the International Bill of Rights and the other human rights treaties
are universal and indivisible. However, the Vienna Programme uses an
approach to universality as if, in quotes, i.e., human rights are “universal”,
in the sense that everyone should have the right to human rights – but,
human rights are also historical constructs and they should be allowed to
change so as to correspond to everyone’s perception of human rights.144
The Secretary-General attempts to capture the complexities of the post-
Cold War human rights debate by emphasizing that human rights, on
the one hand, are a historical synthesis and, therefore, in constant move-
ment. On the other hand, human rights are an absolute yardstick constit-
uting the common language of humanity.145
To be sure, human rights are a product of history. As such, they should be
in accordance with history, should evolve simultaneously with history and
should give the various peoples and nations a reflection of themselves that
they recognize as their own. Yet, the fact that human rights keep pace with
the course of history should not change what constitutes their very essence,
namely their universality.146
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142 See Davidse 1995. The draft Vienna Programme was allegedly the most heavily
bracketed document in United Nations history.
143 See Vienna Programme, Part I, Art. 5 and Part II, Chapter B.
144 See Capter 1.2.1.
145 UN doc. A/Conf.157/22. Compare, however, the OHCHR report for the five-year
review, which includes a more conventional notion of universality, see UN doc. A/53/372.
146 UN doc. A/Conf.157/22.
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The emphasis on the universality and interdependence of all human
rights not only relates to the historical distinction between civil and po-
litical rights and economic, social and cultural rights, but it is also an at-
tempt to bridge the gap between the aforementioned general human
rights and group- or issue-specific human rights. Below, I will address the
focuses of the Vienna conference and its programme focus on women’s
human rights, but the Vienna conference and programme also emphasized
the rights of, for example, minorities and indigenous’ peoples, migrant
workers, children and the disabled.
3.4.2 The Global Campaign for Women’s Human Rights 
and the Vienna Dual Strategy
As was noted above, the UN preparations for the Vienna conference had
been troublesome and the intergovernmental preparatory meetings had
not managed to decide on an agenda for the Vienna conference or on
what to include in the draft Vienna Programme.147 Still, at the final pre-
paratory meeting, there was no common agenda. According to Charlotte
Bunch and Niamh Reilly, this lack of a common agenda provided “... an
important opportunity for women who had focused on building coali-
tions across North-South lines and addressing socio-economic as well as
civil and political rights, to get their ideas included in the Conference
agenda”.148 In other words, the fact that the UN intergovernmental pre-
parations were slow provided an opportunity for well-organized non-
governmental organizations to introduce issues onto the Vienna agenda
and to influence the draft Vienna Programme.
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147 Bunch and Reilly 1994, pp. 6–7.
148 Bunch and Reilly 1994, p. 7. In the aftermath of the UN decade for women and the
Nairobi conference, women’s groups around the world began to show an increased inter-
est in international politics and law, including in human rights. At the beginning of the
1990s, a number of mainly United States-based women’s organizations had begun the
process of initiating and forming what later became the global campaign for women’s
human rights. Different women’s groups also worked towards the regional preparatory
conferences held in Tunis, San Jose and Bangkok, demanding that issues regarding equal-
ity between the sexes and the human rights of women be discussed during these confer-
ences. Bunch and Reilly 1994, p. 3. See also Abeyesekere 1995 and International Cam-
paign for Women’s Human Rights 1992–1993 Report 1993 and Bunch 1995b. The Women’s
Caucus, convened in preparation for the Vienna Conference, succeeded in including
text on women in the draft Vienna Programme, which was a precondition for the text
on women included in the adopted version of the Vienna Programme. This success also
served as an inspiration for further cooperation in conjunction with the Vienna confer-
ence.
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The global campaign for women’s human rights convened a Global
Tribunal on Women’s Human Rights as part of the non-governmental
activities parallel to the Vienna Conference, but it also targeted govern-
ment delegations and the media. The slogan, Women’s rights are human
rights, was probably one of the most frequently heard slogans at the
Vienna Conference. After the conference, the Women’s rights are human
rights slogan has traveled the world.149 The aim of the tribunal was to
demonstrate that the international human rights system had failed to
acknowledge many types of violations suffered by women as human rights
violations and that the system failed to promote and protect women’s
human rights. The tribunal was organized around six panels. The topics
chosen for these panels were among the core topics addressed by the in-
ternational women’s human rights movement, later, in the 1990s. The
panels addressed human rights abuse in the family, war crimes against
women, violations of bodily integrity, socioeconomic rights and political
persecution and discrimination.150 A report from the tribunal was pre-
sented together with a petition for the human rights of women at the
Vienna conference.151 Sunila Abayesekere noted that:
[i]n a way, the campaign for women’s human rights served as a temporary
‘unifying’ factor for a large number of very disparate groups and organisa-
tions from all over the world. However, the end of the Vienna Conference
demonstrated clearly that this unity was indeed a very fragile one.152
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149 After the Vienna conference, the slogan, Women’s rights are human rights, has been
used by UN institutions, such as, the OHCHR, UNIFEM and the Division for the Ad-
vancement of Women in their publications. It has also been used by non-governmental
organizations, such as, Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch and has been
used in numerous speeches, pamphlets, articles, et cetera. by a varied range of people.
See, for example, Hilary Clinton’s address Women’s Rights are Human Rights given at the
Beijing conference, at www.douglassarchives.org/clin_a64.htm (28-09-2003).
150 On each panel, a number of women from different parts of the world testified about
the violations that they had suffered. Key persons within the international human rights
framework and the women’s human rights framework have been chosen as judges for the
different panels. See Bunch and Reilly 1994.
151 The petition for the human rights of women was part of the Global campaign. Ac-
cording to Rogers (1995, p. 131), it had been organized by over 900 women’s groups,
circulated in 124 countries and translated into 21 languages. Members of the Global
Campaign also participated in and contributed to the common position paper prepared
by non-governmental organizations and sent to the Vienna Conference. They managed
to incorporate issues regarding equality between the sexes and the human rights of women
under most of the core items of the common position paper, see Bunch and Reilly 1994,
p. 101–2.
152 Abeyesekera 1995, p. 9.
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The importance of the strategic alliance formed by women’s movements
vis-à-vis Vienna is not undermined by its temporality.153 Because the glo-
bal movement for women’s human rights at the Vienna conference did
not address the dividing lines within the women’s movement on the
grounds of, for example, region, ethnicity, class or sexuality, and because
it did not recognize how differences in resources and power between dif-
ferent women’s groups affected how the women’s human rights agenda
was framed, difference became a conflict rather than a source of know-
ledge and empowerment. Dianne Otto has shown that while the 1990s
campaign for women’s human rights did manage to put a number of
new issues onto the international human rights agenda, the campaign
also led to a deepening chasm between the human rights agenda and de-
velopment agendas and served to reinforce a hierarchy between civil and
political rights and economic, social and cultural rights.154
The Vienna Programme included in its Part II, Chapter B on Equality,
Dignity and Tolerance a special heading The Equal Status and Human
Rights of Women. The issues addressed under this hearing included, for
example, the importance of global action for women towards sustainable
and equitable development; the importance of women’s enjoyment of
mental and physical health and the importance of working towards the
elimination of violence against women in public and private life, inclu-
ding elimination of sexual harassment and trafficking.155 Except for the
focus on violence against women, issue-wise the Vienna Programme fails
to introduce an especially new human rights agenda.
The Vienna statement on violence against women stressed the import-
ance of working towards
... the elimination of all forms of violence against women in public and
private life, the elimination of all forms of sexual harassment, exploitation
and trafficking in women, the elimination of gender bias in the adminis-
tration of justice and the eradication of any conflicts which may arise be-
tween the rights of women and the harmful effects of certain traditional or
customary practices, cultural prejudices and religious extremism.156
The Vienna conference aimed at strengthening the position of women’s
human rights within the UN system and at furthering the transformative
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153 Abeyesekera 1995, pp. 8–10. The global campaign had not envisaged any follow-up
plans. It had also not planned for any collective processes vis-à-vis any analysis or discus-
sion about what the notion behind the slogan, Women’s Rights are Human Rights, really
signified. or what the implications of that notion might be for specific violations suffered
by different women in different parts of the world.
154 Otto 1999.
155 Vienna Programme, Part II, Arts. 37, 38 and 41.
156 Vienna Programme, Part II, Art. 38.
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trend towards new approaches to women’s human rights. The Vienna
Programme transgressed the boundaries between private and public, for
example, by opening up within the UN human rights’ framework dis-
cussion about new forms of violence against women. The Vienna Pro-
gramme’s focus regarding women’s human rights is rather on how to
promote and implement the human rights of women.
In order to promote women’s human rights and to ensure that they
are perceived of as an integrated part of all human rights, the Vienna
Programme promoted a dual strategy, proposing targeted and integrative
action for the implementation of women’s rights as human rights within
the UN system. The dual strategy promoted through the Vienna Pro-
gramme is largely an invention of the UN preparatory work, but traces
of a similar approach are found in some of the regional preparatory
declarations.157 According to Bunch and Reilly, the idea of promoting
women’s human rights was well received during the preparatory process,
but strong opinions were expressed both before and at the Vienna Con-
ferences against the integration of women’s human rights.158
The Vienna Programme Part I, para. 18 provides a background for
and outlines the dual strategy:
[t]he human rights of women and of the girl-child are an inalienable, in-
tegral and indivisible part of universal human rights. The full and equal
participation of women in political, civil, economic, social and cultural
life, at the national, regional and international levels, and the eradication
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157 For example, the African regional meeting adopted a resolution on the protection of
the rights of women, which focuses on women’s full integration into the development
and decision-making processes, see UN doc. A/Conf.157/PC/57-AFRM/14. The report
from the Asian regional meeting contained a commitment to the human rights of
women and to the eradication of discrimination and of gender-based violence against
women, see UN doc. A/Conf.157/ASRM/8-A/Conf.157/PC/59, Art. 22. The report
from the Latin American and Caribbean regional meeting contained an emphasis on
three needs, viz., on the need to implement the human rights of women, on the need to
integrate women into decision-making processes and on the need to eradicate different
forms of discrimination and gender-based violence and sexual exploitation, see UN doc.
A/Conf.157/LACRM/15-A/Conf.157/PC/58, Art. 14. The European Community po-
sition paper included a statement regarding the need to focus on the human rights of
women, especially on issues regarding violence against women, see UN doc. A/Conf.
157/PC/87, Art. 27. The position paper of the European Community also noted vis-à-
vis women’s human rights, “[u]ne action cohérente, enterprise dans l’ensemble du systè-
me, est indispensable”. It highlights the importance of the Commission on Human
Rights on the integration of the human rights of women. So, while the African report
emphasizes the need to integrate women into the development process, the European
Community position paper emphasizes the need for a system-wide UN strategy.
158 Bunch and Reilly 1994.
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of all forms of discrimination on grounds of sex are priority objectives of
the international community [...] The human rights of women should
form an integral part of the United Nations human rights activities, includ-
ing the promotion of all human rights instruments relating to women.
According to the Vienna Programme, elements or components of the
dual strategy are targeted intervention and integrative initiatives, further
broken down into measures for institutional cooperation and measures
for substantial integration.
Targeted intervention includes the strengthening of existing legal and
institutional structures for the human rights of women and new standard-
setting initiatives aimed at reinterpreting human rights. The targeted
intervention proposed by the Vienna Programme includes, viz., first, en-
couraging a focus on issues, such as development, health and violence,
secondly, encouraging the universal ratification of CEDAW by the year
2000; thirdly, strengthening the position of CEDAW by fostering the
development of ways and means to address the large number of reserva-
tions to CEDAW; and, fourthly, urging the withdrawal of reservations
that are contrary to the object and purpose of CEDAW. Moreover, the
CEDAW Committee and the Commission on the Status of Women
were asked to analyze the possibility of creating a right to petition under
CEDAW. The Vienna Programme welcomed the Commission on Human
Right’s decision to consider the appointment of a Special Rapporteur on
violence against women. The standard-setting initiatives proposed by
the Vienna Programme included urging the General Assembly to adopt
the draft declaration against violence against women.
One component of the integrative initiatives is the notion of measures
for institutional co-operation, i.e., measures for increased co-operation
among UN woman-centred institutions and among woman-centred and
human rights-centred institutions. In order to ensure that the human
rights of women are not only approached via the women’s human rights
scheme, the Vienna Programme proposes that:
[t]he equal status of women and the human rights of women should be
integrated into the mainstream of United Nations system-wide activity.
These issues should be regularly and systematically addressed throughout
relevant United Nations bodies and mechanisms.159
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159 See the Vienna Programme Art. 37 for an additional listing of UN institutions
which should cooperate in the mainstreaming of women’s human rights and Art. 42
about the mainstreaming of women’s human rights and gender-specific data within the
UN treaty body system. See, also, the Vienna Programme, Part C-D, concerning the
strengthening of institutional structures and the monitoring mechanisms for human
rights.
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The co-operative measures proposed by the Vienna Programme included
further integration of objectives and goals, for example, among the
Secretariat’s Division for the Advancement of Women and the Centre
for Human Rights, the inter-governmental institutions’ Commission on
the Status of Women and the Commission on Human Rights and the
development agencies.160 The Division for the Advancement of Women
and the Centre for Human Rights were asked to ensure that UN human
rights institutions addressed the topic of the human rights of women
regularly and that UN human rights and humanitarian relief personnel
provided training regarding these issues.161
Another component of integrative initiatives is measures for substantial
integration. Such measures are aimed at the integration of the human
rights of women into the work of the UN human rights treaty bodies,
special procedures and other human rights-centred institutions. The
measure for substantial integration proposed by the Vienna Programme
included demanding that the UN human rights treaty bodies include
the status of women and the human rights of women in their delibera-
tions and findings. The demand also included that States parties supply
information in their periodic reports about the de jure and de facto situa-
tions of women.162 The Vienna Programme also included an emphasis
on the integration of women in decision-making.
In order to ensure that these changes would be effectuated, the Vienna
Programme’s Art. 99 proposed that the General Assembly, the Commis-
sion on Human Rights and other relevant bodies take appropriate meas-
ures for the implementation of the Vienna Declaration and that a five
year review of the Vienna Programme be held in conjunction with the
50th anniversary of the Universal Declaration. The follow-up mechan-
isms for the Vienna Conference have included consideration by the Gen-
eral Assembly, the ECOSOC and the Commission on Human Rights of
appropriate measures for the implementation of the Vienna Program-
me.163
The five-year review of Vienna Programme included an initial review
by the Commission on Human Rights during its 44th session in 1998.
The ECOSOC devoted the coordination segment of its substantive ses-
sion in 1998 to the co-ordinated follow-up to and implementation of
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160 Vienna Programme, Art. 37.
161 Vienna Programme, Art. 42.
162 Vienna Programme, Arts. 42 and 43.
163 Vienna Programme Arts. 99–100 and UN doc. A/Res/48/141, Art. 4. The plenary
session of the General Assembly 10 December 2003 will commemorate the 10th an-
niversary of the Vienna conference.
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the Vienna Programme. The General Assembly analyzed at its 53rd session
in 1998 the progress achieved.164 The five-year review of the Vienna
Programme coincided with the 50th anniversary of the Universal Decla-
ration.165
Many of the recommendations for targeted intervention made in the
Vienna Programme have had practical consequences within the UN sys-
tem, viz., an Optional Protocol to CEDAW has been adopted allowing
for the right to petition under CEDAW, the General Assembly has adopt-
ed the DEVAW, the Commission on Human Rights has established a
Special Rapporteur’s mandate on violence against women, the Secretariat’s
Division for the Advancement of Women and the OHCHR have adopt-
ed annual joint work plans and the UN human rights treaty bodies, as
well as other UN human rights institutions, although to varying extents,
have begun to address the human rights of women in their work. How-
ever, in connection with the Vienna Programme’s emphasis on the inte-
gration of women’s human rights, an integration that goes beyond insti-
tutional cooperation, the some concerns can be detected. The Beijing
conference is often, for example, in the Vienna+5 review is depicted as
continuing the Vienna women’s rights stance. As will be noted in Chap-
ter 3.5.3, the Beijing process does water down the Vienna emphasis on
women’s rights as human rights. Moreover, the strategy for integrating
women’s human rights was in the five-year review process undermined
by the strategy for mainstreaming human rights.166
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164 Since 1994, the Commission on Human Rights has reviewed the implementation of
the Vienna programme at its sessions. See UN doc. E/CN.4/Res/1994/95, 1995/93,
1996/83, 1997/69 and 1998/78. Note that the resolutions include no substantive refer-
ences regarding the Vienna Programme’s emphasis on the human rights of women. UN
doc. E/CN.4/Res/1998/78, Art. 12, however, underlines “... the need to give particular
attention to the human rights of women and the girl child in the five year implementa-
tion review of the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, taking into account
that gender mainstreaming is a key strategy for achieving equality between women and
men and the full enjoyment of all human rights by women”. With regard to the five-year
review, the Commission on Human Rights undertook at its 44th session (1998) an initi-
al review of the implementation of the Vienna Programme, see UN doc. E/CN.4/
1998/177-E/1998/23. The review was based on the Interim report of the OHCHR, see
UN doc. E/CN.4/1998/104.
165 See UN doc. A/Res/52/117, UN doc. A/Res/53/168 and UN doc. E/CN.4/Res/
1998/56, see also website of the Universal Declaration’s 50th anniversary at www.
unhchr.ch/html/50th/50anniv.htm (28-09-2003).
166 The issue of mainstreaming of human rights is addressed in relationship to the de-
mocracy and development themes in the OHCHR final report. The Universal Declara-
tion activities for mainstreaming of human rights are highlighted in this context, see UN
doc. A/53/327, Art. 32. The OHCHR interim report takes a slightly different approach
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3.4.3 Between Vienna and Beijing: The Conference 
on Population and Development (Cairo 1994)
The Cairo conference was the third world conference on population and
development, following the Bucharest conference (1974) and the Mexico
City conference (1984). In some respects, the Cairo conference continued
the weaving process by picking up the loose pieces of yarn from the wo-
men’s human rights agenda of the Vienna conference. Charlesworth notes
that the advancements made for women’s reproductive rights at the
Vienna conference and, especially, the Cairo conference were circum-
scribed at the Beijing conference.167 The focus on women at the Cairo
conference was highlighted right from the start, in the opening speeches,
when, for example, Gro Harlem Brundtland of Norway, stressed that
“[w]omen’s education is the single most important path to higher pro-
ductivity, lower infant mortality and lower fertility”. In her speech, Nafis
Sadik, Secretary-General of the Cairo Conference, stressed that “[e]very
day hundreds of women die from causes related to pregnancy and child-
birth. Every day hundreds of newborn babies die because their mothers
lacked basic maternal health care. We have the means at our disposal to
prevent this tragedy. Let us agree to do so, in the name of humanity”.168
I will not address the Cairo Conference in at any length, but I wish to
emphasize two issues. First, included among the Cairo conference’s con-
tributions to the women’s human rights discourses was the Cairo Program-
me placing the issue of women’s human rights and women’s reproductive
rights at the centre of the world political debate regarding population
growth and development.169 Kurt Tarnoff noted that “[p]erhaps the
most significant departure [at the Cairo conference] from previous popu-
lation conferences is the emphasis placed on women’s status and the im-
portance of women in the broader context of sustainable develop-
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to the Vienna Programme, and focuses especially on the development of methodologies
for the promotion and protection of human rights stressing the importance of a an integ-
rated and holistic approach, mainstreaming of human rights and target-oriented protec-
tion, see UN doc. E/CN.4/1998/104. For further discussion, see Chapter 4.6.2.
167 Charlesworth 1996a. The Beijing Platform in Art. 223, reaffirming the Vienna and
Cairo reproductive rights statements, noted that “... reproductive rights rest on the re-
cognition of the basic right of couples and individuals to decide freely and responsibly
on the number, spacing, and timing of their children ...”. Note that this article is one of
the articles, against which, many states reserved themselves. The article, however, avoids
making reproductive rights into an issue interlinked with women’s bodily integrity.
Similar points of views were expressed in interviews Nos. 3 and 13.
168 UN doc. A/Conf.171/13/Add.1 (1994).
169 For further analysis of the Cairo conference, and especially of reproductive rights,
see Eriksson 2000. For references to the strengthening of the pro-life anti-abortion agenda,
Buss and Herman 2003 and Head 2000a–b.
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ment”.170 However, he also stated that “[b]y far the most controversial
issue expected to be taken up at the Cairo conference is language in the
Plan of Action addressing aspects of sexual and reproductive rights and
health”.171 While the Cairo conference did emphasize women’s bodily
integrity and women as agents in the population and development de-
bate, the Conference also showed that women’s bodily integrity remains
an area for cultural, religious, economic and political conflicts vis-à-vis the
question of abortion and other similar issues. For example, in his opening
speech, Al Gore, at the time the United States Vice President, brought
the controversial issue of abortion to the table as he underlined that the
United States Constitution “... guarantees every woman within its borders
a right to choose an abortion, subject to limited and specific exception”,
he continued noting that:
[w]e are committed to that principle [women’s right to choose abortion].
But let us take a false issue on the table: The United States does not seek to
establish a new international right to abortion ...172
In her speech, Benazir Bhutto, then Prime Minister of Pakistan, highlight-
ed the importance of the principle of equality between women and men,
but she also referred to the principle of sanctity of life enshrined in the
Koran and condemned the use of abortion as a means for family planning
and population control.173 Eriksson notes with respect to the contempor-
ary approach to reproductive rights within international law that the
concept failed to comprehend either in depth or in breadth by the inter-
national entities, instead “... the definition of several key terms, which
form part of it [reproductive rights], has remained rigid and narrow”.174
Secondly, the Cairo Programme emphasized as core political issues
women’s right to bodily integrity, women’s agency and male responsibili-
ty within the family as well as within national and international politics
and lawmaking.175 That is, the Cairo conference recognized men, the
construction of masculinities and the promotion of the partnership be-
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170 Tarnoff 1994.
171 Tarnoff 1994, see also Nikolay 1994.
172 UN doc. A/Conf.171/13/Add.1 (1994). Gore’s strong statement in favor of abortion
is interesting with respect to subsequent developments of the Bush administrations so-
called war against women.
173 UN doc. A/Conf.171/13/Add.1 (1994).
174 Eriksson (2000, p. 491) also notes that as gender remains only marginally integrated
into the human rights framework, and that reproductive right remains only marginally
integrated as part the right to life, the right to health and the prohibition against torture.
175 The Cairo Programme Chapter 5, para. 1 acknowledges that various forms of the fa-
mily exists in different social, cultural, legal, and political systems. The Cairo Program-
me included a chapter on Gender Equality, Equity and Empowerment of Women UN doc.
A/Conf.171/13, Chapter IV.
04-02 Iustus, Sari 8/3  04-03-08 15.31  Sidan 123
tween men and women as core issues of the 1990s sexual and reproductive
health and gender equality debates. While a the partnership approach is
viewed as important in the Beijing and the Beijing+5 processes, it is only
in the Cairo Programme that the focus on men and male responsibilities
for sexual and reproductive health issues and gender equality is framed
in a language of men’s power and dominant position within the family and
in national and international politics. The Cairo Programme notes that:
[c]hanges in both men’s and women’s knowledge, attitudes and behaviour
are necessary conditions for achieving the harmonious partnership of men
and women. Men play a key role in bringing about gender equality since, in
most societies, men exercise preponderant power in nearly every sphere of
life, ranging from personal decisions regarding the size of families to the
policy and programme decisions taken at all levels of Government.176
In later UN documentation, the issue of a woman’s bodily integrity, es-
pecially, with a focus on abortion and the issue of men’s responsibilities
have been framed using a less strong language.177
3.5 The World Conferences on Women 
and Gender Mainstreaming
3.5.1 From Mexico to Nairobi
In 1972, the General Assembly and the ECOSOC proclaimed 1975 as
the International Women’s Year and suggested that a world conference
on women be held during that year.178 Few objected to the proposal, ex-
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176 UN doc. A/Conf.171/13, Chapter 4, Art. 24. In the same article, it is noted that
“[i]t is essential to improve communications between men and women on issues of sexu-
ality and reproductive health, and the understanding of their joint responsibilities, so
that men and women are equal partners in public and private life”. The objectives tied to
Art. 24 include to promote gender equality in all spheres of life (Art. 25). The actions
envisaged include the education of men (Art. 25), including of boys before they become
sexually active (Art. 29). Emphasis is also placed on the prevention of violence against
women and children (Art. 28), and the safety of women in abusive relationships.
177 The integration of men into equality politics will further be addressed in Chapters
3.4.3, 4.3.2 and 6.3.
178 Fraser (1987, pp. 1–2) noted that the idea of an international women’s year did not
come from the UN, but from “traditional women’s organizations” which, according to
Fraser, “... would never publicly admit to being feminist, [although] they carried on the
feminist tradition from the suffrage movement of the nineteenth and early twentieth
century to the resurgence of the women’s movement in the late 1960s”. Hernández-
Truyol (1999, p. 31) claimed that the “... emergence, evolution and revolution of women’s
human rights dates from 1975, which was proclaimed International Women’s Year”.
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cept the Saudi Arabian delegate, who argued that women already had all
the equality that they needed and that the proposed conference would
be “disruptive”.179 Princess Ashrah Pahlavi of Iran objected by arguing
that “male imperialism” had paralyzed important parts of society in both
the developing and the developed worlds long enough and that it was
time that women stopped being “a colony of man”.180
The First World Conference on Women was held in Mexico in 1975
during the International Women’s Year. It marks the beginning of the
UN Decade for Women (1975–85). Arvonne Fraser notes that the “...
fact that this conference was held in the developing world, in a country
contiguous to one of the most highly industrialized nations of the world,
graphically illustrated and symbolized the divisions that would be felt
and discussed at this conference”.181 The differences between southern
and northern experiences were also highlighted in many of the opening
speeches at the Mexico conference. The Secretary-General for the Inter-
national Women’s Year and the Conference, Helvi Sipilä of Finland
underlined in her opening speech that “[i]n fact, women throughout the
world share so many problems that they can and must support and re-
inforce each other in a joint effort to create a better world”.182
The symbol for the International Women’s Year was a stylized dove
with a women’s symbol, viz. a circle on top of a cross. A symbol designed, argues
Fraser, to transcend cultural, language and not the least literacy barriers.
The symbol has “... become an international symbol of the drive for
women’s equality, reprinted literally millions of times, recaptured in jew-
ellery and printed in fabric used the world over ...”.183
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179 Fraser 1987, p. 18, citing Meeting in Mexico 1975, p. 17.
180 Fraser 1987, p. 18, citing Meeting in Mexico 1975, p. 17. Fraser (1987, p. 19) noted
that while few Governments objected to the conference, the work of Helvi Sipilä of Fin-
land, who had been chosen as Assistant Secretary-General for the Women’s Year, was far
from easy because many high level members of the UN staff, remained sceptical about
the conference.
181 Fraser 1987, p. 17.
182 Fraser 1987, p. 23, citing Meeting in Mexico 1975, p. 20–23. The final document
from the Mexico conference highlights the north-south and man-woman frames. The final
document has a strong focus on development issues, at the same time as it uses a women’s
perspective. The main objective is outlined in Art 14 as “... to define a society in which
women participate in real and full sense in economic, social and political life and to
devise strategies whereby such societies could develop”. The General Assembly endorsed
the results of the First Women’s Conference through adopting ten resolutions for their
implementation.
183 Fraser 1987, p. 21.
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The second World Conference on Women was held in Copenhagen
in 1980. The aim of the Copenhagen conference was to readjust pro-
grammes for the second half of the Women’s decade.184 Important issues
regarding women’s inequality were discussed at the Copenhagen confer-
ence. While an official signing ceremony for CEDAW was held at the
Conference, it was also used as a political platform to discuss other
world political issues. The difference between what was perceived as wo-
men’s issues and real political issues became clear at the Copenhagen
conference. It also became clear who has the power to discuss which
issues. Fraser provides an image of when what she calls “troublesome in-
ternational issues” were to be discussed at the Copenhagen conference.
While women had dominated most of the conference, suddenly, when
certain issues were to be discussed, there was “... a flurry of activity as
women delegates were moved aside and the men in virtually every de-
legation began to move into the chairs behind the microphones”.185
As more men moved into the room and the country chairs, gradually little
murmurs of conversation was heard as one woman whispered to another
about male takeover and transfer of power. Eventually [...] a few delegates
had the courage to make slightly humorous or ironic comments on this al-
most universal practice. The point was made that women were not in the
ultimate decision making positions in any country ...186
However, while women were able to unite as not being dominant in
their national contexts or as not being chairs of their country’s delega-
tions when certain issues were discussed, the final document from the
Copenhagen conference provided an image of a world divided not as
much between women and men, but, rather, as among the developing
world, the developed world and countries with centrally planned econ-
omies.187
The Third World Conference on Women, which also ends the UN
Decade for Women, is held in Nairobi in 1985. The aim of the Nairobi
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184 The sub-themes chosen for the Copenhagen conference were education, employ-
ment and health. See Fraser 1987 and Rehof 1993. See also General Assembly resolution
3520 (xxx) (1975), UN doc. A/Res/35/175, and Yearbook of the UN 1975,
pp. 658–662.
185 Fraser 1987, p. 81.
186 Fraser (1987, pp. 79–81) also noted that the situations in Mexico and Copenhagen
became too embarrassing to persist and that by the end of the Nairobi conference, wo-
men dominated the debate throughout the whole conference. However, as noted by
Björk (2003), dominating discussions at a women’s conference does not necessarily
mean being dominant when and where “important” issues are being discussed. See Chap-
ter 5.2.2.
187 Fraser 1987, p. 82.
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conference was to review the progress made during the UN Decade for
Women and to identify remaining obstacles. The review of the progress
made showed that the Decade had played a catalytic role with respect to
legal reforms and with respect to the promotion of de jure equality, but
that reality lagged far behind.188 When outlining world developments,
The Nairobi Forward-Looking Strategies provided, a rather gloomy image
of socioeconomic and natural environments in flux. It was also noted
that women are the ones who lose out if significant action is not taken
to reduce the economic and political gaps between the industrialized and
the developing worlds, as well as the gaps between men and women.189
Mass poverty and the backwardness of the majority of the world’s popu-
lation stemming from underdevelopment produced by imperialism, co-
lonialism, neo-colonialism, apartheid and racism are used to explain the
disparity in resources and power between women and men.190
The conference organizers, however, decided to take a progressive
perspective and to design forward-looking strategies to the year 2000.
Fraser described the Forward-Looking Strategies as aggressive in their as-
sertion that a women’s perspective is necessary on all issues. The Nairobi
Forward-Looking Strategies did occasionally use a gender language and
noted, for example, that “[w]omen, by virtue of their gender, experience
discrimination in terms of denial of equal access to the power structure
that controls society and determines development issues and peace initi-
atives”.191 Similarly, the Nairobi Forward-Looking Strategies referred oc-
casionally to rights, but it does not have a strong human rights focus.192
Fraser argued that “[i]n feminist terms, what was under discussion at
Mexico City and again at Copenhagen was patriarchy, male power and
structures”, but these themes were blurred by the other issues, viz., equal-
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188 Fraser 1987, p. 161.
189 Nairobi Forward-Looking Strategies Arts. 22–36.
190 Nairobi Forward-Looking Strategies Arts. 44, 49–50 and 60–76.
191 Nairobi Forward-Looking Strategies Art. 46. The UN-based follow-ups to the
Nairobi conference and to the Nairobi forward-looking strategies have been carried out
within the framework of the UN system-wide plans for the advancement of women.
The first system-wide plans were adopted as a response to the Nairobi conference on the
initiative of the Commission on the Status of Women. See UN doc. E/1986/8 and
E/Res/1986/71. However, while providing a general map of world scale differences af-
fecting the lives of women, the Nairobi Forward-Looking strategies also began the trend
of identifying special, or especially vulnerable, groups of women, such as, urban poor,
elderly, young, disabled, female-headed households, victims of trafficking and prostitu-
tion, migrant and refugees, women deprived of their traditional livelihood, et cetera. See
also Chapter 3.3.1.
192 See, for example, Nairobi Forward-Looking Strategies Art. 57. The main reference
to human rights related references to the emphasis that states should sign and ratify
CEDAW, see Art. 60.
04-02 Iustus, Sari 8/3  04-03-08 15.31  Sidan 127
ity, development and peace.193 The obfuscating impact of the latter on the
issues of patriarchy, male power and male structures, however, does not
suggest that the issue of patriarchy is not implied in issues, such as,
equality, development and peace, but “[t]he deeper implications of the
drive for equality by women were often either denied or ignored by
delegates”.194
Diversionary tactics are often strategic defenses. And power is illusive. If
equality had to wait for development, [...] and development could not occur
until the vestiges of colonialism were eradicated, then the argument could
be about the new international economic order. This delayed arguing about
equality. [...] The questions are complex. The diversionary tactics were to
avoid the deeper meanings of the equality questions and to ask women to
choose between loyalty to their country and its point of view or to their
own interests and that of their sisters.195
However, she also noted that the Nairobi Forward-Looking Strategies
implied that “... women must accept much of the burden for advancing
their own status. They must act as equals in order to become equal. This
means sharing responsibilities in order to demand rights and sharing
control over children and home in order to free themselves for other
responsibilities and rights. It means taking power and not asking for it”.196
Fraser’s comment is interesting because it counteracts the current trend
of viewing equality politics as uncontroversial. She recognized that it is
and, in all likelihood, will continue to be for a while women who work
for equality between the sexes because it is women who are most likely
to suffer from structural inequalities between the sexes.
Fraser used the image of the Peace Tent, an innovation at the Nairobi
conference, as an image to sum the Nairobi conference. The idea of the
Peace Tent was to invite opposing groups, which at the Nairobi Confer-
ence included Iranian and Iraqi delegates, Palestinian and Israeli delegates
and Soviet and United States delegates to dialogue with respect to differ-
ences in experiences, positions and worldviews.197 In the Peace Tent, the
media was sidelined and the focus was on women’s own dialogue. Fraser
summed up the UN Decade for Women stating:
[i]n a world torn by violence, they [women] have declared that violence is
no solution to problems. In a world structured on inequality, they have de-
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193 Fraser 1987, p. 79.
194 Fraser 1987, p. 79.
195 Fraser 1987, p. 80. Compare with Otto’s (1999) analysis of the Beijing conference,
see Chapter 3.5.2.
196 Fraser 1987, p. 169.
197 Fraser 1987, pp. 210–1.
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clared equality as a goal. And in a world that considered development equi-
valent to economic growth, they have put forward a more comprehensive
definition. Development, in a women’s perspective, is not measured solely
by gross national product numbers; it is measured in human terms, qual-
itatively.198
While Fraser probably captures much of the trends and dominant ideas
of the women’s decade, in her analysis from the consciousness-raising
conference in Mexico to the forward-looking conference in Nairobi, her
choice of language and her perspective also capture some of the women’s
advancement discourse of the 1970s and 80s: that is, it was argued that
women could transcend the great cultural, religious, geopolitical barriers
and, if they could not, they could somehow use the difference. Further,
it was argued that a women’s perspective was per se about promoting
peace, equality and development.
3.5.2 The Fourth World Conference on Women and the Dual
Strategy
The Beijing Conference
The three themes of the UN Decade for Women were development, pe-
ace and equality. While unresolved, it seemed as though the themes had
been exhausted by the time of the Beijing conference.199 The Beijing
conference was largely dominated by the gender equality and women’s
rights agendas. The world political situation and power relations had
changed between the Nairobi and Beijing conferences. According to
Otto, the feminist agenda at Beijing was influenced by the rejection of
Communism in Eastern Europe and the “triumph of capitalism”, the
advances of the human rights framework and the increased post-colonial,
post-structural and queer critiques of modernity.200 That is, at the Beijing
conference and also in the Beijing Platform, there was a shift in focus
from a development agenda with a strong economic and social rights
focus to a human rights agenda with a strong civil and political rights
focus.
The shift in focus from economic and social rights to civil and polit-
ical rights had been feared as being the hidden agenda already at the
time of the Vienna conference. As Otto noted “[t]he Western prioritisa-
tion of political and civil rights, increasingly endorsed by the former
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198 Fraser 1987, p. 213.
199 Fraser 1987, p. 90.
200 Otto 1999, pp. 122–.5.
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East, served as a new orthodoxy of free-market ideology and neo-imperi-
alist development models”.201 The Beijing conference removed “... class
inequality from the global agenda”.202 For example as Otto has noted,
the emphasis on an integrated approach to women’s human rights and
on the indivisibility of the different generations of rights are ideas which
are not reproduced under the strategic objective on poverty, but the
language of rights disappearswhen poverty is addressed. According to
Otto, this occurrence suggests that the Beijing Platform assumes:
[f ]irst, that capitalism has the ability to deliver economic equality to poor
women of the world and, second, that the obligation of states to guarantee
certain economic and social rights is made redundant by the more ‘efficient’
processes of free-market forces. Further, the reproduction of gender hier-
archies by free market competition is ignored and there is no attempt to
address the global imbalance of wealth and consumption that exists be-
tween the North and South. This outcome further highlights the limita-
tions of the equality paradigm, which is blind to inequitable standards that
underpin its formal comparisons.203
The shift from a development-oriented to a fairly, as it seems, conservative
human rights agenda, however, must also be seen in light of the fact that
the Beijing conference was a women’s conference and not a human rights
conference. The Beijing conference and platform, in fact, addressed
economic and social issues extensively, but not within its human rights
segment. Hence, while Otto was certainly correct in her claim that there
was little contact between the woman-in-development and women’s-
rights-are-human-rights tracks at the Beijing conference and on the Beij-
ing Platform, this occurrence is probably as much a consequence of
world politics as it is the historical and constantly reproduced separation
between the women’s advancement agenda and the human rights agenda
and the ambiguous position of the women’s human rights agenda be-
tween the two tracks.204
The question of differences among women, as Higgins noted, did also
present a series of practical and theoretical problems at the Beijing con-
ference.205
The practical problems arose out of the enormous task of negotiating among
a large group of people a single, albeit complex document that would set
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201 Otto 1999, p. 123.
202 Otto 1999, p. 122. See also, for example, Falk 2002, Milner 2002 and Orford 2002.
203 Otto 1999, pp. 128–9.
204 Otto 1999, pp. 123–4. See also Otto 1996c and 1999.
205 Higgins 1996, p. 89.
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the agenda for addressing the problems of women globally. Differences in
culture, language, religion and education presented complications at every
stage of the process.206
The Beijing Platform Art. 46 included what Otto called the Beijing
Platform’s “pivotal statement about diversity”.207 The Beijing Platform
Art. 46 recognized, for example that
... women face barriers to full equality and advancement because of such
factors as their race, age, language, ethnicity, culture, religion or disability,
because they are indigenous women or because of other status. Many wo-
men encounter specific obstacles related to their family status, particularly
as single parents; and to their socio-economic status, including their living
conditions in rural, isolated or impoverished areas.
However, while the article airs an inclusive and diversity-friendly ap-
proach, the inclusiveness is conditioned and, as noted by Otto, “[t]he
contestation of the limits of women’s identities was a consistent under-
current in Beijing”.208
These negotiations of gendered identities mark the contested boundaries
of acceptable womanhood in the global frame.209
Otto exemplified the boundaries with the varied topics of discussions
that took place at Beijing, viz., about sexual orientation, women’s place
within and alternatives to the heterosexual family unit and women’s dual
roles as mothers and nurturers and as managers and entrepreneurs.210
Hence, while the Beijing Platform allowed for some additional scope for
a woman’s self-definition, more, for example, than was recognized in
CEDAW, it also resulted in what Otto calls “... a new alliance between
traditional ideas about women as mothers and wives and the current
imperative to harness the skills and energies of women to support free-
market development”.211
That is, the Beijing agenda was dominated by rights and gender issues,
but how rights and gender were to be conceptualized was not evident
and during the conference process attempts were made to circumscribe,
rather than to expand the women’s human rights agenda and the frames
of allowed womanhood.
131
206 Higgins 1996, p. 89.
207 Otto 1996c, p. 25.
208 Otto 1996c, p. 25.
209 Otto 1996c, p. 25.
210 Otto 1996c, p. 27.
211 Otto 1999, p. 131.
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The Preparatory Regional Conferences
Five regional preparatory meetings for the Beijing conference were held
in late 1994 and early 1995.212 While differently and to a different extent,
the final regional documents almost all used a language of gender and in-
cluded some references to human rights. They also all, at least with respect
to certain, issues promoted some form of a dual strategy, emphasizing, at
the same time, the strengthening of woman-centred initiatives and the
integration of either women or gender.
The Jakarta Declaration for the Advancement of Women in Asia and the
Pacific (the Jakarta Declaration) used a language of gender. The Jakarta
Declaration noted, for example, that gender roles are changing in con-
temporary Asia and in the Pacific region and that women have been more
open to these changes than men. The Jakarta Declaration approached
the notion of gender as socially construed and changeable. Art. 13 stres-
sed, for example:
[d]espite overwhelming evidence to the contrary, the assumption that gen-
der roles are fixed biologically has become embedded in cultures, resulting
in attitudes and behaviour of both women and men that have proved par-
ticularly resistant to change.
The Jakarta Declaration also included a critical area of concern over wo-
men’s human rights. The issues characterized as women’s human rights
issues were described as different forms of violence against women, the
rights of indigenous women, work and family relations.213
A dual strategy for equality between the sexes is proposed in the Jakarta
Declaration especially at the part when the declaration discusses national
and development initiatives.214 According to the Jakarta Declaration,
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212 The final documents from the regional meetings were used in the UN drafting pro-
cess for the Beijing Platform. The following regional platforms were adopted the Jakarta
Declaration (the Asia and Pacific Regional Conference), UN doc. E/CN.6/1995/5/
Add.1; the African Platform for Action (African Regional Conference), UN doc.
E/CN.6/1995/5/Add.2; the Latin American Program for Action (Latin American 
Regional Conference), UN doc. E/CN.6/1995/5/Add.3; the Economic Commission of
Europe (ECE) Programme for Action (European Regional Conference), UN doc.
E/CN.6/1995/5/Add.4; and the Arab Plan of Action (Arab Regional Conference), UN
doc. E/CN.6/1995/5/Add.5. See also Otto 1996c, pp. 10–1.
213 UN doc. E/CN.6/1995/5/Add.1, Arts. 40–9. Strategic objectives were developed
with regard to violence against women, indigenous women and women under war and
conflict situation, see UN doc. E/CN.6/1995/5/Add.1, Chapter IV (E).
214 The Jakarta declaration refers to the integration of women as agents in the develop-
ment process (Art. 1), and to the “... integration of gender concerns in all stages and at
all levels of sustainable development as a means to ensure human well-being, equitably
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strong woman- or equality-centered institutions are needed within bureau-
cracies at the same time that gender concerns should be mainstreamed
into public policies and programmes. The Jakarta Declaration defines
gender mainstreaming as:
[a] assigning well-defined responsibilities, and strengthening the institutio-
nal capacity of all government agencies to undertake gender-responsive de-
velopment planning in their sectors or areas of responsibility; [b] timely
and reliable statistics on the situation of women and men to provide a basis
for formulating policies and programmes, and for monitoring and evaluat-
ing them.215
The African Platform for Action (the African Platform) used a language
of gender. As opposed to the Jakarta declaration, the African platform
used a language of gender mainly as an alternative for sex. The African
Platform, for example, refers to the importance of “gender-disaggrega-
ted” data.216 To a more significant degree, the African Platform focused
on human rights. One of its critical areas of concern is women’s legal and
human rights. The African Platform refers to the Vienna Conference,
noting that “[t]he conference took historic new steps in declaring that
violation of women’s rights is violation of human rights” and to Art. 18
of the Vienna Programme that states that the human rights of women
and the girl-child are an inalienable, integral and indivisible part of uni-
versal human rights.217 While not extensively referring to or outlining a
dual strategy, the African Platform does between the strategy for integra-
ting a gender perspective and human rights.The mission statement of the
African platform notes that:
[t]he operating principle of the African Platform for Action is the integra-
tion of the gender perspective in all policies, plans and action directed to-
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enjoyed by all people” (Art. 5), and the declaration stresses that “[c]onsistent efforts to-
wards achieving a balanced gender partnership are a prerequisite for the full development
of human potential” (Art. 6). However, gender-responsive planning, policy-making and
implementation are referred to as mechanisms for increasing equality between women
and men under many of the strategic objectives. See the strategic Objectives B1, B2 and
B4.
215 Jakarta declaration art. 69–70.
216 For alternatives see, for example, the African Platform Arts. 4, 21, 41, 73 and 75.
When addressing women’s and men’s roles in the family and in society, the Platform no-
ted that: “[s]ocialization is the process by which a child is taught the roles he or she is to
play in society. This process determines how adult men and women behave as chief
agents of socialization in families, schools and communities”, see the African platform,
Art. 41.
217 African platform, Art. 56.
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wards the achievement of equality, development and peace. The underly-
ing assumption is that international instruments that have been developed
for human rights should be applicable to all sectors of society.218
The Latin American and Caribbean Programme for Action (Latin Ameri-
can and Caribbean programme) picked up, although somewhat reluct-
antly, the language of gender. The Programme expressed an ambivalent
approach to gender and gender analysis. Gender equity and analysis
were perceived as potentially dynamic, at the same time that the mean-
ing of gender was pinned down by biological differences and its conse-
quences for human reproduction. The programme notes, for example,
in paragraph 11 that:
[i]n recent years, the new concept of gender equity has been developed as a
means for approaching this problem [participation of women in social and
economic life without discrimination on the grounds of sex, race or ethnic
group]; though not yet an object of consensus, it is a dynamic idea that is
still evolving and that represents a basic contribution to the analysis of wo-
men’s position in society. The gender inequalities in the economic, politi-
cal, social and cultural spheres have arisen from the biological differences
between the sexes in terms of reproduction.
When addressing the strategic area of concern on Human Rights, Peace
and Violence, the Latin American and Caribbean programme noted that
there is a limited recognition that “... women’s rights are human
rights”.219 Among the many strategic actions proposed by the program-
me is the need for a “... theoretical framework with which more effective
steps can be taken to promote equality and combat violence ...” and “...
taking the concept of human rights as the cornerstone of that framework
...”.220
The Arab Plan for Action (Arab Plan) eschewed any use of gender
language and, in fact, cited the term, gender, only very sparingly and as
an alternative for sex.221 The Arab Plan differed from the other regional
platforms in that it explicitly defined religious values as the foundation
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218 African platform, Art. 1a. When approaching global perspectives (Art. 4), the Plat-
form stated that “[t]he gender perspective and its incorporation in all policy decisions is
of paramount importance in engendering equality, development and peace”.
219 Latin American and Caribbean programme, Art. 175g.
220 Latin American and Caribbean programme, Art. 190.
221 For example, the Arab Plan referred to “gender statistics” (Art. 19), to “gender differ-
ences in school enrolment rates” (Art. 29 (2a)) and to “gender discrimination in educa-
tion” (Art. 29 (2m)).
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for the plan and for the rights of women as human beings.222 The Arab
Plan referred to human rights by noting, for example, that the rights of
women are an integral part of the social, economic, political and cul-
tural rights defined in the Universal Declaration under any circumstances
and for any reason and via references to CEDAW223 The Arab Plan used
a woman-centred approach, emphasizing the extirpation of obstacles for
the advancement of women and the importance of empowering women
within the different target areas. The term, mainstreaming, and a lan-
guage of integration were used mainly to refer to the necessity of in-
tegrating women, i.e., as a means of highlighting women’s participation,
for example, in decision-making processes.
The Economic Commission of Europe’s Programme for Action (ECE Pro-
gramme) used a strong gender language.224 The ECE Programme was
the only regional document that elaborated upon the meaning of gender
as an analytical tool, however, in this case equating gender with sex and
giving it a strong woman focus.225 The ECE Programme’s Art. 94 stated
that:
[g]ender analysis, including statistics, should be used systematically to iden-
tify the gender-specific impact and implications of economic, political and
social reforms and policies, including international trade agreements. In
many instances the gender analysis should be further broken down into
age-specific categories and the outcome of the gender analysis incorporated
in decision-making processes. A systematic gender analysis of the causes
and consequences of poverty should be developed to identify those categories
of women that are most affected. Efficient systems are needed for monitor-
ing potentially harmful impacts so that policies can be redesigned as required.
These should be developed with the active participation of Governments
and non-governmental organizations.
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222 Arab plan, Art. 4.
223 Arab plan, Arts. 24 and 39.
224 See, for example, the ECE Programme for Action Arts. 9, 27, 30, 31, 43, 63, 93,
124, 125 and 156. Gender as social sex was used, for example, in the context of changing
“gender roles” within the family and in the labor market, Art. 9, in stressing the close in-
terrelatedness of human sexuality and “gender relations” and that these together “... ef-
fect the ability of women and men to achieve and maintain sexual health and manage
their reproductive lives”, Art. 27. The ECE Programme also stressed, for example, the ur-
gent need of refugee women for “gender-sensitive” protection, Arts. 30–3, and addressed
“gender concerns” in employment, Art. 43, and “gender-sterotyping” in the media, Art. 63.
225 The ECE Platform was also elaborate in its promotion of gender analysis and of a
strategy for mainstreaming gender concerns. See, for example, ECE Platform Arts. 16,
102j, 106, 119, 181 and 209c.
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The ECE programme also referred in its preambular declaration to
human rights underlining that:
[t]he human rights of women are an inalienable, integral and indivisible
part of universal human rights and must therefore be promoted, protected
and realized at all stages of the life cycle – childhood, adolescence, adult-
hood and old age – and must further reflect the full diversity of women, re-
cognizing that many women face additional barriers because of such factors
as their race, language, ethnicity, culture, religion, sexual orientation, dis-
ability, socio-economic class or status as indigenous people, migrants, dis-
placed people or refugees.226
The ECE Programme underlined the importance of a dual strategy for
women’s advancement and equality.227 While accentuating the need for
targeted action for women, the ECE programme underlined that the
gender impact must be taken into account from the earliest stages of
and throughout the implementation and evaluation of policies.228 The
outlined system-wide and broad-based strategy for gender analysis was
based on “... lessons drawn from a gender and development approach,
as well as from countries which pursue gender-sensitive policy implementa-
tion strategies” and these should be furthered so as to develop “... metho-
dologies and mechanisms and for mainstreaming gender concerns into
economic and social policy”.229 The gender mainstreaming strategy as
outlined in Art. 189 stated that:
[m]ainstreaming of the gender perspective should be applied to coopera-
tion programmes aimed at developing the private sector of the economy in
the countries in transition. Western establishments and joint ventures should
be stimulated through these programmes to apply and promote non-discri-
mination and affirmative action measures.
The ECE Programme promoted a connection between what it defines as
the partnership approach and gender mainstreaming.
Partnership between women and men is the basis for a new gender contract
based on equality, which would entail a redistribution of domestic and
family care, contribute to economic independence for women, reduce wo-
men’s double workload and break down existing stereotypes of the roles of
women and men [...] An active and visible strategy of gender mainstream-
ing is perceived as a integral to the process for transforming the gender
contract.230
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226 UN doc. E/CN.6/1995/5/Add.4, Art. 2a.
227 ECE Programme Art. 212.
228 ECE Programme, Art. 22.
229 ECE Programme, Art. 22.
230 ECE Programme, Art. 2.
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The partnership approach is later recognized, especially in conjunction
with the Beijing+5 process as an integral part of, alternatively as an addi-
tion to the strategy for mainstreaming a gender perspective.
Hence, while a language of gender, a focus on rights and some form
of a dual strategy are promoted in all regional documents, the emphasis
of each document is different. Moreover, the similarities in the choice of
concepts and phrasing, i.e., the emphasis, for example, on women’s rights
as human rights or on the mainstreaming of a gender perspective, does
not have the same meaning in the different regional platforms. It is the
European approach that became dominant at the Beijing conference
and in the Beijing Platform with regard to both rights and gender main-
streaming.
Advancing Women and Mainstreaming Gender
The drafting and negotiation processes of the Beijing Platform were
affected by the above-referenced trends. The draft Beijing Platform
remained heavily bracketed throughout the drafting process and up
until the last stages of the negotiation process at the Beijing Confer-
ence.231 Moreover, many states submitted reservations and interpretive
comments, delimiting the scope and interpretation of the Beijing Plat-
form, both with respect to the use of the term, gender, and in areas, such,
as the sexual and reproductive rights of women.232 The version of the Beij-
ing Platform, which ended up being adopted, became, nevertheless, a
much referred to and fairly useful document.
The Beijing Platform consists of twelve critical areas of concern, viz.,
women and poverty, the education and training of women; women and
health; violence against women; women and armed conflict; women and
the economy; women in power and decision-making; institutional mech-
anisms for the advancement of women; women and the media; women
and the environment; and the girl-child. The twelve critical areas all have
a strong woman-focus. However, the Beijing Platform also established
the dual strategy, which has since been promoted as the dominant dual
strategy for women’s advancement and gender equality within the UN
system. The dual strategy promoted in the Beijing Platform emphasized,
on the one hand, woman-centred equality initiatives by developing twelve
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231 Otto (1996c, p. 7) noted that the Beijing Conference was defined as much by its
participants as by its non-participants. Saudi Arabia and Granada did not participate
and Somalia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia were not invited.
232 For an overview of the reservations and interpretive comments, see Dormady 1997.
For alternative analysis, see Buss and Herman 2003.
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critical woman-centred areas of concern and by identifying strategic
objectives to be taken by governments and by UN inter-governmental
institutions and specialized agencies. On the other hand, the Beijing
Platform, also under each of the strategic objectives, emphasized its the
strategic objectives cannot be attained through woman-centred initiatives
alone, but that
[g]overnments and other actors should promote an active and visible policy
of mainstreaming a gender perspective into all policies and programmes, so
that, before decisions are taken, an analysis is made of the effects on women
and men, respectively.233
The term, gender, nevertheless, remained in brackets in the draft Beijing
Platform during much of the negotiation process, both during the 39th
session (1995) of the Commission on the Status of Women, that served
as a preparation for the Beijing conference, and during the actual Beijing
conference itself. At its 39th session, the Commission on the Status of
Women decided to establish an informal contact group to seek agree-
ment on the “... the commonly understood meaning of the term ’gen-
der’ in the context of the Platform for Action of the Fourth World Con-
ference on Women”.234 The informal contact group adopted a statement
indicating the commonly understood meaning of the term, gender.235
The statement was to be read at the conference by the President of the
Beijing Conference. According to the statement:
[t]he word “gender” had been commonly used and understood in its ordin-
ary, generally accepted usage in numerous other United Nations forums
and conferences; there was no indication that any new meaning of connota-
tion of the term, different from accepted prior usage, was intended in the
Platform for Action.236
However, there was no commonly known definition and usage of the
word, gender, within the UN prior to the Beijing Conference. The term,
gender, and different forms of gender mainstreaming strategies had al-
ready been promoted within different parts of the UN system, but the
term was neither common nor ordinary.237
The fact that the term gender remained controversial throughout the
Beijing conference can be exemplified by some of the interpretive com-
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233 Beijing Platform art. 79. See also Arts. 105, 123, 141, 164, 189, 202, 229, 238, 252
and 273.
234 UN doc E/CN.6/1995/14-E /1995/26, Chapter I, decision 39/3 and Chapter VIII,
Art. 17. See also Otto 1996, p. 11.
235 UN doc. A/Conf.177/L.2, Art. 2.
236 UN doc. A/Conf.177/L.2, annex, Art. 2.
237 UN doc. HRI/MC/1998/6.
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ments submitted by states as regards the Beijing platform. The inter-
pretive statements, such as the ones submitted by the Holy See and Para-
guay, reacted against the idea that gender is socially construed, i.e.,
against the idea that men and women do not have predefined roles. These
interpretive statements also reacted against the idea that just as gender is
construed, so, too, is dominant forms of sexuality. In other words, these
statements reacted against the idea that heterosexuality should not be
vouchsafed a prioritized position vis-à-vis other forms of sexuality. The
Holy See, for example, submitted an interpretive statement regarding
the concept of gender, accepting its usage in the Beijing Platform, but
noting that it should be understood “... according to ordinary usage in the
United Nations context, the Holy See associates itself with the common
meaning of the that word, in languages where it exists” and further, that:
[t]he term ‘gender’ is understood by the Holy See as grounded in biological
sexual identity, male or female. Furthermore, the Platform for Action itself
clearly uses the term ‘both genders’. The Holy See thus excludes dubious
interpretations based on world views which assert that sexual identity can
be adapted indefinitely to suit new and different purposes.238
The delegation of Paraguay pointed out in its interpretive statement that
the government of Paraguay interpreted the term gender as referring to
both sexes, man and women, and that it is with this sense that the term
had been integrated in Paraguay’s national documents.239
The tensions regarding the term, gender, are also present throughout
the Beijing Platform. The Beijing Platform promoted several different,
and to some extent, contradictory meanings of gender, using it both as
the social dimension of sex and as an alternative to sex. For example, the
Beijing Platform, when it emphasized under the strategic objective on
education the “gender-bias” in teaching and educational material, the
lacking “gender-awareness” of educators and non-discriminatory and
“gender-sensitive” professional school counseling, the Beijing Platform
seemed to promote a social constructionist approach to gender and to aim
at unpacking gender stereotypes.240 However, gender is also used as an
alternative for biological sex. The following examples describe situations
when gender is used in that way, viz., when governments, intergovern-
mental organizations, et cetera, are encouraged to collect “gender- and
age-disaggregated” data; when highlighting the importance of “gender
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238 UN doc. A/Conf.177/20.
239 UN doc. A/Conf.177/20. Note, however that the Holy See’s definition was subsequ-
ently picked up by the International Criminal Court’s Statute and in the final document
of the Durban conference, see Chapter 6.3.
240 See the Beijing Platform Arts. 71, 74, 75, 80a and 83g.
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balance” in connection with nominating persons to judicial and other
positions; or when proposing the elimination of “gender disparities”
with respect to access to all areas of tertiary education by ensuring that
women have equal access to career development, training, scholarships
and fellowships.241
The basic idea behind the Beijing Platform’s dual strategy for the ad-
vancement of women and gender equality is that woman-centred initiat-
ives are necessary as long as women remain structurally disadvantaged
within, for example, the framework of the twelve critical areas of concern.
Woman-centred initiatives, however, can only promote women; they are
not designed to change core economic, political or legal structures. Gen-
der-based mainstreaming initiatives are designed to change the core by
making gender everybody’s concern and by making gender analysis an
integral tool in all policy development. However, given the extensive de-
bate about and the contradictory meanings assigned to the concept of
gender, one might ask whether the notions of mainstreaming a gender
perspective held much substantial contend at Beijing.
Women’s Human Rights
The Beijing Platform’s ninth critical area of concern addresses Human
Rights of Women. Many of the other critical areas of concern and strategic
objectives of the Beijing Platform, such as, for example, education, health
and violence, are issues that can be addressed both in terms of the
advancement of women and of human rights.242 The Beijing Platform ad-
dresses these issues in terms of the advancement of women, with sparing
references to rights, while human rights are referred to as a separate issue.
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241 The Beijing Platform made references to “gender-disaggregated data” when addres-
sing poverty, Art. 68a, and violence against women, Art. 206j; references to “gender-
balance” are made when addressing international bodies, Art. 142b, for lists of national
candidates for election or appointment to UN bodies, Art. 190j and, in general, in UN
Member States, UN delegations and international fora, Art. 192i, 299; and “gender
disparity” is emphasized when proposing that universal access to and when ensuring “...
gender equality in the completion of, primary education for girls by the year 2000”,
Art. 81b; and the proposal to “... take specific measures for closing the gender gaps in
morbidity and mortality where girls are disadvantaged”, Art. 106l. In the Division for
the Advancement of Women report on gender mainstreaming, use of concepts, such as,
“gender-disaggregated data”, was noted. See UN doc. HRI/MC/1998/6, Arts. 30–31
and footnote 27.
242 Violence against women is, however, addressed in relationship to women’s human
rights in larger extent than is the case regarding education, poverty and health. See the
Beijing Platform Arts. 112 and 114. A rights’ language is used with reference to women’s
health. See Beijing Platform Art. 89.
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The critical area of concern of Human Rights of Women is focused on
emphasizing the importance of human rights and on what I have defined
as targeted internvention and integrative action focused on institutional
cooperation when addressing the Vienna Programme.243 The Beijing
Platform Art. 222 stresses the importance of gender analysis arguing that
[i]f the goal of full realization of human rights for all is to be achieved in-
ternational human rights instruments must be applied in such a way as to
take more clearly into consideration the systematic and systemic nature of
discrimination against women that gender analysis has clearly indicated.
The Beijing Platform Art. 225 adds an emphasis on women’s diversity,
noting that:
[m]any women face additional barriers to the enjoyment of their human
rights because of such factors as their race, language, ethnicity, culture, re-
ligion, disability or socio-economic class or because they are indigenous
people, migrant workers, displaced women or refugees.
The draft Art. 225 included reference to sexual orientation, but it was
deleted in the adopted version.244 The article also notes that women
may be marginalized as a consequence of their lack of knowledge about
their human rights.
While, at first glance, the Beijing Platform builds on the Vienna Pro-
gramme’s statement that the human rights of women throughout the
life cycle are an inalienable, integral and indivisible part of human rights
and that all human rights are universal, indivisible, interdependent and
interrelated, the overall emphasis is less clear.245 When addressing women’s
(human) rights the Beijing Platform shifts between a language of “women’s
rights” and “women’s human rights”. The Beijing Platform reaffirms the
Vienna Programme’s emphasis that women’s human rights are human
rights, but limits the notion of women’s human rights to the CEDAW
framework.
In some respects, the draft Beijing Platform included stronger state-
ments regarding women’s human rights than were included in the adop-
ted version of the Beijing Platform. The differences in commitment may
be exemplified by, for example, the Beijing Platform Arts. 213 and 222.
Art. 213 affirmed that all human rights are universal, indivisible, inter-
dependent and interrelated. The article did not affirm that women’s
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243 The importance of recognizing human rights is emphasized in the Beijing Platform
Arts. 210–213. Targeted intervention and integrative action focused on institutional
cooperation is emphasized in Arts. 214–228.
244 UN doc. A/Conf.177/L.1, Art. 226.
245 Beijing Platform Arts. 213 and 216.
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human rights are an inalienable part of universal human rights, but re-
ferred to the Vienna Programme’s affirmation that women’s human
rights are human rights.246 The article also stated that the full and equal
enjoyment of all human rights by women was a priority for Govern-
ments and the UN. The draft Beijing Platform included a bracketed,
stronger commitment, stating that the full and equal enjoyment of all
human rights by women was a requirement of international law. Similar
differences between the Beijing Platform and the draft Beijing Platform
can be detected regarding how gender analysis is introduced to the
human rights framework in Art. 222. The Beijing Platform Art. 222 reads
“[i]f the goal of full realization of human rights for all is to be achieved,
international human rights instruments must be applied in such a way
as to take clearly into consideration the systematic and systemic nature of
discrimination against women that gender analysis has clearly indicated”.
The Draft Beijing Platform Art. 222 reads “[[g]ender] analysis applied
to human rights law has shown that the formal requirement of equal
treatment of men and women does not take into consideration the sys-
tematic nature of discrimination against women. Consequently, if the
goal of universal realization of human rights for all is to be achieved,
[universally accepted] international human rights [law] instruments
must be applied in a way that takes this fact into account.]”. The Beijing
Platform reversed the order of the Draft Beijing Platform’s commitment
to gender analysis within the field of human right. The Beijing Platform
used the term human rights where the Draft Beijing Platform referred to
human rights law. That is, the adopted Beijing Platform seems to yern
for the separation of the notion of women’s rights from the notion of
women’s human rights and especially from the notion of human rights
law. In the aforementioned distinction, women’s rights correspond to
political goals, but the do not aim at altering the interpretation of human
rights.
Follow-up to the Beijing Conference
The Beijing Platform should be implemented through the work of all
the bodies and organizations of the UN system during the period
1995–2000.247 The Beijing Platform underlined that an enhanced frame-
work for international cooperation on gender issues must be developed
within the UN, including a coordinated follow-up to all UN world con-
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246 See the Beijing Platform Art. 213 and UN doc. A/Conf.177/L.3 (Draft Beijing Plat-
form), Art. 213.
247 Beijing Platform Art. 306. See also From Beijing to Beijing+5 2000.
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ferences, and strengthening the UN institutional capacity for implement-
ing the Beijing Platform and the gender mainstreaming strategy.248 The
General Assembly decided that, together with the ECOSOC and the
Commission on the Status of Women, it would form a three-tiered
inter-governmental mechanism responsible for the policy-making and
follow-up to the Beijing conference.249
The five-year review of the Beijing conference was organized as a Gen-
eral Assembly special session entitled, Women 2000: Gender, Equality
and Peace for the Twenty-First Century, the so-called Beijing+5 session.
The special session itself was marked by an increase in rightwing religious
groups lobbying against many of the advances made at Beijing.250 The
Beijing+5 session resulted in the adoption of the Report of the Ad Hoc
Committee of the Whole of the Twenty-third Special Session of the General
Assembly and the adoption of the General Assembly Resolution entitled,
Further Actions and Initiatives to Implement the Beijing Declaration and
Platform for Action (Beijing+5 document).251 The Beijing+5 document
reaffirmed
... the importance of mainstreaming a gender perspective in the process of
implementation of the outcome of other major United Nations conferences
and summits and the need for a coordinated follow-up to all major confer-
ences and summits by Governments, regional organizations, and all of the
bodies and organizations of the United Nations system within their respect-
ive mandates.252
That is, the Beijing+5 session contributes to the emphases on “gender” and
“human rights” as crosscutting issues and on the importance of advancing
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248 The intergovernmental institutions, the General Assembly, the ECOSOC and the
Commission on the Status of Women, the Secretariat institutions, the Office of the
Secretary-General and the Division for the Advancement of Women and specialized
agencies, such as, INSTRAW and UNIFEM were emphasized as key institutions in the
implementation process.
249 UN doc. A/Res/50/203, through E/Res/1996/6. The coordinated follow-up to
world conferences and summits is established by the ECOSOC and the Adminstrative
Committee on Coordination, see UN doc. E/Res/1997/61 and UN doc. E/1998/60. In
accordance with the follow-up overview, the General Assembly is responsible for policy-
making and it is the appraisal organ for the Beijing conference. The ECOSOC should
oversee and make recommendations for the system-wide implementation of the Beijing
Platform and devote its 1995 substantive session to the review and appraisal of the
ECOSOC’s Agreed Conclusions 1997/2. The Commission on the Status of Women
plays a central role in monitoring the implementation within the UN system by giving
recommendations to the ECOSOC.
250 See Buss and Herman 2003 and Head 2000a–b.
251 See UN doc. A/S-23/10/Rev.1 and A/Res/S-23/3.
252 UN doc. A/S-23/10/Rev.1, Political declaration, Art. 7.
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these intersecting agendas through a coordinated conference follow-up.
The analysis of the Vienna and Beijing processes and of the – as it
seems – gradual shift of focus regarding both women’s human rights
issues and the women’s advancement and gender equality agenda, how-
ever, has also demonstrated that while the 1990s opened up for women’s
human rights and gender equality issues, they also changed the focus of
these issues. The change of focus and the undermining of progressive
agendas have led the international women’s non-governmental organi-
zation, Development Alternatives with Women for a New Era (DAWN)
to criticize the current political climate and the negative effects of the
Cairo and Beijing+5 conferences. DAWN published a statement at the
outbreak of the war on Iraq, emphasizing the impact of the changing
political climate on the international community’s engagement for the
advancement and human rights of women.
Contrary to the relatively open environment for such advances that existed
during the 1990s, the first decade of the 21st century confronts us with ex-
treme social conservatism, aggressive unilateralism, and support for militar-
ism of the Bush administration, and the worsening of fundamentalist
trends elsewhere as well. In such as context, it is very important to protect
the gains made for women’s human rights through careful and considered
action.253
These drawbacks and reversals have led to DAWN proclaiming out of
sheer exasperation: “For the sake of our hard won gains, no official nego-
tiations of any kind!”.254
3.5.3 A Short Note on the Integrated and Coordinated 
Follow-up to UN Conferences
The political significance of the UN world conferences and their impact
on world politics are continually renegotiated. The early 1990s confer-
ences, for example, were marked by a political openness and a willing-
ness to discuss social and human rights issues. The world conferences
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253 DAWN says NO TO NEGOTATIONS! 2003. Sen and Corrêa (2000) argued that the
1990s world conferences have been perceived as favourable towards women and women’s
issues, but that the gains won have constantly been compromized by conservative forces.
The events of September 11 and the war against terrorism, however, has led proponents
of informality to question whether informality is really the way to go. That is, in the
struggle between the force of the argument or claim: that’s not legal and the force of the
argument or claim: that’s not fair, the pendulum once again seems to be swinging towards
the that’s not legal argument. See also Buss and Hermann 2003.
254 DAWN says NO TO NEGOTATIONS! 2003.
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held at the beginning of the new Millennium have been marked by the
growing economic and political instability in the world. The Durban
conference, for example, has been seen as the end of the world conferen-
cing era. The Israeli-Palestine conflict, the conflict between the United
States and the Arab world, the North-South conflict regarding largely
environment-related and trade-related issues, however, did put a damp
squid on the conference and its outcome. Feminist scholars have also
increasingly begun to question the content, meaning and status of the
advances made and whether the human and economic resources used in
the preparations for the conferences, at the conferences and for sustain-
ing the outcomes are worthwhile.255
The outcome documents of the world conferences are soft law docu-
ments. The distinction between soft and hard law was addressed in
Chapter One and it was noted that during past few decades, the UN has
developed a preference for soft law solutions, especially in economic and
social fields. However, it was also noted that the distinction between legal
and non-legal obligations remains relevant because using a soft law form
may be a way for states to minimize commitment. Chinkin noted that
“[a]t Beijing, states specifically rejected the Australian proposal that the
conference be one of commitment”.256 Chinkin noted also that al-
though issues regarding equality between the sexes and the human rights
of women have certainly been advanced at the world conferences “... it
must be asked whether the fruits of these conferences have become part
of international law, binding upon states and other international players
with an expectation of compliance”.257
One of the main possibilities and challenges with the programmes
and platforms for action adopted at the world conferences is that they can
be used to introduce new issues onto the UN and the world community
agendas. Michael Banton calls this principle the “principle of ratchet”,
i.e., a group of states wish to address a certain issue and they try together
to secure agreement on a particular wording, which, thereafter, they use
whenever they can. And as Banton noted “[o]nce a form of words has
been accepted it can be used again or moved up a notch; this is the func-
tion of rhetoric in official conferences.258 However, while it is easier to
get an issue into a final document of a world conference, than it is to get
the UN to take up the initiative to draft an international treaty, much
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255 See for example Charlesworth 1996a, Chinkin 1996, Otto 1996a, 1996c and 1999
and Sen and Corrêa 2000.
256 Chinkin 1996, p. 210.
257 Chinkin 1996, p. 209.
258 Banton 2000, p. 68.
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effort and energy is demanded, including, as well many human and
financial resources. Moreover, with regard to controversial issues as much
effort is needed to keep the issue on the agenda. To underscore both the
magnitude and the futility of the effort expended Charlesworth calls this
phenomenon, the Sisyphus phenomenon, after the character in Greek
mythology condemned to roll a huge stone up a mountain. After the
stone has rolled back down again, Sisyphus is doomed to begin all over
again. He is never able ti achieve any kind of permanent change and the
constant work with the stone is a ceaseless heavy burden.259 That is, some
of the advances made are accepted and become part of the international
human rights framework, interpreted as law, politics and policy. The
more controversial questions, however, tend to be reopened at every
conference and re-formulated in order to breakdown the content and
meaning of the advances.260 The DAWN statement refers to the Sisy-
phus phenomenon when noting that:
[c]ontrary to the beliefs of some, prior official statements that promise or
undertake not to reopen previously agreed conference texts provide no
guarantee whatsoever against the weakening of existing agreements. In fact
this was exactly the agreed position of every delegation including the Holy
See (Vatican delegation) at Cairo+5 and Beijing+5, but there was dreadful
struggle anyway. 261
Charlesworth also argued that women are the sherpas of the global sum-
mits.262 Sherpas are Tibetan carriers, i.e., diligent, wise and ever-persis-
tent guides, who in the Tibetan mountains, carry the baggage of explo-
rers and backpackers. Charlesworth suggests that “[w]omen are typically
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259 Charlesworth 1996a.
260 Charlesworth (1996a) used the question of women’s reproductive health to exemplify
the Sisyphus phenomenon. The Cairo Conference placed issues regarding women’s health,
reproduction and sexuality within the human rights framework and addressed abortion
as a public health issue. The Copenhagen Summit used a much weaker language and
much lobbying from the Vatican and right-wing, religious groups have weakened the
status of women’s reproductive rights, not so much at the Beijing conference as at the
Beijing+5 process. It can be noted that most of the reservations and interpretive com-
ments regarding the the Beijing Platform submitted by government delegations related
to women’s bodily integrity and sexual and reproductive rights, see, for example, the re-
servations of Argentina, the Dominican Republic, Egypt and the Holy See, UN doc.
A/Conf.177/20. Eriksson (2000, pp. 178–9) discusses the reservations in relationship to
the persistent objector rule in international law.
261 DAWN says NO TO NEGOTATIONS! 2003. For a critical discussion of the five-year
reviews, see also Sen and Corrêa 2000.
262 Charlesworth (1996a), however, noted that, with the exception for the Beijing con-
ference, women constitute only less than 10 % of the members of the delegations to the
world summits.
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the true sherpas or porters, having carried huge, unrecognised loads to
allow the mountaineers their hour of glory at the summit”.263
Nevertheless, the UN has, made efforts to ensure the follow-up and
consolidation of the outcomes of the UN world conferences. Because
many issues, including gender and women’s human rights issues, are ad-
dressed at several conferences, the UN has taken steps to identify these
crosscutting themes and to promote coordinated follow-ups of the con-
ferences.264 The ECOSOC, its functional commissions and the General
Assembly constitute the three-tiered system for reviewing the follow-up
to UN conferences and summits.
Since 1995, the ECOCOC has taken upon itself the role of promot-
ing integrated and coordinated follow-ups to UN conferences.265 The
ECOSOC reviews progress made in the implementation of issues com-
mon to the conferences during its annual coordination segment and it
addresses the crosscutting themes in its review of the work of its functional
commissions. For example the ECOSOC has addressed mainstreaming
a gender perspective as a crosscutting theme.266 In 2001 ECOSOC
established a regular sub-item, Mainstreaming a Gender Perspective in all
Policies and Programmes of the UN System under its regular agenda item
on coordination issues.267 The Commission on the Status of Women is
implied in the follow-up procedures through its responsibilities for the
Beijing and Beijing+5 follow-ups and the Commission on Human
Rights has been implied through its initiatives for the implementation
of the Durban Conference.268 The General Assembly has also been im-
plied in the follow-up procedures and, since the Millennium Summit
and the adoption of the Millennium Declaration that is linked to key
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263 Charlesworth 1996a.
264 See Secretary-General’s reports UN doc. E/1995/86, UN doc. E/1998/19 and UN
doc. A/57/75-E/2002/57.
265 See the ECOSOC’s Agreed Conclusions 1995/1 and 2000/2, see also UN doc.
E/Res/2001/21 and UN doc. E/2001/73, para. 15–23.
266 For further discussion, see Chapters 4.5 and 5.2.4.
267 See UN doc. E/Res/2001/41 and Chapter 5.2.4.
268 Since the Beijing Conference, the Commission on the Status of Women has revie-
wed the implementation of the critical areas of concern from the Beijing Platform at a
number of its sessions and it has served as the preparatory body for the Beijing+5 session
by reviewing the implementation of the Beijing+5 outcome document. The Commis-
sion on Human Rights decided through Resolution 2002/68 on Racism, racial discrimina-
tion, xenophobia and related intolerance to establish an intergovernmental working group
on the effective implementation of the Durban Programme, to establish a special African
working group and to establish a voluntary fund to ensure additional functions for the
implementation of the Durban Programme. See UN doc. A/57/75-E/2002/57 for the
work of the other functional commissions.
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objectives from the conferences, the General Assembly does contribute
to the integrated and coordinated follow-up through efforts to promote
the implementation of the Millennium declaration.269
3.6 Conclusions
In this chapter, I have provided an outline of the histories of human
rights and of the UN’s human rights framework since the late 18th cen-
tury up to the 1990s violence against women discourse. The purpose of
this chapter has been to show the impact of sex or sexual difference as
legal, political and symbolic markers throughout these histories. The
gradual inclusion of women as rights’ holders and the development of a
transformative women’s human rights framework are construed on the
paradox of feminism and even reproduce it. De Gouges described her
political activism for women’s rights as based on paradoxes. She noted
that many people might not support her because she had only paradoxes
to offer. Scott argued that the paradox is at the heart of the history of
women’s rights advocacy: the goal of the advocacy is to eliminate sex as a
principle of differentiation in politics and law and the main tool for
doing so is to highlight that sex matters, i.e., to reproduce that differen-
ce.270 This paradox should not be reduced to or disregarded as a lapsus
in women’s rights advocacy. The construction of human rights in the
late 18th century demanded the exclusion of man’s others as rights holders
and the exclusions based on sex, race, social origin, geopolitical location,
sexuality, et cetera, have been so fundamental that they cannot be trans-
cended without an emphasis on difference. The construction of the liberal
rights regime has been so clever at exclusionary practices and so successful
in hiding the traces of them, that it is those advocates, who argue for in-
clusion who seem to promote difference and category and identity politics
and who also become the most vulnerable to attack by virtue of their ex-
clusions. That is, Scott notes:
[t]he history of feminism can be understood as an interplay between a re-
petitious pattern of exclusion and a changing articulation of subjects. The
terms of exclusion repeatedly produce ‘sexual difference’ as a fixed, natural
boundary between the political and the domestic, or the self-representing
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269 UN doc. A/Res/55/162 and 56/95, UN doc. A/56/326 and UN doc. A/57/75-
E/2002/57, para. 10. The General Assembly has also through resolution 57/270 estab-
lished an open-ended working group on the integrated and coordinated follow-up to
UN conferences. See UN doc. A/res/57/270 and UN doc. A/Res/56/211. See also Secret-
ary-General’s reports UN doc. E/1995/86 and UN doc. E/1998/19.
270 Scott 1996, p. 4.
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or the represented, or the autonomous and the dependent. But the terms
of exclusion are also variable and contradictory, based in different epistemo-
logies, and this variability and contradiction result in fundamentally differ-
ent conceptions of the ‘women’ whose rights are being claimed.271
The development of the UN human rights framework and the adoption
of woman-centered human rights have resulted in a situation where the
UN human rights framework includes the UN general human rights
documents, as well as the large number of group-specific human rights
frameworks, including women’s human rights. The development of
woman-centred equality strategies within the UN has also led to the de-
velopment of the UN women’s advancement schemes that include equal
opportunities, development and women’s human rights schemes. Hence,
the UN women’s human rights schemes “live double lives”, of sorts.
They belong both to the UN human rights scheme and to the UN
women’s advancement schemes, while, at the same time, not necessarily
being core elements of either scheme. During the 1990s, the UN has
made attempts to overcome similar distinctions between certain areas
and to eliminate any duplication of work efforts. The dual strategies
have been adopted as a means to counteract the marginalization of the
so-called women’s issues.
The dual strategies adopted at the Vienna and Beijing conferences are
attempts to strengthen woman-centered initiatives by ending their mar-
ginalization by resorting to measures for integrating women’s human
rights and mainstreaming a gender perspective. The differences between
the Vienna and Beijing strategies and the differences regarding how wo-
men’s human rights are addressed on the Vienna Programme and on the
Beijing Platform, however, are also results of the partial separation of
human rights from women’s human rights and the latter’s dual nature as
both a human rights issue and an issue of women’s advancement. The
two dual strategies seem compatible with each other and are so, to a cer-
tain degree. However, the first dual strategy has in large extent become
specific to the UN human rights system, while the second dual strategy
should affect the overall UN system, i.e., including the UN human
rights system. In the overall UN system, the dual strategy, especially, the
gender mainstreaming strategy co-exists with other overall policy strat-
egies, such as, the strategy for mainstreaming human rights.
149
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4 Mainstreaming a Gender
Perspective and Integrating
Women’s Human Rights
In Chapter One, I outlined three objectives for this thesis. The first
objective is to situate and analyze the development of the integrative
parts of the Vienna and Beijing Strategies. The second objective 
is to unpack and analyze their content. The third objective is to
analyze their implementation. In Chapter Three, I focused on the
first objective. In this chapter, Chapter Four, I will focus on the
second objective. This chapter is divided into seven parts. After a
brief introduction, I will analyze the analytical tool and category
of gender through its academic history in Chapters 4.2–4.3. In
Chapter 4.4, I will direct my focus on the challenges posed by moving
an analytical category and tool, such as gender, between and among
different language contexts and institutional settings. In Chapter
4.5, I will analyze the UN strategy for mainstreaming a gender
perspective. In Chapter 4.6, I will analyze the UN strategies for
mainstreaming human rights and integrating women’s human
rights. Thereafter I will offer my conclusions.
4.1 Introduction
During the 1990s, the international community exhibited a growing in-
terest in and concern for women’s inequality. So, too, within the UN
human rights framework, there has been a focus on women’s inequality
and on the alleged shortcomings of the sex neutral and separate woman-
centred strategies for addressing inequalities. This focus has led to a shift
within the UN human rights framework toward what I have referred to
as integrative strategies, but, which can also be referred to as mainstream-
ing strategies.1 The aims of these strategies include counteracting the
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1 In this thesis, I have used the term, integrative strategies, when referring to the parts 
of the Vienna and Beijing strategies that emphasize the integration of women’s human
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marginalization of women’s human rights and other so-called women’s
issues within the UN system. However, the exclusion of women’s con-
cerns and, furthermore, the exclusion of women as rights holders are
deeply rooted in dismissive strategies in the history of human rights. The
portrayals of women as the exceptions, as deviances from the male norm
are deleterious themes and ones, which have been reproduced time and
again within the UN human rights framework. These themes have been
perpetuated in the UN system by the very same techniques that the UN
has applied in an effort to address wrongs against women, i.e, via its at-
tempts to promote women’s human rights by devising separate instru-
ments and institutions for women.
In Chapter Three, I discussed some of the problems relating to “cat-
egory-centred” approaches to discrimination and equal rights matters,
emphasizing especially the creation of woman-centred human rights in-
struments. Moreover, I underlined that the partial separation between
“human rights” and “women’s human rights” and the creation of differ-
ent institutional structures for the two sets of rights had led to a situa-
tion where women’s human rights now seem to belong both on the UN
human rights agenda and on its women’s advancement agenda.
The aim of this chapter is to unpack and analyze the content of the
strategies for integrating women’s human rights and mainstreaming a
gender perspective. The analysis is informed by the feminist, constructi-
vist and discursive methodologies presented in Chapter Two. Feminist,
constructivist and discursive methods provide means for questioning what
is perceived as evident. Such methods, such as Bacchi’s What is the prob-
lem? approach, provide means for unpacking strategies, for example, the
aforementioned mainstreaming strategies, These methods also provide
the apparatures for analyzing how the strategies contribute to shaping
problem representations and questioning whether they are adequate
solutions to the problems. The core of the analysis is well captured by
Haslanger’s presentation of causal, constitutive and weak pragmatic con-
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rights and the mainstreaming of a gender perspective. At the risk of creating some confu-
sion, in this chapter, I will use the term, mainstreaming strategies. I prefer the term, integ-
rative strategies, because it is translatable into the languages that I am familiar with, viz.,
Swedish, Finnish and French. However, in this chapter, Chapter 5.4.2, I, however, use a
distinction common in the mainstreaming literature between integrative mainstreaming
and transformative mainstreaming. I would like to avoid using the rather inconvenient
term integrative integrative strategies when referring to a specific form of integrative strat-
egies. Thus, I will in this chapter use the term mainstreaming instead or integrative strat-
egies.
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structions as intertwined. In other words, there is an intertwining of the
three key elements of the analysis: the causal construction is what we
wish to explain, the constitutive constructive is what we wish to explain
it with and the third element is weak pragmatic construction or the feed-
back loop between the first two elements. I am convinced, as is Bacchi,
that it is necessary to challenge the presumption that “... achieving social
problem status for one’s cause is in itself a sign of success [and] a com-
mitment to important change”.2 Bacchi’s What is the problem? appro-
ach develops ways to move beyond monocausal problem representation
that implicitly suggests that simple solutions to social problems exist.
That is, Bacchi suggests that we should not be seduced by what seems
like equality advances. Just because it happened to be difficult and time
consuming to move an issue onto the UN human rights agenda, does
not necessarily ascertain the adequacy or the sufficiency of certain pro-
posed solutions.
The focus of the first parts of this chapter, i.e., in Chapters 4.2–4.5,
will be on the “travels” of the term gender and on the content of strategy
for mainstreaming a gender perspective. The strategy for integrating
women’s human rights will be addressed in Chapter 4.6. The unequal
emphases on the gender-based and women’s human rights-based inte-
grative strategies correspond to unequal emphases on the two strategies
within the UN system. The strategy for mainstreaming a gender perspec-
tive has become the preferred strategy for equality between the sexes. To
a certain extent it has also subsumed the strategy for integrating women’s
human rights.
4.2 Second-Wave Feminist Perspectives 
on the Sex/Gender Distinction
4.2.1 The Development of the Sex/Gender System
In the previous chapter, I noted that, while the Beijing Platform promo-
ted a strategy for mainstreaming a gender perspective, the shift from the
use of a language of sex to the use of a language of gender was one of the
most controversial items during the negotiation process. The purpose of
the following analysis of the academic history of the sex/gender distinc-
tion is twofold. On the one hand, the purpose of the analysis is to de-
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scribe some of the difficulties tied to the gender turn in equality politics
by way of the history of the terms. On the other hand, the purpose of the
analysis is to destabilize the idea of a fixed content or meaning for the
analytic category of gender.3
The term, sex, has traditionally been used within English language to
describe whether a person is male or female. During the 1960s, a sex/
gender distinction was developed by scholars, such as Robert Stoller, who
were interested in analyzing and explaining the experiences of intersexual
and transsexual persons.4 Stoller used the following definitions of sex
and gender:
... the word sex [...] refer[s] to the male and female sex and the component
of biological parts that determine whether one is a male or a female [...]
This obviously leaves tremendous areas of behaviour, feelings, thoughts
and fantasies that are related to the two sexes and yet do not have primarily
biological connotations. It is for some of these psychological phenomena
that the term gender will be used ...5
According to Stoller, an individual’s sex could be either female or male
and an individual’s perception and representation of gender could be
either feminine or masculine. His interest was in what he perceived as
the non-conformity of an individual’s sex and gender.6
David Glover and Cora Kaplan noted that “[a]s much as any single fi-
gure could, Stoller put the distinction between sex and gender on the
map for writers and researchers in the humanities and in social sciences”,
and as his ideas became common-place “... they were also soon being
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3 This overview will evidently make considerable generalizations of the almost half a
century old sex/gender distinction. For additional reviews of the sex/gender distinction,
see Carlson 2001, Carlsson 1992, Glover and Kaplan 2000, Gothlin 1999, Haraway
1991, Moi 1997, Scott 1991, Svensson 2001, Thompson 1989 and Roth Walsh, ed.
1997.
4 Stoller 1968 and 1975. The term gender, however, had already been used in a similar
context, see for example, Comfort 1963.
5 Stoller 1968, p. ix. See also Glover and Kaplan 2000, p. xxi.
6 Stoller (1968, p. viii) used the sex/gender distinction, and the notions gender and gen-
der identity as working terms, noting that “[w]ith gender difficult to define and identity
still a challenge for theoreticians, we need hardly insist on the holiness of the term ‘gen-
der identity’”. According to Stoller (1968, pp. 9–10, 50), a normal child develops into a
sexed and gendered being by first recognizing hers/his sex as either female or male and,
then, in interaction with hers/his family and society finding hers/his sex-compatible gen-
der. According to Stoller, intersexual and transsexual individuals suffered from a mal fait
connection between sex and gender; they recognized the world as divided into two sexes,
but had a “destructive hermaphrodite gender consciousness”. See also Glover and Kaplan
2000, p. xxi.
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used in ways that he could not have anticipated”.7 What Glover and
Kaplan refer to as the unexpected uses of the sex/gender distinction is
the adoption by second-wave feminists of the 1970s of the distinction as
their own.8 The American and European feminist movement, which re-
awakened in the 1970s, the so-called second-wave of feminism, was in-
terested in analyzing why women were oppressed by men and in figuring
out strategies to end patriarchal oppression. Having analyzed what was
perceived of as the failures of the first-wave of feminism, second-wave
feminists knew that sex oppression ran deeper than state practices, laws
and constitutions. For second-wave feminists, sex oppression became
something that was structural (as described by Marxism), individual 
and symbolic (as described by psycho-analysis) and very real as learnt
through the search for women’s experiences in the consciousness-raising
groups of the women’s movement.9 The sex/gender distinction provided
a useful analytical and political framework for why and how women
were oppressed by men and for explaining that what seemed as women’s
and men’s nature or sex was, in fact, a social construction or gender.
The development of the feminist sex/gender distinction is accredited
to Gayle Rubin.10 Rubin used the conceptual framework of the sex/gen-
der system “for lack of a more elegant term”.11 She differentiated between
the terms sex and gender in the following way. The term sex meant the
male and female differences deriving from nature, i.e., bodily, genital
and reproductive differences and the term gender meant the historically,
culturally and socially contingent, transformative processes that turn the
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8 Feminisms are often categorized in three waves. The liberal and cultural feminists of
the 19th and early-20th centuries constituted the first-wave, to a large extent, the Marxist
and radical feminisms of the post-1960s constituted the second-wave, and the third-
wave was constituted by the post-1980s postmodern and poststructural feminist trends.
Each new wave built upon the former, but was also a reaction against the epistemic and
political shortcomings of the former. The approach of the three waves is largely based on
an Anglo-American development within feminisms and fails to give credit to the diverse
histories of European and global feminisms. See Jónasdóttir and Björk, eds. 1994, Segal
1999 and Weedon 1999.
9 As noted by Haraway (1991), early Anglo-American second-wave feminisms, as well
as later variants, however, do “write from the belly of the monster”: They are a result of
and dependent upon the paradigms and discourses that they criticize. Hence, when early
Anglo-American second-wave feminists developed their fairly grand theories of women’s
oppression, they did so, being influenced by neo-Marxism, neo-Freudianism and the
knowledge found through consciousness-raising. For an introduction to Marxist influences
on feminisms and consciousness-raising as a feminist method, see MacKinnon 1989.
10 See Haraway, 1991, Millett 1971, Moi 1997 and Scott 1991.
11 Rubin 1975, p. 159.
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“biological raw material” or what is male and female into what is a man
and a woman.12 According to Rubin, a sex/gender system exists in some
form in every human society. However, these historically, culturally and
socially produced systems can be matriarchal, egalitarian, patriarchal or
other. That is, it is not inevitable that societies organize themselves into
patriarchal sex/gender systems. The rationale behind the sex/gender sys-
tems is “... a taboo against the sameness of men and women, a taboo 
dividing the sexes into two mutually exclusive categories, a taboo, which
exacerbates the biological differences between the sexes and thereby creates
gender”.13 According to Rubin, males and females are as “biological raw
material” different from each other “[b]ut they are not as different as day
and night, earth and sky, yin and yang, life and death”.14 Being so alike,
the gender creation process becomes a process by which natural similari-
ties are suppressed.15 Rubin fails to explain conclusively why the sex/
gender system results in the suppression of similarities and the promo-
tion of differences. The main reason she offers in explanation of that
phenomenon is that it is somehow connected to the creation of hetero-
sexuality and the creation of heterosexual family units that can serve as a
basis for production/reproduction in both kinship and capitalist sys-
tems. In the sex/gender system, opposites learn to attract. When these
sex/gender systems are patriarchal, heterosexuality will ensure that
women do not create “kinship systems” of their own organized by way of
lesbian love, sisterhood or woman-centred political action.
Rubin is reluctant to define a possible way out of oppressive sex/gen-
der systems. One suggestion that she puts forth is that the feminist move-
ment must attempt “... to resolve the Oedipal crisis of culture by reorgan-
izing the domain of sex and gender in such a way that each individual’s
Oedipal experience would be less destructive”.16 Her attempt to re-organ-
ize the Oedipal crisis does not entail a return to nature. Sex might con-
ceptually be defined as the biological raw material, but human beings are
social, cultural and articulate. There is no nature without culture and
there is no sex without gender and vice versa. There are only more or less
oppressive, hierarchical and power-impregnated sex/gender systems.
Rubin’s solution, however, would demand a thorough re-organization of
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12 Rubin 1975, pp. 159, 165.
13 Rubin 1975, p. 178.
14 Rubin 1975, p. 179.
15 Rubin 1975, p. 180. Note de Gouge’s claim that man has given himself rights over
women, that exist nowhere else in nature, see Chapter 3.2.1 and Chapter 4.2.2.
16 Rubin 1975, p. 198. In a later text, Rubin (1984) criticizes her analysis in The Traffic
in Women for having overlooked the importance of sexuality and lust in Western indus-
trialized states. See Chapter 4.2.2.
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society; it would demand political action that recognizes “... the mutual
interdependence of sexuality, economics, and politics without underestim-
ating the significance of each in human society”.17
The sex/gender system, developed by Rubin, is radically different from
Stoller’s sex/gender distinction. As opposed to Stoller, Rubin does not,
view the two sexes and their corresponding genders as natural. With her
system approach, she moves the distinction from an individual to a struct-
ural level. That is, for Rubin the sex/gender system theory was an analyt-
ical framework that enabled her to analyze the relational construction of
masculinities and femininities and men and women in different societies.
For Stoller, the sex/gender distinction was an analytical framework that
enabled him to analyze and work with individuals who did not fit into
the dominant, interpreted as natural, man-woman frame.
4.2.2 Sameness/Difference and the Other Woman
While the emphasis on a sex/gender system was downplayed with the
decline of Marxist influences on feminist scholarship, the sex/gender
distinction became the favoured analytical framework among English
language feminists during the 1970s and 80s. The distinction, however,
also contributed to the heated debates about whether women were the
same or different from men and, connected to this debate, the ongoing
argument about whether all women are the same and share the same
experiences of being oppressed by men.
While theoretical, these two debates are closely connected to the strat-
egic reasons for the feminist adoption of the sex/gender distinction. The
sex/gender distinction did provide a means in the struggle to remove
women from “... the category of nature and to place them in culture as
constructed and self-constructing social subjects of history”.18 Rubin had
been cautious when developing her sex/gender system theory; she em-
phasized that her system approach provided for a culturally contingent
approach.19 Many feminists, following in her footsteps, but lacking an
anthropological perspective, used the sex/gender distinction to establish
a universal foundation for women’s oppression by men. As Judith Butler
noted, the need to strengthen feminism’s own claims to be representative
has occasionally motivated a shortcut to a categorical or fictive universality
of the structure of domination, held to produce women’s oppression by
men.20 Feminists were interested in understanding why and how gender
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17 Rubin 1975, p. 210.
18 Haraway 1991, p. 134.
19 Butler 1990, pp. 3–4.
20 Butler 1990, pp. 3–4.
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was construed and how it mainly affected women’s lives within their
societies. These feminists were also interested in changing the oppressive
system. In order to make their arguments catchy, it seemed an easy solu-
tion and, at the time not a huge sacrifice, to omit discussions about dif-
ference.
Within the sameness/difference debate, the proponents of the same-
ness position argued that women and men were essentially the same,
give or take a few bodily differences, but that patriarchal societies produ-
ced and reproduced oppressive gender constructs, which made man into
the norm and woman into the exception. These patriarchal societies ac-
corded priority to the male spheres of life and empowered these spheres.
At the same time, this patriarchal drive excluded women from these male-
dominated and male-empowered and empowering spheres and relegated
women to other, lesser, even tamer spheres.21 The proponents of the dif-
ference approach argued that women and men were essentially different
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21 The so-called Gilligan-MacKinnon controversy exemplifies well the sameness/differ-
ence debate. In In a Different Voice (1982), Carol Gilligan set out to criticize Lawrence
Kohlberg’s analysis of moral development. According to Kohlberg, the highest stage of
moral development was signified by an ethics of justice, which, in simplified terms, was
signified by the ability to make detached and objective decisions about right and wrong.
However, in accordance with Kohlberg’s empirical analysis, only boys/men attain this
highest level of responsible and ethical selfhood. Gilligan’s response to Kohlberg was that
he had omitted and devalued women and the specificities of women’s development into
responsible and ethical selves. According to Gilligan, the moral development of boys/
men and girls/women differs because the formers’ ethics of justice demand approaching
moral dilemmas as math problems with humans, while the latter develops an ethics of
care in which moral dilemmas are narratives of relationships that extend over time. Wo-
men’s different moral/ethical voice perceives identity as defined by a context of relations-
hips judged by a standard of responsibility and care. Gilligan perceives morality as aris-
ing from the experience of connection and conceived of as a problem of inclusion rather
than one of balancing claims. Catharine MacKinnon has praised the strong and elegant
sensitivity of Gilligan’s work, but she and other radical and constructivist feminists
opposed Gilligan’s conceptualization of the ethics of care/responsibility as feminine. Mac-
Kinnon, who, as a post-Marxist, radical feminist, perceives women’s and men’s relation-
ship as one of female victimization and male supremacy and who approaches all of soci-
eties institutions whether social, political or legal as being transgressed by a normalized
ideology of men’s sexual power over women, criticizes Gilligan for failing to acknowledge
these societal and sexual power structures that make women into women and men into
men. MacKinnon (1987, p. 39) recognizes the value of an ethics of care, but argues that
an ethics of care is only feminine in the sense that it is the ethical/moral space that ac-
corded to women by patriarchy: “[w]omen value care because men have valued us accord-
ing to the care we give them [...]. Women think in relational terms because our existence
is defined in relationship to men”. Hence, as MacKinnon argues, it is impossible to hear
women’s voices as long as men have their feet on women’s throats. For further analysis of
the sameness/difference debate, see Carlson 2001, Fuss 1996 and de Laurentis 1993.
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and the aim of feminist struggle should not be to make women into
men, but to ensure the revalorization of the traditionally female spheres
of life, viz., to add back the value that had been stripped from those spheres.
In accordance with Diane Fuss, the definition of essentialism, in feminist
theory, can be located:
... in appeals to a pure or original femininity, a female essence, outside the
boundaries of the social and thereby untainted (though perhaps repressed)
by patriarchal order. [...] Essentialism emerges perhaps most strongly within
the very discourse of feminism, a discourse which presumes upon the unity
of its object of inquiry (women) even when it is at pains to demonstrate the
differences within the admittedly generalizing and imprecise category.22
What Fuss points out is that although the anti-essentialists might be
winning in the feminist sameness/difference debate, feminism becomes
essentialist with its focus on women. In much of English language and
Nordic feminist scholarship, the sameness/difference debate lost out in
favor of a sameness approach. However, the early sameness/difference
debate that was preoccupied with questions about women’s and men’s
sameness/difference very soon gave way to a criticism of what Fuss de-
fined as the essentialism intrinsic to the feminist discourse. That is, a cri-
ticism of the sameness of women, a sameness that is presupposed in
questioning of sameness/difference between women and men.
In the United States, a black feminist critique of Anglo-American fe-
minisms developed during the early 1980s, which was, then, closely fol-
lowed by Lesbian, Latin and Asian feminist critiques. Similarly, fe-
minists from other parts of the world began to criticize the hegemony of
Western feminisms and the image of the other women in Western femin-
isms.
Black feminists in the United States argued that black equaled black
men and women equaled white women and that black women’s experi-
ences and the specific forms of discrimination suffered by black women
was excluded from the agenda of both the black liberation movement
and the second wave feminist movement.23 Adrian Wing argues:
[c]onstant overt and covert discrimination, both individual and institutio-
nal, augments the lifelong spirit injury of black women. [...] I am [ ] not
the ‘essential’ (white) woman discussed by many white feminists. I am not
a white woman ‘leached of all color and irrelevant social circumstance – a
process which leaves black women’s selves fragmented beyond recognition’.
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22 Fuss 1997, p. 251. Compare with Braidotti’s analysis presented in Chapter 2.2.1 and
the discussion about the paradox of feminism presented in Chapter 3.2.1 and Chapter 6.
23 For an introduction to black feminism and critical race feminism, for example, see
Wing, ed. 1997 and 2000.
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My experience cannot be reduced to an addition problem: ‘racism + sexism
= straight black women’s experience’. I am not a ‘white woman plus’.24
Similar arguments were put forth by lesbian women. Lesbian and other
non-heterosexual feminists argued that while feminists criticized patriarchy
they, still, supported the heterosexual, intrinsically patriarchal, norm, ex-
cluding lesbian women and the possibilities of lesbian relationships and
all women sisterhoods from their analysis. For example, in her article,
Thinking Sex (1984), Rubin argues that Western, industrialized societies
are governed by a hetero-patriarchal norm that privileges heterosexual and
monogamous sexuality and excludes or labels abnormal and unnatural
all other forms of sexuality. In Thinking Sex Rubin revises her sex/gender
system theory. When developing it had not realized the importance of
sexuality as an organizing principle in Western, industrialized societies.
She notes:
[f ]eminist conceptual tools were developed to detect and analyse gender-
based hierarchies. To the extent that these overlap with erotic stratification,
feminist theory has some explanatory power. But as issues become less those
of gender and more those of sexuality, feminist analysis becomes irrelevant
and often misleading. Feminist thought simply lacks angles of vision which
can encompass the social organization of sexuality.25
Similar criticisms were produced by non-Western feminists. According
to Chandra Mohanty, for example, Third World feminisms must be
construed, on the one hand, via a critique of Western feminisms and, on
the other hand, via the development of autonomous, geographically,
historically and culturally grounded feminist epistemologies.26 Mohanty
acknowledged that neither Third World nor Western feminisms are
singular and homogenous in their epistemologies and political goals.
Further, she acknowledged that feminists, however, need to destabilize
and reinterpret their analytic categories in order for feminisms to incorp-
orate the difference, diversity and contradictions in the category of wo-
man more efficiently.
The relationship between ‘Woman’ – a cultural and ideological composite
Other constructed through diverse representational discourses (scientific,
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24 Wing, ed. 1997, p. 30. See also the chapter on multi-dimensional discrimination under
Chapters 3.3.1 and 5.4.2.
25 Rubin 1984, p. 309. Note that the what I have called the Beijing gender controversy
was, in part, a result of the potential of “gender” concepts being employed as a means for
questioning the heterosexual norm, see Chapter 3.5.2.
26 Mohanty 1991, p. 51. Compare with discussions relating to the UN world conferences
on women in Chapters 3.5.1 and 3.5.2, and the discussion about international fe-
minisms in Chapters 2.2.1 and 6.1.
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literary, juridical, linguistic, cinematic, etc.) – and ‘women’ – real, material
subjects of their collective histories – is one of the central questions the
practice of feminist scholarship seeks to address. This connection between
women as historical subjects and representations of Woman produced by
hegemonic discourses is not a relationship of direct identity, or a relation of
correspondence or simple implication. It is arbitrary [...] I would like to
suggest that the feminist writings [...] discursively colonize the material and
historical heterogeneities of the lives of women in the third world, thereby
producing/re-presenting a composite, singular ‘third world woman’ ...27
The diverse and well-founded critiques of racist, heterosexist and im-
perialist feminisms have led to de-stabilization and a lost impression of
unity within the feminist epistemological and political projects. As noted
by Audre Lorde:
[b]eing women together was not enough. We were different. Being gay-girls
together was not enough. We were different. Being black together was not
enough. We were different. Being Black women together was not enough.
We were different. Being black dykes together was not enough. We were
different ... It was a while before we came to realize that our place was the
very house of difference rather than the security of any particular differ-
ence.28
Evidently, the process of the destabilization of feminist analysis and of
feminist political projects also affected feminism’s analytical framework
because the sex/gender lens distorted the ability to see other differences.
The feminist post-1980s enjeu with respect to what analytic categories
to use is well described by Haraway:
[i]t has seemed very rare for feminist theory to hold race, sex/gender, and
class analytically together – all the best intentions, hues of authors and re-
marks in prefaces notwithstanding. In addition, there is as much reason for
feminists to argue for a race/gender system as for a sex/gender system, and
the two are not the same kind of analytical move. And again, what happened
to class? The evidence is building of a need for a theory of ‘difference’ whose
geometries, paradigms, and logics break out of binaries, dialectics, and na-
ture/culture models of any kind. Otherwise threes will always reduce to
twos, which quickly become lonely ones in the vanguard. And no one learns
to count to four. These things matter politically.29
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27 Mohanty 1991.
28 Haraway 1991, p. 139, citing Audre Lorde (1982).
29 Haraway 1991, pp. 128–9. The problem of reductionism is also addressed by Bacchi
(1999), see Chapter 2.3.3.
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4.3 Third-Wave Feminist and Male-Centred
Perspectives on the Sex/Gender Distinction
4.3.1 Post-Feminisms and Sexual Difference
The 1980s led to a destabilization of the idea of one feminism, fighting
for a homogeneous and unified community of women and it resulted in
a questioning of feminism’s sex-centred and gender-centred analytical
categories relationship to race, class, sexuality and other similar social
categories. The increased postmodern and poststructural influences on
feminism resulted in a questioning of the assumptions at the heart of the
sex/gender distinction and whether an analytical framework is useful if
it attempts to distinguish between women and men as material beings
from their gender.30 The postmodern and poststructural turns led to a
questioning and reinterpretation by feminists notions, such as, absolute
and binary categories, Marxist and socialist approaches to power, equality
and emancipation and representations of the autonomous male subject.
Feminism itself is criticized for being inherently modernist and non-
adaptive to the emerging postworlds. Peu en peu, during the 1990s, the
term feminist and women’s studies was changed to gender studies in an
attempt to design a more inclusive “feminist” agenda.
While many postmodern and poststructural feminist scholars use the
sex/gender distinction as an example of binary categories at the heart of
feminist theory, Judith Butler’s work is the most direct poststructural
feminist engagement with the sex/gender distinction and its dissolution.31
Gender Trouble (1990) became most known because of the notion of
gender as performative and because of highlighting the subversiveness of
“gender trouble”, i.e., of performing the other’s gender. Butler argued that
“[g]ender is the repeated stylization of the body, a set of repeated acts
within a highly rigid regulatory framework that congeal over time to
produce the appearance of a substance, or a natural sort of being”.32 And
she noted that “[i]f gender is the cultural meanings that the sexed body
assumes, then a gender cannot be said to follow from a sex in any one way.
Taken to its logical limit, the sex/gender distinction suggests a radical dis-
continuity between sexed bodies and culturally constructed genders”.33
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30 For discussion, see Braithwaite 2002, Brooks 1997, Nicholson, ed. 1990 and Scott,
Kaplan and Keates, eds. 1997.
31 See Butler 1990 and 1993, see also, for example, Braidotti 1991 and 1995, Carlson
2001, Haraway 1991, Moi 1997 and Nicholson 1994.
32 Butler 1990, p. 30.
33 Butler 1990, p. 6.
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Hence, what Butler argued is that sex and gender can be completely dis-
entangled at least in theory. The consequence of this disentanglement is
that man and masculine become free-floating artifices that can just as
easily be taken to signify a female body as a male body and vice versa,
with woman and feminine.34 In Gender Trouble, however, sex is analytic-
ally secondary to gender. Butler only suggests that what is perceived 
as natural sex is also a product of gendered processes and as a result 
“... gender is not to culture as sex is to nature, gender is also the discursive/
cultural means by which ‘sexed nature’, or ‘natural sex’ is produced and
established as ‘prediscursive’, prior to culture, a politically neutral surface
on which culture acts”.35 Hence, she mentions that sex appears in language
as a substance, as something that exists before language, but this appear-
ance is created through a performative twist of language and discourse.
In Bodies that Matter (1993) Butler questioned what she calls the materi-
ality of sex.36 However, she acknowledged that “[t]o claim that the ma-
teriality of sex is constructed through a ritualized repetition of norms is
hardly a self-evident claim”.37 In order to understand how the materiality
of sex is constructed, it is necessary to reconstruct the common percep-
tion of construction.38 Bodies eat, sleep, feel pain and pleasure and these
facts are perceived as constructed only with difficulty, but the irrefutability
of these experiences gives no indication of the meaning of affirming them
or of the discursive means by which they are affirmed.39 Hence, in Bodies
that Matter, Butler has rethought some of the presumptions made in Gen-
der Trouble, stating that “[i]t is not enough to argue that there is no pre-
discursive sex that acts as the stable point of reference on which, or in
relation to which, the cultural construction of gender proceeds”.40 The
politico-theoretical project that Butler attempts in Bodies that Matter is to
abolish the idea that sex is apolitical and non-performative, sex here mean-
ing, body, biological raw material, nature.41 She assumes that a success-
ful reformulation of sex will make gender defined as a cultural construct
superfluous, which will eliminate dualist assumptions of body/mind,
nature/culture, woman/man, female/male, feminine/masculine, et cetera.
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34 Butler 1990, p. 6.
35 Butler 1990, p. 7.
36 Butler 1990, p. 19.
37 Butler 1993, p. xi.
38 Butler 1993, p. xi.
39 Butler 1993, p. xi.
40 Butler 1993, p. xi.
41 See the discussion about a critical language of sex and sexing in Davies 1997 and in
Chapter 2.2.2.
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Poststructural, postcolonial and queer feminists have contributed to
the unpacking of the sex/gender distinction by showing that binaries,
such as, the sex/gender distinction, are fundamentally flawed and that
one cannot be essential, i.e., pre-discursive if the other is constructed, be-
cause the distinction itself is a construction. Rather than resulting in the
development of a new preferred analytic category that could replace the
fallen distinction, the criticism has led to the marginalization of the no-
tion of sex in feminist discourses, while the notion of gender continues
to be used, although outside the distinction. The marginalization of sex,
on the one hand, has resulted in a dematerialization of the experience of
being a woman or a man. The marginalization of sex, on the other hand,
has also resulted in a stabilization of the notion of gender. That is, when
relying on the sex/gender distinction, feminists perceived sex as stabile
and gender as flexible and culturally variable, but when sex is excluded,
women as embodied, material, beings have to some extent become mar-
ginalized and some of the markers of sex seem to have leapt over onto
the feminist understanding of gender. Feminists, such as, Braidotti, for
example, have made attempts to introduce new understandings of bodily
experiences into feminist analysis.42 Toril Moi, for example, has argued
that, in their attempts to eliminate ontological sex and the sex/gender
distinction, poststructural feminists have arrived at a gender that has be-
come almost as ontological as sex.43 This ongoing process of dematerial-
ization and stabilization poses new demands on feminist analysis.
4.3.2 Unpacking Patriarchy and Integrating Men
The above brief overview of the theoretical and political history of the
feminist sex/gender distinction focused on how feminists have approached
the woman subject and women’s oppression by men. In analyzing wo-
men’s oppression, feminists have emphasized that the construction of the
woman subject is relational and dependent upon its difference from the
construction of the male subject. The feminist focus, however, has been
on the construction of women’s gender, and on how women are affected
by the hierarchical and power-impregnated construction of sexual and
other differences. Hence, although a dialectical notion of gender is in-
trinsic to Second-Wave and, especially, socialist and radical feminist the-
ories, feminists have not paid equal attention to the construction of men’s
gender or on how men are affected by sexual difference. Until recently
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42 For postcolonial feminist analysis, see Spivak 1999 and Trinh 1989 and 1991.
43 Moi 1997.
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feminist scholars have approached men, maleness and masculinities
through abstractions such as the male objective standard or the masculine
norm.44 The male norm or men as the objective standard had no resem-
blance to real men, and did not acknowledge differences within the cate-
gory of men.
The mounting criticism against Second-Wave feminisms’ racism, sex-
ism and imperialism and the deconstruction of the idea of women’s sha-
red experience has resulted in an increased attention on and deepened
analysis of men, maleness and masculinities. The difference-oriented fe-
minist discourses had a more complex relationship to men, maleness and
masculinities because these feminisms emphasized the interconnections
between different forms of oppression, some of which were shared with
non-hegemonic men and masculinities.
With regard to the feminist approach to the notion of the male norm
and to masculinities, the masculinity studies which emerged during the
1990s made their own contributions to the feminist approach in the form
of new approaches and problematizations.45 It is however important to
note that the new found interest in men’s experiences of maleness and
masculinity does not necessarily contribute to the feminist project per se.
The focus of much of the critical men’s or masculinity studies remains
on men’s experiences of maleness and of masculinities, not on global scale
sexual politics.46
The postmodern and poststructural turn in feminism, and the shift of
focus from feminist to gender studies, including masculinity studies, has
eroded the idea and the analytical priority given to the structural, hier-
archical and power-impregnated gender relationship. That is, the coming
of gender studies led feminisms into an epistemological and conceptual
dead end: how should feminists explain patriarchy, the hierarchical and
power-impregnated gender relationship and the preference of the male
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44 For a discussion about the male norm, see, for example MacKinnon 1989.
45 For an introduction to critical male or masculinity studies, see for example Connell
1995, Ekenstam, Frykman and Johansson 1998, Greig, Kimmel and Lang 2000, Seidler
1994 and Wetterberg 2002. For an analysis of the critical male or masculinity studies as
part of gender studies, see, for example, Glover and Kaplan 2000.
46 Connell (1995, pp. 76–81) for example attempted to understand the construction of
masculinities and the relationship between different male identities or masculinities
using the notions of hegemony/subordination and complicity/marginalization. Seidler
(1994, p. 3) analyzes the construction of masculinities in relationship to the dichotomies
of modernity and the aligning of masculinity with authority and reason. He notes that
“[a]s men, we often taken it to be our particular task to know what is best. Since we speak
with the authority of reason, it is easy for others to be silenced”.
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norm if women did not share, at least to some extent, the experience of
being oppressed by men, if power was not structural and if some men
were as oppressed as women by the dominant male norm? To some
extent, feminist theory is, still, stuck in that dead end. Preferred expla-
nations of this paradox of feminist thought are: paradoxes are fruitful;
women are different, but they are, still, oppressed by men; and analytical
shortcomings do not change reality: women are discriminated against,
oppressed, violated and killed because of their sex.
Braidotti has noted that the 1990s paradigm shift in feminist theory
has served as a necessary criticism of dominant and hegemonic feminisms,
but that the development gender studies has also contributed to the de-
politization of feminism. That is, feminism’s insecurities with its analytical
categories has not only led to the development of vibrant feminist dis-
courses, but has also watered down feminst analysis about hierarchies
and power.47 Braidotti argues that
[o]n a more theoretical level I think that the main assumption behind
“gender studies” is a new symmetry between the sexes, which practically
results in a renewal of interest for men and men’s studies. Faced with this, I
would like to state my disagreement with this illusion of symmetry ...48
4.4 Translations and Travels
The above analysis of the changing content and contestations of the ana-
lytic category f gender refers only to the concept’s English language aca-
demic history. In this history, gender, to use Haraway’s words, has “cost
blood in struggle in many social arenas”.49 Since the 1970s, the concept
of gender, however, has not only developed within English language aca-
demia, but it has also been translated into other language contexts and it
has traveled from within its academic context to public equality politics.
In the attempts to translate the sex/gender distinction into other languages
and other feminist contexts, some aspects of the struggle and its results
have been lost. Instead, Nordic feminists, for example, have had to deal
with not only how to translate the concept, but also how to relate to the
dominance of English language within academia.50 For example, Swedish
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47 Braidotti 1995, p. 150–1.
48 Braidotti 1995, p. 151.
49 Haraway 1991, p. 127.
50 Widerberg 1998. In the main Nordic languages, i.e., Danish, Finnish, Norwegian
and Swedish, different strategies have been chosen to translate the sex/gender distinction
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feminist scholars have translated the sex/gender distinction into Swedish
using the terms kön (sex) and the term genus (gender). While the term
genus has traditionally only been used to define grammatical categories,
the concept revolutionized Swedish equality politics through the so-
called genus system theory posited by Swedish feminist historian Yvonne
Hirdman, presented as part of Maktutredningen in 1990.51 Today, the
concept of genus is as much part of Swedish language as gender is part of
English language. The Swedish concept has, however, had more to do
with state-centred policy measures, such as, the sex/gender equality poli-
tics, as well as the establishment, in 1998, of the National Secretariat for
Gender Research (Nationella Sekretariatet för Genusforskning), than with
grassroots politics.52
Karin Widerberg discusses problems with translating Danish feminist
research and a gender-related conceptual apparatus from Danish to Eng-
lish. Widerberg highlights that:
[b]ut when we go deeper, we see that translating understandings of gender
from one culture and language to another also implies eliminating certain
concepts and contextual understandings. “Going international”, wanting
to participate and be understood in the international feminist debate, thus
implies changing the voice as well as the story.53
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into the national languages. Danish, Finnish and Norwegian feminist scholars have con-
tinued to use the concept for sex, i.e., kjønn in Norwegian, køn in Danish and sukupuoli
in Finnish for both sex and gender and to use add-ons such as social sex or to incorporate
the English language concept of gender when specifically discussing gender. The European
Women’s Studies network, ATHENA, has analyzed the diverse meanings of gender in
different European languages, see Braidotti, ed. 2000, Braidotti, Vonk and van Wichelen,
eds. 2000.
51 Hirdman 1990, see also Hirdman 1998. Hirdman defines genus as an on-going pro-
cess with individual, structural and symbolic implications through which sexed individu-
als are formed feminine or masculine. Hirdman’s genus system is based on two logics: the
separation of the sexes and the primacy of the masculine norm. Hirdman has been criti-
cized for her static conception of gender and system theory. Lengthy debates have been
held regarding whether the concepts of gender and genus are compatible. Nonetheless,
Hirdman’s theory became the basis for much of Sweden’s public equality work during the
1990s. See Carlsson Wetterberg 1992, Hirdman 1993.
52 Svensson 1997 and 2001. See also Kouvo 2004 (forthcoming).
53 Widerberg’s (1998, p. 133) reflections are caused by a translation of one of her Danish
language articles into English. During the translation, she had noted the different mean-
ings of gender in Danish and in English, but the English language editor had requested
her to eliminate the Danish references in order to make the articles more general. Rae-
vaara (2002, pp. 106–7) discusses problems with conceptual stretching and well-travel-
led English concepts, on the one hand, and non-travelling concepts, for example, Fin-
nish language concepts, on the other hand.
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The question of choice of language and the consequences of language
have also been addressed, by comparative legal scholars, for instance.54
Marianne Garre, for example, by linking cognitive linguistics to transla-
tion, has formulated two hypotheses regarding the translation of not
gender, but human rights concepts:55
First, given that comprehension depends on the linguistic basis on which
cognitive models are activated, inconsistencies in [...] translations of inter-
national human rights texts will create confusion and uncertainty about
how human rights texts are to be understood. Second, given that professio-
nal groups share professional traditions and backgrounds, individuals be-
longing to such a professional group will interpret contested conceptions a
more consistent manner than lay people. And consequently legal profession-
als will interpret contested rights concepts in a more consistent manner
than other professionals and lay people, including translators.56
The implications of the choice of language and difficulties in translation
are a part of both international feminist scholarship and UN everyday
reality.57 In the case of the UN gender mainstreaming strategy, travels
and translations of concepts include both a change of context, i.e., from
academia to public equality politics and a change in language, i.e., from
English to as in the case of the UN Russian, French, Spanish, Chinese
and Arabic. The English and French versions of the Beijing Platform’s
emphasis on gender analysis and the gender mainstreaming strategy ex-
emplify difficulties in translating the term gender in a UN context.
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54 Zweigert and Kötz 1992, Chapter A, see also Garre 1999.
55 According to Garre (1999, p. 53–4), cognitive linguistics assumes “... that the funda-
mental way in which we think, understand and operate is grounded in experience, culture
and language and expressed through cognitive models such as metaphors, categories,
prototypes, idealized cognitive models, contested concepts, etc., all of which constitute
our cognitive abilities” and she notes that “[t]ranslation of human rights texts, on this as-
sumption, will be similarly determined, i.e. complicated or facilitated, by human cogni-
tion”.
56 Garre (1999, p. 168–71) cites three criteria that she views as distinct for the trans-
lation of contested concepts within the human rights field: if a concept is contested in
one language it is likely to be contested in other languages as well; when contested con-
cepts are translated from one language to another the whole debate about why a concept
was contested in the first language does not have to be communicated, but it is important
to communicate basic tenets in the ongoing discussion; it should be noted that profes-
sionals and lay people may have completely different understandings of why and how a
concept is contested.
57 The UN’s main headquarters are located in French-speaking Geneva and in English-
speaking New York. The UN originally started with five official languages, viz., English,
French, Spanish, Russian, Chinese. Since the 1970s, when Arabic was added to the list,
it has six official languages.
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English
If the goal of full realization of human
rights for all it to be achieved, inter-
national human rights instruments
must be applied in such a way as to
take more clearly into consideration
the systematic and systemic nature of
discrimination against women that
gender analysis has clearly indicated. 
In addressing the enjoyment of human
rights, Governments and other actors
should promote an active and visible
policy of mainstreaming a gender per-
spective in all policies and program-
mes so that, before decisions are taken
an analysis is made of the effects on
women and men, respectively.
French
Pour assurer la jouissance universelle
des droits de la personne humaine, 
il faut tenir compte de la nature systé-
matique des discriminations dont les
femmes sont victimes, que l’analyse
par sexe fait clairement apparaître,
dans l’application des instruments
internationaux relatifs aux droits de 
l’homme.
Pour assurer la jouissance des droits 
de l’homme, les gouvernements et les
autres intéressés devraient promouvoir
des mesures concrètes et visibles afin
d’intégrer la problématique hommes-
femmes dans tous leurs programmes 
et politiques, de sorte que toute dé-
cision soit précédée d’une analyse de
ses effets sexospécifiques.
Art.
222
229
The official English and French versions of Beijing Platform Arts. 222
and 229 exemplify some of the difficulties. The English versions use the
terms “gender analysis”, “mainstreaming a gender perspective” and “an
analysis of the effects on women and men”. In the French version, these
three terms are translated into “l’analyse par sexe”, “intégration de la pro-
blématique hommes-femmes” and “analyse des effets sexospécifiques”.58 Hence,
while the English version puts forth what seems to be a fairly unified
strategy, this unity is broken already by the time the concepts are trans-
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58 The concept of sex is translatable in French with sexe, but the concept of gender is not
as evidently translatable in French with the word, genre. According to Maria Puig de la
Bellacasa (2000, p. 67) French-speaking feminists have been reluctant to translate gender
with genre, but this hesitancy is slowly changing. The term genre is used in French trans-
lations of English language feminist texts; it is also used in French language publications
by the European institutions and by other international institutions after the Beijing
Conference. In the previous chapter, I noted that the Holy See had made reservations re-
garding the use of the term gender in the Beijing Platform. In the French version of the
reservation, it regards the use of the term sexe. See also Bisilliat 2000.
Image: Comparison between English and French language versions of Beijing Platform
arts. 222 and 229.
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lated into French. The gender mainstreaming strategy, which at least
among women’s advocates and gender experts, evokes ideas about change
and social construction, does not exist, as such, in the French version.
The persuasiveness of the gender turn in UN equality politics has cer-
tainly led to the translation and travel of the concept of gender beyond
its original English language context. Conceptual confusion, however,
which includes both problems relating to translation and to the commun-
ication of the meaning of gender, remains among the constraints in the
implementation of the gender mainstreaming strategy within the UN
system.59 The fact, that gender remains controversial was noted in
Chapter 3.5.2 in conjunction to both the Commission on the Status of
Women’s preparatory session for the Beijing conference and the Beijing
Platform.
Among the persons that I talked to at the UN, most, however, were
in favour of the gender turn in UN equality politics. Only two persons
questioned in any considerable extent the usefulness of the “gender in-
dustry”.60 None of those persons who found the sex/gender distinction
to be a useful aid in thinking about women, men and equality and 
who were in favor of the gender turn in equality politics, however, were
unaware of the difficulties with translating “gender” or with trying to
understand and explain what “gender” stands for.61
Some of the interviewed persons stressed the importance of the sex/
gender distinction within the framework of the UN gender turn. One
person noted for example:
[i]t is important for people to understand the distinction to understand that
gender roles are not static. So, when we are confronted with issues of culture,
tradition, violations of basic human rights usually of women and children,
then we can go back to them and say, well this is tradition and things change!
You cannot change sex as a biological thing, but you can change gender roles,
you can change everything that has to do with social constructs.62
In one of the interviews, UN gender training and thinking in terms of
the sex/gender distinction were highlighted as great learning experiences,
but the same person confessed that, she had neither the time after the
gender training nor the know-how to integrate a gender perspective into
her work.63 The focus on the sex/gender distinction during the gender
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59 Gender Mainstreaming: An Overview 2001.
60 The critical perspectives were expressed during interviews Nos. 4 and 6.
61 Interviews Nos. 3, 9, 10, 13 and 15.
62 Interview No. 10. Similar points of views were presented in interviews Nos. 3, 9 and
13.
63 Interview No. 7.
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training, however, also came into question. One person argued that
while making the difference might be important, actually working with
the concept, i.e., implementing it, demands knowing how to make use of
the difference and there had not been enough practical guidance explai-
ning how to use the sex/gender distinction and a gender perspective.64
The fact that the term gender is an English language concept, which
is not necessarily translatable into other languages, was highlighted in
some of the interviews.65 For example, one of the interviewed persons
noted that:
[a]ctually, you have various translations in various languages. You can take the
word in French, in Spanish and in Arabic, but it wouldn’t ... it would be the
same word, but not really with the same meaning ... Do you see what I mean?
In French they have two different terminologies to deal with that. They would
say “la question du genre” which is correct in French, but that does not mean a
lot as “le genre” is the word you use to say that a table is feminine or masculine,
or they use the question of “sexospécificité” [...] In Spanish it is “genero”, which
is masculine of feminine, and now I have forgotten how we say in Arabic ... but
it doesn’t really mean anything in Arabic either.66
The challenges faced when attempting to translate the concept, how-
ever, were not viewed as being very serious. One person noted that if the
concept of gender was used in the wrong way, she corrected it, but this
error was merely a technical flaw and not a fundamental flaw.67 Another
person noted that the difficulties in translating the concept had contri-
buted to its success, and she stressed that “... it is good that we [the UN
human rights framework] do not have a definition, as the more you need
to explain it the more you try to understand it”.68 Another person, how-
ever, was critical about the claim that non-translatability can be an asset
especially in relation to human rights. Noting that as the idea of human
rights include “standardization of certain principles and ideas into some-
thing that everybody can understand and agree upon”, gender as a fluid
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64 Interview No. 1. In the same interview it was noted that in the vast majority of cases
there is, still, a need to think specifically about women.
65 Interviews No. 2, 3 and 10.
66 Interview No. 2. Translation was also addressed as a difficulty in interviews Nos. 3
and 10.
67 Interview No. 10.
68 Interview No. 2. Svensson (1997, pp. 52–3) notes that imprecise concepts can be
used, stating that “[o]m utgångspunkten tas i språkets osäkerhet måste varje språkligt ut-
tryck alltid motiveras och analyseras. Detta är givetvis omöjligt. Men trots denna omöj-
lighet kan strävan och medvetenheten om osäkerheten vara en bit på vägen. Det kan
medföra att varje text, skriftlig eller muntlig, varje uttryck i andra former, alltid bör läsas
ur flera aspekter”.
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concept can be useful for nothing except to “start a discussion of the fact
that because of how people are they end up being treated differently”.69
Another person highlighted that the gender concept is too complex
and that “[w]e need to return to talk about more specific things”.70
4.5 An Analysis of Gender Mainstreaming
Strategies
4.5.1 The Gender Turn and the ECOSOC Agreed Conclusions
on Gender Mainstreaming
The concept of gender and the idea of gender mainstreaming were in-
troduced to a broader UN audience around the time of the Nairobi
Conference (1985). The gender mainstreaming strategy had its break-
through, however, at the Beijing conference in 1995.71 While different
gender mainstreaming strategies have been developed for different sec-
tors within the UN, the core of the strategy is captured in the ECOSOC
Agreed Conclusions 1997/2 on gender mainstreaming (hereafter, Agreed
Conclusions) adopted as part of the ECOSOC follow-up activities 
to the Beijing conference.72 The Agreed Conclusions contain a definition
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69 Interview No. 4.
70 Interview No. 13, similar points of views were expressed in interview No. 10. In inter-
view No. 4, it was noted that that just as the term gender is difficult to grasp, so is the
gender mainstreaming strategy.
71 The strategy for mainstreaming a gender perspective has to a large extent been dev-
eloped in the development and European contexts. Mazey (2001) argues that it is origin-
ally a Swedish strategy. The European Commission adopted a gender mainstreaming ap-
proach through the Commission Communication on Incorporating Equal Opportunities for
Women and Men into All Community Policies and Activities (COM(96) 97 final). The de-
cision was operationalized through the Community Framework Strategy on Gender
Equality (2001–2005) (COM(2000) 335 final). See also Gender Mainstreaming: Concep-
tual Framework, Methodology and Presentation of Good Practices 1998. A decision to in-
tegrate a gender perspective into all Community activities is also included in the Treaty of
Amsterdam Art. 2. For discussions, see Björk and Kouvo 2002 and Mazey 2000, 2001
and 2002. Sweden adopted a decision to integrate an equality perspective in all govern-
mental politics in 1994. The decision to gender mainstream led to the adoption of the
so-called Jämtegrering strategy developed for local governments; see, for example,
www.z.lst.se/jamsthet/jamtegrering.php (28-09-2003), Lorentzi 2001 and Sandler 1997.
72 In the aftermath of the Beijing conference both the OSAGI and the IANGWE have
been created. It is also at these web pages that a large number of UN guidelines and best
practice examples regarding the implementation of the strategy for mainstreaming a gen-
der perspective were found, see at www.un.org/womenwatch/osagi/ (16-01-2004) and
www.un.org/womenwatch/ianwge/ (16-01-2004). Actions for gender mainstreaming
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of gender mainstreaming, which is the most referred to within the UN.
According to the Agreed Conclusions, mainstreaming a gender perspec-
tive” is
...the process of assessing the implications for woman and men of any plan-
ned action, including legislation, policies and programmes, in all areas and
at all levels. It is a strategy for making women’s as well as men’s concerns
and experiences an integral dimension of the design, implementation,
monitoring and evaluation of policies and programmes in all political,
economic and societal spheres so that women and men benefit equally 
and inequality is not perpetuated. The ultimate goal is to achieve gender
equality.73
In accordance with the ECOSOC definition of gender mainstreaming,
the strategy of mainstreaming a gender perspective implies a shift of focus
from women to women and men and moving what have been women’s
issues (at the same time as transforming them into gender issues) from
the margins to the mainstream. It is a process-oriented strategy aiming
at the rather illusive goal of gender equality.
The term gender is not defined in the Agreed Conclusions. However,
while many, still, struggle with understanding the content and differences
between the terms, sex, and, gender, in equality politics, a dominant in-
terpretation of the terms has developed, one that has been reproduced in
many guidelines and manuals.74 For example, the Division for the Ad-
vancement of Women defines gender and sex as:
[gender is] the socially constructed roles of women and men that are ascri-
bed to them on the basis of their sex, in public and in private life. The
term ‘sex’ refers to the biological and physical characteristics of women and
men. Gender roles are contingent on a particular socio-economic, political
and cultural context and are affected by other factors, including age, race,
class and ethnicity. Gender roles are learned and vary widely within and
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have been taken by UN programmes and funds, see for example www.undp.org/gender/
(28-09-2003), www.unifem.org/ (28-09-2003), www.unfpa.org/gender/ (28-09-2003),
www.unicef.org/gender/index.html (28-09-2003), www.ilo.org/dyn/gender/gender.home
(28-09-2003), www.who.int/health_topics/gender/en/ (28-09-2003) and www.world-
bank.org/gender/ (28-09-2003).
73 ECOSOC Agreed Conclusions 1997/2, Chapter 1, Art. A.
74 Note, however, the definition of gender used by the International Criminal Court in
its statute and the definition used in Durban Programme have more in common with
the definition found in the Holy See’s interpretive comment about how gender should
be understood in the context of the Beijing Platform, addressed in Chapters 3.5.2 and
6.3, than with the definition of gender used by the Division for the Advancement of
Women.
04-02 Iustus, Sari 8/3  04-03-08 15.31  Sidan 172
between cultures. As social constructs they can change. Gender roles shape
women’s access to rights, resources and opportunities.75
That is, the Division for the Advancement of Women’s definition of the
term gender is based on the sex/gender distinction as it was framed and
promoted by early second-wave feminist scholars. It is doubtful whether
the Division for the Advancement of Women’s and the other UN woman-
centred institutions’ social constructivist approach to gender is at the
core of the UN strategy for mainstreaming a gender perspective. It is
doubtful as well whether the social constructivist approach has been well
communicated. When addressing the Beijing gender controversy, I noted
the criticism garned by the idea that gender is construed and can be re-
constructed. This criticism was provoked apparently because the afore-
mentioned idea brought into question a number of sensitive topics, one,
for example, being the heterosexual norm.76 In the chapter on transla-
tions and travels I, also, referred to insecurities regarding the meaning of
gender existing within the UN system.77
The aim of the UN gender mainstreaming strategy is defined in the
Agreed Conclusions as “gender equality”. The Agreed Conclusions,
however, are also silent on the meaning of gender equality.78 OSAGI has
proposed the following definition of gender equality:
[g]ender equality implies that the interests, needs and priorities of both
women and men are taken into consideration – recognizing the diversity of
different groups of women and men. Gender equality is not a ‘women’s
issue’ but should concern and fully engage men as well as women.79
The OSAGI definition picks up on the emphasis of the Agreed Conclu-
sions that mainstreaming a gender perspective implies a focus on both
women and men. The focus on both women and men has been promo-
ted as one of the main aspects of the strategy for mainstreaming a gender
perspective. The strategy does not frame inequalities between the sexes as
a women’s issue, but as a concern for both women and men. The focus on
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75 UN doc. HRI/MC/1998/6, Art. 16
76 See Chapter 3.5.2.
77 See Chapter 4.4.
78 See, for example, the ECOSOC Agreed Conclusions 1997/2 on gender mainstream-
ing, Chinkin 2001 and Lorentzi 2001. The lack of definition might be partly due to the
fact that with the inclusion of difference and diversity perspectives and the right to a
subjective voice in conceptions about equality, perspectives that are supposed to be in-
trinsic to the idea of gender equality, the idea of a definition has become counter-pro-
ductive. See Chapter 6.3.
79 OSAGI, Fact Sheet 1, 2001. For further analysis of the goal of gender equality, see
Chapter 1.3.1.
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both women and men was supposed to enhance the strategy with a crit-
ical edge, i.e., to contribute to an analysis of how inequalities are produ-
ced and reproduced in the gender relationship. The OSAGI definition
also emphasizes a shift away from a one-dimensional man-woman frame
and suggests that the aim of gender equality should recognize the divers-
ity of women and men.80 There are, however, some tendencies suggesting
that the strategy has been used presuming, as Braidotti noted, a symmetry
between the sexes.81
Besides defining what mainstreaming a gender perspective means, the
Agreed Conclusions also include general principles for gender main-
streaming, as well as specific recommendations to different UN institu-
tions regarding how to implement the gender mainstreaming strategy.
The six gender mainstreaming principles in the Agreed Conclusions are an
attempt to ensure the institutional implementation of the gender main-
streaming strategy within the UN system. The gender mainstreaming
principles highlight the importance of defining issues so that gender-
neutrality is not presumed and gender differences may be detected. The
principles also highlight high-level responsibility and system-wide im-
plementation of the mainstreaming strategy, which include encourge-
ment of a number of goals, viz., participation by women in UN decision-
making and other activities; concrete programs and other mechanisms for
gender mainstreaming; awareness of the importance of woman-centred
initiatives; a clear political will; and sufficient human and financial re-
sources. Essentially, there are three main emphases in the principles; first,
the presumtion that nothing is gender-neutral; secondly, that attempts to
mainstream a gender perspective will not succeed without adequate
highlevel support and concrete guidance and guidelines; thirdly, that
mainstreaming does not replace the need for targeted action on behalf of
women.
The recommendations in the Agreed Conclusions are an attempt to
describe in greater detail how the institutional implementation should
be ensured within different UN institutions. The recommendations are
technical in nature and target five main areas; recommendations to the
UN intergovernmental processes; recommendations regarding the insti-
tutional requirements for gender mainstreaming; recommendations re-
garding the role of gender units and focal points in gender mainstream-
ing; capacity-building for gender mainstreaming; and recommendations
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80 The cultural sensitivity of the gender mainstreaming strategy will be further addressed
in Chapter 6.3.
81 Braidotti 1995, pp. 150–1. See Chapter 4.3.2.
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regarding the role of gender mainstreaming in the follow-up to global
UN conferences. The recommendations highlight the importance of the
UN woman-centred institutions and of the gender units and focal
points established within different UN institutions for the development
and implementation of gender mainstreaming strategies.82 However,
while the woman-centred institutions and gender units and focal points
are given the mandate to develop gender mainstreaming strategies and
to function as knowledge banks for UN institutions attempting to im-
plement gender mainstreaming strategies, the responsibility for gender
mainstreaming is system-wide. With the help of the woman-centred and
gender-centred institutions, all UN institutions should develop for their
own area of work, specific gender mainstreaming strategies.83
Hence, the Agreed Conclusions on gender mainstreaming provide a
general framework for how to ensure that the gender mainstreaming
strategy is moved into and implemated within the UN system. Three
main aspects crystallize themselves in the Agreed Conclusions as parti-
cularly important in the process of developing and subsequently imple-
menting the strategy for gender mainstreaming: mainstreaming, gender
analysis and targeted interventions. I will below analyze these three core
components.
4.5.2 Core Components of the Gender Mainstreaming Strategy
The Mainstreaming Component
Mainstreaming strategies – both gender mainstreaming and other main-
streaming strategies – have traveled the world with great success during
the 1990s. There is a growing amount of management-oriented literature
about successful mainstreaming initiatives. International institutions seem
to be competing in the publication of manuals and creation of web sites
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82 The follow-up to UN conferences is also highlighted in the Agreed Conclusions
1997/2 in conjunction to capacity building for gender mainstreaming. In order to facilit-
ate gender mainstreaming in the follow-up, review and appraisal of global UN confer-
ences, the ECOSOC urges all entities of the UN system to apply a gender perspective to
all follow-up activities and utilize a gender perspective effectively to identify the differ-
ential of implementation on women and men.
83 The envisaged steps for implementing the Agreed Conclusions 1997/2 at the institu-
tional level include the adoption of gender mainstreaming policies and the formulation
of specific gender mainstreaming strategies; use of institutional directives for gender
mainstreaming; improvement of gender mainstreaming tools; establishment of instru-
ments and mechanisms for monitoring and evaluation; and creation of accountability
mechanisms.
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about the best mainstreaming practices.84 While mainstreaming strategies
seem fairly straightforward, they are not necessarily easy to use, they are
rather “... strategies that everybody can understand, although no-one is
sure what they require in practice”.85 The basic idea behind mainstream-
ing strategies consists of moving an issue, for example gender, into a
framework from which it had previously been excluded and allowing it
to be integrated into or to transform that framework. That is, at their best,
gender mainstreaming strategies have a two-fold aim: to move issues from
the margins to the mainstream and to allow the issues to have an impact
on and transform the mainstream. The mainstream includes both the
core, i.e., for example, the high-level decision-making bodies within an
institution, and the system-wide broad-based institution.86 The two
aims of mainstreaming, however, are not always highlighted interdepend-
ently, but within the mainstreaming literature, a distinction is made be-
tween integrative and agenda-setting or transformative mainstreaming
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84 As the gender mainstreaming strategy was first developed within the development field,
there is a large amount development-oriented gender mainstreaming literature. For an
overview, see, for example Bell 2001, Mikkelsen, Freeman, Keller et al. eds, 2001, Moser,
Törnquist and van Bronkhorst 1998, Razavi and Miller 1995, Sandler 1999 and Schal-
wyk, Thomas and Woroniuk 1996. Since the gender mainstreaming strategy was adopted
as the prioritized equality strategy within the European Union context, a considerable
amount of literature has also been developed about gender mainstreaming and the Euro-
pean Union. For an overview, see Beveridge and Shaw 2002, see also Feminist Legal
Studies (Special Issue: Gender Mainstreaming) vol. 10 (2002) Journal of European Social
Policy (Special Issue: Gender Mainstreaming) vol. 7, No. 3 (2000), Kvinder, Køn &
Forskning (Special Issue: Mainstreaming) No. 2 (2000). There is not as yet as much writ-
ten about gender mainstreaming and international law. For further reading, see however
Connors 1995, Gallagher 1997, Gear 2001, Hafner-Burton and Pollack 2002, Orford
2002 and Charlesworth and Wood 2001. Well developed gender mainstreaming web sites
within the fore-mentioned sectors, for example, are: www.sdnp.undp.org/gender/ (28-
09-2003) and www.un.org/womenwatch/ianwge/gm_facts/ (28-09-2003).
85 Beveridge and Nott (2002a, p. 308) note that mainstreaming has been defined as a
“‘deceptively simple concept that is likely to be extremely difficult to operationalize’ and
as ‘an extraordinarily demanding concept, which requires the adoption of a gender per-
spective by all the central actors in the policy process’”
86 ECOSOC Agreed Conclusions 1997/2. The UNDP information packs define the
mainstream as an “[i]nter-related set of dominant ideas and development directions, and
the decisions or actions taken in accordance with those”. The mainstream is defined as
having two main components: ideas (theories and assumptions) and practices (decisions
and actions). The mainstream’s ideas and practices determine who gets what and provide
a rationale for allocation of resources. Being part of the mainstream means “having equit-
able access to society’s resources, including socially-valued goods, rewards and opportun-
ities” and having “equal participation in influencing what is valued, shaping develop-
ment directions, and distributing opportunities”, see Gender Mainstreaming, UNDP,
2000, p. 8.
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approaches. Integrative mainstreaming includes moving a certain issue such
as gender or human rights into a pre-existing framework, while agenda-
setting or transformative mainstreaming includes the reorientation and
transformation of a whole agenda.87 Hence, the integrative approach is
focused on moving issues into a framework, while the transformative ap-
proach is focused on getting everyone within that framework to think
gender and ensuring that gender mainstreaming efforts have a substantial
impact on a certain framework. Another distinction that is often brought
out is the distinction between expert-driven and participatory mainstrea-
ming.88 Expert-driven mainstreaming strategies rely to a great extent on
the work of either external or internal so-called gender experts, who design
strategies for mainstreaming for the institution and who provide gender
training. Participatory mainstreaming strategies, while certainly relying,
to some extent on expert knowledge, are focused to a greater extent on
allowing the persons working with the strategies to provide the content
for the strategies.
According to Fiona Beveridge and Sue Nott, the mainstreaming stra-
tegy is fuzzy because it does not give enough information about how to
mainstream or about what the expected results of mainstreaming should
be.89 This fuzziness, resulting from the lack of clear guidelines as to what
should be mainstreamed and how it should be mainstreamed, can lead
to lesser and less thought-through activities for mainstreaming a gender
perspective. In other words, this lack of clarity may defeat the purpose
and sabotage the aims of mainstreaming. What may even have happened
is that this obfuscation might have contributed to the preference for inte-
grative mainstreaming approaches within many public institutions, while
feminist scholars have argued that the gender mainstreaming strategy
cannot be successfully implemented without a transformative agenda.90
OSAGI, in its conceptual clarification, promotes an agenda-setting or
transformative approach to mainstreaming stating that:
[m]ainstreaming is not about adding a ‘women’s component’, or even a
‘gender equality component’, to an existing activity. It involves more than
increasing women’s participation. Mainstreaming situates gender equality
issues at the centre of policy decisions, medium-term plans, programme
budgets, and institutional structures and processes. Mainstreaming entails
bringing the perceptions, experience, knowledge and interests of women as
well as men to bear on policy-making, planning and decision-making.
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87 Jahan 1995.
88 Beverdige and Nott 2002, p. 301.
89 Beveridge and Nott 2002a.
90 Beveridge and Nott 2002a.
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Mainstreaming can reveal a need for changes in goals, strategies and actions
[...] It can require change in organizations [...] to create organizational en-
vironments which are conducive to the promotion of gender equality.91
In the Gender Mainstreaming: An Overview, it is noted that although
there is “... no set formula [for gender mainstreaming ] that can be ap-
plied in every context. [...] [W]hat is common to mainstreaming in all
sectors or development issues is that a concern for gender equality is
brought into the mainstream of activities rather than being dealt with as
an add-on”.92 A purely integrative approach to mainstreaming only
moves women’s or gender issues from specialized institutions to add-ons
within the mainstream agendas. However, as will be shown in Chapter
Five, UN human rights institutions have in practice come to implement
an integrative mainstreaming strategy.
The preference for integrative, instead of agenda-setting or transforma-
tive mainstreaming strategies, is probably due to integration being easier
than transformation. Transformative mainstreaming demands that every-
body integrate a gender perspective into their own work. This demand is
the tricky part of the gender mainstreaming strategy. That is, in case a
transformative gender mainstreaming agenda is to be implemented,
everybody working within an institution needs to understand what gen-
der mainstreaming means, how it should be effectuated and what the
implications would be of the use of a gender perspective in connection
with their specific work. Introducing new analytical and policy frame-
works into an institutional structure is always a tricky process. Even
trickier is when the issues are controversial or are perceived as threaten-
ing by some people. Ideas which might be perceived as threatening may
be the idea that how women and men actually are is socially construed,
or that how women and men are can (and should) be changed in order to
promote equality. It would be naïve to think that promoting mainstream-
ing of a gender perspective would not encounter any resistance or that
attempts would not be made to downplay the potentially transformative
elements in mainstreaming initiatives. The gender mainstreaming strategy
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91 Gender Mainstreaming: Strategy for Promoting Gender Equality 2001.
92 Gender Mainstreaming: An Overview (2001, p. 2). According to the Commission 
on Human Rights, mainstreaming human rights involves: the adoption of a human
rights-based approach to activities carried out in terms of the respective mandates and
components of the United Nations system; the development of programmes or projects
addressing specific human rights issues; the reorientation of existing programmes as a
means of focusing adequate attention on human rights concerns; the inclusion of a
human rights component in field operations of the United Nations; the presence of the
human rights programme in all structural units pf the Secretariat responsible for policy
development and coordination, see UN doc. E/1998/60, para. 11.
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is not a neutral strategy. In fact, most things which transform must be
rather radical for the transformation to take place. Moreover, for a per-
son who has not been interested in so-called women’s issues and who
might be convinced that women and men are equal, that feminism is
passé and that feminists have gone too far, understanding why a gender
perspective is important and how having a gender perspective might
affect that person’s work is an arduous process, un upphill battle. As a
consequence, the gender mainstreaming strategy is often framed in non-
threatening terms and it has been promoted as a strategy that will bene-
fit everyone alike.93
While the persons whom I interviewed were positive about a dual stra-
tegy, i.e., to having both woman-centred and mainstreaming measures
for women’s advancement and gender equality, they commented that
mainstreaming efforts within the UN remained under development and
that it was not always evident how to mainstream and how to substantiate
the mainstreaming efforts. The mainstreaming efforts that had been under-
taken were largely integrative, i.e., when gender was mainstreamed, it
became an add-on, rather than an integrated part of the human rights
agenda of a certain institution. The three main reasons for the lack of
transformative mainstreaming initiatives were: lack of time, lack of high-
level institutional support and a gender mainstreaming fatigue. That is,
while a decision has been made vis-à-vis, a broad-based and system-wide
approach to gender and while gender training programs have been organ-
ized, sufficient efforts have not been made to ensure that people with an
interest in gender issues can work with gender issues or that everybody
has the time to find out what a gender perspective might mean for them
in their work. One of the persons interviewed outlined that while the
gender training had been an eye opener, it was difficult to find the time
to mainstream a gender perspective into everyday work.94 The same per-
son noted however that:
... I don’t think that it [gender] should be added. It should always be there. It
should be part of my daily work. I shouldn’t have to think: oh, I have to add
gender. But that requires a huge mind set and personal responsibility. I need to
realise in my brain that gender is another component it is not an add-on. If I
think of gender as an add-on, I run the risk of forgetting it ... But the battle is
in my own head, isn’t it? 95
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93 The idea of everybody’s benefit will be further addressed in Chapter 6.3.
94 Similar points of views were expressed in interviews Nos. 8 and 12.
95 Interview No. 7. That the heavy workload hampered gender mainstreaming efforts
and that gender mainstreaming remained something of an add-on was emphasized by
most people that I interviewed.
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In some of the other interviews, lack of mid-level and high-level institu-
tional support was viewed as one of the main reasons for a lack of main-
streaming success.96 That is, the policy-decision for a broad-based and
system-wide approach to gender has provided the arguments or founda-
tions upon which to build and has created the tools for building for per-
sons within the UN system, persons who already have an interest in and
a concern for women’s issues.97 The arguments and tools are under-
mined, however, by the dearth of both high-level and mid-level support
for the strategy. Factors, such as, a lack of informed, knowledgeable people,
trained in gender mainstreaming and the lack of adequate, enabling sup-
port for the mainstreaming of a gender perspective have contributed 
to gender mainstreaming fatigue.98 It was also argued that the gender
mainstreaming agenda had been accepted because it was politically correct
to accept the agenda.99 As one of the persons interviewed said, “[i]t’s an
industry like everything else. It makes jobs for people. It produces a lot
of paper. 100
The Gender Analysis Component
The entry point in the ECOSOC gender mainstreaming definition is a
presumption that nothing is gender-neutral or sex-neutral, but that we
live in a gendered and sexed world where how and if we are women and
men are factors or attributes which matter in all areas and in all aspects
of our lives.101 Gender analysis is the tool for understanding how gender
and sex matter. A gender analysis demands identification of the gender
and the social roles of men and women and an assessment of how gen-
der and especially gender inequitable power relations affect proposed
decisions, policies, projects, et cetera.102 The analysis can contribute to a
shifted focus from integrative to transformative mainstreaming strategies.
As OSAGI has noted, gender analysis is “... the critical starting point for
gender mainstreaming”. According to OSAGI, all gender analysis should
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96 Interviews Nos. 4, 7 and 13.
97 Interviews Nos. 4, 7, 10 and 13.
98 This point was especially focused on in interviews Nos. 10 and 13.
99 Interviews Nos. 4 and 7. Similar critical perspectives were put forth in interview No. 6.
100 Interview No. 4.
101 Gender Mainstreaming: An Overview (2001, p. 5) states that “[g]ender is an issue be-
cause of the fundamental differences and inequalities between women and men”.
102 Chinkin 2001, p. 12, Lorentzi 2001, pp. 10–1, Gender Analysis, UNDP 2001.
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also be contextual, i.e., dependent upon and related to the specific prob-
lem area or issues analyzed.
Analysis of gender perspectives should be an integral part of all analysis
undertaken, or should be undertaken as a separate analysis, if necessary.
Such analysis is not something to be done solely by gender specialists but
should be an essential element of all professional competence of all United
Nations staff.103
That is, while gender analysis is a sophisticated analytical framework
that borrows much of its terminology and analytical tools from gender
studies and other social sciences, within the UN human rights system, it
should be transformed into an easily accessible format that everybody
can adapt to hers or his problem area and can apply in hers or his work.
However, as was noted at the beginning of this chapter, gender is a com-
plex and contested analytical framework and it is difficult to communi-
cate the meaning of gender to a very broad audience that might not be
familiar with feminist and/or gender politics. The challenge is even greater
vis-à-vis the gender analysis in conjunction with the gender mainstream-
ing strategy because, here, people should not only be able to understand
the idea of gender analysis, but they should also be able to apply it in
their work. Hence, when the analytical tool “gender” was introduced
into public equality politics, there seemed to be a conviction that the
mere shift from a focus on sex and women to gender would promote
equality, i.e., there seemed to be a belief in the magic of gender. That is,
early gender mainstreaming strategies tended to promote the concept of
gender as a rather enigmatic conceptual framework from which, if we
are lucky, will spur gender equality. The belief that the shift of wording
itself would lead to an increased focus on gender issues, and subsequently
to gender equality has withered away over the years. Later gender main-
streaming guidelines and manuals, such as, OSAGI’s Gender Main-
streaming: An Overview (2001) focused on designing an accessible gen-
der analytical framework, highlighting concrete and practical steps for
gender analysis in different sectors. That is, the difficulties in communi-
cating the meaning of gender analysis and translating it into practice
have led woman-centred institutions within the UN that should function
as motors in the gender mainstreaming process to develop, what I have
defined as, grounded gender analytical frameworks.
The OSAGI overview notes that while gender differences and inequal-
ities “... manifest themselves in different ways in specific countries or
181
103 Gender Mainstreaming: An Overview 2001, p. 27.
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sectors [...] there are some broad patterns that point to questions that
should always be considered”.104 These questions include: inequalities in
political power, i.e., access to decision-making, representation, et cetera;
inequalities within households; differences in legal status and entitle-
ments; gender division of labour within the economy; inequalities in the
domestic/unpaid sector; violence against women; and discriminatory at-
titudes.105
The analytical task in most areas demands asking questions relating to:
• Responsibilities, activities, interests and priorities of women and men and
how their experiences of problems may differ, i.e., reflections upon the
gender factors that could relate to the problem or issue.
• Assumptions about “families”, “households” or “people” that may be im-
plicit in the way a problem is posed or a policy is formulated, i.e., reflec-
tions upon the common understanding of concepts and conceptual
frameworks that build on gendered presumptions.
• Obtaining data or information to allow the experiences and situations of
both women and men to be analyzed, i.e., seeking information that goes
beyond, for example, the number of farmers and what they produce
and that allow assessments of whether there are differences and inequal-
ities between the crops produced and the work done by women far-
mers and men farmers.
• Seeking the inputs and views of women as well as men about decisions
that will affect the way we live. Because there are often significant differ-
ences between the priorities of women and men, it is important to
allow and to enable women and men to participate equally in decision-
making processes.
• Ensuring that activities where women are numerically dominant receive
attention, areas including, for example, domestic work. The productive
input of domestic and caring work as well as, for example, women’s
agricultural tasks are, still, overlooked and need to be recognized.
• Avoiding assumptions that all women or all men share the same needs
and perspectives. There are often differences between women and men
that relate to class, religion, age, ethnicity and other factors. It is im-
portant to refrain from generalizing across diverse populations. Instead,
we must consider how individuals are influenced by a plethora of
factors, including gender.
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104 Gender Mainstreaming: An Overview 2001, p. 5.
105 Gender Mainstreaming: An Overview 2001, pp. 5–6.
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• Analyzing problems or issues from a gender perspective and seeking to
identify means of formulating directions that support an equitable distri-
bution of benefits and opportunities. Given gender differences and in-
equalities within societies, it cannot be presumed that women and men
will have equal opportunities for participation, but special attention is
needed to ensure that all people benefit equally.
Gender analysis in its basic form, as detailed above, provide for a sophis-
ticated analytical framework. There has been a noticeable shift from gen-
der analytical approaches which rely on the magic of gender over to gen-
der analytical approaches which are grounded. Though this shift has
contributed to creating a more accessible analytical framework, gender
analysis is, still, a demanding task.
Moreover, OSAGI’s gender analysis framework cannot be used directly,
but it needs to be adapted to the context of and subject matter dealt
with by a specific institution. That is, in order for gender analytical
approaches to be successful it is necessary not only to have a thorough
understanding of gender and of how gender generally impacts on differ-
ent issues. It is also necessary to contextualize the analysis and adapt it to
the specific areas and issues dealt with within a specific institution.
The above referred to problems were also highlighted during the in-
terviews. The persons that I interviewed voiced concern over, both the
problems with understanding how to gender analyze and the problems
with adapting gender analytical frameworks into specific contexts with-
out losing, thereby, the analytical potential of the gender perspective.
Most of the persons that I interviewed were positive not only about
mainstreaming, but also about implementing a gender analytical frame-
work. Nonetheless, it was noted that there have been tendencies to inter-
pret the gender mainstreaming strategy with a woman-focus or a sex-focus
and to interpret the term gender as another word for woman or sex and
there remains a great deal of confusion about how gender should be
understood.106 One person, however, noted that it was important not to
get caught up in the gender rhetoric, but to instead try to think about
what a gender analysis would mean and what it would contribute. The
person noted:
[t]here have been different stages in how we conceptualise gender, as sex and so-
cial construct. However, I think that more then the concept itself it is the analysis
that you can do when you are looking at the differences between women and
183
106 In Interviews Nos. 8 and 10, it was stressed that in practice work for mainstreaming,
a gender perspective meant recognizing women.
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men. I don’t use gender as such, but I say that let’s do an analysis of what this
means ... access to education ... power relations between women and men ... So,
it is the analysis more than gender itself.107
Another person noted that the UN had tried to progress too rapidly
when it was to mainstream gender, when it had not even integrated
women’s human rights.108 And another person interviewed commented
as follows:
I don’t know if it’s true, but I think that we made a big jump ... I mean, before
we had achieved something very solid in the area of promoting and protecting
women’s rights we started to talk about gender. And I think that if you don’t
have a solid understanding of the importance of bringing women into the work
it is very difficult to start to talking about women and men.109
Some of the persons interviewed noted, however, that there was a grow-
ing awereness that “gender” did not only concern women, but that it
was an issue that had impact for both women and men.110 Nevertheless,
in practice gender, still, meant women.111
Targeted Intervention
The strategy for gender mainstreaming forms a part of the UN dual
strategy for women’s advancement and gender equality, i.e., while the
UN encourages the use of the strategy for mainstreaming a gender per-
spective, it also invites and wishes to strengthen woman-specific initiat-
ives. Because the UN uses expert mainstreaming approaches, it is also the
woman-centred institutions that are given the mandates to promote the
gender mainstreaming strategy. That is, the decision to gender mainstream
has added a new component to the work of the UN woman-centred in-
stitutions. The woman-centred institutions together with gender focal
points and different gender networks initate and develop strategies for
gender mainstreaming. They also function as knowledge banks in the
gender mainstreaming process.
Most gender mainstreaming strategies, however, do, within themselves
include an emphasis on both gender mainstreaming and on woman-
centred interventions or so-called targeted interventions.112 It is recognized
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107 Interview No. 13.
108 Interview No. 1.
109 Interview No. 13.
110 Interviews Nos. 1, 4, 6, 10 and 13.
111 Interviews Nos. 7, 8 and 13.
112 Gender Mainstreaming: An Overview 2001, p. 2.
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that the gender mainstreaming strategy cannot be implemented success-
fully without a continuing focus on women, as it is women who tend to
be structurally disadvantages vis-à-vis men. For example, in OSAGI’s
overview, targeted interventions are defined as complementary strategies
... that have as their primary goal the narrowing of gender gaps that dis-
advantage women. These interventions could include special research on
the differential impact of trade patterns on women, support for a network of
women’s NGOs [non-governmental organizations] looking at women in
the media, training to sensitize the judiciary on domestic violence and
rape, or training for male politicians on discriminatory practices against
women in politics. These types of targeted interventions do not in any way
contradict the gender mainstreaming strategy.113
That is, while gender mainstreaming strategies are legitimated through
their differences from woman-centred strategies, successful gender main-
streaming demands a continuing support for woman-centred targeted in-
terventions. As was noted above the shift to applying gender perspecti-
ves from woman-centred equality strategies has also been only partial. In
reality much of gender mainstreaming efforts are carried out by woman
and with a focus on women.114 Gender work remains the responsibility
of women who have an interest in women’s or gender issues. Neverthe-
less, targeted interventions may be described as the reality check of 
the gender mainstreaming strategies. The targeted interventions may be
described as the always necessary and, still, often annoying feminist
questions, viz., Where are the women? Haven’t we forgotten the women?
What about the feminization of poverty, women’s health issues, women’s
reproductive rights, violence against women, et cetera? Another key ques-
tion might be: How can we ensure that we will not forget women?
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113 Gender Mainstreaming: An Overview 2001, p. 2. Both the UNDP information packs
and Chinkin’s manual on gender mainstreaming in legal and constitutional affairs define
the gender mainstreaming strategy partly through its difference from earlier woman-
centred strategies and separate sex equality strategies. The UNDP information packs up-
grades this difference into one of the core features of the gender mainstreaming strategy.
Chinkin (2001, p. 12) is more moderate, noting that “... gender mainstreaming does
not automatically remove the need for women-specific programmes or for projects targe-
ting women. These will often remain necessary to redress particular instances of past dis-
crimination or long-term, systemic discrimination”.
114 This was highlighted in most interviews. For example in Interviews Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4,
6, 9, 10, and 13.
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4.6 Mainstreaming Approaches to Women’s
Human Rights
4.6.1 The Vienna Strategy and Beyond
The idea of human rights is embedded in Western political and philo-
sophical history: rights can be viewed as one of the more persuasive con-
structs of Western modernity. Intimately intertwined with this history
and this construct are the exclusion of women as rights’ holders and the
creation and ever changing notion of sexual difference.115 Hence, while
women have been recognized as rights’ holders on an equal basis with
men, within the UN human rights framework, human rights have not
necessarily been designed to bridge the gap vis-à-vis the inequalities
between women and men or to include protection against woman-
specific violations. The UN women’s human rights framework provided
some tools against woman-specific violations. However, as was noted in
Chapter Three the establishment of a women’s human rights frameworks
within the UN human rights framework has also contributed to the
marginalization of women and of women’s human rights within the UN
human rights framework.116 The women’s human rights framework,
especially prior to the adoption of the CEDAW framework, only in a
limited fashion change how human rights were conceptualized and what
was considered to be human rights violations.
It was during the 1990s, and especially in relation to the Vienna, Cairo
and Beijing processes, that people started to appreciate the importance
of new ideas and understandings about human rights. The strategy for
the promotion and integration of women’s human rights, which included
targeted intervention and mainstreaming initiatives for women’s human
rights was, as was noted in Chapter Three, developed during the Vienna
conference. The integrative part of the Vienna strategy, however, was 
later reformulated, or blurred, in conjunction to the development of
both the strategy for mainstreaming a gender perspective and the strategy
for mainstreaming human rights. The Vienna strategy has been over-
shadowed by the Beijing strategy especially since the adoption of the
ECOSOC Agreed Conclusions on gender mainstreaming and the pro-
clamation of gender mainstreaming as the UN system-wide and broad-
based strategy for equality. The Vienna strategy has been refocused in
part on mainstreaming human rights since the Vienna+5 review and the
186
115 Nousiainen and Pylkkänen 2001, pp. 22–7.
116 Gallagher 1997.
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50th anniversary of the Universal Declaration. The aim of this chapter,
Chapter 5.3, is to analyze two items: first, the potential of rights-based
mainstreaming approaches and, secondly, the strategy for integrating
women’s human rights.
4.6.2 Rights-based Approaches117
In the aftermath of the Vienna conference, the UN has begun to pro-
mote not only the integration of women’s human rights, but also the
mainstreaming of human rights. The latter strategy is of a later date and
has largely been conceptualized within the framework of the five-year
review of the Vienna conference, the UN’s reform process and the UN’s
millennium activities.
Mainstreaming human rights crystallizes itself as a core theme in the
five-year review of the Vienna conference. In the Secretary-General’s re-
port for the five-year review, mainstreaming human rights is not defined,
but it is considered to include a number of specifically outlined object-
ives, viz., the adoption of rights-based approaches; the development of
projects and programs with a human rights focus; the reorientation of
existing programs towards according adequate attention to the human
rights area or agenda; the adoption of a human rights component in UN
field operations; and the presence of the human rights programme in all
structural units of the Secretariat.118 According to the report, the purpose
of the rights-based approach is:
... [to] ensure[] that human rights standards, as established in international
law, are applied as a criterion for policy orientation and for the solution of
problems in specific areas. It introduces a normative basis which is obligat-
ory for State Parties, and thus requires a legislative response at the state level.
A rights approach implies that “beneficiaries” of policies and activities are
active subjects and “claim holders” and stipulates duties or obligations for
those against whom such claims can be made (objects or “duty bearers”).119
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117 The UN reform programme was initiated by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan in
1997. The aims of the reform programme included: establishing a new leadership culture
and management structure; assuring financial solvency; instituting a thorough overhaul
of human resources; restructuring the UN Secretariat; strengthening the Secretariat
normative, policy- and knowledge-related functions and the Secretariat’s ability to serve
the inter-governmental bodies; making sustainable development a UN priority; and ex-
tending its human rights activities, www.un.org/reform/track2/hilights.htm (22-05-2002).
See, also, Annan 1997 and www.un.org/reform/refdoc.htm (28-09-2003).
118 UN doc. E/1998/60, para. 11.
119 UN doc. E/1998/60, para. 12.
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The UN Reform Programme launched in 1997 underlined the UN’s
“unique institutional framework to promote human rights”, but noted
that the increasing demands on the UN human rights programme had
revealed a number of shortcomings that reduced the impact and efficiency
of the UN human rights system.120 The Reform Programme suggested a
type of dual strategy in order to come to terms with the shortcomings.
The Programme underlined the importance of both strengthening the
UN’s human rights framework integrating the human rights programme
into a broad range of UN activities.121
The elevated position for human rights is continued in the Millennium
Declaration, where human rights, democracy and good governance are
chosen as target areas.122 The Roadmap to the Implementation of the Uni-
ted Nations Millennium Declaration refers to the Reform Programme
and notes that “[t]he cross-cutting nature of human rights demands that
whether we are working for peace and security, for humanitarian relief
or for a common development approach and common development
operations, the activities and programmes must be conducted with the
principles of equality at their core”.123 The integration of human rights
norms into UN policies and programmes is one of the strategies for
implementing the Millennium Declaration goals.124 The elevated posi-
tion accorded to human rights particularly in the reform programme
and in the Millennium Summit process is evidence of the new role given
to human rights in the post-Cold War era.
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120 The human rights area was identified as one of the five core areas within the UN
mandate. See UN doc. A/51/950, paras. 28 and 196–7.
121 In order to consolidate the UN human rights framework, the OHCHR and the
Centre for Human Rights were consolidated into one OHCHR providing the High
Commissioner for Human Rights with a “... solid institutional basis from which to lead
the Organization’s mission in the domain of human rights”, see UN doc. A/51/950,
para. 79. The High Commissioner for Human Rights was also asked to review the human
rights machinery and to develop recommendations on possible ways to streamline and
rationalize it, at the same time as the UN human rights programme was to be fully integ-
rated into a broad range of UN activities, see UN doc. A/51/950, para. 206, action 16a,
see also para. 79.
122 UN doc. A/Res/55/2. The Millennium Declaration emphasizes respect for a number
of different sets of rights, viz., civil and political rights; economic, social and cultural
rights; minority rights, women’s rights and the rights of other disadvantaged groups, UN
doc. A/Res/55/2, para. 25. See also UN doc. A/56/326, Chapter V.
123 UN doc. A/56/326, para. 201.
124 UN doc. A/56/326, para. 204. Regarding the implementation of the Millennium
Declaration goals, see UN doc. A/57/270. The Secretary-General’s report on implemen-
tation refers to the changes in world politics, noting that “[s]ecurity must not come at
the expense of human rights”, see UN doc. A/57/270, para. 89.
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As was the case with the dual strategy for women’s advancement and
gender mainstreaming developed at the Beijing conference, the strategy
for strengthening and mainstreaming human rights is easy enough to
understand, but in accordance with some of the early evalutions, it 
has not been easy to apply. An example of how the strategy has been
implemented and of problems encountered during the implementation
process, is the Human Rights Strengthening Programme (HURIST),
coauthored by the UNDP and the OHCHR, which aims at mainstream-
ing human rights into UNDP development programming.125 In the
UNDP policy document pre-dating the HURIST programme, the full
realization of the rights to development were defined as the main areas
where human rights could contribute to UNDP practices.126 These
rights to development were listed as including freedom from poverty,
the integration of human rights into sustainable development through
people-centred development and good governance. The HURIST pro-
gramme aims at developing guidelines and methodologies in order 
to identify the best practices and learning opportunities for mainstream-
ing human rights into sustainable development.127 The UNDP has a
long history of mainstreaming strategies, and early evaluations of the
HURIST programme has shown that there is also growing acceptance of
human rights as standards. However, there is, still, much confusion about
how to turn human rights into practically applicable tools, i.e., how to
189
125 As a result of the Secretary-General’s request that all UN institutions mainstream hu-
man rights, the UNPD adopted in 1998 a policy document on the integration of human
rights. The UNDP policy document was based on an understanding of human rights as
a cross-cutting theme within the UN system that would enable further cooperation be-
tween UN specialized agencies, including the UNDP and the OHCHR, see Integrating
Human Rights with Sustainable Development: A UNDP Policy Document 1998. Efforts to
implement the UNDP policy has been achieved through the HURIST programme, a
joint programme between the OHCHR and the UNDP, launched in 1999 and ending
in 2005. For further information about the HURIST programme and how to mainstream
human rights in development programming, see van Weerelt 2000 and 2001 and the
HURIST web site at www.undp.org/governance/hurist.htm (28-09-2003).
126 Integrating Human Rights with Sustainable Development: A UNDP Policy Document
1998
127 It is noteworthy that while the original HURIST programme did not include a focus
on gender-related issues, a shift of focus was instigated after the mid-term review. The
new focus areas include issues such as pro-poor human development policies; HIV/
AIDS; environment management and energy use; inclusive decentralised governance and
governing institutions; and indigenous peoples. The shifted focus will also include seek-
ing to develop and field-test a number of specific tools for human rights-based program-
ming, such as human rights and gender mainstreaming programme reviews; human
rights-based participatory assessments; and human rights-based performance assessment
procedures. See www.unhchr.ch/development/hurist.html (09-01-2004).
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develop rights-based programming and how significant the added-value
of mainstreaming human rights in practical terms really is.128
The rhetoric of human rights has been accepted, but the substance, the
concrete applications, the “operationalizing” has been lacking. [...] The key
challenge now is to focus on actual practice: What does RBP [rights-based
programming] mean, how does one do it, what difference does it make,
what are good examples from other countries. The words “practical” and
“concrete” cannot be overemphasised here.129
The efforts to operationalize the strategy for mainstreaming human rights
evoke a distinction between human rights as standards and human rights
as tools.
When the strategy for mainstreaming human rights was developed,
the rights-based approach seemed to rely, largely, on the anticipated be-
nefits of using human rights as standards within different areas. Hence,
when working for sustainable development and the eradication of pov-
erty, the UNDP can rely on the language of legal obligation and can
demand that State Parties to the ICESCR or another human rights-trea-
ty fulfill their obligations under the treaties. Hence, the importance of
being able to use the language of law and legal obligation in interaction
with governments and the importance of using codified rights as bench-
marks are accented as crucial aspects in the strategy for mainstreaming
human rights.130 Van Weeralt argues that the rights-based approach en-
tails using international human rights standards as a prism when analy-
zing, developing and implementing development programmes.131 The
systematic approach of human rights principles during all phases of pro-
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128 For an introduction to the mainstreaming of human rights in UNDP activities, see
www.undp.org/governance/humanrights.htm (28-09-2003).
129 O’Neill and Bye 2002, pp. 6–7. O’Neill and Bye, however, also note that there is “...
no magic formula to mainstreaming; no silver bullet or checklist to complete that would
somehow yield the desired result”.
130 In their evaluation of the UNDP strategy for mainstreaming human rights, O’Neill
and Bye (2002, p. 8) accentuate the importance of making governments directly account-
able for the fulfilment of the rights their citizens are entitled to and the importance of
supporting governments in their attempts to fulfil their legal obligations. Tomas˘evski,
the UN Special Rapporteur on the right to education strongly supports “... a clear art-
iculation of the requirements of the rule of law as the basis for human rights main-
streaming”, see UN doc. E/CN.4/2003/9, para. 4. According to Tomasevksi, “[t]he
grounding of human rights in the rule of law provides the outline of the accountability
framework within which individual and collective government responsibilities can be
translated into practice as the corollary of the universal right to education”, para. 4. See
also UN doc. E/CN.4/2002/60, paras. 27–29. See, also, Van Weerelt 2000 and 2001.
131 Van Weerelt 2000.
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gramme development and implementation can “... empower people to
make decisions about issues that affect their lives, rather than treating
them as passive objects of decisions made on their behalf by bureau-
crats”.132 That is, because human rights codify important principles, hu-
man rights can serve as benchmarks for planning, policies and action in
many areas.
There is little guidance as to how human rights should be transformed
from human rights as standards into human rights as tools. That is, as of
yet there is little guidance as to what human rights contribute beyond
allowing institutions and organizations to put pressure on governments
and beyond the use of human rights standards for self-evalution. William
O’Neill and Vegard Bye elaborate on a number of issues integral to
rights-based programming. These issues range, on the one hand, from
converting normative principles and legal obligations that governments
are bound by into development programs to, on the other hand, establish-
ing combined rights and development indicators and systematic moni-
toring mechanisms to determine compliance with these same norms.133
In a training manual for economic, social and cultural rights, the focus
on the individual is accentuated as one of the core aspects of a rights-
based approach. While all areas do not necessarily benefit from a rights-
based approach, human rights – as tools – may contribute to the changing
of values and attitudes on a long-term basis. One such change might be
the shift in emphasis from problems to individuals and from needs to
individual rights. As noted in the training material, “... a rights-based
approach involves not charity or simple economic development, but a
process of enabling and empowering those not enjoying ESC [economic,
social and cultural] rights to claim their rights”.134 In the training material,
a human rights activist gives the following definition of a rights-based
approach:
[w]hat does a “rights approach” mean? First, it means clearly understand-
ing the difference between a right and a need. A right is something to
which I am entitled to solely by virtue of being a person. It is that which
enables me to live with dignity. Moreover, a right can be enforced before
the government and entails an obligation on the part of the government to
honor it.
Second, and as a consequence of the foregoing, a right is defined on the
basis of dignity, that is to say on the basis of “being”, not “having” or the
191
132 Van Weerelt 2000.
133 O’Neill and Bye 2002, pp. 8–9.
134 Circle of Rights 2002, Module 1.
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social or economic program of a party or a government. A political pro-
gram can-and-should-be negotiated, where dignity is non-negotiable.135
In other words, a part of the strategy for mainstreaming human rights
includes taking rights seriously, underscoring the necessity of ratifying
human rights documents and profiting from both the fact that human
rights are codified norms and the fact that they are perceived of as empo-
wering. Another part of the strategy for mainstreaming human rights in-
cludes figuring out, how human rights can be used as operational tools
and what the added value of a rights-based approach is.
The emphasis on the strategy for mainstreaming human rights as
conceived in the aforementioned processes seems to promote mainly 
the mainstreaming of the core human rights agenda. That is, while the
Vienna process’ emphasis on the indivisibility, interdependence and
interrelatedness of all human rights is implicit in the strategy for main-
streaming human rights, the elevated position accorded by the Vienna
Platform to women’s, children’s, minorities’ and indigenous peoples’ rights
has not as of yet been integrated in the strategy for mainstreaming
human rights. Similarly, there have been few efforts made to analyze
how different mainstreaming strategies interact. Although probably a
problem in UN practice, there have been very few references in UN
documentation as to how the strategies for mainstreaming human rights
and a gender perspective might actually co-exist.136
The fact that human rights can serve as important benchmarks or
trumps, however, does not mean that they are useful or add a necessary
dimension to all areas of policy, planning or activity. In order to avoid
human rights sloganism – that a simplified human rights dimension be
added everywhere – it is necessary to be careful and selective when trans-
lating human rights standards into human rights tools. In the process of
designing human rights-based approaches it is also necessary to keep in
mind, that adding a new perspective, for example, to the development
framework, will probably also result in an exclusion of some other per-
spective.137
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135 Circle of Rights 2002, Module 1.
136 The interaction between different mainstreaming strategies was also highlighted by
the Special Rapporteur on Education, see Chapter 5.3.2.
137 See Chapter 2.3.2.
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4.6.3 Integrating women’s Human Rights-based Approaches
As was noted above the strategy for integrating women’s human rights
has been overshadowed by both the strategy for mainstreaming a gender
perspective and the strategy for mainstreaming human rights. One
might argue that in the light of the tasks of moving a gender perspective
into the UN system, including into its human rights framework, and
moving human rights beyond the human rights framework, the integra-
tion of women’s human rights into the mainstream of the UN and its
human rights framework seems as such an easy task. Moreover, the
strategy for integrating women’s human rights is closely interlinked 
with the 1990s women’s-rights-are-human-rights claim and movement.138
The adoption of the strategy for strengthening and integrating women’s
human rights at the Vienna conference was a result of persistent lobby-
ing by women’s movements. Hence, the focus of the strategy has been
affected by the dominant mainstreaming strategies, i.e., by the strategies
for mainstreaming a gender perspective and human rights, but also by
what women’s and human rights advocates have focused on as women’s
human rights.
The strategy for mainstreaming women’s human rights is not an espe-
cially simple strategy. Both in conjuction with the other mainstreaming
strategies and by itself, it poses considerable challenges. Nevertheless, as
the strategy for mainstreaming women’s human rights has been by-pas-
sed by the other mainstreaming strategies and as the strategy has been
blurred by the overall emphasis on women’s-rights-as-human-rights, no
substantial guidelines for mainstreaming women’s human rights have
evolued within the UN system. What is lacking are guidelines that un-
pack the meaning and ideas behind mainstreaming women’s human
rights, equivalent to, for example, the ECOSOC Agreed Conclusions on
gender mainstreaming.139 Hence, the content of the strategy for main-
streaming women’s human rights is best analyzed by how it has been
approached by the different UN human rights institutions and by what
193
138 See Chapters 2.3.2, 3.4.2 and 3.5.2.
139 Most expert group meetings and workshops coorganized by the UN human rights
and women’s advancement institutions, such as the 1995 Expert Group Meeting on the
development of guidelines for the integration of gender perspectives into the UN hu-
man rights activities and programmes or the 1999 worskhop on gender integration into
the human rights system, have targeted, as noted, integration of a gender perspective
and have escheved the integration of women’s human rights. For further discussion, see
Chapter 5.5.
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kind of focus it has been given by the women’s human rights move-
ment.140
The strategy for integrating women’s human rights is dependent upon
what meaning and content are given to the notion of women’s human
rights and on where it is suggested that women’s human rights are to be
integrated. When attempting to define what women’s human rights 
are in order to be able to implement the strategy for integrating women’s
human rights a tension hinders the process. This tension pertains to a
number of perceptions, viz., what the UN has codified and what has
been promoted in soft law instruments as women’s human rights and
what women’s advocates and others perceive women’s human rights to
be. As was noted in Chapter Three, from an international human rights
law perspective all human rights per definition are also women’s human
rights as women are humans. At the same time, beyond the human
rights framework there is a constantly transforming body of specialized
hard law-based and soft law-based women’s human rights.141 The latter
have developed in order to give increased attention to violations suffered
by women and to “women’s human rights”. These different perceptions
about what women’s human rights are have an impact on what is actual-
ly integrated. When addressing feminist perspectives on international
human rights, I noted that the feminist approaches ranged from a liberal
defense of rights to a radical reclaiming of rights.142
There are currently four different approaches to women’s human
rights promoted within the UN as part of the strategy for mainstreaming
women’s human rights: a CEDAW-centred approach, an institutional ap-
proach, a woman- or subject-centred approach and a thematic approach.
In the UN context women’s human rights have largely been defined
through the CEDAW, i.e., the dominant interpretation of what women’s
human rights are is viewed as having been included in the CEDAW.
Hence, the strategy for integrating women’s human rights has been inter-
preted as a strategy for integrating the CEDAW, either by bringing the
CEDAW closer to the human human rights framework, or by including
references to the importance of ratifying CEDAW, withdrawing reserva-
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140 The mainstreaming measures undertaken, for example, by the Commission on
Human Rights, analysed in Chapter 5.3.2, the Human Rights Committee, analyzed in
Chapter 5.4.3, and the CEDAW Committee, analyzed in Chapter 5.4.6, provide good
examples of how the strategy for integrating women’s human rights can be approached.
141 See Chapter 3.3.2.
142 See Chapters 2.3.1–2.3.2.
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tions from CEDAW and reporting to the CEDAW Committee.143 While,
to a large extent, the CEDAW-centred approach is focused on what per
definition has been codified as women’s human rights, the approach has
also much in common with the institutional approach. When addressing
the Vienna strategy, I noted that the Vienna Programme accented the
creation of mechanisms for institutional integration. That is, besides
emphasizing that the CEDAW is an integral part and should be brought
closer to the rest of the human rights framework, additional institutional
changes have been proposed to bridge the gap between women’s human
rights and human rights.144 Some of the mechanisms for institutional in-
tegration that have been proposed and that are being implemented, are
the joint workplans between the OHCHR and the Division for the Ad-
vancement of Women, the increased cooperation between the Commis-
sion on Human Rights and the Commission on the Status of Women
and the increased cooperation between the human rights treaty bodies.
The woman- or subject-centred approach to the integrating of women’s
human rights is the least intrusive interpretation of integration of women’s
human rights. The woman-centred approach is not focused on specific
human rights or on how these human rights have been defined, but on
the individual whose rights are being violated. That is, the focus is on the
individual women whose rights have been violated. Integrating women’s
human rights through the woman-centred approach can be interpreted
as giving attention to the cases addressed where the victim is a woman
and viewing these cases as efforts to integrate women’s human rights.
Integrating women’s human rights through a woman-centred approach,
however, can be pushed a bit further to include a recognition that wo-
men have been marginalized and that, therefore, specific attention has to
be given to women as rights’ holders, so as not to reproduce the margi-
nalization. That is, the woman-centred approach can include conscious
efforts to address cases where the victims are women.
The thematic approach is closely tied to the 1990s women’s-rights-are-
human-rights movement, not the least of which was the global campaign
against violence against women initiated in conjunction to the Vienna
process. That is, during the 1990s women’s human rights, to some extent,
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143 The General Assembly and many of the treaty bodies have, for example, chosen to at
times apply the CEDAW-centred approach to the integrtation of women’s human rights.
See Chapters 5.2.3 and 5.4. This approach is, however, not applied exclusively.
144 For an overview of the institutional mechanisms proposed in the Vienna Programme,
see Chapter 3.4.2. For an overview of different mechanisms for institutional mechanisms
adopted within the UN human rights framework, see Chapter 5.
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have been approached through specific violations, such as violence
against women.145 The thematic approach has contributed to the strategy
for integrating women’s human rights in two ways, first by shedding
light on issues that have previously been excluded from the human rights
sphere, and, secondly, by pushing the notion of human rights further.
The thematic approach, however, can also lead to the marginalization of
overarching (less medializable) issues, such as women’s economic, social
and cultural rights, and not the least poverty and under-development as
factors impeding women’s human rights.146
I noted above that how the strategy for integrating women’s human
rights is interpreted is also dependent on where it is suggested that wo-
men’s human rights should be integrated. The strategy for integrating
women’s human rights is often promoted as a system-wide and broad-
based strategy equivalent to the strategy for mainstreaming a gender per-
spective. In reality, however, the strategy has come to be approached as a
strategy specific for the UN human rights framework, i.e., the focus of the
strategy is to overcome the marginalization of women’s human rights
within the UN human rights framework.
The above text referred to definitions of how women’s human rights
have been approached, definitions which are largely deduced from how
women’s human rights have been approached within the UN human
rights framwork. The strategy for integrating women’s human rights, how-
ever, can also be perceived of as an add-on and an integral part of both
the strategies for mainstreaming a gender perspective and of mainstream-
ing human rights. That is, the strategy can be perceived of as part of the
targeted interventions needed for mainstreaming a gender perspective
within the UN human rights framework, and because the UN has em-
phasized a holistic perspective toward human rights “women’s human
rights” are integral to those rights that should be mainstreamed when
“human rights” are mainstreamed. Within the World Health Organization,
for example, efforts have been made, on the one hand, to mainstream 
a gender perspective and, on the other hand, to mainstream human
rights.147 While it is difficult to assess the overall success of these main-
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145 The thematic approach has been used by, for example, the General Assembly, the
Commission on Human Rights and the Commission on the Status of Women. See
Chapters 5.2.3, 5.3.2 and 5.3.3.
146 See Otto 1999, and Chapter 3.5.2.
147 Advancing Safe Motherhood through Human Rights, see at www.who.int/reproductive-
health/gender/tools.html (28-09-2003). See also Transforming Health Systems, Goonsekere
1998 and Lovecy 2002.
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streaming efforts, the Department of Reproductive Health and Research
at the World Health Organization has developed gender-based and
rights-based approaches to reproductive health. These approaches have
been implemented through gender and reproductive rights training.148
The Department of Reproductive Health and Research’s early work was
conducted under the title of Women’s Perspectives and Reproductive
Health. According to one of the persons interviewed, the World Health
Organization began focusing on women’s human rights as a spin off
from gender mainstreaming work. It was argued that “... the fact that 
it [human rights] is a legal framework and that there is this whole UN
system developing and elaborating on conventions et cetera gives a kind
of weight to the work [for women and gender equality] something that
just gender mainstreamig doesn’t”.149
4.7 Conclusions
The aim of this chapter has been to analyze the strategies for mainstream-
ing a gender perspective and for integrating women’s human rights.
Implicit in the analysis has been Haslanger’s claim regarding the link
between what we wish to explain and what we wish to explain it with and
Bacchi’s proposals that social problems are not necessarily solved with
the development of policy strategies and her emphasis that we should
shift our focus from viewing policies as evident solutions to viewing a
policy solution as one among many possible problem representations.
Both Haslanger and Bacchi question truths which have been taken for
granted about gender and equality issues. That is, they acknowledge that
although inequalities between the sexes are an everyday reality for women
and men around the world the strategies for mainstreaming a gender
perspective or women’s human rights do not necessarily capture these
realities or provide tools against inequalities. The excessive focus on one
or two strategies might even be counterproductive. The process of de-
veloping the strategies, which involves the very politicized process of
integrating the strategies within the UN human rights framework, might
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148 For an overview of the Transforming Health Systems: Gender and Rights in Reproduct-
ive Health training material see at www.who.int/reproductive-health/gender/modules.
html (28-09-2003), World Health Organization has also conducted a pilot programme
in Mozambique regarding the use of a human rights-based approach to make pregnancies
safer, see at www.who.int/reproductive-health/mps/index.htm (28-09-2003).
149 Interview No. 9.
04-02 Iustus, Sari 8/3  04-03-08 15.31  Sidan 197
have unintended consequences for and lead to unexpected inclusions
and exclusions in connection with the proposed strategies.
I have now analyzed the development of the Vienna and Beijing strate-
gies in Chapter Three, and I have analyzed the content of the strategies,
which was the focus of this chapter. I would argue now that the aim of
the strategies has changed during the strategy development process. It
has been demonstrated that both the idea of mainstreaming a gender
perspective and the idea of mainstreaming women’s human rights have
lost some of their transformative content during the process of ground-
ing the policies, all the while the policies remain difficult. In one of the
interviews, although the importance of promoting a strategy was brought
to light, it was also mentioned how important it was to remain attentive
to any presumptions which might lie behind or beneath a particular
strategy – to stay alert as to any possible secondary effects the strategy
might cause.150 The lack of definitions and discussion, due to factors,
such as, the lack of time, the lack of resources, the lack of interest or the
fear of conflict, will only lead to a replication of the relative failure and
marginalization of the woman-centred strategies. As argued by Beveridge
and Nott:
... it must be recognised that the rhetoric of mainstreaming, like the rhetoric
of equality of opportunity or the rhetoric of positive action, can be ‘twisted
and deployed to diffuse its transformative potential [or to be used] against
feminist goals.151
OSAGI has analyzed many of the difficulties encountered with the
mainstreaming of a gender perspective. The persistent constraints to
mainstreaming have been identified as including “... conceptual con-
fusion, inadequate understanding of the linkages between gender per-
spectives in different areas of the work of the United Nations and gaps
in capacity to address gender perspectives once identified”. These per-
sistent constraints could be translated into three questions regarding
gender mainstreaming: what does it mean? What does it do? And how
should it be done? 
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150 Interview No. 1. For example, due to the success enjoyed by the mainstreaming stra-
tegies during the 1990s and due to the fact that today, within the UN system, there are a
number of overlapping mainstreaming initiatives, viz., gender, human rights, women’s
human rights, et cetera, it is unavoidable that questions emerge regarding multiple
mainstreaming strategies or how exactly to mainstream within a mainstreaming strategy.
For further discussion about multiple mainstreaming approachs, see Chapters 5.3.2 and
6.5.
151 Beveridge and Nott 2002a, p. 308.
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The persistent constraints, which contribute to the danger that the
mainstreaming strategies are being or will be misused, stem partly from
the insufficient dissemination of the knowledge developed within the
woman-centred institutions regarding mainstreaming strategies, partly
from difficulties in adapting the strategies to specific contexts. While the
woman-centred institutions have promoted transformative approaches
to mainstreaming, including social constructivist conceptions of gender
and far-reaching interpretations of women’s human rights, these ap-
proaches have not yet been well communicated to the overall UN human
rights framework – or during the process of communication, the con-
tent of the strategies might have changed. The insufficient communica-
tion and the altered content of the strategies may be partly blamed on
the problems generally intrinsic to mainstreaming strategies. That is,
whether expert or participatory mainstreaming strategies are used, it is
necessary for the experts or the architects of the strategies to let go of the
mainstreaming strategy once it has been introduced, and to let it evolve
by means of discussion or review sessions and operationalizations so as
to adapt it to the needs of a specific context. Hence, certain amounts of
both fluidity and openness are essential to the process of mainstreaming.
Mainstreaming strategies are unsuccessful if they are carried out with a
top-down approach. In order to encourage everyone, every member of
staff, to integrate a gender perspective, women’s human rights or human
rights, as many people as possible ought to participate in the identifica-
tion of the actual needs of a specific context. Each staff member should
discover how they could best integrate women’s human rights or a gen-
der perspective into their work. It would be naïve, however, to assume
that every staff member at the OHCHR, for example, felt passionately
about gender or women’s human rights, that they would be ready to
take the necessary time and effort to analyze how they and their work
could benefit from the integration of women’s human rights or a gender
perspective – and, thereafter, be willing to make the requisite changes in
their work flow. It might very well be worthwhile to ponder whether in
the absence of a nourishing environment, and in the absence of extensive,
participatory and well-guided discussion and feedback, the integrative
strategies can be successful?
199
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5 The Institutional
Implementation of the
Integrative Strategies
In the previous chapters, Chapters Three and Four, I analyzed the
development and content of the strategies for integrating women’s
human rights and mainstreaming a gender perspective. In this
chapter, Chapter Five, I will focus on the third objective of this thesis
i.e., I will focus on how different institutions within the UN human
rights system have approached and chosen to implement the inte-
grative strategies. Chapter Five is divided into five main parts, parts
in which I will analyze the implementation within the Charter-
based, treaty-based and extra-ordinary human rights mechanisms.
5.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter, I suggested that, while, the strategies for main-
streaming a gender perspective and integrating women’s human rights,
seem, prima facie, to be straightforward concepts, there is scant informa-
tion or knowledge about them, in particular, how to mainstream, what
to mainstream or what the short-term or long-term results of mainstream-
ing would and should be. While mainstreaming strategies may contribute
to and even may transform an integrated and critical approach to women’s
inequality within the UN system, the very fuzziness of both strategies
makes them easy to bypass or ignore and even abuse. 
In this chapter, I will analyze the institutional implementation of the
integrative strategies for mainstreaming a gender perspective and integ-
rating women’s human rights within the UN human rights framework.1
1 The Secretary-General’s reports to the Commission on Human Rights on the integra-
tion of the human rights of women and the gender perspective, in addition to informa-
tion from the specific institutions, have been used when developing this chapter. See
UN doc. E/CN.4/1997/40, UN doc. E/CN.4/1998/49, UN doc. E/CN.4/1999/67,
UN doc. E/CN.4/2000/67, UN doc. E/CN.4/2001/71 and UN doc. E/CN.4/2002/81,
UN doc. E/2003 (early version) and E/CN.4/2003/72.
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I am interested in how the different instiutions have approached issues
regarding equality between the sexes and women’s human rights, and
how these approaches have changed during the last decade.
Image: Overview of the institutions within the UN Human Rights system addressed in
the thesis.
Charter-based,
Intergovernmental
Institutions
Security Council
General Assembly
Economic and Social
Council (ECOSOC)
– Commission on
the Status of Women
– Commission on
Human Rights
Extra-conventional,
Expert Institutions
(i.e. the Commission
on Human Rights
special procedures)
Special Rapporteur
on Extrajudicial,
Summary of
Arbitrary Executions
Special Rapporteur
on the Situation of
Human Rights in
Afghanistan
Special Rapporteur
on the Right to
Education
Special Rapporteur
on Violence Against
Women, Its Causes
and Consequences
Treaty-based,
Institutions
Committee on the
Elimination of All
Forms of Racial
Discrimination
(CERD Committee)
Human Rights
Committee
Committee against
Torture (CAT
Committee)
Committee on the 
Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimi-
nation against
Women (CEDAW
Committee)
Committee on the
Rights of the Child
(CRC Committee)
Committee on
Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights
(CESCR Com-
mittee)
Charter-based,
Administrative
Institutions (i.e. 
the Secretariat)
Division for the
Advancement of
Woman
Office of the UN
Special Adviser on to
the Secretary-General
on Gender Issues and
Advancement of
Women (OSAGI)
Office of the High
Commissioner on
Human Rights
(OHCHR)
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2 The image on the previous page gives an overview of only a small part of the UN human
rights framework and institutional structure. I have chosen to concentrate the analysis on
core Charter-based, treaty-based and extraordinary human rights institutions, which have
been implied in the development of the UN human rights and women’s human rights
discourses, not the least in the conjunction to the world conference processes. For more
substantive overviews of the Human rights framework,, see, for example, Alston 1996,
ed. and Alston and Crawford, eds. 2000.
3 The ECOSOC’s functional commissions, viz., the Commission on Human Rights
and the Commission on the Status of Women, will be addressed separately. See Chapters
5.3.2 and 5.3.3.
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The above matrix offers an overview of the Charter-based, treaty-based
and extra-conventional mechanisms that are referred to in this thesis.2 I
have identified key documents or processes within each institution that
address or can be perceived as addressing the mainstreaming of a gender
perspective or the integration of women’s human rights. The focus of the
analysis is on the period 1992–2002, i.e., on the period during which
the aforementioned strategies have been developed. I have included initia-
tives undertaken during 2003 when such actions seem to indicate a shift
or an important step in the approach of the institution with regard to
the implementation of the integrative strategies. Given the limitations as
concerns the institutions and the documents referred to, this chapter can
only indicate some tendencies in how the integrative strategies have been
approached by the UN human rights system and it should not be read as
a substantial analysis of the activities of each of the above-mentioned in-
stitutions vis-à-vis the strategies. The sum of the analysis, however, does
provide insights into changes within the UN human rights framework
and within the specific institutions vis-à-vis issues regarding equality be-
tween the sexes and women’s human rights.
5.2 The Charter-based Intergovernmental
Institutions and the Integrative Strategies
5.2.1 Introduction
The UN Charter established the mandates for the Charter-based institu-
tions. Among the Charter-based institutions, the ones that work with
issues relating to the UN human rights and women’s advancement agen-
das are primarily the General Assembly, the ECOSOC and some of its
functional commissions and some of the Secretariat institutions. The
Charter-based intergovernmental institutions that I will address below
include the Security Council, the General Assembly and the ECOSOC.3
04-02 Iustus, Sari 8/3  04-03-08 15.31  Sidan 202
203
The Security Council has been included, because during the last decade,
it has begun to address human rights and the humanitarian law dimen-
sions of peace and security issues. The General Assembly is, still, an im-
portant intergovernmental institution with regard to human rights, whi-
le the ECOSOC has come to delegate many of its functions in the field
of human rights to the Commission on Human Rights. The Security
Council is not implied in the follow-up to the Vienna and Beijing confe-
rences. The General Assembly and the ECOSOC play key roles in the
follow-up processes.
5.2.2 The Security Council
It was not envisaged at the San Francisco conference that the Security
Council would be dealing with human rights matters.4 Up until the 1960s,
the Security Council’s human rights record remained sporadic. Since the
1960s, however, the Security Council has occasionally addressed human
rights when gross and persistent human rights violations have consisted
a threat to peace and security.5 Since the late 1980s, the Security Council,
in line with the general trend within the UN, has begun to use not only
country-specific approaches, but also thematic approaches. It is within
the framework of the thematic approaches that the Security Council has
developed a broader approach to human rights.6 In the aftermath of the
Cold War, the Security Council has increasingly come to interpret the
absence of democratic governance and the failure to protect human rights
as either symptoms of or causes of threats to peace and security.7 During
the Security Council meeting of the Heads of State in 1992, the Security
Council stated that “[t]he absence of war and military conflicts does not
in itself ensure international peace and security. The non-military sources
of instability in the economic, social, humanitarian and ecological fields
have become threats to peace and security”.8 Orford notes that the con-
ception of human rights used in the discourses of the new interventio-
nism is “... radically circumscribed to fit [the] vision of procedural demo-
4 The Security Council can investigate and recommend solutions when international
peace and security are threatened. It also can decide on the use of economic sanctions or
military action against an aggressor. The Security Council has fifteen members of which,
the only permanent members are China, France, the Russian Federation, the United
Kingdom and the United States. The Security Council resolutions are considered legally
binding for UN Member States. See, UN Charter Chapter V and Bailey 1995.
5 Bailey 1996, p. 306.
6 Orford 1997, p. 445.
7 Orford 1997, p. 445.
8 The Security Council Summit Statement concerning the Council’s Responsibility in the
Maintenance of International Peace and Security, cited in Orford 1997, footnote 3.
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cracy as the end of intervention”.9 While the Security Council’s approach
to human rights remains focused on civil and political rights, the Secur-
ity Council has come to address, albeit marginally, women’s human rights
and the gendered dimensions of peace and security through these acknow-
ledgements and through the increased inclusion of thematic issues on the
Security Council agenda.
The Security Council’s sensitivity to questions regarding women’s in-
equality began during the early 1990s information campaign about viol-
ence against women in the context of the conflicts in former Yugoslavia
and Rwanda, as is the case for many UN institutions.10 The sensitivity
process continued through the discussions about the situation in Afghan-
istan and the Taliban’s mistreatment of women.11 As part of its thematic
approaches the Security Council did come to address, the situations of
women and children during the armed conflicts once having addressed
the situation of civilians generally.12 In March 2000, the Security Council
considered the thematic topic, Maintaining Peace and Security: Human-
itarian Aspects of Issues before the Security Council. The experiences of
women and children in armed conflicts and the necessity of protecting
women and children were topics that were emphasized in the Security
Council’s discussions. In his statement, the President of the Council de-
clared that “... in some instances the integration of humanitarian com-
ponents into peacekeeping operations would contribute effectively to
their carrying out their mandate” and, in this regard, he emphasized the
importance of adequate training for peacekeeping personnel in inter-
national humanitarian law and human rights with regard to the special
situations of women and children as well as vulnerable population
groups.13 Seven months later, in October 2000, the Security Council
9 Orford 1997, pp. 463–4.
10 Charlesworth and Chinkin 2000, p. 254.
11 See, for example, UN doc. S/Res/1333 (2000), UN doc. S/res/1383 (2001) and UN
doc. S/Res/1419 (2002) on the situation in Afghanistan.
12 Women, children and indigenous peoples are among the topics, which could be called
traditional thematic topics on different UN agendas. See, Security Council Resolutions
UN doc. S/Res/1261 (1999) on Children and Armed Conflict, UN doc. S/Res/1265
(1999) on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, UN doc. S/Res/1296 (2000)
on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict and UN doc. S/Res/1314 (2000) on
Children and Armed Conflict, UN doc. S/Res/1325 (2000) on Women and Peace and
Security, and UN doc. S/Res/1379 (2001) on Children and Armed Conflict. See, also
Pratt and Fletcher 1994.
13 UN doc. S/PRST/2000/7. The importance of recognizing violations of women’s and
children’s rights was also emphasized by some of the other speakers. The Security Council
discussion, however, failed to lead to any action, see, http://www.un.org/Depts/dhl/ res-
guide/scact2000.htm (15-10-2002).
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considered the thematic topic Women and Peace and Security.14 The UN
Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, opened the discussion, commenting on
how the nature of conflict had changed during the second half of the
20th century and that civilians, including women and children, are in-
creasingly the victims of and targets in conflict and war. Annan emphas-
ized, and this focus has become constitutive for the Security Council ap-
proach to women, that women are not only victims, but that they are also
often better equipped than men to prevent and resolve conflict and war.15
A similar perspective was epoused by the Special Advisor on Gender Issues,
Angela King. King highlighted several benefits emanating from the
focus on women and the presence of women, viz., that the focus is legit-
imized with respect to achieving equality between the sexes, that female
peace-keepers have a proven ability to recruit local women onto peace
committees and other peace and reconstructive work and, further, that
women are also “... less hierarchical in dealing with local communities
and [they] listen more ...”.16
The Security Council session on Women and Peace and Security result-
ed in the adoption of Resolution 1325 (2000) on Women and Peace and
Security. Corresponding to the discussion prior to its adoption, the reso-
lution expresses concern, on the one hand, “... that civilians, particularly
women and children, account for the vast majority of those adversely af-
fected by armed conflicts” and, reaffirms, on the other hand, “... the im-
portant role of women in the prevention and resolution of conflicts and
in peace-building”.17 The resolution also refers to both the need to “...
implement fully international humanitarian and human rights law that
protects the rights of women and children during and after conflicts”
and to the “... urgent need to mainstream a gender perspective into peace-
14 There were only eight women speakers out of a total of about forty speakers at the
meeting on women and peace and security. See UN doc. S/PV. 4208 (2000).
15 UN doc. S/PV.4208, p. 3.
16 UN doc. S/PV.4208, p. 4. Mr. Listre (Argentina) noted that “[a]rmed conflict has a
special and disproportionate impact on women, and it is thus right to conclude that wo-
men have their own views which must be heeded in discussions of the best ways to avoid
or settle conflicts or how to organize the future of communities that have been affected
by such conflicts”, see UN doc. S/PV.4208, p. 16. Mr. Shen Guofong (China) noted
similarly that women are the direct and principal victims of armed conflict and war and
because “women hold up half the sky”, efforts to maintain international peace cannot be
lasting if women are not allowed to participate in building it, see UN doc. S/PV.4208,
p. 17. Similar comments were made by Mr. Lavrov (Russia), who noted that women are
“... not merely helpless victims”, but they are also resources and they can provide “... in-
valuable assistance in reconciling belligerents and tending the wounds of war”, UN doc.
S/PV.4208, p. 21.
17 UN doc. S/Res/1325 (2000), preamble.
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keeping operations”.18 The substantial articles of the resolution focus on
the following goals: the necessity of increasing the representation of wo-
men on all decision-making levels, in both national and international
contexts, including as UN special representatives and envoys, and in
field-operations; the Security Council’s willingness to integrate a gender
perspective into peacekeeping operations and the need for training on
all levels in this regard, as well as with regard to women’s human rights;
and the necessity to protect women from violence and from other forms
of violations of their human rights.19 The Security Council decided to
“... remain actively seized on the matter [of women and peace and secur-
ity]”.20
The Security Council’s resolution has received quite a lot of attention
by women’s advocates and organizations, but the Security Council, itself,
has failed to “remain actively seized on the matter”, especially after the
events of September 11. The Security Council has not adopted any fol-
low-up resolution that specifically addresses women and peace and secu-
rity. Moreover, while the Security Council has reasserted its commit-
ment to issues regarding women and peace and security in some of its
other thematic and country-specific resolutions, these reassertions remain
vague.21
The approach chosen in the Security Council resolution, however, was
“progressive” in the sense that it emphasized a focus on women in situa-
tions of risk or danger, i.e., in conflict-torn areas and also within UN
peacekeeping and peace-building operations. This approach was a new one
for the Security Council. The approach chosen by the Security Council
leaves, however, very little room for women’s roles to move beyond the
conservative images of women as either victims or caregivers. The approach
18 UN doc. S/Res/1325 (2000), preamble.
19 UN doc. S/Res/1325 (2000), Arts. 1–17
20 UN doc. S/Res/1325 (2000), Art. 18.
21 Sexual violence and the situation of girl children, however, was emphasized in UN
doc. S/Res/1379 (2001) on Children and Armed Conflict where the Security Council
reiterated its recognition of the role of women in conflict prevention and requested the
Secretary-General to give more attention to gender perspective in peacekeeping and peace-
building missions in its UN doc. S/Res/1366 (2001) on the role of the Security Council
in the Prevention of Armed Conflict. In its recommendations to the General Assembly,
the Security Council included only three women among the 23 candidates on its list for
candidates for judges to sit on the International Tribunal for Rwanda, see UN doc.
S/Res/1431 (2002) and UN doc. S/Res/1449 (2002). The Resolutions on Threats to In-
ternational Peace and Security caused by Terrorist Attacks do not generally include any
references to women’s human rights or gender issues. See UN doc. S/Res/1368 (2001),
UN doc. S/Res/1438 (2002), UN doc. S/Res/1440 (2002) and UN doc. S/Res/1450
(2002).
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emphasizing women as victims in need of protection, in fact, reproduces
the sexual logics of war, which, according to Charlesworth and Chinkin,
“... is connected to ideas of male soldiers’ privileges, to the power of
military’s lines of command, as well as [to] class and ethnic differences
among women”.22 The sexual logics of war not only produce women as
victims, but also as property that should be protected.23 The protector/
protected imagery is one of inequality because it gives the protector the
right to protect and the freedom to choose the means for protection, at
the same time as it denies those persons who are to be protected, i.e.,
certain women “... agency or ability to provide for their protection”.24
Orford shows that protector/protected and man/woman frames to issues
regarding women and peace and security also obscure the bigger picture,
i.e., these frames obscure many of the issues that feminists have raised,
such as the relationship between insecurity and economic liberaliza-
tion.25
The Security Council’s approach to women as assets in peacekeeping
and peace-building processes provides women with some agency, but only
because, as Orford notes, women are viewed as “innately peaceful”.26
Orford queries whether it is even possible to talk about conflict in the
context of globalization “... without suggesting that some women may
perhaps not see taking ‘their rightful and equal place at the decision-
making table in questions of peace and security’ as the key issue facing
them today?”.27 That is, women’s participation in peacekeeping and peace-
building processes is conditioned on the premise that, women will want
to participate without challenging the dominant peacekeeping and peace-
building processes to which they are supposed to lend a feminine touch.
Hence, the Security Council discussion and resolution are responses
to the UN’s demands for the mainstreaming of a gender perspective and
of human rights and to the recognition of the harsh realities that women
face in conflict situations. This chosen approach, however, avoids any
contact with any in-depth notions of gender. What is more, this chosen
line also averts its eyes from the possibility of a bulkier, non-conformist
image of a woman, one which might even force the Security Council to
address, first of all, the gender relationship in peace and security matters
and, secondly, the sexed and racial elements embodied in the “... construct
22 Charlesworth and Chinkin 2000, p. 254.
23 Charlesworth and Chinkin 2000, p. 254.
24 Charlesworth and Chinkin 2000, p. 254.
25 Orford 2002, p. 282.
26 See also Svensson 2003.
27 Orford 2002, p. 282.
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of the virile white male defender of women and children, upholding
Western values against a racial inferior”.28 The approach also reinforces
ideas about the kinds of jobs that can be delegated to women and men
respectively within the UN.29
When discussing the history of the World Conferences on Women, I
referred to Fraser’s experiences from the Copenhagen conference where
women had dominated most sessions, except those sessions where items
painted by Fraser as troublesome international issues were discussed.30
Björk provides a similar insight from the Commission on the Status of
Women session in March 2003, held “in the caves of the UN”, while at
the same time, three floors above the Security Council or “... the men
were deciding on different degrees of militarism or war”.31 She notes that
the women activists had no access to the floor where the Security Coun-
cil held its meetings. She described the session of the Commission on
the Status of Women or as she called it: the “cave world” as a “surrealist
place” where “... we [the women] through little adjustments in an official
document try to remain sane, try to make sense”.32 Björk asked, with
respect to the current context, whether women should abandon the UN
and the global arena because there does not seem to be any place left for
human rights, let alone for women’s rights.33 In this respect, King’s asser-
tion voiced during the Security Council discussion on women and peace
and security that “... the most important lesson learned is that lessons
are not always learned” seems especially apt for the UN framework.34
5.2.3 The General Assembly
As opposed to the Security Council, the General Assembly has a broad
mandate regarding both human rights and the advancement of women.35
Largely through the work of its Third Committee, which works with so-
28 Charlesworth and Chinkin 2000, p. 254.
29 Charlesworth and Chinkin (2000, p. 294) note that “... between 1957 and 1989 there
were only twenty women (mainly) nurses in the approximately 20.000 military personnel
who served on UN missions”. By the year 2000, the number had increased to around 4 %.
30 See Chapter 3.5.1.
31 Björk 2003, p. 14.
32 Björk 2003, p. 14.
33 Björk 2003, p. 14.
34 UN doc. S/PV.4208 (2000), p. 6.
35 During its annual sessions, which are held in New York, the General Assembly carries
out its work by subdividing into six main committees. The main committees correspond
to the major fields of responsibility of the General Assembly. It is the Third Committee
– the Social, Humanitarian and Cultural Committee – that deals with most of the
human rights and women’s rights issues. Decisions by the General Assembly are not
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cial, humanitarian and cultural affairs and the follow-up to UN world
conferences regarding human rights and socioeconomic issues, the Ge-
neral Assembly develops the long-term and short term goals of the UN
human rights and women’s advancement agendas. Quinn argues that the
cohabitation of human rights and social issues, including the advance-
ment of women, on the Third Committee’s agenda, should not be seen
exclusively through an optic of mutually exclusive competition for re-
sources and attention.36 Instead, the two sets of issues are interlinked. It is
this very linkage that has contributed to the dual nature of the women’s
human rights and women’s advancement agendas.37
According to Cassese, “[i]t would be erroneous to speak of an Assembly
philosophy or strategy of human rights. In actual fact, the views of the
Assembly are those injected into its resolutions by the various groups of
states prevailing at any specific time within that body (and consequently
in the Organization as a whole)”.38 Hence, the position of human rights
on the General Assembly agenda has changed considerably during the
history of the UN.39 Until the late-1950s, the General Assembly was do-
minated by Western states and by Western conceptions of human rights.
Thereafter, up to the mid-1970s, the General Assembly’s approach was
increasingly affected by the Socialist states, which, supported by some
developing countries, promoted an economic and social rights agenda
that the Western states were obliged not to ignore. Later, again, up to the
late-1980s, the General Assembly’s approach was increasingly affected 
by the developing world; Group and development rights’ frameworks
emerged. It is during this third phase that the UN’s women’s human
rights framework developed by the adoption of the CEDAW. During the
post-Cold War period, the General Assembly evinced a growing open-
ness toward alternative human rights frameworks and discussed more
and more frequently, for example, the topic of the human rights of the
disabled and the elderly.
The General Assembly’s approach to human rights and its methods of
working for human rights have been criticized. Quinn notes that while
binding upon Member States’ governments, but the decisions do “... carry the weight of
world opinion on major international issues, as well as the moral authority of the world
community”, see www.un.org/ga/57/about.htm (23-09-2003).
36 Quinn 1996, pp. 60–1.
37 The dual nature of the women’s human rights agenda has been discussed in Chapters
3.3.2 and 4.7.
38 Cassese 1996, p. 29.
39 Cassese 1996, p. 29. The different approaches and how they change over time are not
necessarily unique for the General Assembly, but bear resemblance to the trends within
the other institutions of the UN.
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the contributions to the international human rights framework made by
the General Assembly often constitute nothing more than replications
of what has already been done by the Commission on Human Rights
and what has already been replicated by the ECOSOC, supporters of
UN human rights activities tend to take the “empirical” view that “more
is better”.40 Cassese argued that the General Assembly has abused its
unique position regarding human rights by indulging in the practice of
passing a large number of resolutions knowing that these would amount
to nothing but “paper solutions to serious problems”.41
It seemed that the more impotent the Assembly felt in the face of difficult
problems, the more often in resorted to paper solutions. One is reminded
of the Queen of Hearts in Alice in Wonderland, who had only one way of
settling all difficulties, great or small, namely to order ‘off with his head’, but
nobody paid any attention to her commends and no beheading was ever
carried out.42
Quinn notes that the criticism against the General Assembly is especially
persistent for thematic and other non-specific resolutions that tend to be
procedural and declaratory in character.
Despite its supervisory and priority setting mandate, the Assembly has no
effective method for follow-up or evaluation of implementation of its re-
solutions. The Secretary-General’s reports, all too often requested by delega-
tions semi-automatically, without regard to purpose or resource implica-
tions, are by and large bureaucratic set-pieces which do little to advance
understanding of the issues.43
However, both Quinn and Cassese underline that the criticism directed
towards the General Assembly is often based on how the critical voices
would want the General Assembly to act rather than on how the General
Assembly actually can act.44 Cassese notes that the Assembly together
with other UN bodies succeeded in shifting from a static concept of
human rights to a dynamic concept of human rights conceived as a means
of realizing international peace.45
The General Assembly is part of the three-tiered intergovernmental
mechanism specifically responsible for follow-up to the Beijing conference.
The General Assembly also works for the integrated and coordinated
40 Quinn 1996, p. 57.
41 Cassese 1996, p. 51.
42 Cassese 1996, p. 51 and Quinn 1996, p. 71.
43 Quinn 1996, p. 96.
44 Cassese 1996, p. 50.
45 Cassese 1996, p. 47.
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follow-ups to UN conferences.46 The General Assembly organized the
Beijing+5 review as a special session. The Beijing+5 session and its out-
come document, however, were affirmative rather than transformative
with regard to the Beijing Platform’s gender mainstreaming and women’s
human rights agendas.47 As was noted in Chapter Three, the Beijing+5
session has been perceived as undermining some of the advances made
during the Vienna, Cairo and Beijing conferences. In the aftermath of
the Beijing+5 session, the General Assembly organized a Millennium
Assembly, which also led to the adoption of the Millennium Declara-
tion.48 The declaration listed freedom, equality, solidarity, tolerance and
respect for nature and shared responsibility as the main values essential
to international relations in the 21st century. The declaration proclaimes
women’s and men’s equal rights to freedom and equality in development
as part of two of the main values, freedom and equality.49 The declara-
tion also identifies gender equality and the empowerment of women
throughout the declaration as a means for poverty eradication; human
rights are mentioned as a means for democracy.50
The General Assembly’s affirmative rather than transformative role
and its approach to women’s advancement and gender equality as special
issues can also be exemplified through a review of the General Assembly’s
resolutions on the topics. During its 56th session (2001), for example,
the General Assembly adopted four main types of resolutions regarding
human and women’s human rights. I have chosen to define these resolu-
tions as institutional and implementation resolutions, thematic resolu-
tions, country-specific resolutions and resolutions on emerging issues.
The resolutions that I have defined as institutional and implementation
resolutions adopted under the human rights agenda, dealt with matters
relating to the promotion and implementation of international human
rights treaties, declarations and other instruments.51 Among the general,
46 See UN doc. A/Res/50/203 and UN doc. A/Res/56/211.
47 See, for example, UN doc. A/S-23/10/Rev.1, UN doc. A/Res/S-23/3, UN doc.
A/Res/51/69, UN doc. A/Res/52/100, UN doc. A/Res/54/141, UN doc. A/Res/55/71,
UN doc. A/Res/56/132 and UN doc. A/Res/53/120.
48 See UN doc. A/Res/55/2 and UN doc. A/Res/55/162.
49 UN doc. A/Res/55/2, Art. 6.
50 In the Secretary-General’s Report, The Roadmap to Implementation addresses women
along with children and disabled persons are grouped under the heading Protecting the
Vulnerable. See UN doc. A/56/326.
51 The resolutions focused especially on the International Convention on the Protection
of the Rights of all Migrant Workers, the Declaration on Rights of Persons belonging to
National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities, the Declaration on the Right
and Responsibility to Promote Human Rights, the comprehensive implementation and
follow-up to the World Conference against Racism, the Special Session of the General
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i.e., non-woman-specific institutional and implementation resolutions, only
very few made substantive references to women’s human rights or to gen-
der-related issues. Exceptions were the Resolution on the International
Convention on the Protection of the Rights of all Migrant Workers,
which includes references to CEDAW. The Resolution on the Promo-
tion of the Declaration on Rights of Persons belonging to National or
Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities includes a reference to the
necessity of applying a gender perspective. The Resolution on Human
Rights in the Administration of Justice mentions CEDAW. The Resolu-
tion on National Institutions for the Protection of Human Rights makes
references to the Beijing Platform and the Resolution on Human Rights
Education includes references to women’s human rights. The woman-
centred institutional and implementation resolutions addressed, for example,
the improvement of the status of women within the UN system, the sta-
tus of institutions such as the CEDAW Committee and UNIFEM, the
implementation of the CEDAW, its Optional Protocol, and the Beijing
Platform and the Beijing+5 final document. 52
The thematic resolutions adopted under the human rights agenda dealt
with issues relating to specific human rights issues falling within the
framework of the International Bill of Rights or some of the other human
rights treaties and declarations.53 Most of these resolutions made some
references to women’s human rights or gender-related issues. The Res-
olution on Religious Intolerance included references to discrimination
against women and practices that violate the human rights of women.
The Resolution on the Right to Food includes references to the human
Assembly on Children, on the integrated and coordinated follow-up to UN conferences
in the economic and social fields, on human rights in the administration of justice, on
the strengthening UN action in the field of human rights, on the enhancement of inter-
national cooperation in the field of human rights, on national institutions for the protec-
tion of human rights and on human rights education. See UN doc. A/Res/56/144, UN
doc. A/Res/56/145, UN doc. A/Res/56/147, UN doc. A/Res/56/149, UN doc.
A/Res/56/153, UN doc. A/Res/56/158, UN doc. A/Res/56/161, UN doc. A/Res/56/162,
UN doc. A/Res/56/163, UN doc. A/Res/56/211, UN doc. A/Res/56/222 and UN doc.
A/Res/56/267.
52 See UN doc. A/56/576. See also resolutions UN doc. A/Res/56/127, UN doc.
A/Res/56/130, UN doc. A/Res/56/125, UN doc. A/Res/56/132.
53 Resolutions were adopted regarding the elimination of all forms of religious intoleran-
ce, on the right to food, on the right to development, and on the eradication of poverty,
measures to combat contemporary forms of racism and racial discrimination, xenophobia
and related intolerance, on the third decade to combat racism and racial discrimination,
on torture, and on human rights and cultural diversity, see UN doc. A/Res/56/143, UN
doc. A/Res/56/150, UN doc. A/Res/56/155, UN doc. A/Res/56/156, UN doc. A/Res/
56/157, UN doc. A/Res/56/265 and UN doc. A/Res/56/266.
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rights of women and to the importance of mainstreaming a gender per-
spective and the Resolution on the Right to Development included re-
ferences to women’s rights and the importance of a gender perspective.
The Resolution on the Eradication of Poverty acknowledged women’s
need for better control over resources and noted the importance of a
visible policy of mainstreaming a gender perspective. The Resolution on
Torture included references to gender-specific forms of torture, such as
sexual violence and the Resolution on Cultural Diversity included re-
ferences to gender equality. The woman-centred thematic resolutions in-
cluded resolutions on issues, such as, women in development, violence
against women migrant workers, improvement of the situation of women
in rural areas, traditional or customary practices affecting the health of
women and girls and the situation of older women in society.54
Country-specific resolutions dealt with the human rights situation in
specific countries.55 Among these resolutions, the Resolution on Myan-
mar included rape in its list of human rights violations committed to-
wards persons belonging to ethnic and religious minorities. The resolu-
tion referred to specific violations of the human rights of women, such 
as forced labour, trafficking and sexual violence and exploitation. The
Government of Myanmar is also urged to take the CEDAW Commit-
tee’s recommendations into account and to carry out human rights educa-
tion and gender-sensitization training for military personnel and others.
The Resolution on Afghanistan included references to CEDAW and to
the Security Council’s Resolution on Women and Peace and Security.
The resolution demanded that the new Government of Afghanistan
should respect human rights ‘regardless of gender, ethnicity or religion’
and condemns gross violations committed against women and girls.56
54 Women in development is addressed in UN doc. A/Res/56/188. The girl-child is ad-
dressed in UN doc. A/Res/55/78. Violence against women migrant worker is addressed
in UN doc. A/Res/56/131, improvement of women’s status in rural areas is addressed in
UN doc. A/Res/56/129, harmful traditional practices is addressed in UN doc.
A/Res/56/128 and the situation of older women is addressed in UN doc. A/Res/56/126.
55 Resolutions were adopted regarding the situation of human rights in Myanmar, on
the subregional center for human rights and democracy in Central Africa, on the ques-
tion of human rights in Afghanistan, on the situation of human rights in Sudan, on the
situation of human rights in Iraq, on the situation of human rights in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, on the situation of human rights in parts of South-Eastern Europe,
on the situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran, and on the situation of
human rights in Cambodia. See UN doc. A/Res/56/231, UN doc. A/Res/56/230, UN
doc. A/Res/56/176, UN doc. A/Res/56/175, UN doc. A/Res/56/173, UN doc. A/Res/
56/174, UN doc. A/Res/56/172, UN doc. A/Res/56/171 and UN doc. A/Res/56/ 169.
56 UN doc. A/Res/56/176, preamble and Arts. 2, 12 and 13.
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The Resolution on the Sudan included references to women’s situation
in armed conflict, to action taken against women’s participating in civil
society gatherings and it called on the Sudan to sign and ratify CEDAW.
The Resolution on Iraq referred to the concluding comments of the
CEDAW Committee regarding Iraq and called on the Government of Iraq
to ensure human rights for all individuals irrespective of origin, ethnicity,
gender or religion. The Resolution on the Republic of Congo included
references to CEDAW, expressed concern for the numerous cases of rape
and other sexual violences, urged the parties to the conflict to protect
human rights, including the human rights of women. The Resolution on
the Islamic Republic of Iran included references to the systematic viola-
tions of the human rights of women and the girl child. The Resolution on
Cambodia included substantial reference to the human rights of women
and different types of violations of the human rights of women.
The resolutions that I have defined as resolutions on emerging issues
are resolutions that address matters that have only quite recently been
included on the human rights agenda. During the General Assembly
56th session, resolutions were adopted, for example, on the use of mercen-
aries as a means of violating human rights and impeding the exercise of
the right of peoples to self-determination, protection of migrants, on the
rights of people with disabilities, on the UN decade for human rights
education, on human rights and mass exodus, protection and assistance
to internally displaced persons and on human rights and terrorism.57
These resolutions included very scarce references to women’s human
rights or gender issues. The Resolution on the Protection of Migrants in-
cluded references to CEDAW and women’s human rights, the resolution
on the rights of people with disabilities included references to non-dis-
crimination, the Resolution on the Decade for Human Rights Educa-
tion included references to women and women’s human rights, the res-
olution on internally displaced persons included references to the needs
of internally displaced women and the Resolution on Human Rights
and Terrorism included references to the killing of innocent people such
as women.
The General Assembly has a very broad mandate regarding human
rights and the advancement of women. As implied in the follow-up to
the Beijing conference and the integrated follow-up to UN conferences,
it should also promote the integrative strategies. In its approach, the Gen-
57 UN doc. A/Res/56/160, UN doc. A/Res/56/164, UN doc. A/Res/56/166, UN doc.
A/Res/56/167, UN doc. A/Res/56/168, UN doc. A/Res/56/170 and UN doc. A/Res/
56/232.
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eral Assembly has been affirming rather than transformative. It might be
possible to characterize the General Assembly’s work for the integration
of women’s human rights or a gender perspective with the catchphrases do
as I say and not as I do and more is better. That is, while the General As-
sembly has come to integrate references to woman- and gender-centred
issues in many of its general as well as woman-centred resolutions, there
is very little coherence in any of these references. There is very little that
indicates that the General Assembly has chosen a specific strategy to in-
clude women’s human rights or gender concerns into its human rights-
related work. The references to women’s human rights or gender con-
cerns also appear more frequently in resolutions that address traditional
human rights issues than in the resolutions on emerging issues, which
might indicate that the General Assembly has learnt to express its concern
for women’s human rights or gender issues where considered appropriate,
but that it has not necessarily learned to add woman-related and/or gen-
der-related issues to new issues. Many of the references also seem to be
add-ons, i.e., the General Assembly has not chosen a transformative main-
streaming approach. To a certain extent, the more is better approach to
integrating women’s human rights or a gender perspective, i.e., to make
as many references as possible, but without necessarily worrying about
substance, can be a useful tool. The approach can be used in expressing
concern for women and the situation of women, where such concern
has not earlier been offered, thus contributing to an increased attention
accorded to women and women’s issues. However, in case equal attention
is not given to the substance behind the emphasis on women’s human
rights or a gender perspective, the results are likely to be comparable to
the outcome addressed earlier, vis-à-vis the Security Council, in other
words, well-meaning attempts to advance women and gender equality
are conditioned, forcing women into old, stereotypical roles.
5.2.4 The Economic and Social Council
The drafters of the UN Charter envisaged the ECOSOC as playing 
an important role in the development of the UN’s human rights and
economic and social, including women’s advancement agendas.58 The
58 The ECOSOC annually holds two regular sessions, alternating between Geneva and
New York. During its sessions, the ECOSOC meets in three regular committees. The
Second Committee deals with human rights issues. The geographical distribution within
ECOSOC should be as follows: 14 members should be from African states, 11 from
Asian states, 6 from Eastern European states, 10 from Latin American and Caribbean
states, and 13 from Western European and other states. Originally, the ECOSOC had
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ECOSOC, however, has come to delegate much of its human rights
mandate to the Commission on Human Rights, at the same time as, it has
become a leading body with respect to the follow-up to the Beijing con-
ference and with respect to the integrated and coordinated follow-up to
UN conferences. The contemporary ECOSOC plays an important role
as it coordinates the work of fourteen UN agencies, ten functional com-
missions and five regional commissions, and coordinates the UN and
non-governmental organization relations.59 During the early decades,
when the Commission on Human Rights was preoccupied with the
drafting of the International Bill of Rights, the ECOSOC had a more
outspoken human rights profile. The cooperation and interlinkages created
between the Commission on Human Rights and the General Assembly
during the drafting of the International Bill of Rights, however, partly
contributed to the diminishing importance of ECOSOC’s human rights
work.60 Declan O’Donovan criticizes the ECOSOC for its conservative
approach to human rights and argues that the ECOSOC has failed its hu-
man rights mandate both by failing to engage substantially in human
rights issues and by failing to relate human rights issues to the wider
economic and social field.61 O’Donovan concludes, arguing that “[i]t is
doubtful if the Council will ever achieve the prompting, guiding, and
coordinating role which has been mapped out for it in countless plans by
delegates and secretariat officials over the years. It has all the characteris-
tics of a holding operation. It has already been joined or superseded in
status by bodies which are its offshoots, and the same may happen with
others such as the Commission on Human Rights”.62
The ECOSOC’s continuing close relationship with the Commission
on the Status of Women, as well as its work regarding the follow-up to
UN world conferences have, however, contributed to the ECOSOC’s
playing a distinguished role, particularly, in the development of the Beij-
ing strategy for the advancement of women and gender equality. The
ECOSOC’s main initiatives for the strategy for mainstreaming a gender
perspective have developed within ECOSOC’s own initiatives for the
follow-up to the Beijing conference and the integrated follow-up to the
UN conferences. In 1995, ECOSOC devoted its coordination segment
only 18 members, but the membership was increased to 27 in 1963 and to 54 in 1971.
See UN doc. General Assembly resolution 1991B (XVIII) (1963), UN doc. General As-
sembly Resolution 2847 (XXVI) (1971).
59 www.un.org/esa/coordination/ecosoc/about.htm (23-09-2003).
60 O’Donovan 1996, p. 115.
61 O’Donovan 1996, p. 122.
62 O’Donovan 1996, p. 125.
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to the follow-up to the UN conference and, since 1996, at each session
it has dealt with different crosscutting issues relating to the conferences.
The 1996 coordination segment was devoted to the crosscutting theme
of poverty eradication and, as a result of the Beijing conference, with the
subtheme, gender mainstreaming in poverty eradication.63 According to
the Secretary-General’s report relating to the topic, mainstreaming a
gender perspective in poverty eradication requires “... a conscious effort
to ensure that gender is taken into consideration in activities on poverty
eradication on a routine basis to avoid either marginalisation or in-
divisibility of women”.64 The ECOSOC resolutions relating to gender
mainstreaming in the field of poverty eradication showed a need for
more in depth discussion about gender mainstreaming. Hence, it was de-
cided that mainstreaming a gender perspective would be addressed as
the cross-cutting theme for the year 1997.65
The ECOSOC discussion preceding the adoption of the draft agreed
conclusions related mainly to conceptual definitions for and the content
of the strategy for gender mainstreaming.66 Some Member State delega-
tions seized the opportunity to explain how their governments advanced
women and equality between the sexes. Mr. Young-Sikh Hwang of the
Republic of Korea, for example, noted that his government continued to
work on mainstreaming the gender perspective in its national policies in
accordance with its commitments under the Beijing Platform. Mr. Hussein
of Kenya emphasized the positive actions taken by his government to in-
creased education for girls and training for women.67
The discussions relating to the conceptual framework for the strategy
of mainstreaming a gender perspective indicates that as late as 1997, there
63 ECOSOC Agreed Conclusion 1996/1 and UN doc. E/1996/61, Part II. The ECOSOC
devotes a segment of each of its sessions to the coordination of the policies and activities
of the specialized agencies, organs, organizations and bodies of the UN system relating
to the achievement of the economic and social objectives of the UN. The outcome and
the adopted recommendations should be communicated to the General Assembly and
other relevant bodies in the UN system.
64 UN doc. E/1996/61, Chapter II, Art. 83.
65 ECOSOC 1997 report Chapter IV, Art. 1.
66 The ECOSOC decided that as a follow-up measure to the Beijing Conference that
the Secretary-General should submit yearly reviews to the Commission on the Status of
Women and to the ECOSOC on progress made in mainstreaming a gender perspective
into the UN system. The General Assembly requested through UN doc. A/Res/50/203
and UN doc. A/Res/51/69 both the report of the Secretary-General via the Commission
on the Status of Women and the report of the ECOSOC on the follow-up to the Beijing
conference. For example, the reports UN doc. E/CN.6/1997/2 and UN doc. A/51/322
are responses to those two mandates.
67 UN doc. E/1997/SR.21, p. 5 and UN doc. E/1997/SR.22, pp. 9–10.
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was a lack of a common understanding regarding the conceptual content
of mainstreaming a gender perspective. Most speakers did reflect on the
meaning of gender or of mainstreaming a gender perspective in their state-
ments. These reflections, however, varied between equating the term,
gender mainstreaming, with the advancement of women, without ques-
tioning why the change in terminology had come about, on the one
hand, and questioning the lack of definitions, or elaborating on potential
definitions, on the other hand.68 Mr. Hynes of Canada argued that main-
streaming a gender perspective was a straightforward strategy, according
to which “... all policies and programmes throughout the system should
be designed, implemented and evaluated with the constant and conscious
view to their relative implications for women and men”.69 Mr. Parshini-
kov summarized the strategy for mainstreaming a gender perspective as a
strategy for continually bearing in mind the goal of equality between men
and women in the planning, implementation and evaluation of its activ-
ities. Ms. McNish stressed the tendencies to define “... gender mainstream-
ing as concentration in women-specific issues must be eliminated” and
noted that there had been a shift away from seeing women “... as a vulner-
68 See, for example, the statements by Mr. Mwakawago of the United Republic of Tan-
zania, Mr. Young-Sikh Hwang of the Republic of Korea in UN doc. E/1997/SR.21 and
the statements by Ms. Dowdeswell, Executive Director of the UN Environmental Pro-
gramme and Ms. Barbero-Baconnier of the International Organization for Migration in
UN doc. E/1997/SR.22. Ms. Kirsch of Luxembourg, speaking on behalf of the European
Union opened the discussion at the 21st session by noting that mainstreaming a gender
perspective within the UN system could serve as an example for gender mainstreaming
on national levels, but also that “[i]t would be useful if the Council’s agreed conclusions
were preceded by a definition of the concept itself, since a degree of misunderstanding
persisted throughout the system ...”, see UN doc. E/1997/SR.21, p. 2. Ms. Kirsch does
not propose any definition for the concept of gender mainstreaming, but goes on to
note the importance of gender analysis, gender training for UN staff and high-level ac-
countability for gender mainstreaming action. The point made by Ms. Kirsch is not elab-
orated upon any further during the 21st meeting, but similar concerns were voiced by
the Finnish and Russian representatives during the 22nd meeting. Ms. Korpi of Finland
wonders “... whether Governments and organizations really understood the idea of
mainstreaming and whether they all interpreted it in the same way”. She also notes that
while there had been much discussion about women’s projects and the number of wo-
men in higher positions “... much less had been said concerning policies to be followed
and ways of mainstreaming a gender perspective into those policies”. Mr. Parshinikov of
the Russian Federation stated that he supported most of the initial actions taken by the
UN to mainstream a gender perspective “... he had the impression that there was not yet
a common interpretation of mainstreaming” and he notes that “[t]he tendency towards
excessive theorizing and the use of a language which was clear only to the initiated had
doubtless contributed to that situation”, see UN doc. E/1997/SR.22, pp. 6–7.
69 UN doc. E/1997/SR.21, p. 6.
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able group and women’s issues as marginal to the national and global
agenda towards an approach that emphasized that the roles and respons-
ibilities of both women and men needed to be factored into programmes
and policy decision-making”.70 Ms. Williams noted that:
The gender approach involved giving: more consideration to non-biological
factors affecting women’s health [...] more attention to the roles and
responsibilities of men in relation to women’s health concerns, more involve-
ment of men in bringing about change, and greater recognition and sup-
port for women as participants in the development of health care for them-
selves, their families, and their communities.71
The discussion relating to the content and practical applicability of the
strategy for mainstreaming a gender perspective was focused on ways
and means for implementation. According to Mr. Hynes, the necessary
steps for implementation included: high-level commitment to the im-
plementation of the gender mainstreaming strategy; promotion of Com-
mission on the Status of Women as a catalyst in the implementation pro-
cess; attention to the role played by UN human rights institutions;
increased coordination within the UN; and the allocation of sufficient
financial and other resources.72 Mr. Mwakawamo of Tanzania, who spoke
on behalf of the Group of 77, raised issues about the UN’s responsibility
for ensuring gender mainstreaming not only within the UN and the
developed world, but also in Africa and in least-developed countries. He
called for special attention to areas such as “... capacity-building, resource
flows, and transfer of technology in support of activities aimed at the
empowerment of women ...”.73 Ms. Hernandez Quesada of Cuba noted
that, while contemporary statistics seemed to suggest a growing level of
women’s participation, the ideas that had marginalized women for cen-
turies remained unchanged.74 Ms. Wilhelmsen of Norway noted the im-
70 UN doc. E/1997/SR.21, pp. 7–8.
71 UN doc. E/1997/SR.21, p. 11. Ms. Wilhelmsen, an observer for Norway, also noted
that “[e]veryone concerned must realize that societies and organizations needed the
knowledge and experience of both women and men”.
72 UN doc. E/1997/SR.21, pp. 6–7. Similar points were made by, inter alia, Ms.
McNish of Jamaica, Mr. Dlamini of Swaziland and Ms. Wilhelmsen of Norway.
73 UN doc. E/1997/SR.21, p. 4. Similar points of view were raised by, inter alia, Ms.
McNish of Jamaica, Mr. Somavia of Chile, Mr. von Beckh Widmanstetter of Argentina
and Ms. Hernandez Quesada of Cuba.
74 UN doc. E/1997/SR.22, pp. 8, 14–5. Moreover, Quesada noted that “[m]any of the
world’s inhabitants were still subject to the daily scourge of poverty. Of the 1.3 billion
people living in extreme poverty 70 per cent were women and girls. That was a disaster
that could only be aggravated by neo-liberal prescriptions, and the number of women
who had no job, home or right to a decent life was bound to increase. She was struck by
the fact the word poverty appeared only once in the draft agreed conclusions, although
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portance of creating a UN database on gender mainstreaming.75 Ms.
Zhang of the International Labour Organization made a disparate, but
important comment noting that although many concrete measures were
needed to implement the gender mainstreaming strategy equally impor-
tant was the changing of mentalities and attitudes.76
The ECOSOC has adopted a number of follow-up resolutions to the
Agreed Conclusions.77 The importance of the ECOSOC Agreed Con-
clusions was reaffirmed in 1998 and a decision was taken to monitor the
implementation of the agreed conclusions, annually, under the agenda
item on Integrated and Coordinated Implementation of and follow-up to
all major United Nations Conferences and Summits.78
In 2001, after a request by the Commission on the Status of Women,
the ECOSOC created a regular subitem regarding mainstreaming a gen-
der perspective under its regular agenda item on coordination. The sub-
item was created in order to “... monitor and evaluate achievements
made and obstacles encountered by the United Nations system, and to
consider further measures to strengthen the implementation and monitor-
ing of gender mainstreaming within the United Nations system”.79 Ac-
cording to the resolutions 2001/41, the regular subitem on gender
mainstreaming will enable the ECOSOC to monitor more efficiently any
advances made by the ECOSOC, by its functional commissions and by
other entities within the UN system with respect to mainstreaming a
gender perspective. The ECOSOC has also decided, after a request by
the Commission on the Status of Women, to devote one of its substantive
sessions before 2005 to the review and appraisal of the system-wide im-
plementation of the agreed conclusions 1997/2.80
the Secretary-General’s report mentioned the adoption of a gender perspective in the
struggle against poverty. The International Organization for Migration noted the vulner-
able situation of women migrant workers and victims of trafficking and the need to create
support structures for these women so that they would not only be able to return home,
but also be able to create a new life for themselves. Similar points of view were raised by
Ms. Brandstrup of the Food and Agricultural Organization and Ms. Pavlic of UNESCO.
75 UN doc. E/1997/SR.21, pp. 13–4. Ms. Acuner of Turkey raised a similar point, but
by referring to the importance of the Womenwatch database managed by the Division
for the Advancement of Women.
76 UN doc. E/1997/SR.22, p. 5.
77 UN doc. E/Res/1998/43, 2001/41 and 2002/23.
78 UN doc. E/Res/1998/43. The Coordination Segment of the 1998 session was devoted
to the coordinated follow-up and implementation of the Vienna conference. See also
UN doc. E/1998/60 and UN doc. E/1998/64.
79 UN doc. E/Res/2001/41.
80 UN doc. E/Res/2001/41, see also UN doc. E/CN.6/2002/2, Art. 94.
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In 2002, the ECOSOC adopted a resolution on gender mainstream-
ing, according to which, the ECOSOC has decided to intensify efforts
to ensure that gender mainstreaming is an integral part of all activities in
its work and the work of the subsidiary bodies. Further, the ECOSOC
has also, therefore, decided to give appropriate attention to gender per-
spectives and the particular obstacles that women face in all its segments
and agenda items”.81 The resolution identifies a number of different
ways in which its subsidiary bodies have successfully paid attention to
situations that are specific to women and to the mainstreaming of gender
perspectives into their work.82 These results include: identifying gender
equality as an essential element for the realization of social, people-cent-
ered and sustainable development and approaching gender as an issue
that cuts across all areas of policy; stressing the need to include women
in planning, decision-making and implementation processes at all levels;
emphasizing the link between human rights and gender equality; recog-
nizing that men and women are often affected differently by political,
economic, social and environmental factors and the consequent need to
develop gender-sensitive policies that address the different experiences of
men and women; and continuing to use and call for data disaggregated
on the basis of sex and using indicators that provide separate analysis by
sex.83
As I did with the General Assembly, I will exemplify how the ECOSOC
has come to mainstream a gender perspective or to integrate women’s
human rights through an overview of the relevant resolutions adopted
by ECOSOC during its 2001 session.84 Among these resolutions the
81 UN doc. E/Res/2002/23, Art. 3
82 UN doc. E/Res/2002/23, Art. 4.
83 In 2002, the ECOSOC also endorsed the UN doc. E/CN.4/Res/2002/50 in which
the Commission on Human Rights decided to request all special procedures and other
human rights mechanisms of the Commission on Human Rights and the Sub-Commis-
sion to regularly and systematically take a gender perspective into account in the imple-
mentation of their mandates and to include in their reports information on the qualita-
tive analysis of human rights of women and girls. See UN doc. E/2002/23-E/CN.4/
2002/200, pp. 26–7.
84 The general human rights and human rights-related resolutions adopted by ECOSOC
in 2001 dealt with the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independ-
ence to Colonial Countries and Peoples by the specialized agencies and the international
institutions associated with the UN, with a global code for ethics for tourism, with hu-
man rights education and with the global campaign for poverty eradication. See UN
doc. E/Res/2001/28, references to UN doc. E/2001/L.21 and UN doc. E/2001/ SR.43,
UN doc. E/Res/2001/37, references to UN doc. E/2001/L.32, UN doc. E/Res/ 2001/
38, references to UN doc. E/2001/L.33 and UN doc. E/2001/L.24/Rev.1, UN doc. E/
Res/2001/42, references to UN doc. E/2001/L.42.
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Resolution on Human Rights Education refers to the dignity of men
and women in its preamble, but, otherwise, the resolutions contain no
mention of material, which could be called either women’s human rights
or gender issues. The woman-centered human rights and human rights-
related resolutions adopted by the ECOSOC in 2001 dealt with the
situation and assistance to Palestinian women and with the discrimination
leveled against women and girls in Afghanistan.85 A number of resolutions
dealt with the work of woman-centered institutions, viz., the resolutions
on the proposal for a multi-year programme for the Commission on the
Status of Women for 2002–2006 and on the agreed conclusions of the
Commission on the Status of Women on the thematic issues.86
The resolutions dealing specifically with the follow-up to UN confer-
ences or with mainstreaming included resolutions on the integrated and
coordinated follow-up to the major UN conferences and summits, co-
ordinated implementation of the Habitat agenda and the resolution on
mainstreaming a gender perspective.87 Among these items, it is only the
resolution that specifically addresses mainstreaming a gender perspective
that refers to the mainstreaming of a gender perspective.
As opposed to the Security Council and the General Assembly, the
ECOSOC has come to promote a strategy for mainstreaming a gender
perspective more than integrating women’s human rights. The discussions
preceding the adoption of the ECOSOC Agreed Conclusions 1997/2,
however, do show, more or less, that the same issues that were put on the
table during the discussion, i.e., conceptual content and practical applic-
ability and consequences, still remain persistent constraints for main-
streaming a gender perspective within the UN. The ECOSOC’s main-
streaming strategy has, nevertheless, developed. The recent ECOSOC
analysis shows that it changes and is substantiated in the process of the
institutional implementation of the mainstreaming strategy.
5.2.5 Conclusions
The differences in the mandates of the Security Council, the General As-
sembly and the ECOSOC are reflected in the extent to which the diffe-
rent institutions have come to integrate women’s human rights or a gen-
der perspective. The Security Council has done so occasionally as part of
85 UN doc. E/Res/2001/2 and E/Res/2001/3, references to UN doc. E/2001/27.
86 UN doc. E/Res/2001/4 and UN doc. E/Res/2001/5.
87 UN doc. E/Res/2001/21, references to UN doc. E/2001/L.41 and UN doc. E/2001/
SR.43, UN doc. E/Res/2001/22, references to UN doc. E/2001/L.28 and UN doc.
E/Res/2001/41, references to UN doc. E/2001/L.29.
222
04-02 Iustus, Sari 8/3  04-03-08 15.31  Sidan 222
223
its thematic approaches and it has only marginally integrated a concern
for women’s situation in its country-specific approaches. The General
Assembly and the ECOSOC have been better at developing women’s
human rights or gender initiatives. The General Assembly, especially, has
been fairly successful in integrating a concern for women’s situation into
its Third Committee work and human rights-related resolutions. The
ECOSOC has promoted the strategy for mainstreaming a gender per-
spective.
The above-referenced concept, integration of a concern for women’s si-
tuation, is supposed to capture the common approach of all three institu-
tions. In other words, women are, still, singled out as a group possessing
needs that differ from the norm and that make them suspectible to be-
coming more vulnerable than other human beings. As was shown earlier,
in the section detailing the Security Council, the singling out of women
can lead to the reproduction of stereotypical ideas of women either as in
need of protection or as inherently peaceful and, therefore, adapted to
peacekeeping and peace-building work. While this approach might lead
to more attention directed toward women who fit into and who are willing
to fit into the woman model dominant within the UN, this approach is not
transformative. That is, it does not open itself up to new interpretations
of women’s human rights or the potential of gender-based approaches.
5.3 The Commissions on Human Rights and 
on the Status of Women and the Integrative
Strategies
5.3.1 Introduction
The ECOSOC has been active in establishing functional commissions
within its areas of activity. While many of the functional commissions of
the ECOSOC work with or at times evoke human rights or women’s or
gender-related issues, the Commission on Human Rights, and the Com-
mission on the Status of Women remain the most important commis-
sions with respect to these issues. The Commission on Human Rights,
working with human rights, is implied in the follow-up to the Vienna
and Durban conferences, while the Commission on the Status of Wo-
men, working with the UN women’s advancement and gender agenda, is
implied in the follow-up to the Beijing conference. Since 1967, the
Commission on Human Rights has also established special procedures
mandates when wishing to examine more closely and monitor specific
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human rights or the human rights situations in specific countries. The
thematic or country-specific special rapporteurs, representatives, in-
dependent experts of the working group members are not paid for their
work and the quality of their work may vary considerably. Nevertheless,
the special procedures have become an increasingly important part of the
UN human rights framework, and mainstreaming of a gender perspective
have contributed to bringing the Commission on Human Rights and
the Commission on the Status of Women closer to each other.
With regard to the question of equal representation of the sexes no
comparable strategy to the one for promoting an equitable geographical
distribution among the Commission on Human Rights Member States
exists to enhance an even representation of men and women. Alston
notes that “[r]epresentation of women as heads of delegations has been
strikingly poor, despite the Commission’s own rhetoric of equality”.88
According to the Secretary-General’s report on the integration of the hu-
man rights of women and a gender perspective, during the 57th and 58th
sessions, women, however, did represent around 40 % of the participants,
though the figure did decline at the 59th session.89 The Commission on
the Status of Women also utilizes the principle of equitable geographical
distribution, but, because it addresses issues relating to the women’s ad-
vancement agenda of the UN, its members have mostly been women.90
224
88 Alston 1996c, p. 194. The Commission on Human Rights web site does not disclose
the names or sexes of the Commission’s country representatives, see www.unhchr.ch/
html/menu2/2/chrmem.htm (28-09-2003). The web site, however, does list the names,
sexes and nationalities of the Commission’s bureau since 1946 up to 2003. According to
the listing, the annual presidency has been held by five women and 46 men. Note that
the five first sessions of the Commission were chaired by Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt. Nine
women and 44 women have functioned as rapporteurs to the Commission and, of the
other members, about 2–3 persons, only around a dozen of 59 sessions have included
women members. There is no indication of a change happening over time, see www.
unhchr.ch/html/menu2/2/chrbur.htm (28-09-2003).
89 UN doc. E/CN.4/2003/72, para. 28.
90 The bureau of the last Commission on the Status of Women session was an all women
bureau, see www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/csw/members (28-09-2003).
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5.3.2 The Commission on Human Rights and Its Special
Procedures
The Commission on Human Rights
The Commission on Human Rights was established by the ECOSOC in
1946.91 Among its early tasks was the drafting of the International Bill of
Rights, but it was also given an overarching mandate within the UN to
develop and promote human rights. Since its establishment, the Com-
mission on Human Rights has progressively re-articulated its role as an
actor in its own right. While preoccupied with the drafting of the Inter-
national Bill of Rights, the Commission on Human Rights interpreted
its mandate narrowly or, as Alston puts it, “... struggled valiantly and
successfully to avoid becoming an overtly political organ”.92 During its
first decades, the Commission on Human Rights did operate under a
conservative approach to rights, drafting the core human rights docu-
ments, but being disengaged vis-à-vis women’s or other alternative rights’
frameworks. The Commission on the Status of Women drafted the early
women’s human rights conventions.93 Since the late-1960s, largely spur-
red on by the increased number of newly independent African and Asian
states as members of the UN, the Commission on Human Rights has
slowly abandoned its strategy of inaction. It has even begun to assume a
proactive role both with regard to the implementation of human rights
and with regard to the response to human rights violations. Alston notes
that the Commission on Human Rights has “... succeeded in transforming
itself over the decades from an almost exclusively standard-setting body
91 UN doc. ECOSOC Res. 5 (I) (1946). The Commission on Human Rights meets
annually in Geneva. It can address any human rights issues on the UN agenda and under
the authority of the ECOSOC, it can establish extra-conventional human rights man-
dates. Originally, the Commission on Human Rights had only 18 members, but the
membership was increased to 21 in 1961, to 32 in 1966, to 43 in 1979 and to 53 in
1990 (ECOSOC Res. 845 (XXXII) (1961), 1147 (XLI) (1966), 1979/36 and 1990/48.
The geographical distribution is as follows: 15 members should be from African states,
12 from Asian states, 5 from Eastern European states, 11 from Latin American and Carib-
bean states and 10 from Western European and other states, see United Nations Hand-
book 2001, p. 95.
92 Alston 1996c, p. 129.
93 Alston 1996c, p. 132. According to Alston (1996c, pp. 138–43), one of the reasons
for the early inaction of the Commission on Human Rights was the Western domina-
tion of the UN and the anxiety experienced by some Western states that a pro-active
Commission with a mandate to deal with complaints regarding human rights violations
would lead to a plethora of criticism and complaints regarding human rights violations
committed by these states.
04-02 Iustus, Sari 8/3  04-03-08 15.31  Sidan 225
into one which is capable of responding more of less effectively to viola-
tions, while at the same time pursuing a wide range of other initiatives
designed to strengthen the rule of law and respect for human rights”.94
Today, the Commission on Human Rights functions in its own right re-
garding human rights issues.95 Alston notes, however, that the develop-
ments have been “... spasmodic rather than gradual and has been fuelled
more by confrontation than by rational debate”.96 The reasons behind
the spasmodic developments are seldom either evident or one-dimensio-
nal.97
All the special procedures, now in existence, were established after
1980. The early special procedures had all country-specific mandates.
The first thematic mandates dealt with the core issues of the civil and
political rights agenda. In recent years, an increasing number of thematic
mandates dealing with economic and social rights, as well as with so-
called third generation rights and group rights have been established.
When it establishes a special procedure, the Commission on Human
Rights is guided by the human rights agenda; the establishment of a special
procedure seems to have become a way for the Commission on Human
Rights to get information about current human rights topics.98 The
Commission on Human Rights can also redefine the mandates in its reso-
lutions renewing mandates and it can define priorities for the mandates.
During the 1990s, the Commission on Human Rights asked the special
rapporteurs to include information on the violations of the human
rights of women in their reports and to apply a gender perspective in
their work.99
The Commission on Human Rights began its emphasis on the integ-
ration of the human rights of women in 1993, when it adopted a resolu-
tion on Integrating the Rights of Women into the Human Rights Mechan-
isms of the United Nations, inspired by the Sub-Commission resolution
addressing women’s rights as an inalienable part of human rights and a
94 Alston 1996c, p. 197.
95 Alston 1996c, pp. 205–6.
96 Alston 1996c, p. 197.
97 Alston 1996c, pp. 127–8. Some of the major changes, such as, the adoption of the
independent complaints procedures under ECOSOC Resolution 1235 (XLII) and
ECOSOC Resolution 1503 (XLVIII) and the subsequent establishment of the special
procedures correspond to the increased influence of African and Asian member states
within the UN. See Alston 1996c, p. 194.
98 Alston 1995c, pp. 167–8 and Lempinen 2001, p. 13.
99 UN doc. E/CN.4/1997/3 and Lempinen 2001, p. 244–5.
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Secretary-General report on violence against women.100 Since 1993, the
Commission on Human Rights has annually adopted a resolution regard-
ing the integration of the rights of women into the human rights mech-
anisms. Since 1999, the Commission on Human Rights agenda includes
a regular agenda item on the Integration of the Human Rights of Women
and the Gender Perspective.101
The preamble of the 1993 resolution on integrating the rights of
women into the human rights mechanisms of the UN states that women
are susceptible to particular sorts of human rights abuses and that the
Commission on Human Rights needs to be aware of these at an early
stage. As was fairly common around the time of the Vienna conference,
the 1993 resolution addresses both the question of the integration of
women’s human rights and the question of violence against women.
With regard to the question of the integration of women’s human rights,
the Commission emphasizes substantial and institutional integration, i.e.,
the Commission on Human Rights wishes to “... ensure that informa-
tion regarding the rights of women is integrated regularly and system-
atically into all United Nations mechanisms for the promotion, protec-
tion and implementation for human rights”.102 The substantial changes
100 See UN doc. E/CN.4/Res/1993/46 and for further information, see UN doc.
E/CN.4/1993/122. In 1993, the Commission on Human Rights also adopted resolu-
tion 1993/8 regarding rape and the abuse of women in the territory of the former Yugo-
slavia.
101 See UN doc. E/CN.4/Res/1994/45, UN doc. E/CN.4/Res/1995/86, UN doc.
E/CN.4/Res/1996/48, UN doc. E/CN.4/Res/1997/43, UN doc. E/CN.4/Res/1998/51,
UN doc. E/CN.4/Res/1999/41, UN doc. E/CN.4/Res/2000/46, UN doc. E/CN.4/Res/
2001/50, UN doc. E/CN.4/Res/2002/50 and UN doc. E/CN.4/2003/44. The early re-
solutions were intimately tied to the resolutions adopted regarding different forms of
violence against women. In 1994, for example, the resolution includes references to both
the integration of the human rights of women and to violence against women, while,
during later years, these issues have been dealt with in separate resolutions. The Com-
mission on Human Rights has also begun to address new woman-centred issues in its re-
solutions, such as, trafficking in women and women’s equal ownership of, access to and
control over land and the equal rights to own property and to adequate housing. In
1998, the agenda item on the Integration of the Human Rights of Women into the Hu-
man Rights Mechanisms of the United Nations was a subitem under the agenda item on
the further promotion and encouragement of human rights and fundamental freedoms,
including the questions of the programme and methods of work of the Commission, see
UN doc. E/CN.4/1998/1/Add.1. In 1999, an agenda item on the integration of the
human rights of women and the gender perspective with the subitem, violence against
women, had been integrated into the Commission agenda. A similar agenda item is
included on the Commission on Human Rights agendas the following years. See UN
doc. E/CN.4/2000/1, UN doc. E/CN.4/2001/1 and UN doc. E/CN.4/2002/1.
102 UN doc. E/CN.4/Res/1993/46, preamble.
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should be enabled through conscious decisions being made, for example,
by the Commission on Human Rights special procedures to integrate
women’s human rights and through increased institutional cooperation
between, for example, the Commission on Human Rights and the
Commission on the Status of Women and among the different human
rights treaty bodies. Regarding the question of violence against women,
the Commission on Human Rights condemns all acts of violence against
women and has decided to consider the appointment of a Special Rap-
porteur on violence against women during its next session. The mandate
of the Special Rapporteur is established through the 1994 resolution.103
In the 1994 resolution, the questions of the integration of women’s
human rights and violence against women are, still, addressed together.
Since 1995, however, the two issues are largely addressed in separate
resolutions. The resolutions on the integration of the human rights of
women, however, do not change considerably during the 1990s, although
the focus of the annual resolution tends to vary slightly depending on
what issue is currently high on the agenda. The 1995 resolution, for ex-
ample, focuses on the newly established High-Commissioner for Human
Rights, as well as on the upcoming Beijing conference.104 The 1996 re-
solution, which was adopted after the Beijing conference and after the
1995 expert group meeting on the integration of the human rights of
women, shows a slight shift towards a gender language.105 The 1997 re-
solution draws on the conclusions from the expert group meeting on the
integration of women’s human rights and emphasizes the need for the
103 See UN doc. E/CN.4/Res/1994/45, Art. 6. The resolution also refers to the newly
adopted UN Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women. In the 1994
resolution, no new aspects were added to the question of the integration of women’s
human rights, see UN doc E/CN.4/Res/1994/45, paras. 12–9. Note, however, that the
resolution suggests that the Beijing conference “... may consider the question of means
of integrating the human rights of women into the mainstream of United Nations 
system-wide activities”, see UN doc. E/CN.4/Res 1994/45, Art. 20.
104 The resolution recommends that the Beijing conference consider the question of
means of integration of human rights of women into the mainstream of United Nations
system-wide activity and that different UN institutions contribute to the conference and
to the successful achievement of the goals of the Conference, see UN doc. E/CN.4/
Res/1995/86.
105 The resolution welcomes the recommendation by the chairpersons of the human
rights treaty bodies that each treaty body should consider how to integrate a gender per-
spective most effectively into their work. It also invites the High-Commissioner for Hu-
man Rights to consider assigning to a high-level post within his Office the task of provid-
ing advice on integrating the human rights of women, see UN doc. E/CN.4/Res/1996/
48, Arts. 6 and 12. For information on the expert group meeting, see UN doc.
E/CN.4/1996/105, annex.
228
04-02 Iustus, Sari 8/3  04-03-08 15.31  Sidan 228
229
development of methodologies for the integration of women’s human
rights and for joint work plans between the Centre for Human Rights
and the Division for the Advancement of Women.106 The 1998 resolu-
tion was adopted in fairly close connection to the adoption of the
ECOSOC Agreed Conclusions 1997/2 on gender mainstreaming. The
resolution addresses both the integration of women’s human rights and
the mainstreaming of a gender perspective, emphasizing that:
... the goal of mainstreaming a gender perspective is to achieve gender
equality and that this includes ensuring that all United Nations activities
integrate the human rights of women and to this end calls upon all relev-
ant actors to implement agreed conclusions 1997/2 of the Economic and
Social Council ...107
The trend to apply an integrated approach to the two integrative strat-
egies is continued in the 1999 resolution, which emphasizes the need for
expertise regarding women’s human rights and gender impact analysis,
recognizing that:
... gender mainstreaming will strongly benefit the enhanced and full parti-
cipation of women, including at the higher levels of decision-making in
the United Nations system, and in this regard strongly encourages Member
States to promote gender balance by, inter alia, regularly nominating more
women candidates for election to the human rights treaty bodies and for
appointment to United Nations bodies, the specialized agencies and other
organs.108
The following resolutions all take a similar approach and attempt, in-
creasingly, to tie the Vienna and Beijing strategies to each other. The
2001 resolution, for example, emphasizes the support of the Commis-
sion on Human Rights for the request of the Commission on the Status
of Women’s request that before 2005, the ECOSOC devote another
106 UN doc. E/CN.4/Res/1997/43, Arts. 6–7 recognizes that the “... success of main-
streaming women’s rights will depend on the formalizing, at the highest levels, of a clear
policy and guidelines on the integration of a gender perspective into the United Nations
human rights system, and draws attention to the need to develop practical strategies to
implement the recommendations contained in the report of the expert group meeting
on the development of guidelines for the integration of a gender perspective into human
rights activities and programmes”.
107 UN doc. E/CN.4/Res/1998/51, Art. 3. The resolution welcomes the joint work
plan that has been adopted to enhance the cooperation and coordination between the
OHCHR and the Division for the Advancement of Women and encourages relevant
UN institutions to keep in mind, when recruiting staff, the need for expertise regarding
women’s and girls’ human rights.
108 UN doc. E/CN.4/Res/1999/41, Art. 8.
04-02 Iustus, Sari 8/3  04-03-08 15.31  Sidan 229
coordination segment to gender mainstreaming in order to review the
system-wide implementation of the agreed conclusions 1997/2.109
The preamble of the 2003 resolution distinguishes between acknow-
ledging the need to “... further integrate a gender perspective into all as-
pects of the work of the United Nations system”, on the one hand, and
the need for a “... comprehensive and integrated approach to the pro-
motion and protection of the human rights of women, which includes
the integration of the human rights of women into the mainstream of
United Nations activities system-wide”, on the other hand.110 The differ-
ent strategies are clarified in paragraphs 1 and 2.111 The Commission on
Human Rights emphasizes, in para. 1, that
... the goal of mainstreaming a gender perspective is to achieve gender
equality and that includes ensuring that all United Nations activities, in-
cluding United Nations conferences, special sessions and summits, integrate
the human rights of women.
The Commission on Human Rights, in para. 2, recognizes
... the importance of examining the intersection of multiple forms of dis-
crimination, including their root causes, from a gender persepective, and
their impact on the advancement of women and the enjoyment by women
of their human rights, in order to develop and implement strategies, policies
and programmes aimed at the elimination of all forms of discrimination
against women and to increase the role that women play in the design, im-
plementation and monitoring of gender-sensitive anti-discrimination poli-
cies.112
Throughout the 1990s, the Commission on Human Rights continued 
to address women’s human rights under specific agenda items and in
109 UN doc. E/CN.4/Res/2001/50, Art. 5. The resolution also refers to the importance
of mainstreaming a gender perspective into the preparations, work and the outcome of
the World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related
Intolerance. The year 2002 resolution includes references to the adoption of the Security
Council resolution on women and peace.
110 UN doc. E/CN.4/Res/2003/44. The Commission on Human Rights also decided in
the resolution to integrate a gender perspective into all of its agenda items, see para. 36.
In its resolution 2003/45 on the elimination of violence against women, the Commis-
sion emphasized the final report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women,
in which she stressed that, while the last decade has contributed to worldwide normative
recognition of violence against women, the efforts to implement the legislative changes
are lagging behind.
111 UN doc. E/CN.4/Res/2003/44, Art. 1 defines the integration of women’s human
rights as a step towards mainstreaming a gender perspective.
112 The paragraph on multiple forms of discrimination was first presented in UN doc.
E/CN.4/Res/2001/50.
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separate resolutions.113 An exception is Resolution 2001/34 on women’s
equal ownership of, access to and control over land and the equal rights
to own property and to adequate housing, which was adopted in 2001
under the agenda item on economic, social and cultural rights. Also, in
2001, the Commission on Human Rights addressed women’s human
113 In 1995, the Commission on Human Rights, for example, adopted Resolution
1995/86 on the question of integrating the human rights of women into the human
rights mechanisms of the UN, Resolution 1995/20 on violence against women migrant
workers, Resolution 1995/25 on trafficking and Resolution 1995/85 on the elimination
on violence against women. For further information, see UN doc. E/CN.4/1995/176-
E/1995/23. In 1996, after the Beijing conference, the Commission on Human Rights
adopted Resolution 1996/48 on integrating the human rights of women throughout 
the United Nations system, Resolution 1996/17 on violence against women migrant
workers, Resolution 1996/24 on traffic in women and girls and Resolution 1996/49 
on the elimination of violence against women. For further information, see UN doc.
E/CN.4/1996/177-E/1996/23. In 1997, the Commission on Human Rights adopted
Resolution 1997/43 on integrating the human rights of women throughout the UN sys-
tem, Resolution 1997/13 on violence against women migrant workers, Resolution
1997/19 on traffic in women and girls and Resolution 1997/44 violence against women.
For further information, see UN doc. E/CN.4/1997/150-E/1997/23. In 1998, the
Commission on Human Rights adopted Resolution 1998/51 on integrating the human
rights of women and Resolution 1998/17 on violence against women migrant workers.
For further information, see UN doc. E/CN.4/1998/177-E/1998/23. In 1999, the
Commission on Human Rights adopted Resolution 1999/41 on integrating the human
rights of women throughout the UN system, Resolution 1999/40 on traffic in women
and girls and Resolution 1999/42 on elimination of violence against women. For further
information, see UN doc. E/CN.4/1999/167-E/1999/23. In 2000, the Commission on
Human Rights adopted Resolution 2000/46 on the integration of the human rights of
women throughout the United Nations system, Resolution 2000/13 on women’s equal
ownership of, access to and control over land and the equal rights to own property and
to adequate housing, Resolution 2000/44 on traffic in women and girls and Resolution
2000/45 on the elimination of violence against women. For further information see UN
doc. E/CN.4/2000/167-E/2000/23. In 2001, the Commission on Human Rights adop-
ted Resolution 2001/50 on integrating the human rights of women throughout the UN
system, Resolution 2001/34 women’s equal ownership of, access to and control over land
and the equal rights to own property and to adequate housing, Resolution 2001/48 on
traffic in women and girls and Resolution 2001/49 on the elimination of violence
against women. For further information see UN doc. E/CN.4/2001/167-E/2001/23. In
2002, the Commission on Human Rights adopted Resolution 2002/50 on integrating
the human rights of women throughout the United Nations system, Resolution 2002/49
on women’s equal ownership, access to and control over land and the equal rights to own
property and to adequate housing, Resolution 2002/51 traffic in women and girls and
Resolution 2002/52 on elimination of violence against women. For further information,
see UN doc. E/CN.4/2002/200-E/2002/23. In 2003, the Commission on Human
Rights adopted Resolution 2003/22 on women’s equal ownership, access to and control
over land and the equal rights to own property and to adequate housing, Resolution
2003/44 on integrating the human rights of women throughout the United Nations sys-
tem and Resolution 2003/45 on violence against women.
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rights issues in some of its other thematic and country-specific resolu-
tions.114 During its 58th session (2002), the Commission on Human
Rights however, because of a lack of time, addressed agenda items 12 on
gender and women’s human rights and 13 on child rights, at the same
time consequently reducing the focus of the debate on women’s rights.115
The Commission on Human Rights resolutions on the integration of
women’s human rights provide good overviews of how the UN’s dis-
course about women’s human rights has changed during the 1990s and
early 2000s. Around the time of the Vienna conference, the women’s
rights are the human rights discourse promoted under the wings of the
violence against women discourse. After the Beijing conference, the
language of gender becomes increasingly dominant. The adoption of the
ECOSOC Agreed Conclucions 1997/2 on gender mainstreaming resul-
ted in an increased emphasis on the strategy for the mainstreaming of a
gender perspective, while the five-year review of the Vienna conference and
the 50th anniversary of the Universal Declaration in 1998 strengthened the
focus on human rights. As noted earlier, however, the strategies for the
integration of women’s human rights and the mainstreaming of a gender
perspective have only been separated from each other in the 2003 reso-
lution. The overview of the other Commission on Human Rights reso-
lutions, however, showed that women’s human rights issues continue to
be addressed as a separate issue within the Commission on Human
Rights. That is, while in some respects, the Commission on Human
Rights has been a forerunner with regard to the strategy for integrating
women’s human rights, it, still, has failed to integrate women’s human
rights into its operations.
The Commission on Human Rights’ Special Procedures
Introduction
Since the 1970s, the Commission on Human Rights has established spe-
cial procedures mandates, consisting mainly of expert special rapporturs
and working group mandates and forming an important part of the new
114 In 2001, during its 57th session, the Commission on Human Rights made references
women’s human rights or gender in the resolutions on migrants, torture, extrajudicial,
summary or arbitrary executions, racism, extreme poverty, freedom of opinion and ex-
pression, the right to food and the right to education, see UN doc. E/CN.4/2002/81,
Art. 62. In 2001, during its 57th session, the Commission voiced particular concerns
over the violations of women’s rights in Afghanistan, Rwanda, Myanmar, Sierra Leone
and the Sudan, see UN doc. E/CN.4/2002/81, Art. 63.
115 UN doc. E/CN.4/2003/72, Art. 6.
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active Commission on Human Rights.116 The special procedures have
been described as one of the contemporary cornerstones of the UN-
based international human rights system.117 In the 1980s, there was very
little interaction between or among the different special procedures
mandates. The Vienna Conference did stress the need for increased co-
operation and for the streamlining of the different parts of the UN hu-
man rights system; this proposal included increased cooperation among
the special procedures and between the special procedures and the treaty
bodies.118 An informal meeting of the special procedures was held in
April 1993. On the basis of the Vienna Programme recommendation,
annual official meetings of the special procedures have been held at the
OHCHR in Geneva since 1994.119
Since 1993, the Commission on Human Rights has demanded that
the special procedures regularly and systematically include information
on violations affecting women in their reports.120 The Commission on
Human Rights has specifically demanded the inclusion of a gender per-
spective vis-à-vis some special procedures.121 During their annual meet-
ings, the special procedures have occasionally addressed issues relating to
the integration of women’s human rights and/or the mainstreaming of a
gender perspective; they have also had the possibility of participating and,
to a great extent, have participated in the gender training organized by
the OHCHR.122 While the Commission on Human Rights, the annual
116 For introductions to the work of the UN Sub-Commission on the protection and
promotion of human rights and the Commission on Human Rights special procedures,
see www.unhchr.ch/html/menu2/2/sc.htm (16-01-2004)) and www.unhchr.ch/html/
menu2/2/chr.htm (16-01-2004). For an overview of the special procedures, see Lempi-
nen 2001.
117 Lempinen 2001, p. 11.
118 Vienna Programme, Part II, Art. 95.
119 The aim of the annual meetings was to increase cooperation among the special pro-
cedures and within the UN human rights system. Hence, the focus of the meetings has
been on administrative and practical matters, as well as on problems relating to the real-
ization of the objectives of the mandates.
120 UN doc. E/CN.4/1993/46.
121 UN doc. E/CN.4/2000/67, Art. 37.
122 In 1995, the annual meeting agenda included an agenda item on the integration of
the human rights of women, but the discussion under the agenda item dealt mostly with
the raison d’être of such an agenda item. In 1996, a similar agenda item was included
and UNIFEM was invited to comment on gender-specific analysis and reporting on hu-
man rights violations. During the discussion, the special procedures emphasized the
need for developed conceptual and legal frameworks. The Special Representative on In-
ternally Displaced Persons, the Special Representative on the Situation of Human Rights
in Cambodia, and the Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights Situation in Sudan
were mentioned as good examples vis-à-vis the integration of women’s human rights, see
UN doc. E/CN.4/1997/3, Art. 49 and Lempinen 2001, p. 245–6. During the ensuing
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meetings and the different occasions for gender training have all served
to increase the attention paid by the special procedures to the integration
of women’s human rights and/or the mainstreaming of a gender perspec-
tive, these factors have not led to consistent approaches to these issues by
the special procedures, as it will be shown below. Or, as noted by Sullivan:
Review of the reports of the special mechanisms since the 1993 World
Conference on Human Rights indicates that significant progress has been
achieved toward broader and more consistent attention to, and analysis of
women’s human rights. [...] Nonetheless, substantial inconsistencies and
gaps remain. The application of general human rights guarantees to the
gender-specific experiences of women and the content of emerging rights
of particular significance to women, such as sexual rights, are, still, relatively
underdeveloped.123
While the special procedures have been established by the Commission
on Human Rights and are guided by the normative framework of hu-
man rights, they enjoy considerable freedom; mandate holders, when
feeling brave, may interpret their mandates quite broadly.124 The special
procedures perceive themselves as independent of both governments and
the Commission on Human Rights. They have proclaimed themselves
to be guided by the principles of neutrality, non-selectivity and objectivity.
The special procedures, however, suffer from similar constraints as does,
for example, the UN treaty body system: a far-reaching special procedures
mandate can be circumscribed by a mandate holder’s inaction; active
mandate holders are constrained by a lack of human and economic re-
sources and a lack of responsiveness on the part of governments.125
years, no attention was paid to the integration of women’s human rights, see UN doc.
E/CN.4/1998/45 and UN doc. E/CN.4/1999/3. In 1999, an agenda item on the integ-
ration of a gender perspective was included, but mostly only for the purpose of inform-
ing about the gender workshop organized by the OHCHR and the Division for the Ad-
vancement of Women, see UN doc. E/CN.4/2000/5.
123 Sullivan 1997, pp. 2–3. See also Sullivan 1999.
124 The UN special rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary and arbitrary executions,
Asma Jahangir, noted that while she is bound by the normative framework relating to
extrajudicial, summary and arbitrary executions and by the Commission resolutions she
is left with a great deal of liberty with respect to choices of focus and priorities. That is,
little by little, by resorting to sound legal arguments, she has been able to sensitize the
Commission on Human Rights to the fact that issues regarding for example so-called
honor crimes fall within her mandate. Seminar presentation by Asma Jahangir on Cultu-
ral Constraints to Women’s Human Rights (November 2001), Institute for Human Rights,
Åbo Academi University, Finland. For further information, see Luopajärvi 2001.
125 Non-responsive governments and other political constraints facing the special proced-
ures are discussed in Lempinen 2001, Chapter 5. The non-action of the special procedures
is discussed in Alston 1996c, pp. 161–71.
234
04-02 Iustus, Sari 8/3  04-03-08 15.31  Sidan 234
235
Below, I will analyze the post-1993 reports of the Special Rapporteur
on extra-judicial, summary or arbitrary executions, the Special Rappor-
teur on violence against women, the Special Rapporteur on the right to
education and the Special Rapporteur on the human rights situation in
Afghanistan. These mandates have been chosen in order to have a civil
and political rights mandate, an economic, social and cultural rights
mandate, a women’s human rights mandate and a country-specific man-
date. The chosen mandates actually misrepresent the true sex ratio
among the Commission on Human Rights special procedures mandate
holders, because the three first mandate holders are women, while only
the Special Rapporteur on the human rights situation in Afghanistan is a
man. Currently, seven of the thematic special procedures mandates hold-
ers are women, while sixteen are men; only two of the country-specific
special procedures mandates holders are women, while nine are men.126
The Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary 
or Arbitrary Executions
The mandate of the Special Rapporteur on summary and arbitrary ex-
ecutions was established in 1982. Ten years later, in 1992, the mandate
was widened to include extrajudicial executions.127 The Special Rappor-
teur’s mandate is one of the Commission on Human Rights special pro-
cedures’ mandates that has explicitly been requested to “... apply a gen-
der perspective in his work”.128 The mandate has been held by Bakre
Waly Ndiaye (Senegal) during the years 1993 till 1998 and, from 1998
onwards, by Asma Jahangir (Pakistan).
126 According to the Secretary-General’s report, 25 % of the 48 experts of the special
procedures in November 2002 were women, see UN doc. E/CN.4/2003/72, para. 28. It
is also noted that the only regional group that had nominated more women than men
was the Eastern European Group (three or five experts), the African, Asian, Latin Amer-
ican and Caribbean groups included 25 % women and less than 10 % of the nominees
of Western European and other states were women (one out of eleven experts), see UN
doc. E/CN.4/2003/72, para. 28 and UN doc. E/CN.4/2003/1/Add.1.
127 UN doc. E/CN.4/1982/29 and UN doc. E/CN.4/1992/72. Until 1992, the manda-
te of the Special Rapporteur was held by Mr. Wako. Because its focus is largely on the
right to life and fair trial, the mandate on summary and arbitrary executions is one of
the core civil and political rights mandates. The legal normative framework for the man-
date is based on the Universal Declaration Art. 3 on the right to life, liberty and the se-
curity of person, ICCPR Art. 6 on the right to life and the death penalty, Arts. 14 and
15 on fair trial and CRC Art. 6 on children’s right to life.
128 UN doc. E/CN.4/Res/1996/74, para. 7(g). See, also UN doc. E/CN.4/Res/1997/61,
UN doc. E/CN.4/Res/1998/68, UN doc. E/CN.4/Res/1999/35, UN doc. E/CN.4/Res/
2000/31, UN doc. E/CN.4/Res/2001/45 and UN doc. E/CN.4/Res/2002/36.
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Ndiaye’s reports are extensive, but he only marginally addressed wo-
men’s human rights issues; the request of the Commission on Human
Rights that he apply a gender perspective to his work only led to a slight
increase in the attention he paid to violations committed against women.
Ndiaye’s approach to issues relating to women’s human rights included
counting the number of the cases he handled which did involve women
and noting that such instances were few and far between. Ndiaye then
concluded that “[w]omen appear not to be particularly targeted for
reasons of their sex”. Further, he added that, in cases where a woman does
hold a position of influence, her situation does not diverge from the
situations of her male counterparts.129 In the subsequent report, Ndiaye
explained the reason for the underrepresentation of cases involving
women, noting that “... the under-representation of women in positions
of influence means that they are less exposed to acts of violence, as they
are not regarded as so much a threat”.130 The following report again is
slightly different. In this report, Ndiaye paid slightly more attention to
women, but he noted that, because of a lack of resources, he could not
perform an in-depth gender analysis.131
In her early reports, Jahangir used an approach similar to Ndiaya’s,
but she also used her mandate to transform dominant ideas about what
constitutes violations of the right to life, by addressing, for example, 
129 For example, in the report UN doc. E/CN.4/1994/7 pursuant UN doc. E/CN.4/
Res/1993/71 Ndiaye notes that he has dealt with only 168 cases in which the victims
were women. This low number, argued Ndiaya, might be due to the relatively small role
played by women in economic and public life. Similar references are made in the report
UN doc. E/CN.4/1995/61. In his report to the General Assembly, he made similar refer-
ences, noting that he took action on behalf of at least 590 women, but that women con-
stitute only a relatively low percentage of the victims of violations of the right to life re-
ported to him, claiming that “[t]he under-representation of women in the political 
and economic lice of many countries implies that they are less perceived as a threat and
therefore less exposed to acts of violence by Governments”. He also noted that “... owing
to a lack of human resources, an in-depth analysis of gender issues has not been feasible”
and he urged the UN to recruit more experts on women’s human rights, see UN doc.
A/51/ 457, Arts. 80–82.
130 UN doc. E/CN.4/1995/61, Art. 415.
131 UN doc. E/CN.4/1997/60, Art. 55. Issues that he refers to include, persecution of
women because of their relationship to men and indiscriminate killings of women in
armed conflict, civil unrest and insurgency operations, see UN doc. E/CN.4/1997/60,
Arts. 53–4. The report UN doc. E/CN.4/1998/68 pursuant UN doc. E/CN.4
/Res/1997/ 61 is similar to the previous report. However, in this report, Ndiaye also re-
ferred to Sri Lankan cases where women had “... allegedly been gang-raped before being
killed”, “... deliberate targeting of women and children by groups of killers in Algeria”
and the killing of a pregnant woman accused of theft in Chad.
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so-called honour killings.132 In Jahangir’s first report, she, like Ndiaye,
counted how many cases she dealt with in which the victims have been
women.133 However, she also noted that she cannot know exactly how
many of her cases constituted cases where women have been violated, as
she often, when addressing violations committed towards groups, does
not know whether the victims are female or male. She introduced a
change in wording with respect to Ndiaya’s reports, stressing that “[i]t is
a fact that women and children are the main victims of armed conflict
and civil unrest”.134 Jahangir included a special heading on the traditional
practices and customs affecting the right to life, under which she noted
that traditional practices, such as, so-called honour killings can, when
condoned or ignored by governments, constitute violations of the right
to life.135 Jahangir was disturbed over the reports of honour killings
committed in the Middle East, Latin America and South Asia, cases
where “... husbands, fathers and brothers have gone unpunished after
having murdered their wives, daughters or sisters in order to defend the
honour of the family”.136 In the subsequent report, Jahangir noted that
while there is an increased discussion within the UN and internationally
about harmful traditional practices and so-called honor killings, there re-
mains a considerable gap between words and action.137 In her recom-
mendations, she notes that the “... main reason for the perpetuation of
132 The report UN doc. E/CN.4/1999/39 submitted pursuant UN doc. E/CN.4/
Res/1998/68 is the first report submitted by Asma Jahangir. Jahangir also addresses in
her reports other violations bypassed or overlooked by Ndiaye, such as, violations of the
right to life on the basis of sexual orientation, see for example doc. E/CN.4/1999/39,
Arts. 74–5 and the use of death penalty when women have committed adultery, see UN
doc. E/CN.4/2003/3.
133 UN doc. E/CN.4/1999/39, Art. 34–5.
134 UN doc. E/CN.4/1999/39, Art. 34–5.
135 UN doc. E/CN.4/1999/39, Arts. 76–7.
136 UN doc. E/CN.4/1999/39, Arts. 74, 76–7. Jahangir does cooperate with the Special
Rapporteur on violence against women and the Special Rapporteur on the independence
of judges and lawyers regarding issues that fall within all of their mandates, such as,
honour killings. In the report UN doc. E/CN.4/2000/3 pursuant UN doc. E/CN.4/
Res/1999/35, Jahangir provides an overview of different types of so-called honour kil-
lings and of the different countries and cultural contexts in which honour killings exist.
She stressed that a “... comprehensive policy has to be drawn up to abolish practices that
impinge upon the life of any person purely because of sexual distinction” and she urged
support for those judges, lawyers and non-governmental organizations that work against
honour killings, see UN doc. E/CN.4/2000/3, Art. 84. UN doc. E/CN.4/2001/9 and
Corr. 1.
137 UN doc. E/CN.4/2001/9 and Corr. 1. Jahangir mentioned her visit to the General
Assembly Special Session Beijing+5 and highlighted UN doc. A/Res/55/66 on the elimina-
tion of crimes against women committed in the name of honour.
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the practice of ‘honour’ killings is the lack of political will by Govern-
ments to bring the perpetrators of these crimes to justice”.138
Governments are urged to make legislative changes to ensure that such kil-
lings receive no discriminatory treatment under the law and sensitize their
judiciary to gender issues. Those threatening the life of a female victim
should be brought to justice. Government homes for women should not be
permitted to detain against their will women whose lives are at risk. Prisons
should never be used to detain potential victims of honour killings.139
In the report, pursuant to Commission on Human Rights Resolution
2002/36, Jahangir underlined that she “... continues to monitor closely
the situation with regard to violations of the right to life of women 
and children”.140 She noted that she continually receives reports about
the murder of women in the name of honour, but that she only acts 
“... where the State either approves of or supports these acts or permits
institutionalized impunity to the perpetrators, or impunity by giving
tacit support to this criminal practice”.141 Jahangir argues that:
[t]he overwhelming number of “honour killings” are carried out by family
members or in conspiracy with them. Laws allowing the heirs of the victims
to either accept compensation in place of punishment or to pardon the of-
fender therefore gives licence to male relatives to murder women on the
justification of being offended by their behaviour. This form of institutio-
nalized impunity for so-called “honour killing” of women is unacceptable
and is a violation of the right to life of a person on the basis of gender.142
138 UN doc. E/CN.4/2001/9, Art. 117.
139 UN doc. E/CN.4/2001/9, Art. 117. In the report UN doc. E/CN.4/2002/74 pur-
suant UN doc. E/CN.4/Res/2001/45, Jahangir focused less on honour killings and picked
up the subject of rapes and killings of women in Sri Lanka. She noted that, together with
the Special Rapporteur on torture and the Special Rapporteur on violence against wo-
men, she sent a joint letter to the Government of Sri Lanka, requesting information on
the steps taken to bring the alleged murderers to justice. She also addressed the killing of
52 women, many of whom had also allegedly been gang raped, prior to being beaten or
shot to death, by government forces in Myanmar.
140 UN doc. E/CN.4/2003/3, Art. 58.
141 UN doc. E/CN.4/2003/3, Art. 59.
142 UN doc. E/CN.4/2003/3, Art. 59. Jahangir also noted that she will continue to
follow closely governmental inaction in order to give a clearer picture through her report
to be submitted in 2004. In her recommendations, she also underlines specifically that
“[g]overnments must end systematic and institutional impunity for those who kill
women in the name of honour and so-called morality”, Art. 98. In the 2002 report,
however, Jahangir also moved into new areas expressing her increasing concern about re-
ports of women being condemned to death for adultery Art. 60. Jahangir has reacted
against the use of the death penalty against women who have committed adultery as
“[t]he offence attributed to the accused does not constitute the most serious crime as it
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As noted, there are considerable differences between how Ndiaye and
Jahangir have chosen to integrate women’s human rights and/or main-
stream a gender perspective. Ndiaye addresses issues regarding women’s
human rights only most dutifully. However, he does not seem insensitive
to women’s human rights issues. Rather, he seems to lack the competence
and the resources for integrating women’s human rights and/or for
mainstreaming a gender perspective. Jahangir does have an interest in
women’s human rights and gender issues; she has worked purposefully
with her mandate in order to lay a bridge over assumptions about the
private/public distinction in international law in order to integrate new
violations under her mandate.143
The Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women, Its Causes 
and Consequences
The violence against women discourse and the global campaign for re-
cognizing violence against women as a human rights violation are good
examples of successful feminist lobbying for the inclusion of an issue
onto the international human rights agenda.144 The issue of violence
against women was addressed during the Vienna conference, not in the
least due to the Global Campaign against Violence against Women
launched by non-governmental organizations before the conference.145
The Vienna Programme includes references to violence against women
in Part I, Art. 18(2), which states that “[g]ender-based violence and all
forms of sexual harassment and exploitation, including those resulting
from cultural prejudice and international trafficking, are incompatible
with the dignity and worth of the human person, and must be elimina-
ted”. The General Assembly responded to the growing concern regard-
ing violence against women by adopting the Declaration on the Elimina-
tion of Violence against Women (DEVAW) in 1993.146 The mandate of
is not an intentional crime with lethal or other extremely grave consequences nor is it life
threatening”. This report also included a chapter on the violations of the right to life of
persons because of their sexual orientation.
143 For a discussion about the private/public distinction, see Chapter 3.2.1.
144 The Nairobi Forward-Looking Strategies Art. 258 stresses that “[v]iolence against
women exists in various forms in everyday life in all societies. Women are beaten, muti-
lated, burned, sexually abused and raped. Such violence is a major obstacle to peace ...”.
For analysis of violence against women and the UN human rights framework, see for
example Bunch and Reilly 1994, Coomaraswamy and Kois 1999, Eriksson 2000 and
Phillips 1999.
145 See Chapter 3.4.2.
146 The declaration was adopted with special references to the Nairobi Forward-Looking
Strategies and UN doc. E/Res/1990/15 and UN doc. E/Res/1991/18.
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the Special Rapporteur on violence against women was established in
1994 as part of the Commission on Human Rights activities for paying
attention to issues regarding violence against women and integrating
women’s human rights into the mainstream of human rights.147 The
Special Rapporteur should function as a key UN institution against vio-
lence against women, receiving and processing information from UN
human rights institutions, governments and nongovernmental organiza-
tions. The Special Rapporteur should work closely with other Special
Rapporteurs and Commission on Human Rights mandates and she
should “... recommend measures, ways and means, at the national, re-
gional and international levels, to eliminate violence against women and
its causes, and to remedy its consequences”.148 The Special Rapporteur
mandate regarding violence against women includes
... all violations of the human rights of women in situations of armed con-
flict, and in particular, murder, systematic rape, sexual slavery and forced
pregnancy, as well as all forms of sexual harassment, exploitation and
trafficking of women, the elimination of gender bias in the administration
of justice and the eradication of the harmful effects of certain traditional or
customary practices, cultural prejudice and religious extremism.149
Radhika Coomaraswamy of Sri Lanka held the mandate of the Special
Rapporteur since its inception until the year 2003 when the mandate
was assumed by Yakin Ertürk of Turkey. Coomaraswamy interpreted her
mandate as consisting of two components: first, the identification of the
different elements of the violence committed against women, including
any laws relating to it; secondly, the identification and investigation of
alleged and actual cases of violence against women. Coomaraswamy
chose to use a thematic approach in her reports, dealing with different
forms of violence against women in each report.
Coomaraswamy began her work by asking the General Assembly to
request governments to provide her with information concerning the in-
stances of violence to which women are subjected, viz., violence in the
family, violence in the community and violence by the state.150 Similar
requests were forwarded to the UN human rights treaty bodies, special
rapporteurs and other relevant UN institutions and agencies.151 In her
subsequent reports, she addressed the different types of violence, focus-
147 UN doc. E/CN.4/1994/45.
148 UN doc. E/CN.4/1995/42, Art. 2.
149 UN doc. E/CN.4/1995/42, Art. 7.
150 UN doc. E/CN.4/1995/42, Art. 13.
151 UN doc. E/CN.4/1995/42, Art. 14.
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ing in her second report on violence against women in the family, in her
third report, on violence against women committed by the community
and, in her fourth report, on violence against women committed by the
state.152 In her fifth report, she summarized her findings.153 The follow-
ing reports focus on specific issues, such as, trafficking, violence against
women during armed conflict and cultural practices in the family that
are violent towards women.154 In her 2003 report, which also completed
her term as Special Rapporteur, Coomaraswamy analyzed her findings
and the developments over the years 1994–2002, focusing on issues,
such as, armed conflict, violence in the family, sexual violence and rape,
sexual harassment, trafficking and religious extremism and harmful tra-
ditional practices.155
Coomaraswamy was a pioneer when it comes to the inclusion of viol-
ence against women committed by their family members as violations of
international human rights law. In her report on domestic violence, she
noted that while domestic violence usually occurs in the private sphere 
– outside the perceived scope of international human rights – when
condoned by the state, such violence can be perceived as human rights
violations.156
Among Coomaraswamy’s contributions to the contemporary under-
standing of the violence against women in all its varied forms as viola-
tions of women’s human rights is her recognition that violence against
women is not only made possible because of how different societies view
women, but also because of how these societies view men. Coomaraswa-
my views violence against women as a consequence of the historically
unequal power relations between women and men and the social and
cultural constructions of women’s and men’s roles. She reacts against
using so-called cultural excuses and argues that “... it must be accepted
that there are patterns of patriarchal domination which are universal,
though this domination takes a number of different forms and is a result
152 UN doc. E/CN.4/1996/53, UN doc. E/CN.4/1997/47 and UN doc. E/CN.4/
1998/54.
153 UN doc. E/CN.4/1999/68.
154 UN doc. E/CN.4/2000/68, UN doc. E/CN.4/2001/73 and UN doc. E/CN.4/
2002/83.
155 UN doc. E/CN.4/2003/75.
156 Coomaraswamy defined domestic violence as the violence that occurs in the private
sphere, generally between individuals who are related through intimacy, blood or law
and she noted that despite the “... apparent neutrality of the term, domestic violence is
nearly always a gender-specific crime, perpetrated by men against women”. As noted abo-
ve, similar argumentation was used by Jahangir when including so-called honour killings
within her mandate. see UN doc. E/CN.4/1996/53, Arts. 23, 26 and 29.
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of particular and different historical experiences”.157 She, however, also
recognizes cultural diversity and different value systems, and emphasizes
that attempts to universalize women’s experiences may conceal other
forms of oppression.
Although Coomaraswamy uses the term, gender, sparingly, she does
apply a gender perspective because she uses a relational approach to the
violence committed against women. Moreover, as opposed to most other
human rights mandate holders, Coommaraswamy focused on both
women and men. For example, when addressing trafficking, Coomara-
swamy noted that trafficking in women and forced prostitution is “[a]
market, driven by customer demand based on racist, sexist and ethno-
centric stereotypes, for foreign and ‘different’ women”.158 When addres-
sing violence against women during armed conflict, Coomaraswamy
noted that “[i]t has been posited that the military establishment is in-
herently masculine and misogynist, inimical to the notion of women’s
rights. The masculinity cults that pervade military institutions are
intrinsically anti-female and therefore create a hostile environment for
women”.159 In her reports on the cultural practices within the family
that are violent towards women, Coomaraswamy argues that although
the different forms of cultural practices have different cultural, religious,
social and historical roots, she identifies the regulation of female sexuality,
masculinity and violence as having common roots. Coomaraswamy noted
that many societies believe that the freedom of women, especially, their
sexual freedom, needs to be curtailed and regulated.160 Women’s right to
a safe and satisfying sex life is according to Coomaraswamy expressed in
the Beijing Platform, but practices that hamper a woman’s enjoyment 
of sexual and reproductive freedoms persist.161 Women’s sexual freedom is
limited by social norms, threats, force and violence. Women who trans-
gress or who have allegedly transgressed the boundaries of appropriate
157 UN doc. E/CN.4/1995/42, Arts. 50 and 57. Coomaraswamy addressed women’s
sexuality and patriarchal control over women’s sexuality as one of the reasons for family
and community violence against women, see UN doc. E/CN.4/1997/47, Art. 8.
158 UN doc. E/CN.4/1997/47, Chapter IV. Coomaraswamy, however, noted that the
root causes for trafficking in women are overlapping. Among the root causes, she lists
women’s lack of rights, the discrimination against women at different levels of society,
the intersection between gender-based discrimination and other forms of discrimination
against women, the sexual and economic exploitation of women, the lack of resources,
the ever widening gap between rich and poor countries, globalization.
159 UN doc. E/CN.4/1998/54, Art. 9.
160 UN doc. E/CN.4/2002/83, Art. 99.
161 UN doc. E/CN.4/2002/83, Art. 99.
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sexual behavior are punished by being excluded, by being badly treated,
by being subjugated to violence and sexual violence and by being
killed.162 Coomaraswamy noted:
[i]n recent times, anthropologists and scholars have pointed out that, 
in certain contexts and in certain societies, being “masculine” in an ideal
sense involves a tolerance of violence. In many societies, the ideal of heroic
masculinity requires acceptance of the notion of honour and the violent re-
gulation of female sexuality. In fact, notions of masculinity are integrally
linked to policing the behaviour of women.163
According to Coomaraswamy, “[t]he heroic male personality whose
masculinity is close to violence is not only the traditional man from the
Mediterranean and Middle Eastern societies that believe in honour”.164
It is also the ideal male personality and masculinity, for example, found
in the popular culture of the United States. Obviously, there are other
and alternative masculinities, but as the Special Rapporteur noted 
“... unless there is public education and campaigns to try to counter the
negative images of violent men as ideals for a society, the heroic male
stereotype in many societies may still be the one carrying the gun”.165
None of the concluding recommendations of the Special Rapporteur,
however, addresses the constructions of men and masculinity. Instead,
they are all focused on conventional women-centered measures and
gender-sensitization measures with a woman focus.166
Coomaraswamy summarized her own work and the first decade of
the Special Rapporteur’s mandate, stating that “... in many ways, the
first decade of this mandate was an explanatory one. As the issue of
VAW [violence against women] was new to the human rights agenda, it
was necessary to develop definitions and standards”.167 With her work,
Coomaraswamy has contributed significantly to the development of the
discourse of violence against women and to the promotion of the inclu-
sion of new forms of violence against women into the international
human rights framework. Coomaraswamy ended her last report by stating
that “[w]hile the first decade emphasized the need for conceptual clarity
and standard-setting, the second decade must focus on compliance and
monitoring”.168
162 UN doc. E/CN.4/2002/83, Art. 102.
163 UN doc. E/CN.4/2002/83, Art. 105.
164 UN doc. E/CN.4/2002/83, Art. 107.
165 UN doc. E/CN.4/2002/83, Art. 108.
166 UN doc. E/CN.4/2002/83, Arts. 120–132.
167 UN doc. E/CN.4/2003/75, Art. 79.
168 UN doc. E/CN.4/2003/75, Art. 79.
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If the first decade emphasized standard-setting and awareness-raising, the
second decade must focus on effective implementation and the develop-
ment of innovative strategies to ensure that the prohibition against violence
is a tangible reality for the world’s women. In this context the Special Rap-
porteur’s successor must focus on how to ensure effective protection of
women’s rights and equal access to justice for women who have suffered
violence ...169
The Special Rapporteur on the Right to Education
The mandate of the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Education was
established in 1998 and Katarina Tomas˘evski of Croatia was chosen as
the first Special Rapporteur.170 The Special Rapporteur was asked to
report on the progressive realization of the right to education around the
world, to promote assistance to governments, dialogues between and
among governments and relevant UN institutions and to identify sources
for financing regarding the progressive realization of the right to educa-
tion. The Special Rapporteur was also requested to “... take into account
gender considerations, in particular the situation and needs of the girl
child, and to promote the elimination of all forms of discrimination in
education” and he or she should make the reports available to the Com-
mission on the Status of Women whenever the contents of such reports
concern the situation of women in the field of education.171
In her reports, Tomas˘evski has chosen to analyze the nature and the
scope of the right to education, both at the level of individual states and
at the level of inter-governmental structures within which governments
act collectively.172 While the focus on individual states falls within the
framework of traditional human rights investigations, the focus on inter-
governmental structures introduces new perspectives on the international
promotion of human rights obligations. The focus on intergovernmental
structures allows the Special Rapporteur, from a human rights perspect-
ive, to analyze the work of intergovernmental development agencies and
the World Bank argue for the introduction of human rights-based ap-
proaches to be interjected into the educational policies of these inter-
governmental institutions.
In her reports, Tomas˘evski has worked with the mainstreaming strate-
gies, i.e., mainstreaming human rights and mainstreaming a gender per-
169 UN doc. E/CN.4/2003/75, p. 78.
170 See Lempinen (2001, p. 242–4) for an overview of the processes for integrating
economic, social and cultural rights and for establishing economic, social and cultural
rights special procedures.
171 UN doc. E/CN.4/Res/1998/33, Art. 1(iii–iv).
172 UN doc. E/CN.4/1999/49.
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spective. Through her annual reports, she develops her analysis of the
mainstreaming strategies and their impacts on the right to education.173
Tomas˘evski wants to mainstream human rights into education policies
because she wants to ensure a rights- and law-based framework for educa-
tion. She stated that because the Commission on Human Rights has
emphasized the importance of mainstreaming a gender perspective, she
has chosen to approach gender issues “... by incorporating gender con-
siderations into the body of the report rather than adding them as a se-
parate section at the end”.174 According to Tomas˘evski, a human rights-
based approach to education allows for a focus on the individual human
being. To approach education as an end in itself, referring to account-
ability as a key demand in international cooperation, Tomas˘evski noted
that:
[t]he human rights approach prioritizes law in holding Governments
accountable for their pledges, individually and collectively. Once a pledge
becomes a human rights obligation failures to attain the agreed ends by the
specified means become denials and violations of human rights which Gov-
ernments, individually and collectively, have to redress by compensating
the victims and ensuring that they do not happen again.175
In the rights-based approach, Tomas˘evski saw a potential means against
the contemporary trends of viewing human beings as human capital and
education as the efficient production of human capital. According to
Tomas˘evski
[t]he human-capital approach moulds education solely towards economic-
ally relevant knowledge, skills and competence, to the detriment of human
rights values. Education should prepare learners for parenthood or political
participation, enhance social cohesion and tolerance. A productivist view
of education depletes it of much of its purpose and substance.176
Tomas˘evski also introduced the notion of “double mainstreaming”. She
uses the notions of double mainstreaming for “... the incorporation of
both gender perspectives and equal human rights of women throughout
the United Nations”.177 According to Tomas˘evski, a women’s human
rights-based approach encourages a perspective where girls and women
173 See UN doc. E/CN.4/1999/49, UN doc. E/CN.4/2000/6, UN doc. E/CN.4/2001/52
and UN doc. E/CN.4/2002/60. See also UN doc. E/1997/27-E/CN.6/ 1997/9, p. 3 and
Sullivan 1999.
174 UN doc. E/CN.4/1999/49, Art. 9 and UN doc. E/CN.4/2002/60.
175 UN doc. E/CN.4/2002/60, Art. 7.
176 UN doc. E/CN.4/2000/6, Art. 67.
177 UN doc. E/CN.4/1999/49, Art. 18.
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are viewed as equal to boys and men. The education of girls and women
may be seen as an end in itself and not as a means to increase women’s
reproductive health, to lower fertility rates, etc. According to Tomas˘evski,
international strategies concerning the education for girls have alternated
between different justifications:
... meeting girls’ needs because these remain unmet to a larger extent than
those of boys; enhancing the productivity or lowering the fertility of the
future generations of women; and promoting equity or justice. The third
justification has sometimes shared the human rights rationale of the equal
worth and dignity of all human beings but not necessarily the human
rights requirement of the elimination of all forms of gender discrimina-
tion. The interdependence of human rights necessitates looking beyond
the sector of education. The institutional responsibility for the elimination
of gender discrimination within the United Nations of in individual states
is a cross-sectoral issue. The development of a common language guided
by elimination of gender discrimination as the goal and yardstick is the ne-
cessary first step towards a comprehensive strategy.178
Mainstreaming a gender perspective into education enables substantial
analysis of sex segregated quantitative data regarding education. To-
mas˘evski addressed the worrisome tendencies to “... shift terminological-
ly to gender while continuing to talk only about girls and women”.179
Tomas˘evski resorted to the example of war and argued that war is not
seen as a gender issue “... although boys are disproportionately affected
by their socialization into the role of combatants”.180 Tomas˘evski further
noted that this socialization process of boys into “combatants” is continued
through schoolbook stories about wars and “war heroes”, violent sports
and computerized war games.181 Tomas˘evski, herself, however, highlights
girls and women when discussing gender. She noted, for example, that:
[s]trengthened and broadened commitments to gender equality in access to
eduction have not yet evolved into similar commitments to attaining gen-
der equality through education. There is a colossal difference between the
two. Getting girls into education often founders because education as a single
sector does not, on its own, generate sufficiently attractive incentives for
the girls’ parents and the girls themselves if educated girls cannot apply
their education to sustaining themselves and/or helping their parents. Years
of attending school appear wasted when women do not have access to em-
178 UN doc. E/CN.4/1999/49, Art. 19, see also table 4–5.
179 UN doc. E/CN.4/2001/52, Art. 41.
180 UN doc. E/CN.4/2001/52, Art. 46.
181 UN doc. E/CN.4/2001/52, Art. 46.
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ployment and/or are precluded from becoming self-employed, do not have
a choice as to whether to marry and bear children, or their opportunities
for political representation are foreclosed.182
In her last report, Tomas˘evski focused on the mainstreaming of human
rights, but she also continued to address the elimination of gender dispar-
ity in education.183 Tomas˘evski identified late and incomplete statistics
as one of key obstacles in working for the elimination of gender disparity
in education. According to Tomas˘evski, there is a need to define what
she called the equality of women and men, rather than “merely equality
between women and men”, as the yardstick.184 She recommended 
“... prioritizing quantitative and qualitative data related to gender dispa-
rities in education so as to create a background for assessing progress in
the year 2005”.185
The double mainstreaming approach used by Tomas˘evski which fo-
cused on both the mainstreaming of human rights and the integration
of women’s human rights and the mainstreaming of a gender perspective
is an attempt to utilize the benefits of both sets, types of human rights,
including women’s human rights and a gender perspective in the work
for promoting the right to education. Combining the aforementioned
mainstreaming strategies does demand much conceptual, operative and
functional prudence. Tomas˘evski approached the different mainstream-
ing strategies as complementary rather than as conflicting. Tomas˘evski
did not approach education as a rights-based phenomenon, per se, but,
rather, as a societal institution that can benefit, for example, from an in-
creased focus on human rights Hence, with respect to educating the girl
child and the woman, Tomas˘evski argued that the double approach
would contribute to an increased understanding of the inequalities in
education and an increased equality in education. Tomas˘evski further
argued that the foundations for responding to this challenge have been
established and are embodied in the commitment of the UN to double
mainstreaming, viz., the incorporation of both gender perspectives and
the equal human rights of women throughout the UN. In other words,
it is only when women’s human rights are integrated at the same time as
a gender perspective is mainstreamed within the UN human rights sys-
tem that women’s human rights will be sufficiently protected.
182 UN doc. E/CN.4/2002/60, Art. 40.
183 UN doc. E/CN.4/2003/9, Chapter 1 and Art. 25.
184 UN doc. E/CN.4/2003/9, Art. 25.
185 UN doc. E/CN.4/2003/9, Art. 25.
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The Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights 
in Afghanistan
The Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Afghanistan
was first appointed in 1984.186 Since then, the mandate of the special
rapporteur has been renewed regularly by the Commission on Human
Rights and endorsed by the ECOSOC. The Special Rapporteur reports
to the Commission on Human Rights and to the General Assembly.
The Special Rapporteur’s mandate is since December 1998 held by Kamal
Hossain of Bangladesh. The two previous special rapporteurs have also
been men.187 The political situation in Afghanistan has changed extens-
ively since the establishment of the Special Rapporteur’s mandate in
1984. Few of these changes seem to have been beneficial for the people
of Afghanistan. Afghanistan has suffered from war and war-like crises
since 1979, culminating in the military intervention of the United States
into Afghanistan in 2001. The war-torn history of Afghanistan has led
to an extensive humanitarian crisis marked by extreme underdevelop-
ment and poverty, ecological catastrophes, diseases and high mortality
rates for mothers and children. The gender disparity index that is based
on a composite index based on the measurement of female life expectancy,
educational attainment and income ranked Afghanistan, even in the
mid-1990s, as among the lowest in the world.188
The 1994 report of Ermacora did not deal with women’s human
rights or equality between the sexes to any considerable extent, although
he occasionally referred to specific violations of women’s human rights
in connection with, for example, discriminatory legislation or harmful
traditional practices.189 Although without any analysis, Ermacore, how-
ever, does draw attention to the stoning of women in northern parts of
Afghanistan and to the adoption of the Ordinance on the Women’s Veil
186 UN doc. E/Res/1984/37.
187 The first Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Afghanistan was
Felix Ermecore of Austria, who held the mandate from 1984 to 1995. The second Special
Rapporteur was Choong-Huyn Paik, Republic of Korea, who held the mandate till
1998, when it was taken over by Hossein. Hossein’s mandate was extended through UN
doc. E/CN.4/Res/2002/19 for three years. The Special Rapporteurs’ reports of all three
Special Rapporteurs, in general, have been extensive. The reports provide an overview of
the activities, including meetings and travels of the Special Rapporteurs, of the political
situation in Afghanistan, including of the political changes since the previous report was
submitted, of the human rights situation in different parts of Afghanistan, including in
refugee camps for Afghan people in the countries surrounding Afghanistan. Most of the
reports, however, seem to be focused on giving an overall picture of the situation and on
reporting within the traditional framework of human rights.
188 UNDP Human Development Report 1995.
189 UN doc. A/49/650.
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that had been issued by a nine-member professional committee of the
High Court of the Islamic State of Afghanistan.190
In 1995, the Special Rapporteur’s mandate is taken over by Paik.191
While women’s human rights and gender issues are not at the forefront
of Paik’s reports, he does refer to women’s issues more extensively than
did Ermacora. Paik tends to refer mostly to information that he has been
given by women’s advocates and gender specialists from different UN
agencies and other governmental and nongovernmental organisations in
Afghanistan. In the conclusions of his first report to the General Assembly,
he noted:
[w]ith regard to the rights of women, the Special Rapporteur witnessed a
high-level of female involvement, especially in the areas of medical care and
education. However, despite the active involvement of women in the affairs
of administration, partly resulting from wartime necessities, the develop-
ment of the situation as a whole does not seem to have greatly changed the
pattern of deeply engrained male domination of the indigenous societal sys-
tem.192
His second and third reports include more extensive references to
women owing to two main factors: first, the Beijing conference had res-
ulted in the creation of new women’s advocacy groups in Afghanistan and,
secondly, the increase in the number of law-based constraints on the lives
of Afghan women due to an increase in the enforced repressiveness of the
Taliban regime resulted in more attention being paid to the situation of
women in Afghanistan.193
In 1998, the Special Rapporteur’s mandate was taken over by Hos-
sain.194 Hossain referred to the situation of women in Afghanistan and
190 UN doc. A/49/650, Arts. 50, 69 and 72.
191 During his period as Special Rapporteur, Paik submitted four reports to the General
Assembly. See UN doc. A/50/567, UN doc. UN doc. A/51/481, UN doc. A/52/493
and UN doc. A/53/539.
192 UN doc. A/50/567, Art. 75.
193 See UN doc. A/51/481, Art. 21. With regard to the Taliban entry into Kabul, Paik
refers, for example, to the Security Council resolutions regarding women’s situation in
Afghanistan, to the socio-economic consequences of the law-based restrictions to women’s
human rights. Paik mentioned that one of the consequences of the Taliban entry into
Kabul was the closing of schools and the University and the demanding that women do
not return to their work, but stay at home. He expresses concern for the survival of those
persons living in the 30,000 female-headed households in Kabul. With regard to the
situation of men, he mentioned that men were required to have long beards within six
weeks or face punishment, see UN doc. A/52/493, Art. 21 and UN doc. A/53/539.
194 In between the years, 1998 and 2002, Hossain submitted reports to the ECOSOC,
see UN doc. E/CN.4/1999/40, UN doc. E/CN.4/2000/33 and UN doc. E/CN.4/
2001/43, UN doc. E/CN.4/2002/43 and UN doc. E/CN.4/2003/39.
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to the violations of women’s human rights to the same extent as did his
predecessor, Paik. In other words, he reported on the situation of women
and on the violations of women’s human rights, relying on information
from women’s advocates and gender experts in UN agencies or other
governmental or nongovernmental organizations. In one of his reports,
Hossain includes a specific section, entitled, simply, Women.195 The in-
formation reproduced in the four paragraphs on women, however fails
to provide any individual analysis.196 A later report summarizes the
information about women and the violations of women’s human rights
from a survey regarding the situation of internally displaced persons in
Afghanistan.197 The information summarized included a number of re-
ferences to violations against women, viz., the denial to women of the
rights to eduction, health and employment, the imprisonment of
women in jails without having been charged or even given any reason at
all, the abduction of women and girls and the enforcement of arranged
marriages.198 Hossain also cooperated and conducted a partly joint mis-
sion with the Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women regarding
the situation of women in Afghanistan.
The report submitted after the adoption of the Bonn agreement, re-
ferred to the emphasis of the Bonn agreements on creating “... a broad-
based, gender-sensitive, multi-ethnic and fully representative govern-
ment” for Afghanistan.199 The report highlighted the changes after the
fall of the Taliban regime noting that
[a] key change which the transition aims to bring about is the restoration
of the rights of Afghan women, who had been the targets of systematic dis-
crimination denying them access to employment, education and health
services. That the process of changes has begun is reflected in the reopen-
ing of schools for girls and women returning to their normal jobs.200
In the ensuing report, Hossain referred to his discussions with the Afghan
national Human Rights Commission regarding key human rights issues,
which included discussions about the human rights of women; his in-
formation regarding women, however, remained merely summary.201
195 UN doc. E/CN.4/2001/43, paras. 49–52.
196 UN doc. E/CN.4/2001/43, Chapter IV (E), Arts. 49–52.
197 UN doc. E/CN.4/2000/33, Arts. 41–9.
198 UN doc. E/CN.4/2000/33, Arts. 41–9.
199 UN doc. E/CN.4/2002/43, Art. 24.
200 UN doc. E/CN.4/2002/43, Art. 45.
201 UN doc. E/CN.4/2003/39, executive summary and Arts. 18 and 32–9
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Within the UN, there has been an ongoing discussion about the situa-
tion of women and girls during the Taliban rule in Afghanistan. The dis-
cussion continued during the reconstruction process. The Secretary-
General of the UN prepared several reports that specifically address the
issue of the situation of women and girls in Afghanistan. Even the General
Assembly, the ECOSOC and the Commission on Human Rights have
adopted resolutions regarding the situation of women and girls in
Afghanistan.202 While it is possible that Hossein made an active decision
to integrate women’s human rights into his last reports, he, nonetheless,
failed to take a transformative approach to women’s human rights and
he failed to attempt to mainstream a gender perspective. Most of the in-
formation provided by Hossein seemed to be based on either discussion
with women’s advocates or gender experts at UN headquarters or field
presences or, based on information gleaned from different reports prepa-
red by the UN or other experts. He made no attempts to analyze the in-
formation he has received.
5.3.3 The Commission on the Status of Women
The Commission on the Status of Women is the main intergovernmen-
tal institution within the UN that has a targeted woman-centred man-
date.203 The Commission on the Status of Women was established as a
Sub-Commission to the Commission on Human Rights in 1946. The
Commission on the Status of Women became a functional commission
in its own right in 1947. The position of the Commission on the Status
of Women within the UN has changed considerably during its six decade-
long history. The Commission on the Status of Women held a fairly
strong position during its first decades.204 While standard-setting was
not part of the original mandate of the Commission on the Status of
Women, such a role was developed through the drafting by the Com-
202 See for example UN doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2000/18, UN doc. E/CN.6/2001/2/
Add.1, UN doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/28 and UN doc. E/Res/2000/9.
203 Until 1993, the Commission on the Status of Women held its meetings in Vienna,
but it transferred its forum to New York, to the Division for the Advancement of Wo-
men. The Commission on the Status of Women membership has increased from 15 to
45 over the years; members are elected by the ECOSOC for four-years terms on the basis
of the principle of equitable geographical distribution. For further references see Reanda
1996, UN doc. ECOSOC Res. 11 (II) (1946), UN doc. ECOSOC resolution 48(IV)
(1947), UN doc. E/1982/34, UN doc. ECOSOC resolution 1987/2.
204 Reanda 1996, pp. 274, 281–9
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mission on the Status of Women a number of formal documents, for ex-
ample, the Convention on the Political Rights of Women, the Conven-
tion on the Nationality of Married Women and the Declaration and
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against
Women. In the 1970s, while the issue of women’s inequality waxed in
importance within the UN system, the status of the Commission on the
Status of Women waned. In 1980, the General Assembly dealt with a
proposal for the abolition of the Commission on the Status of Women,
but the proposal was shelved. Towards the end of the Women’s Decade,
during the ten year period from 1975 to 1985, the Commission on the
Status of Women was consolidated because there was a growing need for
a centralized institutional mechanism within the UN that could monitor,
evaluate and coordinate UN initiatives regarding women.205 The Com-
mission on the Status of Women was assigned the main responsibility
for monitoring the implementation of the Nairobi Forward-Looking
Strategies to the Year 2000.206 The Commission on the Status of Wo-
men held a special session in 1987 in order to review the medium-term
plans for integrating the Nairobi Strategies into all planning within the
UN system. The session was also used to develop ideas for the further
strengthening of the Commission on the Status of Women.207
Since the end of the Third World Conference of Women, Nairobi
1985, and the end of the International Women’s Decade, from 1975 to
1985, the Commission on the Status of Women has increasingly focused
on questions regarding the integration of women’s issues into the main-
stream of the UN.208 In 1992, a delegate emphasized that an assessment
of key issues from a gender perspective would be an important step
towards the integration of women’s rights into the human rights work 
of the United Nations.209 A resolution on the matter was adopted the fol-
lowing year in which the Commission on the Status of Women proposed
additions to the Vienna conference agenda regarding equality between
205 Reanda 1996, p. 270.
206 Nairobi Forward-Looking Strategies, and Reanda 1996, p. 298.
207 See also UN doc. E/Res/1987/22 through which ESOSOC decides to expand the
Commission on the Status of Women mandate to include the monitoring of the imple-
mentation of the Nairobi Forward-Looking Strategies. The terms of reference were again
modified via UN doc. E/Res/1996/6 and UN doc. E/Res/2002/4.
208 Reanda 1996, pp. 275–6.
209 See also UN doc. E/1992/74-E/CN.6/1992/13. The Commission on the Status of
Women’s 1992 resolutions bore titles, such as, advancement of women and the family
(36/1), women in decision-making bodies (36/3), integration of elderly women into
development (36/4) and women and development (36/5). 
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the sexes and women’s human rights.210 The issues that were discussed
before the adoption of the resolution centred around the need to streng-
then CEDAW through urging State parties to withdraw their reserva-
tions, to develop more responsive and effective enforcement mechanisms
for addressing violations of women’s human rights, especially different
forms of violence against women and to urge that all human rights bodies
should “... pay due attention to gender aspects in implementing human
rights, with a view to integrating the human rights of women into the
mainstream of the system for monitoring human rights”.211 The resolution
voices many of the issues that are later integrated in the Vienna Pro-
gramme:212 It points out that all human rights are “... universal, inalien-
able, indivisible and interrelated and, as such, must be applied and be 
of benefit to all women without discrimination and must therefore be
approached from a gender perspective” and it binds the question of
women’s enjoyment of their human rights tightly to the question of the
eradication of all forms of violence against women.213
In 1994, the Commission on the Status of Women was presented with
an interesting report prepared by the Secretary-General on the follow-up
to the Vienna conference, addressing the implementation of women’s
human rights by UN human rights institutions.214 The report explains
the need for a reintegration of women’s human rights into the core of
the human rights system through a historical lens, referring to the early
history of the Commission on Human Rights and the Commission on
the Status of Women and the gradual split between the human rights
and women’s human rights regimes.215 The report focuses on both the
210 UN doc. E/CN.6/Res/37/4 proposes additions to the Vienna conference under
agenda items 9–12 on the provisional agenda. The proposed additions concerned issues,
such as, the full realization of the principles of equality and non-discrimination contained
in all human rights documents, the promotion of the position of women within all areas
related to human rights including in development, the eradication of violence against
women and “... attention should be given to the contemporary trend of seeing the realiza-
tion of human rights from a gender perspective”. See UN doc. E/1993/27-E/CN.6/1
993/18, p. 35.
211 UN doc. E/1993/27-E/CN.6/1993/18, Art. 19. References were also made to the
UN doc. E/CN.4/Res/1993/46 on the integration of the human rights and the UN doc.
E/Res/1992/20 according to which the Commission on the Status of Women should
establish working groups to prepare for the Vienna conference. It is on the basis of the
latter resolution that UN doc. E/CN.6/Res/37/4 has been drafted.
212 UN doc. E/CN.6/Res/37/4.
213 UN doc. E/CN.6/Res/37/4.
214 The report had been requested through UN doc. A/Res/48/108 (1993). See also
UN doc. E/CN.6/1994/11.
215 UN doc. E/CN.6/1994/11, Arts. 4–11.
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institutional and the methodological aspects aimed at breaching the 
gap between human rights and women’s human rights, emphasizing
measures for closer co-operation between the Centre for Human Rights
and the Division for the Advancement of Women, the Commission on
Human Rights and the Commission on the Status of Women and the
Geneva-based treaty bodies and the CEDAW Committee, emphasizing
“... that a gender analysis needs to be applied in all human rights activ-
ities”.216 The report explains
[a]pplied to international human rights law, gender analysis shows that
these norms are not sex-neutral, but their application (and, in part, also
their content) and thus the equal protection and promotion of the human
rights of women is dependent on the socially determined relations between
women and men. In other words, while there is a generally accepted obliga-
tion to eliminate discrimination under international human rights law, the
formal requirement of equal treatment of men and women does not take
into consideration the particular nature or discrimination against women,
which is systemic, pervasive, structural and cultural, and which is at the
base of women’s unequal enjoyment of their rights.217
In response to the report, the Commission on the Status of Women
adopted a resolution on the mainstreaming women’s human rights.218
The resolution especially highlighted the institutional requirements for
mainstreaming, viz., three main needs: the need for closer cooperation
between the Commission on Human Rights and the Commission on
the Status of Women, the need for joint work plans between the Centre
for Human Rights and the Division for the Advancement of Women
and the need for a meeting of the persons chairing the human rights
treaty bodies on a regular basis to address the mainstreaming of women’s
human rights. Since its 41st session in 1997, the Commission on the
Status of Women has not adopted any resolutions that deal specifically
with issues regarding the mainstreaming of women’s human rights. The
Commission has dealt with specific human rights issues and has con-
tinued its focus on different forms of violence against women and traffic
in women and girls.219 The Commission on the Status of Women’s
216 UN doc. E/CN.6/1994/11, Art. 33.
217 UN doc. E/CN.6/1994/11, Art. 33.
218 UN doc. E/CN.6/Res/38/2. Similar resolutions have been adopted during the follow-
ing sessions, see UN doc. E/CN.6/Res/39/5 and UN doc. E/CN.6/Res/40/3. The focus
of the follow-up resolutions is largely to the same as the focus of Resolution UN doc.
E/CN.6/Res/38/2, although new aspects have been added as changes are made within
the UN system.
219 See for example UN doc. E/CN.6/Res/41/2 on older women, human rights and de-
velopment, UN doc. E/CN.6/Res/41/4 on violence against women migrant women UN
doc. E/CN.6/Res/41/5 on traffic in women.
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major contribution after 1997 in the field of human rights however, is the
drafting of the Optional Protocol to CEDAW. In 1999 the Commission
on the Status of Women agrees on a text for the protocol.220
The Commission on the Status of Women is part of the three-tiered
follow-up mechanism to the Beijing conference as envisaged by the Gen-
eral Assembly. The Commission on the Status of Women has fulfilled its
role in the follow-up to the Beijing conference through analyzing the
progress made in the implementation of one or a few of the critical areas
of concern in the Beijing Platform during each of the Commission’s
annual sessions between 1996 and 2001. In the aftermath of the Beij-
ing+5 session, the Commission on the Status of Women has added the
Beijing+5 outcome document to its analysis.221
Integral to the Beijing and Beijing+5 agenda of the Commission 
on the Status of Women is the analysis of the implementation of the sys-
tem-wide and broad-based strategy for mainstreaming a gender perspec-
tive within the UN system.222 The Commission on the Status of Women
has adopted a number of resolutions regarding mainstreaming of a gen-
der perspective into all policies and programmes in the United Nations
system.223 The first resolution was adopted in 1997 on the basis of a
draft resolution submitted by Canada, Australia and New Zeeland. It is
also a result of the ECOSOC resolution that emphasizes the catalytic
role of Commission on the Status of Women in the UN gender main-
streaming efforts.224 The resolution, however, does not include any de-
finition of gender mainstreaming, but it establishes goals and institutional
requirements for gender mainstreaming. The primary goal of mainstream-
ing a gender perspective is to achieve gender equality. Integral to the
220 See UN doc. E/1999/27-E/CN.6/1999/10.
221 For an overview of the critical areas of concern addressed during the Commission on
the Status of Women’s sessions since 1996, see www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/ csw/cri-
tical.htm#bpfa (09-12-2003) and www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/csw/critical.htm#con-
cern (09-12-2003).
222 A review of the implementation of the gender mainstreaming strategy is made on
the basis of the Secretary-General’s reports regarding the progress achieved in the follow-
up to and implementation of the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action and the
progress achieved in mainstreaming a gender perspective within the United Nations sy-
stem. The reporting was initiated through UN doc. E/Res/1996/6. For the reports see
for example UN doc. E/CN.6/2002/2. See also www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/csw/cri-
tical.htm#gender (09-12-2003), UN doc. E/Res/2001/4.
223 UN doc. E/CN.6/Res/41/6 and UN doc. E/CN.6/Res/45/2.
224 See UN doc. E/CN.6/Res/41/6, which is also amongst the background material to
the ECOSOC’s 1997 session on gender mainstreaming at which the ECOSOC agreed
conclusions 1997/2 are adopted.
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goal and even a precondition for it is the empowerment of women.225
The resolution also expresses the necessity of a dual strategy by noting
that gender mainstreaming does not exclude the need for targeted,
woman-specific action.226 In 2001, the Commission on the Status of
Women adopted its second resolution on gender mainstreaming.227 Since
the adoption of the previous resolution, three main changes have occur-
red: the adoption of the ECOSOC agreed conclusions 1997/2, the
statement on gender equality and mainstreaming by the Administrative
Committee on Coordination and the establishment of the Inter-Agency
Committee on Women and Gender Equality. The Commission on the
Status of Women recommended in the resolution that the ECOSOC in-
clude an agenda item on gender mainstreaming on its regular agenda and
that it devote the coordination segment of its 2005 session to evaluating
the gender mainstreaming strategy.
5.3.4 Conclusions
The Commission on Human Rights and the Commission on the Status
of Women have been at the forefront of conceptualizing the strategy for
the integration of women’s human rights and of conceptualizing the
interrelationship between the strategy for integrating women’s human
rights and the strategy for mainstreaming a gender perspective. The
Commission on Human Rights and the Commission on the Status of
Women have however largely focused on developing the strategies and
on promoting implementation of the strategies within other institutions
rather than on how the commissions themselves have succeeded in inte-
grating women’s human rights and/or mainstreaming a gender perspective.
The inclusion of the human rights of women as an integral component
in the work of the Commission on Human Rights is still lacking. So, too,
is the inclusion of a gender perspective that moves beyond a simple gen-
der-equals-more-or-less-woman approach lacking from the work of the
Commission on the Status of Women. These omissions sadly exemplify,
the difficulties integral to integration: The monitoring and evaluation
carried out by the Commission on Human Rights and the Commission
225 UN doc. E/CN.6/Res/41/6, Arts. 1–2. While gender mainstreaming is not defined,
it is framed through references to methods referred to in ECOSOC agreed conclusions
on gender mainstreaming in UN activities in poverty eradication (1996/1), and to the
need for continual development of analytical and practical tools for gender main-
streaming (Art. 26). The main focus of the resolution, however, is on explaining the
roles assigned to different UN institutions.
226 UN doc. E/CN.6/Res/41/6, Art. 3.
227 UN doc. E/2001/27-E/CN.6/2001/14.
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on the Status of Women are effected under specific agenda items dealing
with women’s human rights or gender issues, but the monitoring func-
tions do not equal or necessarily promote the successful integration of
women’s human rights or a gender perspective into the mainstream
work of the Commissions.
The emphasis of the Commission on Human Rights on the integra-
tion of women’s human rights, and in certain cases, on the mainstreaming
of a gender perspective, has resulted in an increasing amount of atten-
tion paid to such issues by the special procedures.228 There is a consider-
able difference, however, between the extent to which and the manner in
which the different special procedures integrate women’s human rights
or mainstream a gender perspective. While the special procedures have
increasingly begun to integrate women’s human rights, this activity tends
to be done, as has been noted by Sullivan, in specific sections within
otherwise “gender-neutral reports”.229 The special rapporteurs that do
not have a special interest in women’s human rights or gender issues or
those rapporteurs, whose mandate does not force onto the mandate hol-
der a concern for such issues, tend to address these issues dutifully, but
without any extensive analysis. Hence, while there are good examples,
such as the reports by Coomaraswamy, Tomas˘evski and Jahangir, many,
still, refer mostly to issues well discussed within the UN, such as violence
against women.230
5.4 The Human Rights Treaty Bodies and 
the Integrative Strategies
5.4.1 Introduction
There are currently seven human rights treaties to which treaty monitor-
ing bodies have been tied: The CERD Committee governs CERD
(1965), the Human Rights Committee governs the ICCPR (1966), the
ICESCR Committee monitors the ICESCR, the CEDAW Committee
governs the CEDAW, the CAT Committee governs CAT (1984) and
228 This point can be noted in the above review of the Special Rapporteur’s report and it
has also been acknowledged by Sullivan (1997) and in the Secretary-General’s report UN
doc. E/CN.4/2000/67, Art. 38.
229 Sullivan 1997, Art. 39.
230 UN doc. E/CN.4/2000/67, Art. 40.
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the CRC Committee governs CRC (1989).231 The International Con-
vention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and
their Families (1990) entered into force in 2003.232
The main treaty-based task of the committees is the reviewing of the
periodically appearing reports of the member states. The reviewing of
the periodic reports also consists of a communications procedure where-
by the comments and questions of the Committees are submitted to the
Member State. The Member State is then vouchsafed the opportunity to
submit written statements and to have a dialogue with the Committee.
Most committees can also review individual complaints. The Committees
can also adopt general comments, i.e., interpretative statements that can
affect the interpretation and jurisprudence under the treaties.233 The
committees have developed their work since the 1970s. Today the com-
mittees present their Concluding Comments in writing and all Com-
mittees also adopt General Comments, interpreting and clarifying the
meaning of treaty articles. The Meeting of the Chairpersons of the Hu-
man Rights Treaty Bodies which was convened in 1984, 1988 and 1990
and, thereafter, biannually or annually is the treaty body system’s own
attempt to promote better coordination among the treaty bodies.234
231 The number or Committee members, as well as the number or annual meetings vary
from treaty to treaty. CERD was adopted through the General Assembly Res. 2106 (XX)
of 21 Dec. 1965 (Entry into force: 4 Jan. 1969), ICCPR was adopted through the Gene-
ral Assembly Res. 2200 A (XXI) of 16 Dec. 1966 (Entry into force: 23 March 1976),
ICESCR was adopted through the General Assembly Res. 2200 A (XXI) of 16 Dec.
1966 (Entry into force: 3 Jan. 1976), CEDAW was adopted through UN doc. A/Res/
34/180 (Entry into force: 3 Sept. 1981), CAT was adopted through UN doc. A/Res/
39/46 (Entry into force: 26 June 1987), CRC was adopted through UN doc. A/Res/
44/25 (Entry into force: 2 Sept. 1990) and the Migrant Workers’ Convention was
adopted through UN doc. A/Res/ and entered into force in July 2003.
232 According to Alston (1995a, p. 5), the treaty bodies are distinguished by a limited
clientele (states parties); a delineated set of concerns set by the normative framework of
the treaty; a limited range of procedural options; caution in terms of setting precedents;
mostly consensus-based decision-making; and non-adversarial relationship to states par-
ties. See also Evatt 2000 and O’Flaherty 2002.
233 For a discussion about the status of the treaty bodies’ general recommendations and
comments, see Otto 2002.
234 UN doc. A/Res/45/85 (1990) and Alston 1995, p. 11. The meetings were convened
pursuant UN doc. A/Res/38/117, UN doc. A/Res/42/105, UN doc. A/Res/46/111, UN
doc. A/Res/48/120, UN doc. A/Res/49/175. For the reports of the meetings see UN
doc. A/39/484, annex, UN doc. A/44/98, annex, UN doc. A/45/636, annex, UN doc.
A/47/628, annex, UN doc. A/49/537, annex, UN doc. A/50/505, UN doc. A/51/482,
UN doc. A/52/507, UN doc. A/53/125 and UN doc. A/54/805. The focus of the meet-
ings has been on developing the work of the treaty bodies.
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The UN human rights treaty body system can be described as suc-
cessful in the sense that all states have signed and ratified at least one or
a few of the human rights treaties. Many states are members to all of the
six human rights treaties. However, the implementation of the human
rights treaties is slow. The work of the human rights treaties, in many
ways, is inefficient and hampered by uncooperative State parties.235 The
committees governing the human rights treaties have also tended to em-
phasize the necessity of an ongoing dialogue with the State Parties,
which occasionally leads to excessive diplomacy in the fear of alienating
State parties.236 Scott Leckie argues that the diplomacy of the treaty
bodies is less about “... a pragmatic balancing of interests designed to find
the truth and to suggest ways of making positive changes in policy and
law” than it is about “... a pro-government bias, to the detriment of the
rights of the individuals concerned”.237 Andrew Clapham uses the term
“splendid isolation” to describe the position of the treaty bodies within
the UN human rights system. The treaty bodies are often viewed as the
core of the UN human rights system.238
After the Vienna conference, the chairpersons at their annual meet-
ing, emphasized, inter alia, that “... all human rights contained in the
international human rights instruments apply fully to women and that
the equal enjoyment of those rights should be closely monitored by each
treaty body within the competence of its mandate”. It was requested
that the treaty bodies amend, where appropriate, their reporting guide-
lines to request information on the situation of women with respect to
the human rights treaties.239 In 1995, in conjunction with the Beijing
conference and after the first workshop on the integration of a gender
perspective into the work of the treaty bodies had been held, the chair-
persons endorsed a recommendation, according to which:
[t]he treaty bodies shall fully integrate gender perspectives into their pre-
sessional and sessional working methods, including identification of issues
and preparation of questions for country reports, general comments, gen-
235 Crawford 2000 and Tistounet 2000.
236 See for example Leckie 2000, p. 132.
237 Leckie (2000, p. 132) continues his criticism by arguing that the concluding com-
ments adopted as a last step in the process of the constructive dialogue are “... so general
as to lose any realistic hope of being taken seriously”.
238 Clapham 2000, p. 175.
239 UN doc. A/49/537, Annex, Art. 19–21. It was also emphasized, as a means for en-
hancing the cooperation among and between different treaty bodies and consolidating
the work of the CEDAW Committee, that CEDAW should no longer be separated from
the mainstream of the other human rights activities, and it should be based, like all the
other human rights treaty bodies, at the United Nations Office at Geneva.
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eral recommendations, and concluding observations. In particular, the treaty
bodies should consider the gender implications of each issue discussed under
each of the articles of the respective instruments.240
The chairpersons address either women’s human rights or issues relating
to the mainstreaming of a gender perspective in most of the ensuing re-
ports, although with less frequency after the Durban conference.241
With regard to the equal representation of the sexes in the treaty
bodies, the Secretary-General’s report on Integrating Women’s Human
Rights and a Gender Perspective for the year 2002, it was noted that
240 UN doc. A/50/505, Annex, Art. 34(a). The chairpersons, however, do not seem to
distinguish between the integration of women’s human rights and the mainstreaming of
a gender perspective because they state that reporting guidelines and the investigative
procedures should be sensitized, sensitive to women’s human rights issues and the situa-
tion of women, see UN doc. A/50/505, Annex, Art. 34.
241 See UN doc. A/50/505, annex and the Report of the Expert Group Meeting on the
Development of Guidelines for the Integration of a Gender Perspective into the UN
Human Rights Activities and Programmes 1995. During the seventh meeting, in 1996,
the chairpersons were asked to comment on the advances made for the promotion of
women’s human rights and the integration of a gender perspective made by each respect-
ive treaty body. The Human Rights Committee reports on its decision to update its ge-
neral recommendation on ICCPR Art. 3 and the ICESCR Committee, the CERD
Committee and the CRC Committee all report on the preparation of a possible revision
of reporting guidelines, see UN doc. A/51/482. In the report of the 8th meeting, in
1997, it was noted that the treaty bodies could do more to integrate a gender perspective
and the Division for the Advancement of Women was asked to prepare a background
paper for the treaty bodies, see UN doc. A/52/507, Arts. 62–4.In the report of the 9th
meeting, in 1998, references were made to a possible joint statement by the CEDAW
Committee, the, the Human Rights Committee and the ICESCR Cmmittee regarding
the indivisibility of rights and the centrality of gender awareness as part of the celebra-
tion of the 50th anniversary of the Universal Declaration, see UN doc. A/53/125, 
Art. 35. In the report of the 10th meeting, references were made to the Division for the
Advancement of Women background paper, requested during the 8th meeting, analyzing
what the various treaty bodies had done and should do, was presented. The chairpersons
strongly endorsed the report and emphasised its usefulness for the treaty bodies. In the
report of the 11th meeting, in 1999, references were made to the 1999 Workshop on
Gender Integration into the Human Rights System. The working methods of the treaty
bodies had been a topic of discussion there and all human rights treaty bodies had been
invited to analyze how and where questions about gender could be raised, see UN doc.
A/54/805, Art. 21. In the report from the 14th meeting held in 2002, women’s human
rights or gender issues are not especially mentioned, but the focus of the report is on the
treaty bodies co-operation with other entities within the UN human rights system, see
UN doc. A/57/399. The analysis of how the different treaty bodies have chosen to inte-
grate women’s human rights and/or to mainstream a gender perspective is based on an
analysis of mainly post-1993 general recommendations, concluding comments and
reporting guidelines adopted by the treaty bodies.
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“[t]here has been little progress in the achievement of gender balance in
the membership of the treaty bodies”.242 According to the report, there
are currently two women and 14 men on the CERD Committee, two
women and 16 men on the Human Rights Committee, two women and
16 men on the ICESCR committee, two men and 21 women on the
CEDAW Committee, one woman and nine men on the CAT committee
and seven women and three men on the CRC committee.243 In other
words, women represent 36 % of the treaty body members; 80 % of these
women serve on the committees dealing with women and children, while
only 12 % serves on the other four treaty bodies.244
5.4.2 The Committee on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination
To a great extant the CERD and the CERD Committee have contribu-
ted to the manner in which discrimination is defined within the UN
human rights framework.245 Until recently, however, the CERD and the
work of the CERD Committee have been solely focused on racial dis-
crimination. None of the general comments adopted by the CERD
Committee during the 1970s and 1980s included references to women’s
rights, sex equality or sex discrimination. General Recommendation No.
14 (1993) refers to “... non-discrimination, together with equality be-
fore the law and equal protection of the law without any discrimination”
as “... a basic principle in the protection of human rights”.246 However,
although sex is recognized as one of the basic non-discrimination cate-
242 UN doc. E/CN.4/2003/72, Art. 37.
243 UN doc. E/CN.4/2003/72, Art. 37.
244 UN doc. E/CN.4/2003/72, Art. 37.
245 The mandate of the CERD Committee includes reviewing the reports of Member
States, making suggestions to the concluding comments and general recommendations,
reviewing complaints and reporting to the General Assembly. The Member States obliga-
tions include the submission of biannual reports under CERD. Member States can
choose if they wish recognize the competence of the CERD Committees to review indi-
vidual complaints. CERD Part II. CERD Arts. 11–13 authorizes the CERD Committee
to deal with interstate complaints submitted by any State Party regarding any other State
Party, i.e. as opposed to the interstate complaints procedure provided for under the
ICCPR. The interstate complaints procedure under the CERD applies to all States Parties
following ratifications. CERD Art.14 and the CERD Optional Protocol authorize the
CERD Committee to review individual complaints. See Partsch 1996, pp. 360–3.
246 CERD General Recommendation No. 14, Art. 1. See also Nanda and McKnight
2000.
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gories, the focus on General Recommendation No. 14 is on different
forms of racial discrimination.247
Around the time of the Durban conference, efforts and undertakings
began to emerge to address the item perceived of as the gender-dimen-
sion of racial discrimination. The intersectional and multi-dimensional
discrimination discourses have also had an effect on the work of the
CERD Committee, which has adopted General Recommendation No.
25 (2000) that addresses the gender-dimension of racial discrimination
and that has also begun to address gender in its concluding observa-
tions. In General Recommendation No. 25, the Committee noted that
“... racial discrimination does not always affect women equally and in
the same way”.248
Certain forms of racial discrimination may be directed towards women
specifically because of their gender, such as sexual violence committed
against women members of particular racial or ethnic groups [...] Racial
discrimination may have consequences that affect primarily or only women,
such as pregnancy resulting from racial bias-motivated rape [...] Women
may also be further hindered by a lack of access to remedies and com-
plaints mechanisms for racial discrimination because of gender-related im-
pediments ...249
According to the recommendation, the committee will endeavour to
take gender into account in its work. It demands that the States Parties
submit information about factors affecting women’s enjoyment of the
CERD rights.250 The Committee has also revised its general guidelines
on the form and content of States Parties’ periodic reports demanding
that States Parties include information on the situation of women.251
247 In 1994, the CERD committee adopted General Recommendation No. 18 regard-
ing the establishment of an international tribunal to prosecute crimes against humanity.
In the recommentation it refers to woman-centred human rights violations, such as,
rape. The general recommendation was adopted in the midst of the Yugoslavia crisis, at a
time when news about systematic rapes and rape camps were becoming fairly frequent.
See MacKinnon 1994, Charlesworth and Chinkin 2000, pp. 309–10.
248 CERD General Recommendation No. 25, Art. 1
249 CERD General Recommendation No. 25, Art. 2.
250 CERD General Recommendation No. 25, Arts. 3–6.
251 The Guidelines stress that “[t]he inclusion of information on the situation of women
is important for the Committee to consider whether racial discrimination has an impact
upon women different from that upon men, in conformity with General Recommenda-
tion 25 on gender-related dimensions of racial discrimination (2000). Reporting officers
are asked to describe, as far as possible in quantitative and qualitative terms, factors affect-
ing and difficulties experienced in ensuring for women the equal enjoyment, free from
racial discrimination, of the rights under the Convention”, see UN doc. CERD/C/70/
Rev.5 (2000), Art. 9.
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The CERD Committee approach is an attempt to identify when gender,
or as is mostly a case when being a woman, adds an additional dimen-
sion to racial discrimination and is continued in General Recommenda-
tions Nos. 27 and 29. In General Recommendation No. 27 on discrimi-
nation against Roma people, the Committee included references to the
education of Roma women and girls and to the health of Roma women
and girls.252 In general, Comment No. 29 on descent-based discrimina-
tion, the Committee included a section on the multiple discrimination
suffered by women and recommended states parties take into account
the situation of women members of communities, as victims of multiple
discrimination, sexual exploitation and forced prostitution.253
After the adoption of General Recommendation No. 25 and the
reporting guidelines, the Committee itself has increasingly begun to
address the situation of women and to ask for “gender-segregated” data in
its concluding observations, but its approach is, still, inconclusive. During
the session at which General Recommendation No. 25 was adopted, the
Committee made no attempts in its concluding observations to evaluate
whether and how states parties approached the gender-dimension of
racial discrimination.254 Since the 56th session, the Committee has be-
gun to make more references to the situation of women, for example, by
expressing concern for the lack of information regarding multiple forms
of discrimination and the gender-dimension of racial discrimination and
by recommending that states parties include such information in their
next periodic report.255 The Committee occasionally expresses concern
for the discrimination suffered by women belonging to certain ethnic
communities or indigenous populations. Even more sporadically, the
Committee approaches specific violations with both gender and racial
252 CERD General Recommendation No. 27, Arts. 17, 22, 27 and 34.
253 UN doc. E/CN.4/2003/72, Art. 33.
254 See for example UN doc. CERD/C/304/Add.99 (Lesotho), UN doc. CERD/C/
304/Add.98 (Estonia), UN doc. CERD/C/304/Add. 96 (Tonga), UN doc. CERD/C/
304/Add.95 (Spain), UN doc. CERD/C/304/Add.94 (Malta), UN doc. CERD/C/
304/Add.93 (Denmark), UN doc. CERD/C/304/Add.91 (France). In the concluding
observation on for example Zimbabwe gender discrimination is mentioned, but only
when complimenting Zimbabwe for the adoption of a general non-discrimination clause
that in its list of grounds for non-discrimination includes gender, see UN doc. CERD
C/304/Add.92. According to the Division for the Advancement of Women the CERD-
Committee had before 1998 addressed gender issues or women’s concerns in approxima-
tely 10 % of its concluding observations, see Women 2000 1998, p. 4.
255 See for example UN doc. A/57/18, paras. 269–291 (Armenia), UN doc. A/57/18,
paras. 292–314 (Botswana), UN doc. A/57/18, paras. 344–366 (Estonia), and UN doc.
CERD/C/60/CO/1 (Austria).
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components.256 In some of its concluding observations, the Committee
does refer to the reports of states parties to CEDAW and it tends to com-
pliment states parties that have recently ratified CEDAW or the Optional
Protocol.257 Some concluding observations, still, lack references to the
gender-dimension of racial discrimination or to woman-centred forms
of racial discrimination.258
The overview of the general recommendations and the concluding
observations of the Committee shows that the adoption of General Re-
commendation No. 25 constituted a shift in the Committee’s approach
to women as victims of racial discrimination and in its definition of the
gender-based dimensions of racial discrimination.259 The Committee’s
approach, nevertheless, remains inconclusive. As noted in the report of
the Secretary-General on the integration of the human rights of women
and a gender perspective, “... the Committee continues its efforts to
clarify the relevance of gender discrimination and women’s rights to the
monitoring and of the implementation of CERD”, but “... the Com-
mittee will need to receive additional information and data that would
allow it to address thoroughly and systematically the gender discrimina-
tion and women’s rights relevant to racial discrimination”.260 As of yet,
the Committee has failed to define the gender-based dimensions to racial
discrimination, other than that it includes attentiveness to woman-
specific violations, i.e., the Committee, still, interprets gender as meaning
sex or women and it does not seem to have developed any consistent
mechanism for detecting gender-related dimensions of racial discrimina-
tion.
256 See for example UN doc. A/57/18, paras. 315–343 (Canada).
257 See for example UN doc. A/57/18, paras. 435–450 (Senegal).
258 See for example UN doc. A/57/18, paras. 391–411 (New Zeeland), UN doc.
A/57/18, paras. 451–470 (Yemen), UN doc. A/57/18, paras. 471–476 (Fiji), UN doc.
CERD/C/60/CO/10 (Papua New Guinea), UN doc. CERD/C/60/CO/4 (Croatia),
and UN doc. CERD/60/CO/5 (Denmark).
259 In its overview of the CERD Committee’s work, the Division for the Advancement
of Women noted in 1998 that approximately 10 % of the concluding observations of
the Committee had addressed what the Division for the Advancement of Women calls
gender issues or women’s concerns. Further, it noted that, while the committee does in-
creasingly recognize that “... in some cases gender is an important factor of its work [...]
it does not systematically take account of gender issues”, see Women 2000, 1998, p. 5.
My analysis of the concluding observations of the CERD Committee observations is
based on a sample of about 30 concluding observations adopted by the CERD Committee
during the period from 2000 to 2002. A list of the concluding observations included in
the sample may be obtained from the author. According to Makkonen (2002, p. 43), the
CERD Committee’s acknowledgement of intersectional and multiple discrimination has
remained more a matter of theory than of practice. See also, Otto 2002, pp.36–8.
260 UN doc. E/CN.4/2003/72, Art. 33.
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5.4.3 The Human Rights Committee
While considerable efforts have been made to stress the equal status and
interdependence of all human rights, the ICCPR, still, remains one of
the more important of the UN human rights treaties. During the 1990s,
the Human Rights Committee has also come to integrate quite actively
the human rights of women. The general comments of the Committee,
adopted during the 1980s, failed to include any extensive references to
non-discrimination or equality between the sexes.261 General Comment
No. 18 (1989) is an exception because it is through this comment that
the Committee adopts the definitions of non-discrimination included in
CERD and CEDAW Arts. 1.262 During the 1990s, there is, as aforemen-
tioned, an increase in awareness regarding non-discrimination and equa-
lity between the sexes.263 The Committee’s guidelines for reporting,
amended in 1995, request that States Parties include information on fac-
tors affecting the equal enjoyment of rights by women under each
ICCPR article.264 However, it is through the adoption of General Com-
ment No. 28 on the equality of rights between men and women that the
Committee’s focus shifted towards a more extensive awareness regarding
non-discrimination and equality between the sexes. General Comment
No. 28 begins with a short presentation of the ICCPR’s non-discrimina-
tion and equal rights provisions.265 Art. 5 in the comment includes a state-
ment regarding women’s human rights, according to which, “[i]nequality
in the enjoyment of rights by women throughout the world is deeply em-
261 General Recommendation No. 4 (1981) dealt with the interpretation of ICCPR Art.
3. It is the first general recommendation that deals with issues regarding equality between
women and men. The adoption of General Recommendation No. 4 coincides with the
entry into force of CEDAW and the Second World Conference on Women held in
Copenhagen.
262 The term, discrimination, is defined in General Recommendation No. 18, Art. 7
with reference to the definitions included in CERD and CEDAW.
263 General Comment No. 19 (1990) dealing with protection of the family does discuss,
for example, the definition of family and sex discrimination in relationship to marriage.
And a number of general comments address general non-discrimination issues. See, for
example, General Recommendations Nos. 21 (1992), 22 (1993), 25 (1996) and 27
(1999). General Recommendation No. 4 is supplanted by General Comment No. 28.
While the 1981 recommendation had used non-discrimination language, the later re-
commendation uses strong women’s human rights language.
264 UN doc. A/50/505, paras. 34–5 and Women 2000 1998, p. 7. In a later revision,
such an emphasis is excluded, see UN doc. CCPR/C/66/GUI/Rev.2 (2001).
265 See General Comment No. 28 (2000), Arts. 1–4. References to multiple discrimina-
tion are made in Art. 30 because the Committee noted that “[d]iscrimination against
women is often intertwined with discrimination on other grounds such as race, colour,
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth of
other status”. For further discussion, see Frostell 1999.
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bedded in tradition, history and culture, including religious attitudes.
The subordinate role of women in some countries is illustrated by a high
incidence of prenatal sex selection and abortion of female foetuses.266
In order to fulfil their obligations under the ICCPR’s Art. 3, States
Parties should take account of factors impeding the enjoyment of the
ICCPR’s substantial rights by both men and women equally.267 The core
of General Comment No. 28 consists of an overview of each of the sub-
stantial articles of the ICCPR and references to what information regard-
ing these rights should be included in the periodic reports. The general
comment does not aim at being exhaustive, but rather aims at providing
examples of what kind of information should be included.
With regard to the ICCPR’s Art. 4 on public emergency and deroga-
tions from the ICCPR during public emergency, the Committee noted,
for example, that “... women are particularly vulnerable in times of in-
ternal or international armed conflict”.268 Member States are requested
to inform the Committee about all measures taken to “... protect wo-
men from rape, abduction and other forms of gender-based violence”.269
With regard to the ICCPR’s Art. 5 on the right to life, the Committee
requests information, especially regarding pregnancy and childbirth and
on practices that threaten a woman’s right to life. With regard to the
ICCPR’s Art. 7 on torture, the Committee requests information about
domestic violence, access to safe abortions in cases of rape-related preg-
nancies, forced abortions, forced sterilization and female genital mutila-
tion. With regard to the ICCPR’s Art. 8 on slavery and slavery-like
practices, the Committee requests information on measures taken to
eliminate trafficking in women and forced prostitution. 270
Only two general comments have been adopted subsequent to the
adoption of General Comment No. 28 and neither of these items refers
extensively to women’s human rights or equality between the sexes.271
266 General Comment No. 28, Art. 5. According to Art. 5, The State Party’s obligations
include ensuring that “... that traditional, historical, religious or cultural attitudes are
not used to justify violations of women’s rights to equality before the law and the equal
enjoyment of all the Covenant rights”.
267 General Comment No. 28, Art. 6. For a substantive analysis of General Comment
No. 28, Frostell 1999 and Otto 2002.
268 General Comment No. 28, Art. 8.
269 General Comment No. 28, Art. 8.
270 General Recommendation No. 28, Art. 11. General Comment No. 28 (2000), Art.
12. In conjunction with the ICCPR’s Art. 7, but also affecting other articles, the Com-
mittee demands information on regulations regarding women’s clothing. See General
Comment No. 28 (2000), Art. 13.
271 General Comment No. 29 (2001) on the ICCPR’s Art. 4 concerning derogation
from treaty obligations due to a state of emergency, does restate, however, the general
266
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Since 1992, however, the Committee’s concluding observations have
tended to include some references to women’s human rights or gender
equality. The substance of these references differs considerably. In some
concluding observations, the Committee mainly compliments states for
having included the term, gender, as a non-discrimination ground in their
Constitutions, for having established women’s rights-related public in-
stitutions or for having ratified CEDAW and its Optional Protocol.272
In some concluding observations, the Committee expresses concerns re-
garding discrimination against women or inequality between the sexes,
using very general language.273 In some concluding observations, the
Committee has omitted all references to discrimination against women
and inequality between the sexes.274 The Committee, however, has be-
come increasingly attentive to issues regarding women’s human rights,
especially regarding different forms of violence against women.275 Hence,
an increasing number of reports towards the end of the 1990s and until
the year 2002 shows concern for specific forms of inequalities between
the sexes and human rights violations suffered by women and demands
information about such matters.
While the Committee has been very slow in including references to
women’s human rights in its general comments, it has been fairly attent-
ive to non-discrimination and equality between the sexes in its conclud-
ing observations. The Committee, however, has avoided jumping on the
gender train and has largely kept to a language either of women’s human
principle of non-discrimination in the ICCPR’s Art. 4(1), noting that “... there are ele-
ments or dimensions of the right to non-discrimination that cannot be derogated from
in any circumstances”, see General Recommendation No. 29 (2001), Art. 8.
272 See, for example, UN doc. CCPR/CO/72/PRK (Democratic Peoples’ Republic),
UN doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.104 (Chile), UN doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.3 (Belgium), UN
doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.48 (Paraguay) and UN doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.86 (Belarus).
273 See, for example, UN doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.103 (Austria), UN doc. CCPR/C/
79/Add.34 (El Salvador), UN doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.39 (Cyprus), UN doc.CCPR/C/
79/Add.52 (Ukraine), UN doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.62 (Zambia) and UN doc.CCPR/C/
79/Add.87 (Lithuania).
274 See, for example, UN doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.10 (Senegal), UN doc. CCPR/C/79/
Add.122 (Republic of Korea), UN doc. CCPR/ C/79/Add.9 (Burundi) and UN doc.
CCPR/C/79/Add.67 (Peru).
275 See, for example, UN doc. CCPR/CO/75/VNM (Vietnam), UN doc. CCPR/CO/
75/YEM (Yemen), UN doc. CCPR/CO/74/SWE (Sweden), UN doc. CCPR/CO/69/
KWT (Kuwait), UN doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.25 (Iran), UN doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.104
(Chile), UN doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.30 (Romania) and UN doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.43
(Tunisia).
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rights or of non-discrimination and equality.276 There is no evident reason
for this choice, possibly, the Committee, as it deals with civil rights and
political rights, is more open to and accepting of a women’s human
rights-based argumentation than a policy-oriented and gender-based
argumentation.277
5.4.4 The Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights
While enjoying equal civil and political rights is a prerequisite for equal-
ity between the sexes, women’s enjoyment of economic, social and cultur-
al rights remains amongst the core constraints to equality. The ICESCR
Committee has however been rather attentive to equality and women’s
rights arguments. In a general sense or with specific reference to women
and men, most of the general comments adopted by the ICESCR Com-
mittee deal with issues regarding non-discrimination and equality.278 As
opposed to the CERD Committee and the Human Rights Committee,
the ICESCR Committee, however, has not adopted a general comment
that addresses women’s human rights or gender issues specifically.279
General Comment No. 4 (1991) on the right to housing reinterprets
the male-biased language of the ICESCR’s Art. 11 (1). According to the
Committee, the Covenant statement that everyone has a right to an ad-
equate standard of living for himself and his family should not be inter-
preted as implying any limitations on the rights of any individuals or fe-
male-headed households.280 Similar readjustments of meaning and the
inclusion of specific groups of women are carried out, for example, in
276 Note, however, the emphasis of the Secretary-General reports that the Committee
has continued to “... make progress in including gender-related and women’s rights issues
in its work”, see UN doc. E/CN.4/2003/72, Art. 34.
277 It can also be noted that the Human Rights Committee had two woman delegates
with an interest in women’s human rights at the time of the adoption of General Com-
ment No. 28.
278 The exception is General Comment No. 9 (1998) on the role of national human
rights institutions.
279 Noting, however, that many of the general comments address non-discrimination
and equality without specific reference to sex or women. See, for example, General Com-
ment Nos. 1 (1989), 2 (1990), 3 (1990) and 9 (1998). Some of the general recommen-
dations address non-discrimination and equality in the terms of different identities and
in terms of vulnerable groups, but without any specific mention of sex or women. See,
for example, General Comments Nos. 7 (1997) and 8 (1997). For a discussion, see Otto
2002.
280 The ICESCR Committee’s General Comment No. 4 (1991), Art. 6.
268
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General Comment No. 5 (1994) on peoples with disabilities where
women with disabilities are mentioned explicitly and General Comment
No. 6 on economic, social and cultural rights of older persons where
older women are mentioned explicitly. The General Comments Nos. 11
(1999) on plans of action for primary education and 12 (1999) on ad-
equate food both further the use by the Committee of an inclusive lan-
guage and both address gender discrimination, for example, in education
and female-headed households. The recently adopted General Com-
ment No. 15 (2002) on the right to water, however, is the best example
of how the Committee’s efforts to promote non-discrimination, equality
and all-inclusiveness in the interpretation of the Covenant’s rights. The
comment includes equality and non-discrimination when developing
the normative content of the right to water. In accordance with the
comment:
[t]he obligation of States parties to guarantee that the right to water is en-
joyed without discrimination (Art. 2, para. 2), and equally between women
and men (Art. 3), pervades all the Covenant obligations. The Covenant thus
proscribes any discrimination on the grounds of race, colour, sex, age, lan-
guage, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property,
birth, physical or mental disability, health status (including HIV/AIDS),
sexual orientation and civil, political, social or other status, which has the
intention of nullifying or impairing the equal enjoyment or exercise of the
right to water.281
The Committee goes further by noting that the state should take steps to
remove de facto discrimination based on one or more of the prohibited
grounds, but also to prevent non-overt discrimination.282 The States
Parties should also “... give special attention to those individuals and
groups who have traditionally faced difficulties in exercising this right, in-
cluding women, children, minority groups, indigenous peoples, refugees,
asylum seekers, internally displaced persons, migrant workers, prisoners
and detainees”.283 The Committee continues to demand that States Parties
take specific steps regarding a number of the aforementioned groups, for
example, women should not be “... excluded from decision-making pro-
cesses concerning water resources and entitlements. The disproportionate
burden women bear in the collection of water should be alleviated”.284
281 The ICESCR Committee’s General Comment No. 15 (2002), Art. 13.
282 The reference to non-overt discrimination regarding the right to water is partly in-
cluded to avoid investments that favour expensive water supplies. ICESCR Committee
General Comment No. 15 (2002), Arts. 14–5.
283 ICESCR Committee General Comment No. 15 (2002), Art. 16.
284 The ICESCR Committee’s General Comment No. 15 (2002), Art. 16 (a). Other
groups that are specifically addressed include children, inhabitants of deprived rural and
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Hence, the comment has developed the Covenant list of non-discrimin-
ation grounds – expanding the list to include new grounds of discrimin-
ation and molding the language into the form used in the definitions of
discrimination embraced by, preferred by CERD and CEDAW. The
Committee has also added a number of groups that might not be discrim-
inated against, but who, nonetheless, tend to be structurally disadvantaged
in society – States parties are urged to pay special attention to such persons
and entities.
The Reporting Guidelines adopted by the Committee deal with each
substantial article of the Covenant and the Committee demands that
States parties report on the situation of women under most of the art-
icles.285 For example, States parties are asked under ICESCR Art. 6 to
submit information about discrimination in law, administrative policies
and in practical relationships between persons. Under ICESCR Art. 7,
States parties are asked about the principle of equal pay for work of equal
value, as well as on just and favourable conditions of work. With respect
to the right to food, states parties are asked for information regarding the
situation of especially vulnerable or disadvantaged groups, such as, land-
less peasants, rural workers, the rural unemployed, the urban poor, mi-
grant workers, indigenous peoples, children, the elderly and other espe-
cially affected groups. It is further stated that attention should be given
to “[a]ny significant differences in the situation of men and women within
each of the above group”.286
Since 1992, the Committee’s concluding observations have also shown
an increased awareness regarding non-discrimination and equality be-
tween the sexes. In almost all of its concluding observations, the ICESCR
Committee makes some references to the situation of women.287 The re-
ferences made during most of the 1990s, however, are less developed
than the references made during the last few years. In the 1990s, the
ICESCR Committee, still, occasionally omitted addressing non-discrim-
ination and equality between the sexes.288 In some concluding observa-
tions, only scarce references are made to positive aspects such as the
adoption of equal treatment legislation or to concerns, such as, the lack
urban areas, indigenous peoples, nomadic and traveller communities, refugees, asylum-
seekers, prisoners, detainees, older people, persons with disabilities, et cetera.
285 UN doc. HRI/GEN/2/Rev.1. While ICESCR Art. 2(2) is explained in the guide-
lines, nothing specific is mentioned about Art. 3.
286 ICESCR Reporting Guidelines, Art. 43
287 ICESCR Reporting Guidelines, Art. 43
288 See for example UN doc. E/C.12/1995/22, paras. 206–10 (Dominican Republic),
UN doc. E/C.12/1992/22, paras. 211–15 (Panama), UN doc. E/C.12/1993/16 (Mexico),
UN doc. E/C.12/1994/4 (Romania) and UN doc. E/C.12/1994/9 (Gambia).
270
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of any information regarding non-discrimination and equality between
the sexes.289 In the recent years, the concluding observation of the
ICESCR Committee, however, have largely followed the example from
its more recent general comment and its reporting guidelines. In each
concluding observation, the ICESCR Committee refers frequently to
the situation of women as well as to the situation of other discriminated
against or vulnerable groups in the specific society. The comments inclu-
de both complimenting the actions taken by and lamenting the inaction
of States Parties. The issues that have tended to draw the attention of the
ICESCR Committee include domestic violence, trafficking in women
and different forms of sexual violence, sexual harassment and inequalities
at the work place, including inequalities in employment and social wel-
fare regimes.290
The ICESCR Committee has come to develop the content of the sub-
stantial rights of the ICESCR both through its general comments and
reporting guidelines. Although the Committee has not to any significant
extent, analyzed or tried to develop the ICESCR articles regarding 
non-discrimination and equality between the sexes, it, nonetheless, has
promoted a far-reaching and inclusive interpretation of both non-discri-
mination and equality between the sexes as part of its other general
comments and as part of its reporting guidelines. The committee, how-
ever, has neither chosen to integrate women’s human rights nor to integ-
rate a gender perspective. The Committee, to a certain extent, uses a lan-
guage of women’s human rights and a language of gender, but it does so
randomly and without any detectable coherence. The Committee seems
to have been inspired by the Vienna Conference and its emphasis on
paying special attention to different groups that have traditionally been
discriminated against or which are marginalized or vulnerable for differ-
ent reasons. The Committee does address women, often specific groups
of women as discriminated against, marginalized or vulnerable. The
Committee also seems to have been especially inspired by the campaign
against violence against women because some of the issues that it fre-
quently prioritizes when commenting on the reports of State Parties are
domestic violence, sexual harassment, trafficking in women and dif-
ferent forms of sexual violence.
289 See for example UN doc. E/C.12/1993/7 (Iran), UN doc. E/C.12/1994/16 (Austria),
UN doc. E/C.12/1995/17 (Algeria) and UN doc. E/C.12/1/Add.13 (Russian Federation).
290 See for example UN doc. E/C.12/1/Add.70 (Sweden), UN doc. E/C.12/1/Add.71
(Algeria), UN doc. E/C.12/1/Add.72 (France), UN doc. E/C.12/1/Add.74 (Colombia),
UN doc. E/C.12/1/Add.8 (Finland), E/C.12/1/Add.77 (Ireland), UN doc. E/C.12/
1/Add.83 (Georgia), UN doc. E/C.12/1/Add.82 (Poland) and UN doc. E/C.12/1/
Add.81 (Slovakia).
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5.4.5 The Committee against Torture
The CAT Committee is the treaty body which has exerted the most
meager effort towards advancing any type of integration of women’s hu-
man rights or a gender perspective. The Committee, for example, has
eschewed making any references to women’s human rights or a gender
perspective in its general comments or reporting guidelines. Moreover,
the Committee makes only scant reference to women’s human rights
issues in any of its concluding observations.291
In the concluding observations on Slovakia, the Committee compli-
mented Slovakia on their adherence to CEDAW and to other international
human rights treaties.292 In the concluding observations on Zambia, the
Committee recommended that Zambia establish programmes to prevent
and combat violence against women, including domestic violence.293 In
the concluding comments on the Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia and
Uzbekistan, the Committee recommended that requested data, disaggreg-
ated by age, “gender”, ethnicity, geography, et cetera, be submitted to the
Committee.294 However, in the majority of the concluding observations,
no reference was made to non-discrimination or equality between the
sexes.295
Neither the strategy for the integration of women’s human rights nor
the strategy for the integration of a gender perspective seems to have been
adopted by the CAT committee. It has only been during the last few years
that the CAT Committee has begun to demand gender-disaggregated
data and to refer occasionally to sexual violence and sexualized forms of
torture.296 These references, however, do not indicate that the CAT
Committee has engaged in any substantial discussions about how to in-
tegrate women’s human rights or a gender perspective or that the CAT
Committee has made any decision to address these issues in a systematic
291 General Comment No. 1 (1997) and UN doc. HRI/GEN/2/Rev.1.
292 UN doc. A/56/44, paras. 99–105.
293 UN doc. A/57/44, para. 66 h.
294 UN doc. A/57/44, para. 96 a, 101 l and 116 m.
295 See for example UN doc. CAT/C/CR/28/2 (Luxembourg), UN doc. CAT/C/
CR/28/7 (Uzbekistan), UN doc. CAT/C/CR/28/3 (Norway), UN doc. A/56/44, paras.
67–76 (Guatemala), UN doc. A/56/44, paras. 33–39 (Armenia), UN doc. A/55/44,
paras. 56–63 (Peru), A/54/44, paras. 35–52 (Yugoslavia), UN doc. A/53/44, paras.
179–195 (Germany), UN doc. A/49/44, 105–115 (Morocco) and UN doc. A/48/44,
paras. 133–160 (New Zeeland).
296 Note however that the Secretary-General’s reports suggests that the CAT Committee
reflect issues regarding violence against women in its dialogue with states parties and in
its concluding observations, see UN doc. E/CN.4/2002/81, p. 10.
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manner. Andrew Byrnes argues that CAT is construed based on a priva-
te/public distinction “... which excludes from consideration many of the
violations suffered by women at the hands of private individuals”.297
Byrnes notes, however, that the exclusion of the private sphere from
within the scope of the Convention does not disable the CAT Commit-
tee from acknowledging that women suffer from different threats in an
interrogation situation, as detainees and prisoners nor does it disable the
Committee from seeking information regarding woman-centred forms
of torture.298 Just as some of the other treaty bodies have done, the CAT
Committee can also adopt a more progressive approach when interpreting
the provisions of the treaty, allowing for the inclusion of woman-centred
forms of torture.299
5.4.6 The Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination against Women
According to Maria Bustelo, the CEDAW Committee has been seen “...
both by commentators and by its own members as the poor relation of
the treaty bodies, left outside the mainstream of human rights work within
the United Nations and neglected by the international human rights
community”.300 When addressing the Vienna strategy, I called attention
to the fact that the integrative measures of the Vienna strategy included
both substantial and institutional integration.301 Ending the marginaliza-
tion of the CEDAW Committee, both by vouchsafing more status to
CEDAW, for example, through the adoption of the CEDAW Optional
Protocol and through bringing CEDAW and the CEDAW Committee
closer to the rest of the UN human rights family, is part of the measures
for institutional integration. During the 1990s, the CEDAW Committee
has also become increasingly proactive in its approach to the CEDAW
and in its interpretations of women’s human rights. Through the adop-
tion of the Optional Protocol, the CEDAW has been strengthened and
joint activities with the other treaty bodies have brought CEDAW into
the UN human rights family.
297 Byrnes 1996, p. 519.
298 Byrnes 1996, p. 519–20.
299 Byrnes 1996, p. 519.
300 Bustelo 2000, pp. 81–4. See also Bayefsky 2001, p. 127–8 and Cartwright 2000.
301 See Chapter 3.4.2.
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The early general recommendations regard technical matters or are
reaffirmations of substantial articles in CEDAW.302 Around the time of
the tenth anniversary of the CEDAW, the general recommendations
became slightly more substantial and the CEDAW Committee began 
to request information that fell outside a narrowly defined scope of
CEDAW.303 The General Recommendations, however, remain fairly
short in length until the adoption of General Recommendation No. 19
on violence against women in conjunction with the preparations for the
Vienna Conference.304 In the recommendation, the Committee allows
itself an extended interpretative space and allows itself to reinterpret, 
for example, the CEDAW definition of discrimination so as to include
gender-based violence. Gender-based violence is defined as:
... violence that is directed against a woman because she is a woman or that
affects women disproportionately. It includes acts that inflict physical,
mental or sexual harm or suffering, threats or such acts, coercion and other
deprivations of liberty. Gender-based violence breach specific provisions of
the Convention, regardless of whether those provisions expressly mention
violence.305
The gender-based violence that falls within the purview of CEDAW is not
limited to the violence committed by governments and public authorities.
The recommendation includes violence committed by private actors as
well.306 Because violence against women was not included as a violation
302 See for example general recommendation No. 1 (1986) and No. 2 (1987) on report-
ing, No. 3 (1987) on education and public information, No. 4 (1987) on reservations,
No. 5 (1988) on temporary measures, No. 6 (1988) on national machineries, No. 7
(1988) on resources and No. 8 (1988) on government representation.
303 See for example general recommendation No. 12 (1989) on violence against women
and No. 13 (1989) on equal remuneration for work of equal value.
304 The CEDAW Committee began addressing violence against women in its General
Recommendation No. 12 (1989), according to states parties were required to protect
women against violence of any kind “occurring within the family, at the work place or in
any other area of social life”. Further, states parties were asked to include information in
their periodic reports about legislation and other measures to protect women against all
kinds of violence in every day life and to support women victims of such violence. See,
also, CEDAW General Recommendations No. 14 (1990) on female circumcision, No. 15
(1990) on women and aids, No. 16 (1991) on unpaid women in rural and urban family
enterprises, No. 17 (1991) on the measurement of women’s unpaid work for recognition
in the gross national product and No. 18 (1991) on disabled women.
305 CEDAW General Recommendation No. 19 (1992), Art. 6.
306 CEDAW General Recommendation No. 19 (1992), Art. 9. See also CEDAW Arts.
2 (e–f ) and 5. The recommendation describes what forms of gender-based violence is
addressed under what articles of CEDAW, see General Recommendation No. 19 (1992),
Arts. 10–23.
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against women’s human rights when the CEDAW was drafted, it has
been necessary to fit it within the old language of discrimination. While
the contemporary international human rights framework has opened
itself up to broad interpretations of equality and discrimination, new
issues do not necessarily fit into common assumptions about discrimina-
tion.
The CEDAW Committee’s approach to gender-based violence also
offers evidence of the persistent predilection of viewing gender as another
word for sex or women.307 When analyzing the annual reports of the
Special Rapporteur on violence against women, I noted that, although she
did not use a language of gender, she promoted a relational approach,
i.e., she viewed violence against women as not only an issue concerning
women’s gender construct, but also as a men’s gender construct. The
CEDAW Committee is less progressive and defines gender-based violence
as violence directed towards a woman by virtue of her being a woman.
Gender-based violence could just as well be violence directed towards a
man by virtue of his being a man. Such violence, classified in this way,
however, would fall outside of the scope of what the CEDAW Committee
should address, because the CEDAW is a women’s human rights conven-
tion. A gender approach to violence against women include an analysis
of why men behave violently and what different societies can do to limit
men’s violence against women.
General Recommendation No. 24 (1999) on CEDAW Art. 12, the
right to health, is not as radical in moving new issues onto the Commit-
tee’s agenda or in reinterpreting CEDAW, but it does continue the trend
of differentiating among women. In accordance with General Recom-
mendation No. 24 (1999), biological differences between women and
men may lead to differences in health status, but there are also societal
factors that are determinative of the health status of women and men,
which can lead to variations of health status amongst women.308
For that reason, special attention should be given to the health needs and
rights of women belonging to vulnerable and disadvantaged groups, such
as migrant women, refugee and internally displaced women, the girl child
and older women, women in prostitution, indigenous women and women
with physical and mental disabilities.309
307 For further discussions see Chapter 6.3.
308 CEDAW General Recommendation No. 24 (1999), Art. 6.
309 CEDAW General Recommendation No. 24 (1999), Art. 6.
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Regarding the strategies for the integration of a gender perspective and
for the integration of women’s human rights, General Recommendation
No. 24 contains an interesting passage.310 In its final recommendations,
it demands that States Parties should:
[p]lace a gender perspective at the centre of all policies and programmes af-
fecting women’s health and should involve women in the planning, imple-
mentation and monitoring of such policies and programmes ... [and] require
all health services to be consistent with the human rights of women, includ-
ing the rights to autonomy, privacy, confidentiality, informed consent and
choice.311
That is, the CEDAW Committee seems to move ever closer towards
promoting gender perspectives as an addition to its woman’s human
rights perspective. There is very little indication, however, that the CE-
DAW Committee uses a gender perspective with anything other than a
very strong woman-focus.
The reporting guidelines adopted by the Committee mainly contain
information regarding how the reports should be drafted, but omit any
information regarding how the different substantial articles of the treaty
should be interpreted.312 The Committee, however, does refer to the Be-
ijing Platform Art. 323, according to which, State parties to the CE-
DAW are asked to include information in their reports on how the Beij-
ing Platform is implemented under CEDAW.313 While it is left up to
the State parties to interpret what kind of information regarding the 12
critical areas of concern should be included in the reports, the reference
opens the door to the inclusion of new areas.
The CEDAW Committee’s concluding observations remained fairly
terse until the mid-1990s and the Committee, still, tends to keep the
discussion close to the substantial articles in the CEDAW. However, when
analyzing the concluding observations of the Committee, it should be
kept in mind that CEDAW is the most ratified UN human rights treaty,
but also, the one to which the largest number of reservations have been
made. While, in some member states, CEDAW has been incorporated
into national legislation and while the treaty has been used in national
310 CEDAW General Recommendations No. 21 (1994) on equality in marriage and
family relations and No. 23 (1997) on women in public and political life continue the
lengthier and more substantial form and content used in General Recommendation No.
19 and No. 24, but without reinterpreting any basic notions in CEDAW.
311 CEDAW General Recommendation No. 24 (1999), Art. 31.
312 UN doc. CEDAW/C/7/Rev.3.
313 UN doc. CEDAW/C/7/Rev.3, Art. 8.
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non-discrimination cases, many member states seem to believe that they
are complying with CEDAW, all the while failing to amend dis-
criminatory laws directly and all the while depriving women of political
rights and basic needs. In reality, noncomplience is common and un-
detected as such. As noted above, many of the concluding observations
are focused on recommending that State parties amend discriminatory
national legislation directly and indirectly. The observations are also
focused on asking State Parties to ensure women equal opportunities 
in education and employment as men.314 However, while, in its general
recommendations, the CEDAW Committee has been restrictive in break-
ing up the notion of a unified category of women, in its concluding ob-
servations, the Committee does refer to, express concern for and demand
information about marginalized groups of women within the State Party.
In the concluding observations on the Netherlands, the CEDAW Com-
mittee, for example, “... expresses concern at the continuing discrimina-
tion against immigrant, refugee and minority women who suffer from
multiple discrimination”.315 Nevertheless, it seems as if new concepts
and approaches are introduced to the Committee less by its independent
experts than via State Party reports. While the CEDAW Committee
itself has not interpreted gender as meaning anything but women’s gen-
der, it does applaud Norway’s attempts to redirect “... attention to the
necessary changes in men’s roles and tasks as an important element in
achieving true gender equality”.316 In its more recent concluding observa-
tions, such as the concluding observations on Trinidad and Tobago, the
CEDAW Committee, while still, mainly focusing on the implementa-
tion of CEDAW, has begun to encourage gender mainstreaming as a
strategy for equality between the sexes.317 However, in the concluding
comments in which the CEDAW Committee can compliment a State
party for having adopted a gender mainstreaming strategy, the Commit-
314 See for example UN doc. A/55/38, paras. 30–66 (Cameroon), UN doc. A/54/38,
paras. 117–160 (Nepal), UN doc. A/53/38, Rev. 1, paras. 175–205 (Panama), A/53/38,
paras. 262–311 (Indonesia). In each of the reviewed concluding observations with the
exception of Rwanda and Iraq the CEDAW Committee refers to inequalities in educa-
tion and employment.
315 UN doc. A/56/38, para. 205. Similar references and references to efforts to combat
racism and xenophobia is made in the concluding observations on Sweden and Finland,
see UN doc. A/56/38, paras. 319–360 and UN doc. A/56/38, paras. 279–311. These
concluding observations are adopted in 2001, i.e. around the time of the Durban confe-
rence. The needs of refugee and immigrant women is also mentioned in the concluding
observations on Greece, see UN doc. A/54/38, paras. 172–212 (Greece).
316 UN doc. A/50/38, para. 486.
317 UN doc. A/57/38 (Part I), at para. 144.
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tee also tends to express its concern for the State Party’s unwillingness to
incorporate CEDAW in its national legislation.318
The CEDAW Committee has adopted only a few general recommen-
dations that as interpretative statements are comparable to those recom-
mendations adopted by the Human Rights Committee or the ICESCR
Committee. General Recommendation No.19 on violence against women
remains the only daring re-interpretation of CEDAW. The CEDAW
Committee has only very carefully trodden into new areas. While, for
example, the CEDAW Committee occasionally uses a language of gender,
such language is mainly used to demand State parties include gender-dis-
aggregated data, to repeal gender roles or stereotypes or on occasions when
the Committee is complimenting States for their gender mainstreaming
efforts.
5.4.7 The Committee on the Rights of the Child
As opposed the earlier human rights treaties, the CRC includes through-
out references to both boy and girl children. It is noteworthy however
that while continuously making references to both sexes is a step towards
giving equal attention to both sexes, such references do not automatically
lead to what could be called gender-sensitivity. Sex-specificity and not the
least sex-segregated statistics and other equivalent information is a neces-
sary step in gender analysis, but sex-specificity does not equal gender-
sensitivity.319 Gender sensitivity demands careful analysis of the societal
consequences of us being women and men.
The CRC Committee adopts both General Comments and General
Recommendations.320 The Committee has since 2001 adopted five ge-
neral comments. General Comment No. 1 on the aims of education
(CRC Art. 29) was adopted in 2001. In the comment, when addressing
the relationship between the general non-discrimination principle in
CRC Art. 2 and CRC Art. 29, it is noted that:
... gender discrimination can be reinforced by practices such as a curriculum
which is inconsistent with the principles of gender equality, by arrange-
318 The CEDAW Committee compliments for example Icelands efforts to incorporate
gender mainstreaming in its policy framework while noting that CEDAW has not been
incorporated, see UN doc. A/57/38 (Part I), paras 215–255, see also UN doc. A/57/38
(Part I), paras. 256–303 (Sri Lanka).
319 See Chapter 4.5.2.
320 For a distinction between the CRC Committee general comments and recommenda-
tions, see the CRC provisional rules of procedure, Arts. 72–73. The general comments
serve as interpretive comments regarding the CRC.
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ments which limit the benefits girls can obtain from the educational op-
portunities offered, and by unsafe or unfriendly environments which dis-
courage’ girls participation.321
General Comment No. 2 on the role of national human rights institu-
tions in the promotion and protection of the rights of the child (2002)
uses a less sex- and gender-sensitive language than the CRC and the Gen-
eral Comment No. 1 do. It uses the sex-neutral term child or children
instead of referring to him and her or an equivalent; it touches upon the
issue of discrimination only in passing.322 General Comment No. 3 on
HIV/AIDS and the child (2003) notes that gender based discrimination
combined with “... taboos or negative or judgmental attitudes to the
sexual activity of girls, often limiting their access to preventive measures
and other services” is of particular concern.323 States are requested to
take gender norms into account when designing HIV/AIDS policies. In
2003 the CRC Committee has adopted two General Comments, No. 4
on adolescent health and No. 5 on measures for implementation of the
CRC. The General Comment on adolescent continues the tradition of
the other general comments to use a less sex-specific language than the
Convention. While the General Comment addresses issues such as for
example adolescent sexuality, it does not distinguish between boys’ and
girls’ experiences, except when dealing with what is often perceived wo-
man-centred phenomena (early marriages, harmful tradititional pract-
ices et cetera.).324 General Comment No. 5 includes no woman- or gen-
der-related references.
The CRC Committee has adopted six general recommendations since
1998 dealing with children and armed conflict, administration of juven-
ile justice, exceptional submission of combined State reports, content
and size of state reports, submission of periodic reports and committee
work in two chambers. The recommendations are as noted largely of an
administrative character and deal, and none of them make any sex-spoe-
cific or gender-related references.
Both the ICESCR Committee and the CRC Committee hold general
days of discussion during each session.325 It is noteworthy that during
321 General Comment No. 1 (2001), Art. 10. Art. 11 addresses the non-discrimination
based on colour, race, ethnicity or national origin. See also Art. 19.
322 See General Comment No. 2 (2002), Arts. 12 and 15.
323 General Comment No. 3, para. 8. The paragraph also highlights discrimination based
on sexual orientation.
324 See for example General Comment No. 4, Arts. 20, 24 and 26.
325 See CRC Committee reports of general days of discussion, document compiled by the
UN High Commissioner on Human Rights and CRC Committee Rules of Procedure
Art. 75.
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the day of discussion on children in armed conflict, references were
made to both girls and boys and to the different violations suffered by
girls and boys during armed conflict. That is, the day of discussion in
1992 evoked issues that are not in any way represented in the Optional
Protocol on children in armed conflict.326 The CRC Committee held a
day of discussion regarding the girl-child in 1995.327 The day was sup-
posed to serve as a preparation to the CRC Committee’s contribution to
the Beijing Conference. Much of the discussion seemed to have circled
around issues regarding violations of women’s and girl-children’s human
rights and the importance of the CRC Committee in promoting the
rights, especially of girl-children. However, the conclusions include an
interesting reference to how gender issues should be approached:
[a]ddressing the question of inequality and discrimination on the basis of
gender did not imply that they [the issues] had to be seen in complete isola-
tion, as if girls were a special group entitled to special rights. In fact, girls
are simply human beings who should be seen as individuals and not as just
daughters, sisters, wives or mothers, and who should fully enjoy the funda-
mental rights inherent to their human dignity.328
The CRC reporting guidelines supply in-depth information about what
the CRC Committee wishes that State parties would report on with
respect to the CRC substantial articles.329 The CRC Committee demands
information differentiated by sex as well as information on differentiation
between girls and boys with respect to most of the substantive articles.
In most of its concluding observations, the CRC Committee refers to
non-discrimination and equality based on sex, and uses a language of
gender. The concerns expressed and the recommendations made by the
CRC Committee regarding sex- or gender-based issues are seldom,
however, extensive, but tend, rather, to amount to one or a few referen-
ces per concluding observation in a manner similar to the references in
the concluding observations by the Human Rights Committee or by the
ICESCR Committee. The most common references regard the discrimi-
nation between girls and boys with regard to marriage age, education,
access to basic resources, harmful traditional practices and sexual as well
as other forms of violence. The CRC Committee tends to focus on one
or a few similar issues in each concluding observation, pointing to the
326 See CRC Committee reports of general days of discussion, pp. 3–9.
327 See CRC Committee reports of general days of discussion, pp. 36–42, see also UN doc.
CRC/C/38.
328 See CRC Committee reports of general days of discussion, Art. 283.
329 UN doc. HRI/GEN/2/Rev.1, pp. 47–100.
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lack of information regarding a specific violation and recommending that
State Parties investigate the issue and take steps to eradicate the viola-
tions. For example, in the concluding observations on the Sudan, the
CRC Committee noted that traditional patterns of discrimination limit
opportunities available for girls and women. It was recommended that
the Sudan “[c]onduct a study to assess the scope and causes of discrimi-
nation between boys and girls and take steps to address such discrimi-
nation, giving particular attention to the impact of traditional and cultural
practices upon girls and women with a view to adopting a proactive and
comprehensive strategy for the elimination of discrimination against
them”.330 In the concluding observations on Spain, the CRC Committee
expressed concern regarding reports about the practice of female genital
mutilation in Spain on girls of Sub-Saharan origin. It recommended that
Spain investigate the issue and take steps to eradicate the practice.331 A
specific feature of the recommendations of the CRC Committee is that
they increasingly address specific violations of the rights of the boy-child
and discusses gender issues from the perspective of the boy-child.332
The CRC Committee is often cited as one of the best examples regard-
ing gender mainstreaming within the UN human rights system. How-
ever, as was noted in the introduction sex-specificity does not equal gen-
der-sensitivity. Otto notes that the CRC, “... although gender inclusive
in its use of pronouns (it consistently uses his and her), is actually gen-
der blind because it does not recognize any differences in the experience
of girls and boys that may be due to structurally embedded unequal
gender relations or to gendered social expectations. By treating girls and
boys in the same way, male/boys’ experience is effectively reinstated as
the standards because gender-specific rights violations are silenced”.333
The review of the general comments, general recommentations and the
concluding observations of the CRC Committee also indicate that the
CRC Committee is a best example on the decline. The CRC was adopted
at a time when the UN had begun to show an increasing interest in
women’s human rights and had begun to use a gender language. The
focus on women’s human rights and gender issues was on the rise during
the first half of the 1990s. It was probably during these years that the
330 UN doc. CRC/C/Add.190 (Sudan), Art. 27. See also for example Art. 21–2.
331 UN doc. CRC/C/Add.185 (Spain), Arts. 40–1.
332 See for example UN doc. CRC/C/15/Add.40 (Sri Lanka), UN doc. CRC/C/15/
Add.121 (Grenada), UN doc. CRC/C/15/Add.130 (Surinam), and UN doc. CRC/C/15/
Add.146 (Lithuania).
333 Otto 2002, pp. 21–2. See also Gruskin and Plafkar 2000.
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CRC Committee acquired its role as a sex- and gender-sensitive human
rights treaty body. This role was strengthened through the CRC Com-
mittee’s involvement in the Beijing conference and with its focus on the
girl-child for a few years after the Beijing conference.
5.4.8 Concluding Comments
The above analysis of some of the work of the UN human rights treaty
bodies shows that considerable differences exist between how and to
what extent the different treaty bodies have chosen to approach and
address women’s human rights and/or gender issues.334 The CAT Com-
mittee and the CERD Committee have been slow to integrate women’s
human rights and/or to mainstream a gender perspective. Although in
different ways, the Human Rights Committee and the ICESCR Com-
mittee have both begun to address women’s human rights and/or gender
issues in their work. The Human Rights Committee uses a women’s
human rights language and has eschewed the gender train. The ICESCR
Committee, on the other hands, has not as of yet adopted a women’s hu-
man rights or gender comment, but quite consistently mentioned either
women or gender concerns in their general comments and concluding
observations throughout the 1990s. It is difficult to assess to what extent
the CEDAW Committee has been active in promoting the strategy for
integrating women’s human rights, but the strategy, nevertheless has
brought the CEDAW Committee closer to the other human rights treaty
bodies. The CRC Committee remains the good example with regard to
making sex-specific references and acknowledging gender concerns, but it
is a best example on the wane, on decline.
334 In my review of the work of the treaty bodies, I have not analyzed the communica-
tions procedures because the communications procedures do not necessarily give much
additional information regarding how the treaty bodies approach women’s human rights
or gender-related issues. There remains, however, a considerable gap between the com-
plaints issued by women and men. In the Secretary-General’s report on the integration
of women’s human rights and a gender perspective, it is noted that “[i]t may be necessary
to target women and their advocates in efforts to disseminate information regarding the
individual complaints procedure”, see UN doc. E/CN.4/2003/72, para. 36. According
to the Secretary-General’s report, 20 communications submitted under the first Optio-
nal Protocol of the ICCPR dealt with issues involving discrimination based on sex. It
also noted that a review of the individual communications procedures under the Human
Rights Committee, CERD and CAT showed that 19 % of the communications submit-
ted to the Human Rights Committee during 2002, 20 % to the CERD Committee and
17 % to the CAT Committee involved a female complainant.
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5.5 The Secretariat and the Integrative Strategies
5.5.1 Introduction
The UN Secretariat is a Charter-based institution and it administers and
executes the decisions by the inter-governmental, expert and judicial hu-
man rights institutions. The OHCHR, located at the UN headquarters
in Geneva and the Division for the Advancement of Women, located as
part of Department of Economic and Social Affairs at the UN head-
quarters in New York City bear the main responsibility for the adminis-
tration of the UN human rights and women’s advancement agendas.335
High-level civil servants such as the UN Secretary-General, the UN
High Commissioner on Human Rights or the UN Special Advisor on
Gender Issues and the Advancement of Women serve as the public faces
of the UN. Depending on what issues they choose to prioritize and the
support they are given, they can wield considerable influence over the
UN policy lines regarding, for example, the human rights of women or
gender mainstreaming.336 While operating mainly under administrative
and executive mandates, the Secretariat as well, depending on priorities
and financial and human resources, can have a considerable effect on
how different issues are approached within the UN human rights frame-
work.
The mandate of the UN High Commissioner on Human Rights was
established after the Vienna Conference.337 The High Commissioner’s
335 The UN Secretariat currently has a staff of 8,900 persons and draws its budget from
over 170 countries. The UN’s main headquarters are in New York City and Geneva, but
a significant presence is also found, for example, in Addis Ababa, Bangkok, Nairobi,
Santiago and Vienna, www.un.org/documents/st.htm (23-09-2003). For developments
within the UN Secretariat, see Beigbeder 2000.
336 Individuals such as the current Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, and the former High
Commissioner for Human Rights, Mary Robinson, are public figures with considerable
power to decide the UN agenda. Sand (2001) argues that with the process of globaliza-
tion and with the increased power of intergovernmental organizations, such as, the UN,
the importance of high-level civil servants and bureaucracies is growing.
337 The High Commissioner on Human Rights’ mandate is based on the UN Charter
Arts. 1, 13 and 55, the Vienna Programme and UN doc. A/Res/48/141 (1993). The
mandates of the High Commissioner and the OHCHR include the promotion of the
universal enjoyment of human rights, play a leading role in the human rights field at in-
ternational and national levels, promote international cooperation for human rights,
stimulate and coordinate action for human rights throughout the human rights system,
promote universal ratification and implementation of international standards, assist in
the creation of new norms, support human rights organs and treaty monitoring bodies,
respond to serious human rights violations, undertake preventive human rights action,
promote the establishment of national human rights infrastructure, undertake human
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office and the UN Centre for Human Rights were consolidated into one
institution as part of the programme for renewing the process of the UN
system.338 The OHCHR only has a limited mandate regarding women’s
human rights and among the woman-centred mandates. It administers,
however, the mandate of the Special Rapporteur on violence against
women, its causes and its consequences, while the Division for the Ad-
vancement of Women administers the work of the Commission on the
Status of Women and the CEDAW Committee. Due to the increased
emphasis on the integration of women’s human rights and on main-
streaming a gender perspective, and also due to the overall emphasis of
streamlining and inter-agency cooperation within the UN, the OHCHR
has increased its focus on women’s human rights and on a gender per-
spective. Additionally, it has increased its co-operation with the Division
for the Advancement of Women.
The Division for the Advancement of Women has been the main Sec-
retariat institution for the advancement of women and gender issues, in-
cluding women’s human rights issues. The Division for the Advancement
of Women serves as a motor for UN activities in the areas of women’s
advancement and gender equality. It supports the implementation of the
Nairobi Forward-Looking Strategies, the Beijing Programme, the Beij-
ing+5 outcome document and other relevant international conference
documents and it administers the work of the Commission on the Sta-
tus of Women and the CEDAW Committee.339 Owing to the increased
rights field activities and operations, and provide education, information advisory serv-
ices and technical assistance in the field of human rights, see www.unhchr.ch/html/
hchr.htm (23-09-2003).
338 UN doc. A/51/950, Arts. 197–8, action 14. The OHCHR administers the UN
inter-governmental, expert and judicial human rights institutions, and reports annually
to the General Assembly, ECOSOC and the Commission on Human Rights. The con-
solidated OHCHR is currently the main Secretariat institution with an overall responsib-
ility for the UN-based human rights regime.
339 The Division for the Advancement of Women served as the Secretariat for the four
world conferences on women and for the General Assembly special session Women
2000. See www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/daw/ (23-09-2003). In the early days of the
UN the Section of the Status of Women residing under the Human Rights Division of
the Department of Social Affairs was the main Secretariat body dealing equality and
equal rights between the sexes. The Section was upgraded to the Branch for the Promo-
tion of Equality for Men and Women as part of the Centre for Social Development and
Humanitarian Affairs. In 1993 the re-named branch moved from the UN headquarters
in Vienna to the headquarters in New York. Since 1996 the Division for the Advance-
ment of Women has resided under Department of Economic and Social Affairs. The Di-
vision for the Advancement of Women is divided into three main sections or units the
Gender Analysis section, the Women’s Rights Unit and the Coordination and Outreach
Unit.
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efforts to mainstream a gender perspective into the UN system, new
mandates and institutional settings have emerged in close affinity with
the Division for the Advancement of Women. The UN Special Advisor
on Gender Issues, the Office of the Special Advisor on Gender Issues and the
Advancement of Women (OSAGI) and the Inter-Agency Network on
Women and Gender Equality (IANWGE) were established after the
Beijing Conference.340
The OHCHR’s location at the Palais Wilson in Geneva and the Divi-
sion for the Advancement of Women’s location within the Department
of Social Affairs at the UN headquarters in New York City have been
seen by some authors as reinforcing the perceived gap between human
rights and women’s human rights within the UN human rights sy-
stem.341 People dealing with women’s issues tend to want the CEDAW
Committee to be in New York and they perceive it as important that
women’s rights are a big part of the work done on behalf of women in
general. Because the whole division moved from Vienna to New York, it
is logical that it stays there. The people who insist on the subject, believe
that it is more important to think in terms of human rights and would
like to see human rights integrated with the other human rights issues –
then, it would and should belong in Geneva with the other treaty bodies.
The situation is as much a political issue as it is a bureaucratic issue.
While for a long time, there has been informal cooperation first be-
tween the Centre for Human Rights and then between the OHCHR and
the Division for the Advancement of Women, it has only been during
the last few years that this cooperation was formalized and the OHCHR
and the Division for the Advancement of Women have begun to adopt
annual joint work plans.342 Since the year 2000, the Division for the
Advancement of Women and the OHCHR have adopted joint work
plans that are communicated to both the Commission on the Status of
340 Beijing Platform Art. 326.
341 See, for example,Gallagher 1997 and Reanda 1996.
342 The cooperation between the Division for the Advancement of Women and the
OHCHR is however increasing, and the earlier informal cooperation is since a few years
consolidated through the Joint Work Plan’s of the Division for the Advancement of Wo-
men and the OHCHR. The Commission on the Status of Women did in its resolution
39/5 (1995) suggest that the cooperation between the Division for the Advancement of
Women and the OHCHR be formalised, the resolution was supported by the UN doc.
E/CN.4/Res/1997/43. See UN doc. E/CN.4/2001/118-E/CN.6/2000/8, and UN doc.
E/CN.4/2001/70-E/CN.6/2001/3. In interview No. 2 it was noted that the joint work
plans are not enough, but a first step in the cooperation between and coordination of
OHCHR and the Division for the Advancement of Women.
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Women and the Commission on Human Rights. The cooperation be-
tween the two offices is aimed at mainstreaming women’s human rights.343
The OHCHR and the Division for the Advancement of Women have
also organized panel discussions, expert meetings and workshops on issues
of common concern, sometimes in cooperation with other institutions.
Some of these activities have contributed directly to the development of
strategies for integrating women’s human rights and mainstreaming a
gender perspective within the international human rights framework.
For example, in 1995, the Centre for Human Rights and UNIFEMco-
organized an Expert Group Meeting on the Development of Guidelines
for the Integration of Gender Perspectives into the UN Human Rights Acti-
vities and Programmes. In 1999, the OHCHR, the Division for the Ad-
vancement of Women and UNIFEM organized a follow-up workshop
on Gender Integration into the Human Rights System. In 2000, in the af-
termath of the General Assembly Beijing+5 Session, a related Expert
Group Meeting was organized by the OHCHR, the Division for the
Advancement of Women and UNIFEM on Gender and Racial Discrimi-
nation.344
The aim of the 1995 Expert Group Meeting was to assist the Centre
for Human Rights and other UN human rights bodies and mechanisms
in drafting gender-sensitive guidelines and other relevant material for
the integration of the human rights of women into UN system-wide act-
ivities and programmes.345 The Expert Group Meeting was convened as
a result of the Vienna Conference and only a few months after the end
of the Beijing Conference.
343 UN doc. E/CN.4/2001/70-E/CN.6/2001/3, Art. 1. The cooperation has included
meetings between the Special Adviser and the High Commissioner, circulation of docu-
ments between and within the two offices, cross-referencing in web sites, facilitation of
visits by for example members of the Commission on the Status of Women and the
CEDAW Committee at the Human Rights Committee, co-organisation of a number of
panel discussions, workshops and expert meetings. Co-operative activities have also been
undertaken regarding the General Assembly’s Special Session Women 2000 (Beijing+5)
and the adoption of the Optional Protocol to the CEDAW. While many of these meas-
ures might seem self-evident they consolidate the previous informal co-operation between
the two offices that was largely based on personal relationships, and some of the co-
organised workshops and expert meetings have been crucial for the development of a
human rights-relevant gender mainstreaming strategy.
344 See Gender and Racial Discrimination 2000, Gender Integration into the Human Rights
System 1999 and Report of the Expert Group Meetings on the Development of Guidelines for
the Integration of Gender Perspective into the United Nations Human Rights Activities and
Programmes 1995.
345 UN doc. E/CN.4/1996/105, para. 1.
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The presentation in the workshop of outcome documents of the con-
ceptual framework included definitions of concepts, such as, gender and
gender-sensitive perspectives and discussed what gender-based approaches
might add to international human rights. The definitions used were those
definitions, which, during the later part of the 1990s, were well dissemin-
ated among UN gender experts.346 As noted in Chapter Four, this con-
ceptual framework is based on an intricate mélange of feminist theories
on sex and gender and feminist woman-centred rhetoric: the outcome
being a conceptual framework, according to which, the nature of gender
oscillates between being a contingent social construct and being nothing
but sex. The only “gender-bending” space allowed, in the above defini-
tions, are the interstices between cultures. Within a culture, the gender
perspective seems to function no differently than an equality perspective
does, because its aim is to make female and male genders equal.
According to the report, gender-sensitive perspectives or gender per-
spectives are “... based on an understanding that in all situations some
perspective of interpreting reality is present”.347 Historically, reality has
been interpreted from a male point of view, which has rendered women’s
realities invisible. The use of gender-sensitive perspectives or gender per-
spectives gives new tools to interpret reality:
[t]he development of gender perspectives in the human rights context facil-
itates understanding of how the exercise and enjoyment of human rights is
adversely influenced by social constructions of the female and male roles.348
It has been noted that although the Workshop report is focused on wo-
men’s human rights, by virtue of its references, to women’s human rights
that have been neglected and made invisible, nonetheless, it is “... evident
that development and utilization of gender-sensitive perspectives will
necessarily improve understanding, and therefore the promotion and
protection, of the human rights of men as well as women”.349 This pre-
346 Gender is defined in the 1995 Workshop Report as the socially construed roles of
women and men, as opposed to biological sex. Gender is seen as culturally variable, but
according to the definition gender constructions on the basis of the two-sex model exist
in “... all societies all over the world” (Art. 13). The problem is however not seen as the
“... social construction of roles, attitudes and relationships of women and men ...” as
these “... will always exist” (Art. 14). The problem is that “... almost invariably gender
constructs function in a way that subordinates and discriminates against women”, and
hence, the challenge is to “... ensure that this construction is fair to both sexes and that
neither sex dominates the other” (Art. 14).
347 The 1995 Workshop report, Art. 15.
348 The 1995 Workshop report, Art. 18.
349 The 1995 Workshop report, Art. 18.
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sumption that gender perspectives contribute to all promotion and pro-
tection of human rights is reproduced in much gender and human
rights material, although there are seldom any extensive analyses of how
and what benefit the gender perspective can contribute.350
The 1999 Workshop was a follow-up to the 1995 Expert Group
Meeting and organized as part of the joint work plan of the OHCHR
and the Division for the Advancement of Women. While the 1995 Ex-
pert Group Meeting was convened at the beginning of the gender turn
in international human rights, much activity had already happened in
1999.351 The 1999 Workshop attempted to assess the progress made and
build on already existing structures. The Workshop proposed a large
number of recommendations, many of which dealt with the need for in-
creased information, normative clarification, training and inter-institu-
tional exchanges. Read together, the reports from the Expert Group
Meeting and the Workshop suggested that while the integration of
women’s human rights and the gender mainstreaming projects have de-
veloped in the sense that more and more well-developed questions have
been asked, the obstacles to the integrative and mainstreaming projects
are fairly basic.
The Expert Group Meeting on Gender and Racial Discrimination may
be perceived of as a consequence of the gender mainstreaming project.352
The Beijing Conference drew attention to how age, disability, socio-
economic position or membership in a particular ethnic group created
certaintypes of barriers for women. The UN human rights institutions
have been very reluctant to address issues of multiple and intersectional
discrimination, partly because such issues tend both to cross-over and
fall into the interstices between the traditional mandates, partly because
none of the existing institutions have had the conceptual or practical
tools to deal with such issues.
5.5.2 The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
The High Commissioner for Human Rights functions as the UN’s face
to the world vis-à-vis, human rights. The office holder reports annually
about hers or his activities to the General Assembly, the ECOSOC and
the Commission on Human Rights.353 During the years when at the
350 For further discussion, see Chapter 6.
351 The 1995 workshop delegates were guided by the ECOSOC Agreed Conclusions
and the Division for the Advancement of Women definition of gender, Arts. 12–13.
352 For further analysis, see Chapter 3.3.1, see also Chapter 6.
353 In the below analysis, I have, to get an overview of the OHCHR’s activities for issues
regarding, as it is often phrased in the High Commissioner for Human Rights reports,
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mandate was held by the first High Commissioner for Human Rights,
José Ayala-Lasso of Ecuador, the OHCHR worked only moderately to
promote the integrative strategies.354 An overview of the High Commis-
sioner’s annual reports to the General Assembly and to the Commission
on Human Rights shows that while women’s human rights were a con-
cern for the High Commissioner during the early years of his mandate,
the concern was expressed through targeted interventions rather than
through attempts to integrate women’s human rights or a gender per-
spective.355 In 1997, the mandate of the High Commissioner for Human
gender and the human rights of women, relied on the High Commissioner for Human
Rights reports to the General Assembly and to a certain extent to the Commission on
Human Rights. The General Assembly reports to ECOSOC have in general not included
any substantial references to gender and the human rights of women. It should be noted
that the reports provide only general overviews, and how thoroughly they address certain
issues is often dependent on who has drafted, commented and finalised the reports.
354 UN doc. A/50/36, Arts. 21, 27–36, and 69. The reports to the General Assembly
provide general overviews to the prioritised issues within and the activities of the
OHCHR during the year. The reports to ECOSOC focus on economic and social
rights, and related matters. The reports to the Commission on Human Rights are the
most comprehensive as the OHCHR reports to the Commission on Human Rights
both under the agenda item on the follow-up to the Vienna conference and under the
agenda item on the promotion and protection of human rights.
355 The report to the Commission on Human Rights in 1995 includes a chapter on the
equal status and human rights of women in which references are made to for example
the Vienna and Beijing conferences, and to the Commission on Human Rights and
Commission on the Status of Women resolutions regarding mainstreaming of the hu-
man rights of women, see UN doc. E/CN/4/1995/98, Chapter IIIF, Arts. 101–105. 
The 1996 report to the General Assembly focuses, as regards women’s human rights, on
the efforts of the human rights treaty bodies to integrate women’s human rights, on the
Special Rapporteur on violence against women’s report regarding trafficking and forced
prostitution of women in Eastern Europe, on the Special Rapporteur’s work against
domestic violence in Brazil, and on the roundtable organised on women’s reproductive
rights. References are also made to the Commission on Human Rights resolution
1996/22 regarding the persons chairing the human rights treaty bodies’ decision to
monitor each treaty body’s integration of women’s human rights. see UN doc. A/51/36,
Chapter VA(2), Arts. 73–6 and 91. The 1997 reports do include very few references to
women’s human rights. In for example the 1997 report to the General Assembly addres-
ses women’s human rights when discussing the work of the Sub-commission Working
Group on contemporary forms of slavery, and the report to the Commission on Human
Rights does not include any substantive references to women’s human rights. The Work-
ing Group’s work concerned the Japanese military’s treatment of comfort women during
the Second World War. See UN doc. A/52/36, Arts. 35–38 and UN doc. E/CN.4/
1997/98. The Working Group’s work concerned the Japanese military’s treatment of
comfort women during the Second World War.
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Rights was taken over by Mary Robinson of Ireland.356 Robinson’s as-
sumption of office coincides in time with the adoption of the ECOSOC
Agreed Conclusions on Gender Mainstreaming, the adoption of the
UN Reform Programme that stresses the importance of human rights
and the preparations for the five-year review of the Vienna Conference
and the 50th anniversary of the Universal Declaration. Robinson also has
an openness to women’s human rights and gender issues; she chooses
trafficking, including trafficking in women and girls, as one of her prio-
ritized areas of concern. Hence, there has been, within the OHCHR, an
increased focus on women’s human rights and gender issues, during the
years when Robinson has held the mandate of the High Commissioner
for Human Rights. This increased focus is partly due to the system-
wide, viz., post-Vienna, post-Cairo and post-Beijing, focus on women’s
human rights and gender issues. The importance, however, of Robinson’s
openness towards women’s human rights and gender issues and her
choice of trafficking as a prioritized issue should not be underestimated.
Nevertheless, as will be demonstrated below, after the events of Septem-
ber 11 and the Durban Conference, the focus of the OHCHR has shif-
ted from women’s human rights issues to human rights and conflict and
racial discrimination, leaving women’s human rights almost completely
unaddressed and neglected in Robinson’s last report.
The focus of the 1998 report to the General Assembly is on the 50th
anniversary of the Universal Declaration and on the five-year review of
the Vienna conference. Trafficking was highlighted as a priority area.
Women’s human rights are addressed in the context of contemporary
challenges to human rights and gender and the human rights of women
are subsumed under the chapter on trafficking in women and children.357
The main challenges regarding gender and women’s human rights iden-
tified by the High Commissioner are many. Three challenges stand out,
in particular, viz., the integration of the gender perspective into all acti-
vities of and within the OHCHR, the active and broad participation of
women within the UN human rights system and the initiation of specific
programmes, special projects and activities aimed at improving the en-
joyment by women and girl children of their fundamental human
rights.358 The 1999 report to the General Assembly includes a chapter
356 In September 2002, the position was taken over by Mr. Sergio Viera de Mello of
Brazil. Sadly, Viera de Mello died in Iraq, in August 2003, while serving as the UN’s
Special Representative in Iraq. The mandate of the High Commissioner on Human
Rights was taken over by Bertrand Rhamcharan.
357 UN doc. A/53/36. See also UN doc. E/CN.4/1998/122 and E/1998/84.
358 UN doc. A/53/36, Art. 50.
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on Gender Issues and the Human Rights of Women, which focuses on a
number of items. Specifically, the report discusses the 1999 workshop
on gender mainstreaming, the 20th anniversary of the CEDAW, the final-
ization of the policy statement regarding gender mainstreaming and the
human rights of women and the preparation of a work plan regarding
these issues, the field offices work on gender issues within the human
rights framework, and the development of the priorities defined in the
1998 report.359 The 1999 report to the Commission on Human Rights
also includes a chapter on Gender and the Human Rights of Women.360
The chapter refers to a number of items, in particular, the increased co-
operation between the OHCHR and the Division for the Advancement
of Women, to the mission statement of the OHCHR on gender and the
human rights of women and to gender and women’s human rights train-
ing. According to the report, the OHCHR:
... will continue to pursue the integration of a gender perspective into all
human rights mechanisms, activities and programmes of the United Nations
system; foster knowledge and understanding on the incorporation of a gen-
der perspective into human rights activities and programmes, invest in
capacity-building at the regional and national levels in incorporating a gen-
der perspective; and develop an information base on the situation of human
rights of women.361
The policy statement on Gender Mainstreaming and the Human Rights
of Women refers to the Vienna, Cairo and Beijing conferences, noting
that the conferences confirmed “... the strong link between the gendered
nature of violations of human rights, and the actual advancement of wo-
men’s human rights”.362 The mission statement fails to make a distinc-
tion between integrating women’s human rights and mainstreaming
gender, but emphasizes gender mainstreaming as the main approach
when outlining the nine core aspects of the OHCHR policy. The nine
core aspects include: the reflection of gender concerns in the conceptua-
lization, implementation and evaluation of human rights policies; strat-
egic planning and the setting of priorities and objectives; the use of gen-
der analysis when analyzing the impact of activities and procedures for
advancing human rights; the promotion of training and sensitization
programmes aimed at integrating gender and building capacity for gen-
359 UN doc. A/54/36, Arts. 90–94. The chapter on trafficking emphasises the rights of
women and children (ch. XIA).
360 UN doc. E/CN.4/1999/9, Chapter III, Arts. 27–30.
361 UN doc. E/CN.4/1999/9, Art. 30
362 Gender Mainstreaming and Human Rights of Women 2000, p. 6.
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der analysis from a human rights perspective for staff members, human
rights bodies and consultants; an active support for and promotion of
the human rights of women and the girl-child; the prioritization of issues
regarding the trafficking in human beings and the mainstreaming of
human rights into anti-trafficking initiatives; the development of specific
strategies and benchmarks to measure progress made in mainstreaming a
gender perspective; the encouragement of Member States to ensure the
broader participation of women in all fields of UN human rights actit-
ivies; dialogue between and among the OHCHR, UNDP, UNICEF,
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, UNIFEM and United
Nations Population Fund in order to build up a common understanding
of the fundamental link between gender issues and the human rights of
women and the girl-child; and the forging of a commitment to internal
gender parity within the OHCHR and recognizing the primary respons-
ibility of Senior Management to provide active leadership in the gender
mainstreaming process. The core aspects highlight the three main parts
of the gender mainstreaming strategy, viz., mainstreaming, gender an-
alysis and the promotion of and equal representation of women. The
other aspects relate closely to the work of the OHCHR, i.e., they em-
phasize both gender training and sensitization within the OHCHR and
the OHCHR’s important role in promoting awareness about the link
between gender and women’s human rights.
In the 2001 report, the Durban conference is given much space and
the report recognizes that “... the victims of discrimination on race,
colour, descent and national or ethnic origin can also suffer multiple of
aggravated forms of discrimination on other related grounds such as sex,
language, religion, political or other opinion, social origin, property,
birth or other status”.363 Women’s human rights are addressed in the
chapter on human rights in conflict and a special focus is vouchsafed to
women and peace, together with the human rights of other vulnerable
groups, such as, children and the elderly and in the context of HIV.364
The 2001 report to the Commission on Human Rights has an extensive
focus on contemporary forms of racism and racial discrimination. A
chapter of the report deals with the gender dimension of racial discrimi-
nation. According to the report, issues, such as, the trafficking in women
and children, violence against women, gender-based war crimes, repro-
ductive rights, et cetera, have highlighted the interconnections between
363 UN doc. A/56/36, Arts. 5, 41–2 and 54.
364 UN doc. A/56/36, Arts. 63–74 and 84.
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sex and race discrimination and other forms of multiple discrimina-
tion.365
The 2002 report to the General Assembly was prepared to after the
terrorist attack of the Twin Towers in New York City and the accompany-
ing terrorism in Washington, DC and Pennsylvania on 11 September
2001 and after the Durban conference.366 The report awards special em-
phasis to human rights and conflict, to racial discrimination and to issues
regarding development. The report omits any specific chapter on either
equality and non-discrimination or on gender and women’s human
rights issues. Further, the report does not address women’s human rights
to any significant extent. For example, in the chapter on human rights
and conflict, there is no specific reference to gender or women’s human
rights, except that rape is included in the list of violations suffered by
civilian populations during conflict.367 The report idoes devote a chapter
on mainstreaming, but the focus of the chapter is on the mainstreaming
of human rights, although the report mentions that “[t]he need to integrate
a gender perspective is an issues which both human rights and develop-
ment experts have increasingly recognized as a necessary component of
their work”.368
The above analysis of the reports demonstrates that while there has
been an increased interest and awareness of women’s human rights and
gender issues within the OHCHR, this interest is not constant; the policy
statement indicates that there is no one consistent approach taken within
the OHCHR, Office’s policy consists of a patchwork of different strategies
and goals, which tend to change quite frequently depending on prioritized
policy objectives.
5.5.3 The Secretariat and the Advancement of Women
The Division for the Advancement of Women is the UN Secretariat insti-
tution for the UN’s work for the advancement of women and gender
equality. It is only a minor UN division that services, on the one hand,
the Commission on the Status of Women and the CEDAW Committee
365 UN doc. E/CN.4/2001/16, Arts. 53–59. The report emphasises General Comment
21 of the CERD Committee that focuses on gender factors or issues which may be
interlinked with racial discrimination (Art. 60–61).
366 UN doc. A/57/36, see also UN doc. E/2002/68.
367 UN doc. A/57/36, Chapter II.
368 UN doc. A/57/36, Arts. 93–6, Arts. 97–102 addresses rights-based approaches.
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and, on the other hand, serves as a catalyst for the UN work on gender
equality.369 In the wake of a number events, including the Beijing con-
ference, the creation of the Special Advisor on Gender Issues and the
establishment of the IANGWE, the work of the Division for the Advan-
cement of Women’s in advancing gender mainstreaming, administering
and servicing the Commission on the Status of Women and the CEDAW
Committee has predominated over its work.
Because the Division for the Advancement of Women’s mandate is
divided on women’s rights and gender analysis, the Division for the
Advancement of Women also distinguishes quite clearly between rights-
based and gender mainstreaming approaches. The Division for the
Advancement of Women relies heavily, although not exclusively on the
CEDAW and the Beijing Platform when perfoming its work. The
rights-based approach, which, in the Division for the Advancement of
Women framework, is CEDAW-related, and the gender mainstreaming
approach is related to the Beijing Platform.
The Division for the Advancement of Women and OSAGI have both
contributed to the development of the UN gender mainstreaming strategy
in two ways, first, by developing the strategy and the gender analytical
tool and, secondly, by encouraging and providing support for different
UN institutions to mainstream gender. The Division for the Advance-
ment of Women and OSAGI have also contributed directly to the efforts
to mainstream a gender perspective within the UN human rights frame-
work by preparing analyses and reports regarding what mainstreaming a
gender perspective means and how to mainstream a gender perspective.
For example, in the report on Integrating a Gender Perspective into the
UN Human Rights Practice (1998), the Division for the Advancement of
Women reviewed the efforts of the different treaty bodies to integrate a
gender perspective and defined the next steps to be taken by each of the
treaty bodies, as well as developing general recommendations for all the
treaty bodies. In its report on integrating the gender perspective into the
work of the UN human rights treaty system, the Division for the Ad-
vancement of Women made an attempt to show the interlinkages be-
tween the women’s rights are human rights trend emanating from the Vienna
Process, the woman-centred gender mainstreaming trend emanating
from the Beijing Process and the growing preference for human rights
and rights-based approaches within the overall UN system.370
369 The focus on both women’s human rights and gender mainstreaming is also reflected
in the Division for the Advancement of Women’s organisation as it is divided in a gender
analysis and a human rights section.
370 UN doc. HRI/MC/1998/6, Art. 4.
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The Division for the Advancement of Women has also relied, in its
work, both on the Beijing Platform and on the general shift “... in the
work for gender equality from a focus on advancing women’s status to a
focus on gender relations”, increasingly focused on the role of men and
boys in achieving gender equality.371 While there seem to be tendencies
to frame this work in an added-value of gender equality for men language,
there are also references to a more critical perspective, which, for example,
focuses on “[t]he role of men as perpetrators, and as actors in ending gen-
der-based violence”.372 In the Aide-Mémoire for the Expert Group meet-
ing on the role of men and boys, it was noted that:
[f ]ull engagement of men and boys in achieving gender equality requires
much greater attention to gender stereotypes and expectations about men’s
roles and responsibilities, and how these expectations influence male be-
haviour. Such stereotypes continue to place greater emphasis, as well as
greater value, on the role of men and boys in public life and in the work
place, as opposed to women’s role in unpaid family labour, care giving and
community. Peer pressure, socialisation processes and belief systems influ-
ence adherence to gender-specific stereotypes.373
The Division for the Advancement of Women and the OHCHR also
participate in the work of the IANWGE, a network of UN offices, spe-
cialized agencies, funds and programmes which monitors the implemen-
tation of the Beijing Platform, the outcome of the Beijing+5 Session,
gender-related recommendations emanating from other UN conferences
and the General Assembly special sessions and gender mainstreaming
within the UN system.
371 www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/egm/men-boys2003/aide-memoire.html (28-09-
2003). During the autumn of 2003, the Division for the Advancement of Women organ-
ized, in cooperation with ILO and UNAIDS, an Expert Group Meeting regarding the
role of men and boys in achieving gender equality. Before the meeting, during Summer
2003, an online discussion was organized regarding the issue. The themes chosen for the
online discussion were the world of work, the HIV/AIDS pandemic and the value-added
of gender equality for men and boys [emphasis of the author]. The aims of the Expert
group were many, viz., how to adapt existing approaches of working with men and boys
with regard to, for example, the violence against women to other areas, how to suggest
means for overcoming resistance to the shifts in the power relations between men and
women, how to propose means for overcoming the obstacles preventing men and boys
from contributing more actively towards achieving gender equality and how to elaborate
on the roles of actors in civil society.
372 www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/egm/men-boys2003/aide-memoire.html (28-09-
2003). The critical perspective on men was first introduced into the UN human rights
framework by the Special Rapporteur on violence against women.
373 www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/egm/men-boys2003/aide-memoire.html (28-09-
2003).
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5.5.4 Conclusions
The distance between the different geographical locations for the
OHCHR in Geneva and the Division of the Advancement of Women
in New York City ironically epitomizes as well the theoretical gap between
human rights, on the one hand, and women’s human rights, on the other
hand. The division in labor is that the OHCHR administers and services
most of the UN human rights mandates, while the Division for the Ad-
vancement of Women services the traditional women’s human rights
mandates aptly exemplifies as well the woman-centred equality strategy
that aimed at advancing women and equality between the sexes through
separate woman-specific initiatives. In the aftermath of the Vienna and
Beijing conferences, efforts have been made to bridge the gaps between
the two institutions and between human rights and women’s human
rights.
Still, the processes of integrating women’s human rights and of main-
streaming a gender perspective are only at the most incipent stages of
implementation at the OHCHR. For example, the policy statement on
mainstreaming gender and women’s human rights omits any kind of
extensive information about how to mainstream gender and women’s
human rights. The policy statement, moreover fails to distinguish between
the two strategies. While mixing the two strategies might have been a
strategic choice and while there can be advantages to using both a rights-
based strategy and a gender mainstreaming strategy, a mélange will only
undermine the potential of each strategy if insufficient attention is paid
merely to the potential of each strategy.
I have highlighted that the persistent constraints to successful gender
mainstreaming within the UN relate to the questions: What does it mean?
What does it do? And how should it be done? As I noted earlier, these
questions are very fundamental constraints. There is, however, within the
Division for the Advancement of Women, OSAGI and the newly estab-
lished IANWGE much and ever-growing knowledge about how to
mainstream gender. The Division for the Advancement of Women and
OSAGI have also, as I have noted, shifted away from a focus on the magic
of gender to a grounded strategy for mainstreaming a gender perspective. They
are increasingly attempting to answer questions about how to mainstream
a gender perspective within different contexts. In this respect, the work
and contributions of the Division for the Advancement of Women’s and
OSAGI can certainly add input to the strategy for mainstreaming a gen-
der perspective and women’s human rights within the OHCHR.
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5.6 Conclusions
The aim of this chapter has been to analyze different initiatives under-
taken by different UN human rights institutions in order to mainstream a
gender perspective or to integrate women’s human rights. I have focused
the analysis on key issues or processes within the institutions for the in-
tegration of women’s human rights or for the mainstreaming of a gender
perspective. I have concentrated my analysis on a ten year time period,
from 1992–2002, which is the period of time during which the main-
streaming and gender turns have emerged and are being promoted
within the UN system. Given the limited number of institutions and the
amount of UN documentation analyzed in this chapter, I do not go as
far as to suggest that the analysis provide a thorough empirical analysis
of how the institutions have approached and implemented the integrative
strategies. However, the analysis does provide an overview of how dif-
ferent institutions have tackled the exhortation to integrate women’s
human rights and/or to mainstream a gender perspective.
Most of the UN human rights institutions analyzed in this chapter
have decided to increase their focus on women’s human rights and to in-
tegrate women’s human rights and/or a gender perspective. The Vienna
and Beijing strategies have proven to be successful in highlighting the
attention paid to women’s and/or gender issues. However, the analysis
also suggests that some overall challenges persist with regard to both the
substance and consistency of the emphasis on women’s human rights
and/or a gender perspective. The lack of substance and the lack of con-
sistency are interlinked because, without substance, it is difficult to pro-
mote consistent approaches. In other words, in the absence of any real
clarity about the content, meaning and aims of the strategies, and in the
absence of any type of analysis of the potential shortcomings and negative
effects of the strategies, it is difficult to ensure that the strategies will be
integrated beyond mere simple expressions of concern for the situation
of women, either stowed under specific headings or tucked away in the
ultimate or penultimate paragraphs of resolutions, declarations, guide-
lines or reports.
Among the human rights institutions and the mandates addressed, it
was mainly the Special Rapporteurs on extrajudicial, summary or arbitary
executions and on education that had worked with their mandates in
order to integrate women’s human rights or a gender perspective in any sort
of substantial way. The Special Rapporteur on the right to education,
Katarina Tomas˘evski, was among the few mandate holders that seem to
have attempted to analyze the added value of the mainstreaming strate-
gies for her mandate. The double mainstreaming approach, launched by
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Tomas˘evski, suggests that she recognized the necessity, even the urgency or
exigency of distinguishing between different mainstreaming perspectives
in order to give substance to and make use of the strategies. The Com-
mission on Human Rights, as well as, for example, the Human Rights
Committee and the CERD Committee, offer examples of attempts to
give substance to the integrative strategies through well-defined and
grounded approaches in their decisions to integrate women’s human
rights. Especially, in the case of the CERD Committee, these entities
endeavour to integrate an analysis of the gender dimension of racial dis-
crimination. Nonetheless, it, still, remains to be seen what the institutions
will make of the integrative strategies in practice and on a long-term basis.
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6 Conclusions
In Chapter One, I defined the main objective of this thesis as being
a three-pronged analysis of the integrative parts of the dual strat-
egies, viz., their development, their content and their institutional
implementation within the UN human rights framework. In
Chapter Two, I discussed the theoretical and methodological frame-
works of this thesis, identifying the two principal sources of my in-
spiration: first, feminist scholarship addressing international law
and human rights and, secondly, Carol Bacchi’s What is the pro-
blem? approach. In Chapter Three, I focused on the first prong of
my objective: I situated the integrative strategies into a historical
context and analyzed their developments. In Chapter Four, I focused
on the second prong of my objective: I analyzed the content of the
integrative strategies. In Chapter Five, I focused on the third and
final prong of my objective: I analyzed the institutional implemen-
tation of the integrative strategies within the UN human rights
framework. Those tasks having been accomplished, I now address
the aim of this chapter, which is to conclude the thesis. To aid me
in my summation, I will return to some of the earlier questions
posed in Chapter Two, i.e., I will try to analyze what has “really”
become of the integrative strategies.
6.1 Introduction
During the period between the end of the Cold War and the events of
September 11, international human rights experienced a sort of renaiss-
ance. During this period, more than before, different movements, in-
cluding women’s movements, seized the opportunity, went internatio-
nal, and translated their claims into a language of human rights. In the
aftermath of the September 11 events, some human rights and women’s
rights scholars have noted a downside to “human rights” and “women’s
human rights” arguments. As Gillian Wylie notes, the arguments can 
“... become part of the moral justification given for waging ‘war on ter-
04-02 Iustus, Sari 8/3  04-03-08 15.31  Sidan 299
300
ror’ ...”.1 In their analysis of Sex, Gender and September 11, Charles-
worth and Chinkin note that “[c]rises can have the effect of reaffirming
the traditional distribution of power between women and men”.2
The rather profound shift in the human rights discourse after the
Cold War, however, led to a re-conceptualization of human rights and to
the inclusion of new issues onto the international human rights agenda.
The Vienna and Beijing strategies, i.e., the strategies for strengthening
and integrating women’s human rights and for the advancement of wo-
men and the mainstreaming of a gender perspective, which have been
the focus of this thesis, are part of the attempts to reconceptualize, rethink
and refocus the human rights agenda. The first parts of the dual strategies
are constituted by their emphasis on the strengthening of the women’s
human rights schemes and the women’s advancement schemes of the
UN. These elements are not 1990s innovations, but rather they may be
defined as reaffirmations of the importance of the dominant woman-
centred strategies from the 1970s. It is the second parts of the dual strat-
egies or their emphases on integrating women’s human rights or main-
streaming a gender perspective that are the 1990s innovations.
As has been noted by Charlesworth, Chinkin and Wright, feminist
scholarship provides less for a set of standard answers about women’s op-
pression, than for ways of posing questions. The commitment of femin-
ist scholarship may be seen as basically two-fold. On the one hand, their
commitment is to the production of academic knowledge. On the other
hand, their commitment is to the emancipation of women. This dual
commitment affects how feminist scholars ask their questions, that is,
their criticism needs to be weighed against the dangers of the criticism
hampering the reconstructive project.3 Engle and Higgins suggest that
the dual commitment has been especially prevalent in the field of inter-
national human rights for two main reasons. First, the research agenda
regarding women and human rights was very limited, even up to the be-
ginning of the 1990s. Secondly, increased knowledge or awareness about
the violations of women’s human rights and the extent to which women’s
human rights are violated are instigation enough to launch a probe for
any kind of solution. Hence, feminist international law scholars in the
field of human rights have criticized international human rights, their in-
stitutional framework and their practices, but without querying whether,
1 Wylie 2003, p. 217.
2 Charlesworth and Chinkin 2002, p. 605. See also Björk 2003 and Orford 2002.
3 See Charlesworth and Chinkin 2000, pp. 21 and 61–1. See also Chapter 2.
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feminist interventions into international human rights are worthwhile
on a more fundamental level.4 Or as Engle notes:
[w]hile I had begun [...] with many doubts about the human rights law
and rhetoric, I had ended [...] by suppressing those doubts. It seemed im-
possible both to reject human rights and to promote women’s rights. The
latter issue took priority.5
Braidotti had cautioned feminists as early as 1991 to be moderate in their
joyful celebrations of the “International” and to question whether what
seemed to be facile solutions were not merely convenient pretexts, mask-
ing the inability to come to terms with national politics and local real-
ities?6 Lately, feminist international law scholars and others, have begun
to question the motives underlying the international community’s
attempts to integrate a gender perspective and to “save women”. Accord-
ing to Guattri Spivak, for example, “... the UN must first rationalize
‘woman’ before they can develope her.”7 Orford asks and with reference
to the UN gender mainstreaming project:
[d]oes gender work as a category in such situations [in attempts to support
the role of women in peace processes and in reconstructive projects in Bou-
gainville, the Solomon Islands and East Timor], and if so, whose work does
it do? How does this officially sanctioned desire to ‘include’ women as par-
ticipants relate to the current enthusiasm for exporting institutions of the
free market in the name of democracy? Such issues are much more compli-
cated than the picture painted by these UN documents of a world in which,
to paraphrase Spivak, white women save brown women from brown men.
Failing to ask such questions of the role played by ‘gender mainstreaming’
in the new world order may mean that feminism ends up simply facilitat-
ing the existing projects and prioritise of militarised economic globalisation
in the name of protecting and promoting the interests of women.8
Both Braidotti and Orford suggest that feminist scholars and activists
should, to use Bacchi’s words, “... consider what goes unproblematized
in particular discursive constructions”.9 In other words, as I have already
noted, just because certain approaches and issues, such as the mainstream-
ing of a gender perspective or the recognition of different forms of viol-
ence against women were difficult to get onto the international agenda
4 See however Charlesworth 1999b, Engle 1992a and Orford 1998b and 2002.
5 Engle 1992a, p. 603.
6 Braidotti 1992, p. 7.
7 Spivak 1999, p. 245.
8 Orford 2002, p. 283.
9 Bacchi 1999, p. 207.
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in the first place, it does not mean that feminists should content themselves
with the results. As Bacchi suggests, problem representations are nested,
one within the other. Therefore, shifting the focus of one problem repre-
sentation may very well also change the focus of other problem repre-
sentations.10 Hence, it is necessary to ask continually: What is the pro-
blem? What has really happened? And, last but not least, was anything
excluded, if so, what was excluded while, for instance, a gender perspec-
tive was being included?
Charlesworth and Mary Wood show the dual or binary nature of the
gender and human rights discourses in their analysis of the two facets of
the program launched by the temporary administration in East Timor,
viz., first, how the staff attempted to mainstream a gender perspective
into the independence process and, secondly, how human rights were
used in the same process.11 According to Charlesworth and Wood the
establishment of a Gender Affairs Unit within the temporary adminis-
tration was a far from evident process and when established it was un-
clear what the Gender Affairs Unit should do. Charlesworth and Wood
note, for example, that the small Gender Affairs Unit was unable to “...
produce a clear definition of gender mainstreaming” and that “[i]t was
unclear whether gender mainstreaming was aimed at the UNTEAT
[UN Transitional Administration in East Timor] international workers,
or East Timorese women, or East Timorese people in general”.12
The case of East Timor in the UNTEAT era illustrates however the com-
plexity of the translation of worthy public statements about the equality of
women. UNTEAT’s GAU [Gender Affairs Unit] has an uncertain and little-
known mandate. Its funding was constantly being renegotiated and it tended
to be marginalized and without proper institutional support. Language
and cultural barriers have arisen between local women’s groups and the
GAU. There is little evidence of attention to gender issues outside the
small GAU office.13
Hence, while I urge for critical perspectives in feminist analysis regarding
international law and human rights and while I support, for example, Or-
10 Bacchi 1999, p. 5.
11 Charlesworth and Wood 2002. I use Charlesworth’s and Wood’s research as an ex-
ample, although I have not in this thesis analyzed the implementation of the integrative
strategies beyond the UN system’s international level. Communicating and implement-
ing the integrative strategies in relationship to UN Member States, in UN field opera-
tions and technical assistance programmes et cetera, opens up for an array of new theo-
retical, legal, political and practical questions and problems to be addressed.
12 Charlesworth and Wood 2002, p. 344.
13 Charlesworth and Wood 2002, p. 347.
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ford’s critical questioning about the role of feminist scholarship in the
new imperialistic project which produces and reproduces the exclusion
of Other women, I would also like to note that feminist self-reflection
and auto-criticism does not mean, to put it bluntly, that patriarchy is dead.
Instead, as remarked upon earlier, feminists move about in the incon-
venient spaces and interstices between a self-reflective analyzing of their
own shortcomings and a constant explaining to much of the core that sex
matters. And, while the core nods, I am not always convinced that it lis-
tens.
Charlesworth writes in her article, Alienating Oscar (1993), about
how she had been asked by the conference organizers of an early 1990s
international law conference to avoid making overly provocative femi-
nist interventions in order to avoid alienating the eminent international
law professor, Oscar Schachter.14 According to Charlesworth, Schachter
had not been especially disturbed, but, as Charlesworth notes in a later
analysis, some international legal scholars did become rather alarmed and
they have responded to feminist criticism with either cries or whispers.
The cries have been responses from mainly the liberal tradition in inter-
national law. The criticism of these liberal proponents of international
law has been mainly two fold: first, they criticize what they perceive as
feminism’s disrespect for the basic rules of both academic knowledge
production and international law, secondly, they criticize feminists’ ap-
parent lack of gratitude for the great advances and progress that inter-
national legal scholars and the international legal community have
brought about on behalf of women. The whispers are the non-responses
from critical international legal scholarship. In other words, while most
critical scholars would list feminist interventions in international law as
part of contemporary international scholarship, the engagement seldom
amounts to more than a disengaged acceptance.15 That is, as was noted
in Chapter Two, only in the best of worlds does lack of polemic mean
engaged acceptance. Mostly, it just means disengagement and a lack of
interest.16
The aim of this chapter is to conclude this thesis. The three objectives
of this thesis defined in Chapter One have been developed in Chapters
Three, Four and Five respectively. What I will do in this chapter is to
pick up (return to) the somewhat rhetorical Bacchian questions from
14 Charlesworth 1993a.
15 Feminist international legal scholarship has been criticised by for example Tesón
1993 and Fellmeth 2000. For discussions about these interventions, see Charlesworth
1994a and 1996b and Orford 2002.
16 See Chapter 2.4.
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Chapter 1.1.2: What has really become of the integrative strategies? Are
they a success story? Or did the possibilities and power vanish again? This
chapter is divided in five main parts: In Chapter 6.2, I will analyze the
“mainstreaming turn”; in Chapter 6.3, I will analyze the “gender turn”;
and in Chapter 6.4, I will analyze the strategy for integrating women’s
human rights into the UN human rights framework. In Chapter 6.5, 
I will analyze the interaction between the strategies for mainstreaming a
gender perspective and integrating women’s human rights, i.e., what can
be defined as one of the unintended consequences of the integrative strat-
egies. In Chapters 6.6, I will provide some concluding comments.
6.2 The “Mainstreaming Turn” within 
the UN Human Rights Framework
Since the Nairobi conference, there has been recognition within the UN
system that women’s advancement and equality initiatives can but mar-
ginally succeed, when promoted only in the margins. During the Vienna
and Beijing conferences, dual strategies were promoted, according to
which women’s advancement and equality initiatives should focus on
both targeted intervention and mainstreaming. A continuing recogni-
tion of the importance of targeted interventions is necessary because in
many areas, women, still, remain silenced and inequalities and injustices
between the sexes, still, remain hidden.17 Women need to be empowered
and inequalities and injustices thoroughly analyzed before attempts to
mainstream “women” or knowledge about inequalities and injustices can
fully succeed. That is, in case women are denied equal possibilities and
in case there is a lack of critical knowledge about inequalities and injust-
ices between the sexes, mainstreaming efforts will fail.
Mainstreaming, however, has become a 1990s buzzword: it is argued
that mainstreaming strategies will do what the previous equality strategies
did not and could not do, i.e., substantially promote women’s human
17 When addressing strategies for mainstreaming a gender perspective I underlined that
the strategy formed part of a dual strategy, i.e., the strategy was supposed to be imple-
mented in addition to the strengthening of woman-centred initiatives. I also noted that
in most policy statements, manuals and guidelines for mainstreaming a gender perspect-
ive, the mainstreaming strategy in itself included different forms of targeted interven-
tions aiming, for example, at promoting an equal representation of the sexes and women’s
participation in decision-making. The mainstreaming strategy has, however, in equality
discourses and in practice occasionally been promoted as the progressive alternative to
targeted interventions. See Chapter 4.5.2.
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rights and gender equality.18 Nevertheless, the blame the strategy approach,
as I call it, can hide more persistent constraints to inequalities and in-
justices between the sexes.19 Mainstreaming will end up as nothing more
than just a buzzword if the focus is shifted altogether from targeted
interventions to mainstreaming, without ensuring that two remedial
steps be taken. First, as was emphasized above, women must be enabled
to overcome the historical and structural exclusions to which they have
been subject; secondly, the knowledge production about inequalities and
injustices and better practice examples must continue, and continually be
incorporated in the implementation and evaluation of the mainstreaming
efforts.20
During this thesis-process, two ideas, other than the above emphasis
on the continuing relevance of targeted interventions and of continuing
knowledge production, have crystallized themselves as particularly impor-
tant to recognize in order to develop successful mainstreaming strategies.
I categorize these two “recognitions” as follows: (I) Recognition of the
necessity to develop grounded mainstreaming strategies and to contex-
tualize mainstreaming efforts; and (II) Recognition of the importance of
“passionate mainstreamers”. Both of these “recognitions” are necessary in
order to provide a substance to mainstreaming strategies and to avoid the
situation where they might be haphazardly implemented or emptied or
drained of their potentially transformative content when implemented.
I Grounded and Contextualized Strategies
When addressing mainstreaming strategies, I have distinguished between
integrative and transformative mainstreaming strategies. Integrative main-
streaming includes moving an issue into a framework from which it had
previously been excluded, i.e., the issue is added, but it is not expected to
change the framework. Transformative mainstreaming includes moving
18 During the 1990s mainstreaming strategies have been promoted for gender and
women’s human rights issues. As was noted in Chapters 4.5.2 and 4.6.2 mainstreaming
strategies have also been used with, for example, rights-based approaches in general. When
I in this chapter, Chapter 6.2, address the mainstreaming strategy I rely on knowledge
and examples from the strategies for mainstreaming a gender perspective and integrating
women’s human rights, although I am convinced that the conclusions at least in some
respect are generalizable.
19 See Chapter 1.3.2.
20 The UN Womenwatch database with links to, for example, the Division for the Ad-
vancement of Women’s, OSAGI and the IANGWE provide much substantial informa-
tion about how the UN has approached mainstreaming strategies, see www.un.org/
womenwatch/ (12-01-2004).
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an issue into a framework and allowing it to have an impact on that
framework, to transform it. As, for example, Beveridge and Nott have
pointed out, integrative mainstreaming strategies have become favored
by public institutions, although transformative mainstreaming strategies,
in fact, are the only mainstreaming strategies that are considered to have
long-term effects on the equality discourses of an institution.21 I emphas-
ized that at their best mainstreaming strategies have a twofold aim: to
move issues from the margins to the mainstream and to allow the issues to
have an impact on and transform the mainstream.22
In order to manage the shift from purely integrative to transformative
mainstreaming strategies, i.e., in order to implement the twofold aim,
two aspects have crystallized themselves in this thesis as particularly im-
portant: mainstreaming strategies should be both grounded and context-
ualized. When discussing gender analysis, I emphasized the shift from
what I called strategies based on the magic of gender to grounded strategies,
i.e., while an important component of mainstreaming strategies is that
they are participatory and that individuals working with them may have
a say about their content, it is as important that different steps for suc-
cessful mainstreaming be identified and that different ways of evaluating
mainstreaming strategies be developed. Only then might the shift envis-
aged by OSAGI be effectuated, i.e., the shift from “adding a women’s
component” to “... bringing the perceptions, experience, knowledge and
interests of women as well as men to bear on policy-making, planning
and decision-making”.23
However, grounded, well-defined and critical mainstreaming strategies
do not succeed if they are not contextualized, i.e., adapted to a context,
be it institutional, process-related or framework-related, a context in
which they are supposed to function. Guidelines for mainstreaming, such
as the one developed by OSAGI serve as an aid for mainstreaming efforts.
They provide a hint as to what sort of areas a strategy for mainstreaming
a gender perspective should focus on.24 However, they do not provide in-
sights into how for example the OHCHR or a branch of the OHCHR
should go about when mainstreaming a gender perspective.
The OHCHR’s policy statement regarding Gender mainstreaming
and the human rights of women is an example of an attempt to adapt the
broad-based and system-wide strategy for mainstreaming a gender per-
21 Beveridge and Nott 2002a, see also Chapter 4.5.2.
22 See Chapter 4.5.2.
23 Gender Mainstreaming: Strategy for Promoting Gender Equality, OSAGI, 2001.
24 For an overview of the OSAGI guidelines, see www.un.org/womenwatch/osagi/gen-
dermainstreaming.htm (12-01-2004) and Chapter 4.5.2.
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spective into the specific context of the OHCHR. The policy statement
draws on the ECOSOC agreed conclusions 1997/2 on gender main-
streaming relating them to the Commission on Human Rights resolu-
tions on Integrating the Human Rights of Women throughout the United
Nations System. The policy statement attempts, then, to distinguish how
a gender perspective should be used within the human rights framework
in order to gender mainstream within the OHCHR.25 The policy state-
ment is adamant about gender analysis, but it also highlights the import-
ance of promoting women’s human rights and it contains a special em-
phasis vis-à-vis the question of trafficking. That is, the OHCHR’s strategy
for mainstreaming a gender perspective is given content or substance by
the Office’s work for women’s human rights and by one of the currently
most discussed violations of women’s human rights, viz., trafficking.
Note, however, that the policy statement does not define the different
components of the strategies for mainstreaming a gender perspective or
integrating women’s human rights and it does nor distinguish between
the strategies.26
Since the late-1990s and especially during recent years, there have
been attempts within the UN to develop and implement grounded and
contextualized mainstreaming strategies. Hence, one might argue that it
is only now that mainstreaming has been made possible. An important
aspect in the process of grounding and contextualizing the mainstreaming
strategies, however, is to include in the process an analysis of whether and
why a mainstreaming strategy would be the best solution for the sought-
after goal. That is, a strategy for mainstreaming a gender perspective
might not add anything, for example, to the work of a branch of the
OHCHR, but what the branch might need is a well-grounded and con-
textualized strategy for the integration of women’s human rights.
II Recognizing Passionate Mainstreamers
When addressing mainstreaming strategies, I made a distinction between
expert-driven and participatory mainstreaming efforts.27 To a large extent,
the UN has come to promote expert-driven mainstreaming strategies, i.e.,
the woman-centred institutions are being promoted as knowledge banks
and motors for the mainstreaming strategies and the roles of gender
units and focal points are being accentuated. Expert-driven mainstream-
ing efforts have been criticized as being counter-productive to substantial
25 Gender Mainstreaming and Human Rights of Women 2000, pp. 5–6.
26 See Chapters 5.5.2, 5.5.4 and 6.5.
27 See Chapter 4.5.2.
04-02 Iustus, Sari 8/3  04-03-08 15.31  Sidan 307
308
mainstreaming, which implies that everyone in an institution be given
the opportunity to analyze what mainstreaming means for her or his
own work. However, as was noted above, for mainstreaming strategies to
succeed, it is necessary to know what to mainstream, how to mainstream
and why to mainstream. Hence, the criticism against expert-driven
mainstreaming solutions pertains mostly to the assumption that there is
a “silver bullet” or a once and for all kind of checklist for successful
mainstreaming. Evidently expertise is needed in order to know what to
mainstream. Similarly, however, participatory mainstreaming has been
criticized, especially participatory mainstreaming efforts which, through
participation, aim at endowing an unrepresented or marginalized group
with “a voice”. Orford provides an example of how at a UN seminar on
extreme poverty, efforts were made via participation to give the poor a
voice. The seminar “... ‘broke new ground’ by inviting thirty ‘very poor
persons’ to New York to engage in ‘direct dialogue’ with UN bodies”.28
The staged participation, using thirty “very poor people” as representati-
ve for millions, well-meaning as it may be, operates to mask the extent
to which the very poor are unable to have a say in the often global poli-
tics that produce and reproduce poverty.29
Nevertheless, what tends to be overlooked in mainstreaming manuals,
but what became evident from both my analysis of the implementation
of the integrative strategies is that besides the decisions to integrate wo-
men’s human rights and to mainstream a gender perspective, besides the
mainstreaming efforts made by the woman-centred institutions, besides
gender desks and focal points and besides different structures for inter-
agency cooperation, the integrative strategies are promoted by individuals,
mostly women, within an institution who feel passionately30 about the
issues regarding equality between the sexes. Successful mainstreaming 
is not achieved through the adoption of a mainstreaming decision or
through “borrowed” experts or gender training programs alone, but
through the arduous and persistent work of, what I would call, passiona-
te mainstreamers. One could probably argue that the adoption of the stra-
tegies for integrating women’s human rights and mainstreaming a gender
perspective has legitimized and created tools for individuals within the
UN human rights system who previously had had an interest in and
concern for women’s human rights and equality issues.
28 Orford 2002, p. 280.
29 Orford 2002, p. 280.
30 I use the words “passionately” and “passionate” deliberately. Work for equality and
justice demands much knowledge and even more persistence, but it tends to demand an
equal amount of personal commitment.
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The priority given to women’s human rights and gender equality issues
during the 1990s, and the adoption and promotion of the integrative
strategies have provided legitimacy for those individuals already working
with women’s human rights and equality issues and for broad-based and
system-wide work for equality between the sexes. The chosen focuses of
work of Jahangir, the Special Rapporteur on arbitrary, extrajudicial or
summary executions and of Tomas˘evski, the Special Rapporteur on the
right to education, for example, have largely been influenced by the em-
phasis on the importance of mainstreaming a gender perspective. Simi-
larly, the General Comment No. 25 (2000) adopted by the CERD
Committee on the gender-dimension of racial discrimination and the
General Recommendation No. 28 (2000) adopted by the Human Rights
Committee on the equality of rights between women and men were, as I
have been informed, drafted by women on the committees concerned
about equality issues.
Hence, the Vienna and Beijing processes have resulted in the creation
of new policies and institutional structures, but it is the people who have
been interested in equality issues and who continue to be interested in
such issues, who push the strategies forward. That is, a decision to main-
stream will remain one among many non-implemented policy-decisions,
but for one or a few people, mostly women,31 who have a thorough
knowledge about the inequalities and injustices between the sexes and
who are committed to working for equality and justice. Hence, whatever
approach to mainstreaming is chosen, in order for mainstreaming strate-
gies to be less haphazardly implemented, it is necessary to engender and
promote more effective support structures and sufficiant resources for
those who really do the work.
31 I emphasized above that the passionate mainstreamers tend to be women and this was
also suggested by the examples from the UN human rights system. I am not suggesting
that it is only women who care for equality issues or who can work for equality issues. I
know that this is not true. However, to some extent (in practice to a large extent) it is
women who do the work in the “women’s human rights movement” and it is mostly
women who predominantly emphasize the importance of mainstreaming a gender per-
spective.
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6.3 The “Gender Turn” within the UN 
Human Rights Framework
The “gender turn” in equality politics, i.e., the shift from woman-
centred to gender-centred equality strategies can be defined as the 1990s
innovation in equality politics. When analyzing the gender turn in UN
equality politics during the Beijing process, I remarked that the term
“gender” was far from being an uncontroversial term and that many
competing and contradictory definitions of gender flourished during the
process. When providing a background to the term “gender” as one of
the preferred, but also one of the most debated, analytical categories or
relations in feminist and gender studies scholarship, I pointed out a
number of problems with respect to the usages, translations and travels
of the analytic category of gender. I have also noted that there remains a
great deal of confusion within the UN system about what gender means,
how a gender perspective should be applied in different sectors and what
its contribution should or could be.
Bacchi and Halsanger suggest that concepts such as, gender do more
than just map preexisting groups of individuals or phenomena. They can,
in fact, create and reinforce certain ways of viewing people and issues.32
Hence, while creating a category of so-called “gender issues”, or while
subsuming an array of what had been women’s or equality issues under
the banner of “gender issues”, aimed at changing how we think and
work with certain issues and at promoting equality – the result can be
rather the contrary.
In her analysis of the category of “women” and its implication for
public equality discourses, Bacchi noted that using the category of woman
showed tendencies to limit political change for women. Further, the use
of the category of woman contributed to the marginalization of women
and it forced feminists and other women’s advocates to assign a meaning
to the category of women. Bacchi notes that, by her criticism of the cate-
gory of women she does not “... suggest that feminists should refuse the
meanings assigned to ‘women’”, because deploying the category of women
and its diverse meanings might be strategically important.33 However, as
Bacchi argues
[b]y drawing attention to the political effects of different deployments of
‘women’ we can bring other items onto the agenda. [...] [W]e can draw
attention to the ways in which identity categories are themselves formed by
32 Bacchi 1996, p. 2.
33 Bacchi 1996, p. 11.
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their boundaries, by what they exclude. We can also show how talk about
‘women’ can leave some women’s needs unaddressed. This can produce a
more reflexive, responsive and progressive agenda.34
Similarly, I would argue that the success of the strategy for mainstreaming
a gender perspective might be discerned from the different meanings
that can be assigned to and that, in fact, have been assigned to the term
“gender” and to the impact of gender analysis.
I will refer here below to some of the competing meanings assigned to
the term gender and to the idea of gender analysis, which, in this thesis,
have crystallized themselves as being particularly important features of
the UN human rights system. My intention is to outline the tendencies
or trends and consequences of the following actions: (I) of interpreting
gender as an synonym to sex; (II) of interpreting gender as a synonym to
women; (III) of interpreting gender with a men-centred focus; and (IV)
of pinning down and fixing the term gender as a sex-related term which
can be delimited from other social categories such as race, ethnicity, class,
geographical origin, et cetera.
I Mainstreaming Sex
When discussing gender as an analytical category, I commented that I
prefer using what Margaret Davies has defined as a critical language of
sex instead of the by now diluted language of gender.35 Davies’ preference
for the language of sex, however, is a result of the feminist deconstruc-
tion of the sex/gender distinction and of the fading elegance of the term
gender. During the 1970s and 80s, the sex/gender distinction provided a
means to overcome assumptions about “women’s nature”. Later, how-
ever, the distinction has been criticized for giving preference to certain
types of “women’s gender”.36 The deconstruction of the sex/gender dis-
tinction for the benefit of the notion of gender has been criticized both
for taking “the body” and “real life” out of feminist analysis and for giving
a content to gender that is as ontological as sex.37 How gender has been
framed in much academic and certainly public equality discourses, ob-
scures our understanding of sex as a power-impregnated social category
interrelated to other difference-producing social categories.38
34 Bacchi 1996, p. 13.
35 Davies 1997, pp. 31–2, see also Chapter 2.2.2.
36 See Chapter 4.3.1.
37 Baridotti 1995 and Moi 1997. See also Chapter 4.3.1.
38 Braidotti 1995, see also Chapter 4.3.2.
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In the UN equality discourses the term gender is often both explicitly
and implicitly understood as meaning sex. This understanding, however,
is not a result of a wish to return to a critical language of sex or of a desire
to add a political edge to an argument, but rather the contrary.
Explicitly, the term gender has been equated with sex, for example, in
the Holy See interpretive comment to the Beijing Platform, according
to which it was urged that gender be understood as “... grounded in bio-
logical sexual identity, male or female”.39 While the Holy See recognized
that how men and women are, is culturally variable, it wished to limit
the extent to which gender was perceived as construed, viz., as merely a
matter of interpretation. Similar definitions of gender have been included
in the Statute of the International Criminal Court, which in Article 7(3)
states that “[f ]or the purpose of this Statute, it is understood that the
term ‘gender’ refers to the two sexes, male and female, within the context
of society. The term ‘gender’ does not indicate any meaning different
from the above”.40 The Durban Programme indicates a meaning similar
to the above in its first footnote. The Durban Programme includes only
two footnotes in its text. The “gender footnote” reproduces the Statute’s
definition, stating that “[f ]or the purpose of this Declaration and Pro-
gramme for Action, it was understood that the term ‘gender’ refers to the
two sexes, male and female, within the context of society. The term ‘gen-
der’ does not indicate any meaning different from the above”. The Holy
See’s interpretive comment does hold a considerable weight within the
Catholic world. The inclusion of a similar definition in the Statute of
the International Criminal Court, which remains among the few inter-
national so-called hard law documents that uses a language of gender
and the reproduction of this definition in the Durban Programme, how-
ever, does lend legitimacy to viewing gender as just another word for sex.41
Implicitly, the term gender has been equated with sex in both the
Beijing Platform and in many later attempts by different UN human
rights institutions to use a language of gender and apply a gender per-
spective. The use of terms such as “gender-segregated” data or statistics,
“gender balance”, “underrepresented gender”, et cetera, implies that the
term gender is also substituted, in addition to other usages, as another
word for sex. That is, when the Beijing Platform stresses the importance
39 UN doc. A/Conf.177/20, see also Chapter 3.5.2.
40 For a discussion, see Moshan 1998.
41 The term gender is, however, increasingly used in international law. For example, the
CRC Optional Protocol on the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography
(2000) refers to gender discrimination.
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of “gender-segregated” statistics or when the UN treaty bodies ask Mem-
ber States to in their periodic reports include “gender-segregated” statistics
asking, the Platform or the treaty bodies are asking for information dis-
tinguished by sex. The gradual shift towards a language of gender when,
in fact, nothing but sex is meant, is probably due to a confusion regard-
ing what gender means, at the same time as efforts are made to fulfill the
gender mainstreaming objective.
The above referred to explicit and implicit tendencies to interpret
gender as sex do however not promote what Davies has referred to as a
critical language of sex. Instead, the above tendencies undermine the po-
tential critical edge of gender. That is, they reaffirm ideas of women’s and
men’s identities as fixed and natural. They undermine attempts to allow
women and men to break out of their traditional roles. They undermine
analysis where gender is viewed as one of many social dimensions that
have an effect on our lives. At the same time, given that gender is a con-
cept that seems to be difficult to understand, the practice of using gen-
der as sex undermines one of the positive effects of sex, which is that
most people know what is meant by sex. Moreover, as the term gender is
introduced into legal language with content overlapping with and similar
to sex, the mélange of gender and sex, at some stage, will have an influ-
ence on the interpretation of non-discrimination clauses that, still, tend
to use a language of sex.
II Mainstreaming Only Women
The shift from woman-centred to gender-centred equality politics was
seen by women’s advocates and other proponents of the strategy for
mainstreaming a gender perspective as an attempt to do away with view-
ing women as the problem in equality politics to problematizing, instead,
the inequalities and injustices reproduced in the “gender relationship”.
According to Flax, the notion of gender relations is meant to capture the
complex set of social relations that refer to a changing set of historically
variable, gender- and power-impregnated social relations.42 That is, ana-
lyzing how inequalities between the sexes are produced and reproduced,
entails making a shift from targeting women to targeting the historical
and social arrangement of the sexes. With respect to equality politics, the
shift from woman-centred to gender-centred strategies entails a shift from
viewing women as the problem, to viewing unequal and oppressive gender
relations as the problem.
42 Flax 1987, p. 628 and Svensson 1997 and 2001. See also Chapter 2.2.2.
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Within the UN human rights framework, the strategy for mainstream-
ing a gender perspective, however, has occasionally come to be mainly a
strategy for mainstreaming women or women’s gender. In Chapter Five, I
noted that some of the UN human rights institutions had come to inter-
pret the strategy as a strategy for mainstreaming a concern for women. That
is, when addressing the efforts of the Security Council and the General
Assembly with regards the integrative strategies, I noted that the two in-
stitutions had fulfilled their mainstreaming mandate through adding “a
concern for women”.43 I characterized as positive any expressions of con-
cern offered by institutions, which traditionally had failed to indicate
any concern over women’s human rights or equality issues. However, I
also noted that these expressions of concern tended to force women into
traditional roles as being either especially vulnerable human beings and
victims or as being especially caring or good peace-builders.44
The strategy for mainstreaming a gender perspective was, however,
promoted as a strategy that would target both women and men. The
shift in focus from a woman only focus to a focus on gender relations,
implies a shift from viewing inequalities and injustices between the sexes
as a “women’s issue” to viewing them as everybody’s concern and as a
product of the social construction of unequal gender relations. When
the term gender is used as just another word for woman, the shift from
woman-centred to gender-centred approaches is undermined, at the
same time as women, as well as women’s very material concerns with
respect to especially economic and social rights run the risk of being
marginalized even more, as they are discussed as non-material and sex-
neutral “gender issues”.
III Mainstreaming Only Men
The Cairo conference was a forerunner with regard to using a critical
approach, which focuses on both women and men. The Cairo Program-
me emphasized that “[m]en play a key role in bringing about gender
equality since, in most societies, men exercise proponderent power in
nearly every sphere of life”.45 That is, by focusing on reproduction and
violence against women, the Cairo Programme did note that women do
43 For further references to the notion of mainstreaming a concern for women, see
Chapter 5.2.
44 See Otto’s (1999) discussion regarding women’s “allowed” identities in the Beijing
Platform in Chapter 3.5.2. See also the analysis of the Security Council’s woman-
centred initiatives in Chapter 5.2.2.
45 Cairo Programme, Chapter 4, Art. 24.
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not by themselves produce inequalities and injustices. Therefore, strategies
for equality and justice should focus on both women and men. The
Beijing Platform, however, downplayed the critical approach in favor of
a partnership approach, according to which men and women are equal
partners in the common equality project. For example, in accordance
with the Beijing Mission Statement, “... women share common concerns
that can be addressed only by working together and in partnership with
men towards the common goal of gender equality around the world”.46
The Draft Beijing Platform Art. 224, however, included references to a
critical partnership approach, similar to the one found in the Cairo Pro-
gramme. The Draft Beijing Platform focused partnership between
women and men, and women’s and men’s shared responsibility within
the spheres of sexuality and reproduction. According to draft Art. 224:
[c]hanges in both men’s and women’s knowledge, attitudes and behaviour
are necessary for achieving harmonious partnerships between women and
men. It is essential to improve communication between women and men
on issues of shared responsibility, including sexuality and reproductive
health, so that women and men are equal partners in public and private life.
Special efforts are needed to emphasize men’s shared responsibility and pro-
mote their active involvement in responsible parenthood and sexual and
reproductive behaviour.
The article was deleted from the Beijing Platform47 – possibly because
the proposed interpretation of the partnership approach was to change
oriented. Braidotti has criticized the academic “gender turn” for promot-
ing an assumption about a new symmetry between the sexes.48 That is,
feminists or gender studies scholars, in their attempts to recognize diffe-
rence have done away with a feminist power analysis according to which
the production of difference includes production of power-impregnated
hierarchies. Similarly, the shift in focus between the Cairo, the Beijing
and the Beijing+5 conferences has undermined the critical and relational
potential of gender analysis.
While the UN strategy for mainstreaming a gender perspective does
not seem to be promoted with much critical and relational content, some
of the interviewees noted, however, that there was an openness towards
giving attention to both women’s and men’s genders, but that there was,
still, very little knowledge about how such an effect should be achieved.49
During recent years the UN has begun to promote gender approaches
46 Beijing Mission Statement, Art. 3.
47 UN doc. A/Conf.177/L.3, Art. 224.
48 Braidotti 1995, p. 151.
49 Interviews Nos. 1, 4, 6 and 13.
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and gender projects that focus on men and on the construction of mas-
culinities in different contexts. For example, the Special Rapporteur on
violence against women has focused on the idealization of violent male
personalities and on the construction of violent forms of masculinities.50
In October 2003 the Division for the Advancement of Women did or-
ganize an expert meeting and online discussion under the title of The
Role of Men and Boys in Achieving Gender Equality. The meeting served
as part of the Division’s preparations for the Commission on the Status
of Women’s March 2004 session, at which the Commission on the Sta-
tus of Women focused on the issue of The Role of Men and Boys in Gen-
der Equality. Outside the realm of the women’s human rights-centred
and human rights-centred institutions, The UN has also initiated a grow-
ing number of men-centred gender projects.51
The men-centred approaches to gender and men-centred gender pro-
jects and programmes are interesting. When dealing with issues, such as
reproduction and gender-based violence, they can contribute to a better
understanding of inequalities and injustices between the sexes and to the
promotion of equality and justice. However, as I noted when addressing
critical male and masculinity studies, men-centred approaches are not
necessarily about promoting equality.52 Men-centred approaches are of-
ten about advancing knowledge about men and the construction of
masculinities and about teaching men about themselves and construc-
tions of masculinities. The fact that men-centred approaches are not al-
ways about equality is noted in the From Beijing to Beijing+5 report.
The report states that
[e]fforts to work with men must, however, always be put in the overall con-
text of promoting gender equality and eliminating the adverse social and
cultural values, institutional structures and processes that produce inequali-
ties between women and men. Increased attention to men should not mean
a deviation from committed support to women by reducing the funding
available for women-targeted inputs. Nor should it suggest the abandon-
ment of support to women’s individual or collective initiatives.53
50 UN doc. E/CN.4/1998/54 and UN doc. E/CN.4/2002/83. See Chapter 5.3.2.
51 Some exemples include the INSTRAW project on Men’s Roles and Responsibilities on
Ending Gender-based Violence, see www.un-instraw.org/en/research/mensroles/index.html
(12-01-2004); the UNICEF has also promote project dealing with men and boys and gen-
der-based violence, see www.unicef.org/gender/index.html (12-01-2004); the UNAIDS
Men and Aids – A Gendered Approach, which was part of the UNAIDS World Aids Cam-
paign 2000, see www.thebody.com/unaids/men/contents.html (12-01-2004); and the
UNDP programme for Men and Gender Equality, see www.sdnp.undp.org/gender/pro-
grammes/men/ (12-01-2004).
52 See Chapter 4.3.2.
53 From Beijing to Beijing+5 2000, p. 10.
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The men-centred approaches are very important, but they are not neces-
sarily about promoting equality, and they are certainly not about pro-
moting women’s human rights – that is, for some reason, men-centred
approaches are very seldom about men and women.
IV Mainstreaming Nothing but Gender
In the beginning of this chapter, I referred to Orford’s cautionary com-
ment, according to which we needed to carefully analyze whose game
gender plays.54 Spivak addresses the internationalization of the gender
concept, noting that “[t]here just is no way to sponsor global cultural
studies made easy without falling into neo-colonialism”.55 In Chapter
Four, I cited Haraway who argued that while at times feminist scholars
have attempted to hold “... race, sex/gender and class analytically to-
gether”, the “three” are always reduced to “two”, which “... quickly be-
come lonely ones in the vanguard”.56 These things, as Haraway notes,
“matters politically”.57 Beveridge and Nott have noted that:
[i]t is logically impossible in the long term to pursue a strategy which re-
quires a focus on the real lives of people, a strategy which calls attention to
factors which lie behind their inequality, their poverty, their exclusion and
which examines the processes which produces that inequality, poverty or
exclusion, and to see only gender. While the moment may yet be distant
where it is appropriate to abandon ‘women’s policy’ or ‘gender policy’ at a
strategic level, it is suggested that on a theoretical level the mainstreaming
concept calls into question the privileged position within many social insti-
tutions of ‘gender’ as opposed to race, ethnicity, religion, economic status,
age, (dis)ability and other factors which operate as a challenge to the liberal
orthodoxy and the neutrality of law.58
That is, the language of gender and the promotion of the strategy for
mainstreaming a gender perspective, in the way that OSAGI does it, viz.,
as a “... globally accepted strategy for promoting gender equality” reduces
the complexities of global sex-based and intersecting inequalities and in-
justices.59 The potential reductionism hides both global inequalities and
injustices and differences between groups of women and men. In diffe-
rent contexts of the UN, particularly in conjunction with the Durban
54 Orford 2002, p. 293. See also Chapter 6.1.
55 Spivak 1999, p. 105.
56 Haraway 1991, pp. 128–9.
57 Haraway 1991, pp. 128–9.
58 Beveridge and Nott 2002a, p. 311.
59 See at www.un.org/womenwatch/osagi/gendermainstreaming.htm (12-01-2004).
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60 The strategies for identifying and fighting multi-dimensional discrimination are also
dependent on a category politics, which can, as was noted in Chapter 3.3.1 have de-
trimental effects.
Conference and in the work of the CERD Committee, efforts have been
made to analyze the interconnections between gender and race, and to
approach the gender-dimension of racial discrimination. These ap-
proaches, however, are not dominant approaches.60 The “gender turn” in
UN equality politics however, has reproduced an understanding of gen-
der, which has a strong focus on women’s and men’s genders without
necessarily viewing gender as an analytical dimension that relates to the
other difference-producing and power-impregnated analytical dimensions.
Above I have referred to a number of shortcomings regarding how the
strategy for mainstreaming a gender perspective has been approached
within the UN human rights framework. The shortcomings are analyt-
ical, but with considerable legal, political and practical implications. I
have, especially, emphasized the tendencies to equate “gender” with sex,
with only women, with only men and with only “gender”, i.e., as un-
related and separate from other difference-producing categories and
relations. The “gender turn”, nevertheless, has been fairly successful in
the sense that what was once, at the beginning of the 1990s the new
language for public equality polities, has become, by 2003, the domi-
nant language used in UN equality politics.
6.4 The Reintegration of Women’s Human Rights
From the outset, the UN-based human rights regime included women
as subjects of human rights and attempted to foster the equal and non-
discriminatory promotion and protection of human rights. The early
international human rights regime, however, was seldom interpreted as
emphasizing equal rights between women and men. The International
Bill of Rights remained a blunt instrument for women’s rights advocates.
However, the early woman-centred human rights regime codified what
was called women’s human rights, but the early instruments, such as the
Convention on the Political Rights of Women, did not reinterpret human
rights. These early instruments were mainly attempts to insist that
women be acknowledged as rights’ holders in a human rights context.
Later, woman-centred human rights instruments, such as the CEDAW,
included attempts to reinterpret human rights and to insert new rights
into the human rights framework. The creation of separate women’s
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human rights instruments and, as was also the case, separate UN institu-
tions for the advancement of women and women’s human rights, actually
resulted in increased attention being paid to women’s human rights, but
brought about a marginalization of women’s human rights within the
overall human rights framework. The post-Cold War “human rights
turn” in international politics, however, opened up a window for the
rights claims of feminists and other alternative groups. The 1990s have
been the decade when human rights went from being one of many Cold
War battlegrounds to becoming a core area of international, regional
and national law and politics. Different groups, including women’s
groups, have been able to use this space for making their, at times, con-
flicting, rights-claims.
While both the creation of specific woman-centred human rights
instruments and the current emphasis on the integration of women’s hu-
man rights might be seen as necessary strategies for providing adequate
attention to women as rights holders and for acknowledging how women’s
human rights are violated, these same strategies are also symptoms of the
paradox of feminism.61 That is, since the establishment of the UN and
the adoption of the Universal Declaration, women have had, at least in a
formal sense, the same rights and have been considered equal to other
humans. In reality, due to the historical and structural exclusions of
women from the power-dense spheres of life and the discrimination of
women, women have neither had the same rights nor the equal status.
Hence, women as rights holders and women’s human rights have had to
be promoted via a differentiation between women and other humans,
and thereby supporting the notion that women are the exception, while
others are the norm. The adoption of the Vienna strategy for the pro-
motion and integration of women’s human rights aims at continuing the
trend of transforming the UN human rights framework, at the same time
as it aims at overcoming the split between human rights and women’s
human rights and the marginalization of the latter body of rights. As
shall be shown below, the Vienna strategy, however, does not, break out
of the paradox.
During this thesis-process three ideas have crystallized themselves as
especially important for the inchoateness of the strategy for integrating
women’s human rights. The three elements include: (I) the distinction be-
tween human rights and women’s human rights, i.e., the aforementioned
61 The so-called “paradox of feminism” or the “feminist dilemma”, a paradox and dilem-
ma largely shared with other movements and advocacy groups attempting to promote
the position or rights of a specific group, has been addressed previously in this thesis in
Chapters 3.2.1, 3.5.2, 5.3.3 and 5.5.
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paradox or dilemma; (II) the overly successful collectivism of women’s
human rights; and (III) the thematic approach to women’s human rights.
The three ideas or issues are largely interlinked.
I Human Rights versus Women’s Human Rights
Earlier, I referred to the paradox of feminism, an entanglement by which
feminists are wedged in by their own argumentation in furtherance of
women’s equality. The trap, albeit, as it seems, an unavoidable one, is that
any sort of differentiation of women from all humans vitiates or impairs
the opportunity of approaching women as any sort of human beings. Yet
by not differentiating women from other human beings, tends to lead to
an exclusion of women and women’s concerns. The paradox of feminism
has been reproduced within the UN human rights system, first, with the
separation between women’s human rights and human human rights,
secondly, with the emphasis on the integration of women’s human rights
into the overall human rights framework. With regard to the strategy for
the integration of women’s human rights the paradox crystallizes itself in
two different ways. First, it has contributed to the development of the
two overlapping integrative strategies at the Vienna and Beijing conferen-
ces. Second, it contributes to the hesitations regarding what, in fact,
should be integrated?
The Vienna and Beijing strategies have developed in and emerged
from separate, albeit interlinked human rights and women’s advance-
ment frameworks within the UN. The world conference processes repro-
duce the distinction between women’s human rights and human human
rights. Or, rather, they tend to reproduce the dual nature of the UN
women’s human rights framework as both a part of the UN human rights
framework and a part of the UN women’s advancement and gender
equality framework. That is, the world conference processes reproduce
the paradox of feminism: women remain both within and beyond, they
are included, yet different (or treated differently).
The adoption of the Vienna strategy for the promotion and the integ-
ration of women’s human rights aimed at overcoming the split between
human rights and women’s human rights and the marginalization of the
latter body of rights, at the same time as it aims at continuing the
ongoing trend of transforming the UN human rights framework, which
has been in play since the adoption of DEDAW (1967). Assumptions
have been made that the Vienna strategy was further developed at the
Beijing conference. These assumptions, however, are only partially true.
The Beijing Platform furthered the Vienna Programme’s “integrative
agenda”, i.e., through the adoption of the strategy for mainstreaming a
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gender perspective. The Beijing Platform put an edge on the idea of integ-
ration.62 However, with regard to human rights, specifically, the Beijing
Platform reaffirmed the Vienna Programme’s emphasis on institutional
integration, at the same time as it reformulated the Vienna Programme’s
women’s human rights language in women’s rights terms.
The strategy for integrating women’s human rights has not been as
well developed as the strategy for mainstreaming a gender perspective.63
In UN practice different interpretations of what it means to integrate
women’s human rights, however, have developed.64 The dominant inter-
pretations, or the dominant practices, have been a CEDAW-centred and
institutional approach to the integration of women’s human rights. That
is, the focus, to a large extent, has been on bringing the CEDAW frame-
work closer to the human human rights framework through the
strengthening of the CEDAW and through an emphasis on increased in-
stitutional cooperation. The efforts to strengthen and integrate the CE-
DAW has had a fair amount of success during the last decade, i.e., the
CEDAW is now, placed on the same footing as the other human rights
treaties within the UN human rights treaty body system, not in the least
because of the adoption of the Optional Protocol to the CEDAW.
The CEDAW-centred approach counteracts the CEDAW’s position
as the “poor relation of the treaty bodies”.65 It can be suggested that the
CEDAW-centred and the institutional approaches to the integration of
women’s human rights contribute to strengthening the legal and institu-
tional framework for women’s human rights. However, neither approach
by itself will lead to the realization of women’s human rights, in actuality.
Implementing the strategy for integrating women’s human rights
through nothing but a CEDAW-centred approach can lead to an excessi-
ve focus on formal advances and on law in the realization of women’s
human rights. For example, when the General Assembly or the human
rights treaty bodies apply a CEDAW-centred approach to the integration
of women’s human rights, they tend to focus on the “three R’s” (ratifica-
tion, reservations and reporting), i.e., they emphasize the importance of
ratifying the CEDAW, of withdrawing reservations from the CEDAW
and of reporting to the CEDAW Committee. The “three R’s” are impor-
62 I have in this thesis used the terms mainstreaming and integration interchangeably, as
the terms in the UN framework are used as synonyms. However, the success of the
“mainstreaming” language and the development of mainstreaming strategies in the after-
math of the Beijing conference provides an edge to integration.
63 See Chapter 4.6.3.
64 See Chapter 5.
65 Bustelo 2000, p. 81.
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tant for strengthening and consolidating the UN human rights frame-
work and its standing as a global framework, but as was noted in Chap-
ter One, the adoption of treaties and of new institutional structures only
means going halfway or less to changing practices in actuality.
It can be said that the creation of specific women’s human rights regi-
mes have failed to bring about the inclusion of women and the inclusion
of rights crucial for women’s well-being into the core of the UN human
rights framework. The inclusions might, however, occur with the wearing
down over time of old interpretations of human rights and with the de-
fying of silences at a crossroads and meeting-place for international law-
making.66
II Overly Successful Collectivism
While the early 1990s women’s movement, gathered under the slogan
Women’s rights are human rights contributed to moving women and certain
violations of women’s human rights into the limelight, it also contributed
to the tendencies to view women as a collectivity and to identify women’s
human rights by way of certain, fairly well specified, thematic rights.
The overly successful collectivism of the women’s human rights approach
and the thematic approaches to women’s human rights, as I have named
them, have resulted in a shift from women’s individual rights to an in-
creasingly collective approach to women’s human rights, and they have
also resulted in a preference for thematic approaches with regard to
women’s human rights. Hence, while collective approaches can be positive
and rewarding, they have, nonetheless, with regard to women’s human
rights, been furthered at the expense of identifying and acknowledging
each woman’s right to her individuality and her individual rights, as well
as at the expense of identifying and acknowledging socioeconomic and
other disparities affecting women’s situations. I will here address the
consequences of the overly successful collectivism, while the consequences
of the thematic approach will be addressed under the next heading.
When addressing the “gender turn”, I noted that the strategy for main-
streaming a gender perspective, when promoted as the globally accepted
strategy for gender equality, led to the hiding of global scale inequalities
and injustices. These inquires include not only sex-based inequalities
and injustices, but also economic and social inequalities and injustices.
66 Nevertheless, in order for the wearing down process to promote equality and justice,
and not produce new inequalities and injustices (or disguise the old one’s), it is necessary
to recognize that everyone is not represented at the international law meeting place –
and that lack of representation is certainly not democratic.
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Similarly, the collectivism of the woman’s human rights approach can
lead to an erosion of some of the basic ideas behind human rights, i.e.,
that the human rights framework provides rights for the individual and
aim at protecting the individual from violations committed primarily by
the state, but increasingly also by other actors. While the idea of the auto-
nomous individual has been one of the issues criticized by feminists, some
feminist scholars, such as Smart and Salecl have attempted to save the
autonomous individual and the focus on her or his individual rights.67
The focus on individual rights is also one of the aspects emphasized as
the strength of a rights-based approach.68 Hence, the women’s-human-
rights-are-human-rights movement and some of the ways in which the
UN discourse about women’s human rights have developed run the risk
of undermining core benefits of the human rights framework.
III The Thematic Approach to Women’s Human Rights
Much of the success of the post-Cold War women’s human rights dis-
course is due to its identification of certain thematic women’s human
rights violations under the aegis of which, the broad-based women’s hu-
man rights approach has been promoted. The women’s human rights
discourse has been especially successful with regard to the question of
violence against women and the assertion that violence against women is
a violation of human rights. The “violence theme”, while, as Otto has
noted “... designed with careful attention to women’s diverse experiences
of violence” has come to give priority to certain types of violence.69 The
discourse has especially focused on different forms of harmful traditional
practices, identified in the early 1990s largely by the issue of female
genital mutilation and now, today by the issue of so-called honor crimes.70
Another key theme that has crystallized itself is trafficking. In the early
1990s the trafficking and sex trade discourses, to a large extent, were
focused on the sex trade in children in South East Asia, while the key
focus during recent years has been on the trafficking in women from
former Eastern Bloc countries.71 The themes constitute pressing concerns
with regard to women’s human rights, but the “thematic approach”
might misdirect the focus from, for example, underlying economic and
social inequalities and injustices.
67 Salecl 1994 and Smart 1989. See also Chapter 2.3.1.
68 See Chapter 4.6.2.
69 Otto 1999, p.124.
70 See Chapters 1.2.1 and 2.3.3.
71 Kouvo 2003.
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Bacchi’s What is the problem? approach emphasized the need of a shift
of focus from what has been defined as the problem to how the problem
has been defined. This shift of focus allows us to analyze the short-
comings of our definition of the problem, it enables us to analyze how
political platforms, policies and strategies for equality, while furthering
equality at one level, reproduce exclusions or injustices at other levels.
The women’s human rights approach has moved some women and some
women’s human rights from the margins towards the core. The women’s
human rights approach has, however, also come to reproduce an exclusion
of both so-called second and third generation rights. Otto has, for ex-
ample, noted that while the post-Cold War women’s human rights cam-
paign was “... not conceived as an assertion of civil and political rights
to the exclusion of other categories of rights”, it has unfortunately, in its
production of “... the masculinist form and content of human rights
law” come to assert some rights at the expense of others.72
Consequently, the global women’s human rights strategy has had the un-
intended effect of endorsing the post-Cold War dominance of civil and po-
litical rights.73
The overly successful collectivism, and the priority given to a thematic
approach to women’s human rights has simplified the idea of what
women’s human rights are. As Engle notes, when discussing feminist ap-
proaches to the tensions between women’s human rights and human
rights:
[t]he literature and the movement surrounding women’s human rights has
possibly challenged the human rights core more than any other literature
and movement. At the same time, it has become one of the core’s staunchest
defenders. Even as every author identifies and conveys difficulties with the
discourse, they all make it somehow work for them. The core is shaken, but
it remains. Women are still on the periphery.74
Attempts to push the notion of women’s human rights forward along
with the new interpretation of what women’s human rights are and what
should be included in the human rights framework have also contributed
to the tendency to address all issues as human rights issues. That is, it is
not asked whether using a human rights framework or using a rights’
rhetoric would be beneficial for the sought-after goal. The danger with
successful and well-traveling concepts is that the general public, politi-
cians, policy-makers, lawyers and the media may grow tired of the subject
72 Otto 1999, p. 123.
73 Otto 1999, p. 124.
74 Engle 1992a, p. 605.
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matter without really having dealt with the core of the problem. This
idea is one of the conclusions reached by the Special Rapporteur on vio-
lence against women; she noted that while laws against violence against
women have been adopted during the last decade, reality lags behind.
6.5 Submerged Strategies and Multiple
Mainstreaming
Social constructivist and discursive methods, which in this thesis have
been approached mainly through Bacchi’s What is the problem? approach,
are based on a recognition that knowledge is historically, culturally and
socially contingent. We, scholars, to use Haraway’s words, speak from the
belly of the monster, i.e., we cannot avoid interpreting facts through the
lenses of our history, culture and social contexts. As Bacchi emphasizes,
we, feminist scholars and policy makers, change reality when analyzing,
for example issues regarding women’s inequality.75 While disturbing social
conditions certainly do exist, these issues are, as Bacchi notes “... once
they are given the shape of an interpretation, once they are characterized
as a ‘problem’ [...] no longer real”.76 That is, our interpretation of the
problem and our proposed solutions, might have less to do with the
issue at hand, than with prejudices and political constraints.
In Chapter Two, I underlined that the recognition that knowledge is
subjective and situated and the recognition that we cannot but interpret
reality should not be perceived as excuses for bad research or for dis-
engagement in the pressing inequalities and injustices experienced and
lived by people in the contemporary global community. Rather, the con-
trary should be true. The acknowledgement of knowledge as situated
enables us to avoid the “god trick”, i.e., to avoid claiming that our
knowledge and our vision of the world are objective and universal.77 It
also forces us to constantly question our knowledge claims and what our
partial visions do to the world.
In accordance with the above assertions, it is also impossible to develop
and implement strategies for equality, such as, the strategies for main-
streaming a gender perspective or for integrating women’s human rights,
without these strategies themselves becoming affected in some way by
the very contexts in which they were developed and crafted by some
75 Bacchi 1999, pp. 1–13. See also Chapter 2.3.3.
76 Bacchi 1999, p. 9, see also Chapter 2.3.3.
77 Haraway 1991, p. 189.
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78 The mutations of the strategies for mainstreaming a gender perspective and integrat-
ing women’s human rights were analysed in Chapters 6.3 and 6.4.
shortcomings which often go unrecognized or unnoticed at the outset
and without the strategies mutating in sometimes rather surprising ways
upon implementation.78
The “belly of the monster”, the inescapable context of the integrative
strategies, is the biased history and realities of human rights, which have
resulted in the dominance of certain rights frameworks, and which have
contributed to the separation of women’s human rights from the overall
human rights framework. However, the blame the strategy approach, as I
have called it, tends to be somewhat shortsighted. Because of this flaw or
feature, the integrative strategies were developed less with a focus on
historical and structural injustices resulting in the silencing of many
women’s experiences and the marginalization of women’s human rights
and of women as rights’ holders. Rather, the integrative strategies were
developed with a focus on the shortcomings of the most recent equality
experiments. That is, the integrative strategies have developed to serve as
add-ons and to remedy the shortcomings or woman-centred equality
strategies and of the marginalizing effects of having, within the overall
UN human rights framework, a separate women’s human rights frame-
work. It is uncontestable and irrefutable that the integrative strategies
have contributed to the erosion of the dominant notion that inequalities
and injustices between the sexes are “women’s issues” to be dealt with in
and by a “women’s margins”. Equality has become a concern and a goal
expressed by many. There are, however, no easy solutions to adjust com-
plex and multi-layered patterns of inequality and injustice. No one strat-
egy will lead to equality or justice and most strategies have unintended
consequences.
The development of the different approaches to and the different
strategies for the promotion of equality between the sexes in Vienna and
Beijing seems unintentional. The difference in the subject matter to be
integrated and targeted is not a result of deliberate choice, but a result,
rather, of the different contexts and focuses of the Vienna and Beijing
conferences. Similarly the parallel development of the two dual strategies
is not a result of deliberate choice, but, rather, again, a result of the inter-
governmental and institutional structures within the UN that promote
the dual nature of the UN women’s human rights schemes as part of
both the UN human rights framework and of its women’s advancement
and gender equality framework. The Vienna conference was a human
rights conference, and it addressed women’s human rights as part of the
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human rights framework and with the primary focus of strengthening
the position of women’s human rights within the UN human rights
framework. The Beijing conference was a women’s conference. It addres-
sed women’s human rights as one of many areas to be targeted in order
to “advance women and gender equality”. The strategy for mainstrea-
ming a gender perspective, in and of itself, has nothing to do with the
human rights framework. Because it has come to be promoted in the
Beijing process and in its aftermath as the system-wide and broad-based
strategy, it has also come to be adopted into and have an effect on the
UN human rights framework. As I have suggested, it has also taken over
the strategy for integrating women’s human rights.
The two dual strategies, and especially their integrative strategies have,
however, become gradually submerged when developed for and imple-
mented within the UN human rights framework. When addressing the
five-year review of the Vienna conference, I noted that the five-year re-
view report of the High Commissioner for Human Rights to the General
Assembly emphasized the strategy for mainstreaming a gender perspective,
which, according to the report, was a result of both the Vienna and the
Beijing conferences.79 The five-year review of the High Commissioner for
Human Rights to the Commission on Human Rights includes a similar
reference. In accordance with the report:
[o]ne of the important means of achieving the objective of full respect for
the human rights of women is the mainstreaming of the human rights of
women in the activities of the human rights programme and in all activities
of the United Nations. The Secretary-General has taken the lead in imple-
menting the Economic and Social Council agreed conclusions relating to
gender mainstreaming throughout the United Nations system. The High
Commissioner is intensifying efforts to integrate a gender perspective in all
human rights activities and to help ensure that the human rights of women
are included as an important element of all activities of the system.80
The citation suggests that the strategies for mainstreaming women’s human
rights and a gender perspective are viewed as two mutually reinforcing
strategies, but the specificities are not especially highlighted. Similar
references are made in Secretary-General’s reports presented to the Com-
mission on Human Rights first under the agenda item on Further Pro-
motion and Encouragement of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
and during later years under the agenda item on Integration of the Human
79 UN doc. A/53/327, Arts. 40 and 43.
80 UN doc. E/CN.4/1998/122, Art. 82.
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Rights of Women and the Gender Perspective, entitled The Question of Inte-
grating the Human Rights of Women throughout the United Nations
System.81 The reports include different definitions of certain terminology,
viz., integration of women’s rights, on the one hand, on the other hand,
the mainstreaming of a gender perspective means. The report prepared
for the Commission on Human Rights session in 1998 included the fol-
lowing definitions of “mainstreaming”, “mainstreaming women’s human
rights” and “gender mainstreaming”:
(7) Mainstreaming involves the placing of an issue within the pre-existing
institutional, academic and discursive framework. It is the opposite of mar-
ginalisation and, as such, is an appropriate way to characterize the object-
ive of gender-perspective integration.
(8) Not only does the issue need to be placed within the pre-existing
structures, it needs to be a constant consideration which is central to every
aspect of the work of that structure. The aim of mainstreaming women’s
human rights is to ensure that the inevitable social construction of men’s
and women’s respective roles does not permit a discriminatory bias which
subordinates women to men or places women in any kind of inferior posi-
tion.
(9) Gender mainstreaming is thus the process of bringing an awareness of
the status of women into the public arena, this primarily involves realizing
that there is a gender dimension to every occurrence of a human rights viol-
ation. Secondarily, it involves increasing women’s participation in the mech-
anisms dedicated to protecting and promoting human rights. Moreover,
coordination and cooperation between different parts of the United Nations
system must be strengthened if mainstreaming is to have a lasting impact
on the way human rights work is executed.82
The definitions provide for a very interesting mélange of the different
strategies and what is thought to be necessary prerequisites for and the
goals of mainstreaming women’s human rights and a gender perspective.
As can be noted, the mainstreaming of women’s human rights is defined
as a tool for fighting discriminatory effects of the social construction of
women’s and men’s roles, rather than as a strategy that derives its force
81 E/CN.4/1998/49/Add.1, UN doc. E/CN.4/1999/67, UN doc. E/CN.4/1999/67/
Add.1, UN doc. E/CN.4/2000/67, UN doc. E/CN.4/2001/71 and UN doc. E/CN.
4/2002/81, UN doc. E/2003 (early version) and UN doc. E/CN.4/2003/72.
82 UN doc. E/CN.4/1998/49. Arts. 7–9. See also UN doc. E/CN.4/1999/67, Arts.
8–10. In a later report the definition is submerged into one article, see UN doc. E/
CN.4/2000/67, Art. 8. Note that the two definitions have been excluded from the year
2000 and 2001 reports, see UN doc. E/CN.4/2001/71 and UN doc. E/CN.4/2002/81.
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from already codified women’s human rights and that aims at promoting
women’s human rights. Gender mainstreaming is defined as having a very
strong woman-centred content, i.e., as being a strategy for furthering
awareness about women’s status and for promoting women’s participation
in and position within the UN human rights framework.
The partial submersion of the two strategies and, especially, the lack
of efforts to distinguish between the two strategies encumber the imple-
mentation of the strategies with unnecessary burdens. These encum-
brances can undermine the potential of and the implementation of each
specific strategy.
The submersion of the policy-based strategy for mainstreaming a
gender with the strategy for integrating women’s human rights can un-
dermine the woman-focus and the law-focus of the latter strategy. First,
the fact that women are rights’ holders on equal terms with men and
that, en plus, women’s human rights have been codified in, for example,
the CEDAW can be both strategically important and empowering. Sub-
merging the strategy for integrating women’s human rights with the
strategy for mainstreaming a gender perspective sabotages the “woman
focus” or the first mentioned strategy. The strategy for integrating women’s
human rights is a woman-centred strategy and it is so for good reasons,
because, de facto, in many parts of the world, women enjoy neither basic
civil and political nor basic economic, social and cultural rights. Secondly,
the idea of human rights law carries with it a considerable amount of
good will. It is imbued with a certain amount of good will. The policy-
based strategy for mainstreaming a gender perspective can end up sabo-
taging the force of the law argument both by undermining the distinction
between human rights law and soft law or policy, and by undermining
the focus on individual rights.83 The argument that women’s human
rights are legal rights and, therefore, they should be implemented, has a
rather dubious record of success. International human rights’ laws focus
on individual rights has been criticized for its “Western” and “male” biases.
Nevertheless, when arguments for human rights law are expressed, it is
often the law-argument and the individual rights argument, which are
emphasized as the benefits or strengths of international human rights.84
The submersion of the strategy for integrating women’s human rights
with the strategy for mainstreaming a gender perspective, on the other
83 Similar points of views were expressed by Salecl (1994) and Smart (1989). See Chap-
ter 2.3.1.
84 See for example Chapters 2.3.1, 2.3.2 and 4.6.2.
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hand, leads to a woman-only focus and undermines the transformative
potential of gender analysis. A gender perspective, at its best, can be used
to overthrow taken-for-granted truths about women and men. And a
gender analysis of the diversity of women and men and, especially, of the
gender relationship, can enable us to identify new reasons for inequalities
and injustices and to develop new models for solving “gender-based”
inequalities and injustices. The women’s human rights perspective un-
intentionally added as an integral component of a gender perspective
implies a shift in focus from gender (relations) to women. Similarly the
human rights framework fixes the focus of a gender analysis defining what
issues a gender analysis should target, creating a preference for rights-based
solutions.
The strategy for integrating women’s human rights, however, can bene-
fit from the strategy of mainstreaming a gender perspective and vice versa,
but in order for these two strategies to support rather than undermine
each other, their difference needs to be defined and utilized. When the
strategies are decisively or definitively distinguished from each other, the
potential of each one can be used to support advances in women’s
human rights and gender equality. In Chapters Four and Five, I touched
upon issues relating to “multi-dimensional” and “double” mainstream-
ing approaches noting, however, that, to date, there seem to be few
examples within the UN human rights framework where different main-
streaming strategies, and especially the strategies for mainstreaming
women’s human rights and a gender perspectives, are used in support of
each other.85 Deploying “multi-dimensional” mainstreaming approaches
and “double” mainstreaming approach as defined by the Special Rap-
porteur on education, Tomas˘evski, will probably become increasingly
common. This prediction is based on two suppositions, first, because
promotion within specialized schemes is viewed as an insufficient mechan-
ism, and secondly because mainstreaming strategies have become so
common that it is inevitable that they overlap.
Tomas˘evski argues that it is only by using both a gender perspective
and a women’s human rights-based approach that the rights of girls and
85 Chinkin promotes, for example, in her Gender Mainstreaming in Constitutional and
Legal Affairs (2001) what she calls a rights-based approach to gender mainstreaming.
The World Health Organization has also with respect issues regarding reproduction
adopted gender- and rights-based approaches. See www.who.int/reproductivehealth/gen-
der/tools.html (28-09-2003), www.who.int/reproductive-health/gender/modules.html (28-
09-2003), www. who.int/reproductive-health/mps/index.htm (28-09-2003), www.who.
int/health_topics/ gender (28-09-2003).
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women to education will be sufficiently protected.86 The gender perspec-
tive enables one to perform an analysis of why, how and with what conse-
quences women are discriminated against vis-à-vis educational matters.
The rights-based approach enables one to move beyond what Tomas˘evski
calls the “human capital approach to education”, i.e., with a rights-based
approach, education has a value in and of itself, education is an individual
right. Combining the different mainstreaming strategies in a fruitful
manner involves, however, as Tomas˘evski has noted, “... a considerable
conceptual, strategic and operational challenge”.87 Tomas˘evski does not
propose the double mainstreaming approach as a system-wide and broad-
based strategy, but, within the context of education, she has identified a
need for the double mainstreaming approach. The last remark is impor-
tant because I would not like to suggest, having criticized both the strategy
for mainstreaming women’s human rights and a gender perspective, that
the solution lies in between the two.
6.6 The Strategies Became the Goal
The promise of the three-pronged objective set forth at the outset of this
thesis included providing a background for the integrative parts of the
dual strategies as well as situating them into contexts or contextualizing
them. Further, it was promised that the content and the institutional
implementation of the strategies would be analyzed. I noted in Chapter
One that I was interested in the integrative strategies because, as it seemed,
they had so swiftly become everyone’s darlings. I noted that feminist his-
tory and common sense suggested that if everyone would become fluent
either overnight or within a short period of time in languages of gender
and human rights, then one would probably have to start asking ques-
tions about what really happened? What was the actual victory? What was
the price paid? Where did the possibilities, opportunities and power go
again? While, here, in this thesis, I have analyzed the development, con-
tent and institutional implementation of the integrative strategies, this
thesis is only a beginning for the unpacking of the integrative strategies.
When addressing the feminist perspectives on international law in
Chapter Two, I criticized Charlesworth’s and Chinkin’s approach to in-
86 UN doc. E/CN.4/1999/49, Art. 18. Tomaseski seeks the foundation to the “double
mainstreaming strategy” in E/1997/27, E/CN.6/1997/9, p. 3. See also Tomas˘evski’s later
reports, UN doc. E/CN.4/2000/6, UN doc. E/CN.4/2001/52, UN doc. and E/CN.
4/2002/60. For further dicussion and Tomas˘evski 1998c. and Chapter 5.3.2.
87 UN doc. E/CN.4/1999/49, Art. 19.
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ternational law, according to which international law, first, needed to be
analyzed and unpacked from a feminist perspective, and, secondly, re-
constructed to fit women’s experiences and needs. I noted that feminist
scholars seemed to be bargaining with the system, suggesting that we
support the system for now and we try to explore its potentials for pro-
moting equality and justice, but that we will also keep an eye on whether
the system delivers.88 In retrospect, I have taken the very same approach
with regard to the integrative strategies. I have analyzed the development,
content and implementation of the strategies, commenting that the 
strategies are encumbered with some rather fundamental constraints and
that they have changed during this process of implementation – and not
necessarily for the better. However, I have not wanted to discard the
strategies, but rather, have wanted to save them – for the sake of equality.
The strategic approach is defensible, although not necessarily for the
sake of equality and justice. The strategy for integrating women’s human
rights has been promoted since the Vienna conference in 1993, although
the strategy for mainstreaming a gender perspective has dominated the
UN’s equality discourses since the mid-1990s. During the early years of
its development, the strategy for integrating women’s human rights was
overshadowed by the issue of violence against women, which, although
an important issue, fails to capture the whole problematic concerning
women’s enjoyment of their human rights. During this time, the strategy
for mainstreaming a gender perspective was far from well comprehended,
at least, beyond the sphere of woman-centred institutions. The terms,
“mainstreaming” and “gender”, were used, but as I have shown, without
a clear content. That is, during most of the 1990s people, who were sup-
posed to implement the strategies, neither understood nor were able to
use the strategies. It has only been during the last few years that more
user-friendly guidelines and manuals for mainstreaming a gender per-
spective have been published by the woman-centred institutions. It has
only been during this same, very recent period of time that various UN
human rights institutions have adopted decisions and tailored made
guidelines for their contexts in order to integrate women’s human rights
or mainstream a gender perspective. Hence, it is too premature, to attempt
to predict a future for or to discard the integrative strategies.
It is possible to state that during the last few years, the integrative
strategies have moved into a new phase as more and more attention is
currently being channeled into the grounding and contextualizing of the
strategies. Nonetheless, some fundamental constraints do remain, by-
products, at least, perhaps, in part of the processes of grounding and
88 Charlesworth and Chinkin 2000, pp. 60–1. See also Chapter 2.3.2.
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contextualizing. There are ongoing tendencies to neutralize the strategies.
The strategy for integrating women’s human rights has been activated,
utilizing mainly CEDAW-centred, institutional- and thematic-approaches,
marginalizing as it seems a holistic approach that emphasize women’s
economic and social rights. The strategy for mainstreaming a gender
perspective has become a strategy that both women and men should be
able to profit from equally instead of being a strategy, which, from an
analytical perspective, focuses equally on women and men in order to
promote equality more effectively.
The neutralization of the strategies has resulted in a shift, whereby
the integrative strategies are no longer viewed as means to an end, but
rather as the end in and of themselves. The idea behind the integrative
strategies had been to move women’s human rights or a gender perspec-
tive into the “mainstream” in order, thereby, promoting women’s enjoy-
ment of their human rights or “gender equality”. Now, the formal or
formalized adding of women’s human rights or gender components
seems to have overshadowed the goals. That is, the strategies are no longer
means to a goal. They are no longer approaches which would entail con-
stant evaluation of whether the strategies are actually performing, viz.,
actually promoting women’s human rights and gender equality. We now
seem to have arrived at the point where the adoption of the strategies
and the inclusion of references to “women’s human rights” or to “gender”
have become goals in and of themselves.
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1 The chronological list includes the main law and soft law documents referred to in
this thesis.
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Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the In-
volvement of Children in Armed Conflict 2000
UN Documents2
World Conference and Related Documents
A/Conf.157/1 Provisional agenda of the World Conference on Human Rights
A/Conf.157/2 Adoption of the final document of the World Conference on
Human Rights
A/Conf.157/3/Add.2 Observations et recommendations intéressant le projet et
le document final
A/Conf.157/3/Add. 3 Suggestion concernant le projet de document final
A/Conf.157/22 Address of the Secretary-General of the United Nations
A/Conf.157/23 Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action
A/Conf.157/24 Report of the World Conference on Human Rights
A/Conf.157/PC/46/Add.5-9 Recommendations concerning the provisional agenda
A/Conf.157/PC/57 Regional preparatory meetings of the World Conference
on Human Rights
A/Conf.157/AFRM/14-A/Conf.157/PC/57 Report of the Regional Meeting for
Africa
364
2 In order for the UN document bibliography to be useful I have chosen to categorize
the documents per institution or per theme depending on how and where the docu-
ments have been used in this thesis.
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A/Conf.157/LACRM/15-A/Conf.157/PC/58 Report of the Regional Meeting
for Latin America and the Caribbean-San José Declaration
A/Conf.157/ASRM/8-A/Conf.157/PC/59 Report of the Regional Meeting for
Asia
A/Conf.157/PC.60/Add.2-7 Analytical studies on the six objectives of the
World Conference on Human Rights
A/Conf.157/PC.63/Add.2 Note verbale by the Permanent Mission of Iraq
A/Conf.157/PC.63/Add.5 Déclaration présentée par des organisations non
gouvernmentales
A/Conf.157/PC/87 Exposé de la position de la Communauté Européenne et de
ses Etats Membres
A/Conf.171/13 (1994) Report of the International Conference on Population
and Development
A/Conf.171/13/Add.1 Report annexes I to IV.
A/Conf.177/20 (1995) Report of the Fourth World Conference on Women
A/Conf.177/L.1 Draft Beijing Platform for Action
A/Conf.177/L.2 Report of the Informal Contact Group on Gender
A/Conf.177/L.2, Annex
A/Conf.177/L.3 Informal consultations on the draft platform
A/S-23/10/Rev.1 (2000) Report of the Ad Hoc Committee of the Whole of the
Twenty-Third Special Session of the General Assembly
The Security Council
S/Res/1261 (1999) Children and armed conflict
S/Res/1265 Protection of civilians in armed conflict
S/Res/1296 (2000) Protection of civilians in armed conflict
S/Res/1314 Children and armed conflict
S/Res/1325 Women and peace and security
S/Res/1333 The situation in Afghanistan
S/PRST/2000/7 Maintain de la paix et de la sécurité
S/PV.4208 Statements from the morning and afternoon sessions concerning
women and peace and security
S/Res/1366 (2001) The role of the Security Council in the prevention of armed
conflict
S/Res/1368 Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts
S/Res/1379 Children and armed conflict
S/Res/1383 The situation in Afghanistan
S/Res/1419 (2002) The situation in Afghanistan
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S/Res/1431 The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
S/Res/1438 Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts
S/Res/1440 Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts
S/Res/1449 The establishment of the list of candidates for judges on the Inter-
national Tribunal for Rwanda
S/Res/1450 Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts
The UN General Assembly (UN GA)
A/Pv.29 (1946) An Open Letter to the World’s Women
UNGA Res. 640 (VII) (1952) The Convention on the Political Rights of Wo-
men
*UNGA Res. 1991B (XVIII) (1963) Question on the equitable representation
on the Security Council and the ECOSOC
*UNGA Res. 2106 (XX) (1965) The CERD
*UNGA Res. 2200 A (XXI) (1966) The ICCPR and the ICESCR
UNGA Res. 2263 (XXII) (1967) The DEDAW
UNGA Res. 2847 (XXVI) (1971) The enlargement of the ECOSOC
UNGA Res. 3520 (XXX) (1975) The World Conference of the International
Women’s Year
*A/32/218/Add.1 (1977)
A/Res/33/185 (1978) Preparations for the World Conference of the UN Decade
for Women
A/Res/34/180 (1979) The CEDAW
A/34/PV.107 Discussions regarding the CEDAW
A/Res/35/175 Alternative approaches and ways and means within the UN
system for improving the effective enjoyment of human rights and funda-
mental freedoms
A/Res/38/117 (1983) Reporting obligations of the States Parties to the inter-
national Covenants of human rights
A/39/484 (1984) Report of the meeting of the persons chairing the human
rights treaty bodies
*A/Res/39/46 The CAT
*A/C.3/39/SR.65
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A/Res/42/105 (1987) Reporting obligations under UN instruments on human
rights
A/44/98, annex (1989) Report of the meeting of the persons chairing the human
rights treaty bodies
A/Res/44/25 The CRC
A/Res/44/76 Elderly women
A/45/636, annex (1990) Report of the meeting of the persons chairing the
human rights treaty bodies
*A/Res/45/85 Effective implementation of international instruments on
human rights, including reporting obligations under international instru-
ments on human rights
A/Res/45/155 The World Conference on Human Rights
A/Res/45/158 The International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of
all Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families
A/Res/46/111 (1991) Effective implementation of international instruments
on human rights, including reporting obligations under international instru-
ments on human rights
A/Res/46/116 The World Conference on Human Rights
A/47/628 (1992) Report of the meeting of the persons chairing the human
rights treaty bodies
A/Res/47/122 The World Conference on Human Rights
A/48/38 (1993) Report of the CEDAW Committee
A/48/44 Report of the CAT Committee
A/Res/48/108 The Implementation of the Nairobi Forward-looking Strategies
for the Advancement of Women
A/Res/48/120 The Effective implementation of international instruments on
human rights, including reporting obligations under international instru-
ments on human rights
A/Res/48/121 The World Conference on Human Rights
A/Res/48/141 The High Commissioner for the promotion and protection of all
human rights
A/49/38 (1994) Report of the CEDAW Committee
A/49/44 Report of the CAT Committee
A/49/537 Report of the meeting of the persons chairing the human rights treaty
bodies
A/49/650 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in
Afghanistan
A/Res/49/175 The International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of
All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families
04-02 Iustus, Sari 8/3  04-03-08 15.31  Sidan 367
A/50/36 (1995) Report of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights
A/50/38 Report of the CEDAW Committee
A/50/505 Report of the meeting of the persons chairing the human rights treaty
bodies
A/50/567 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in
Afghanistan
A/Res/50/203 Follow-up to the Fourth World Conference on Women and full
implementation of the Beijing Declaration and the Platform for Action
A/51/36 (1996) Report of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights
A/51/38 Report of the CEDAW Committee
A/51/322 Report of the Third Committee on the outcome of the Beijing con-
ference
A/51/457 Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or ar-
bitrary executions
A/51/481 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in
Afghanistan
A/51/482 Report of the meeting of the persons chairing the human rights treaty
bodies
A/51/950 Report of the Secretary-General on renewing the UN
A/Res/51/69 Follow-up to the Fourth World Conference on Women and full
implementation of the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action
A/Res/51/118 Comprehensive implementation of and follow-up to the Vienna
Declaration and Programme of Action
A/52/36 (1997) Report of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights
A/52/38 Report of the CEDAW Committee
A/52/493 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in
Afghanistan
A/52/507 Report of the meeting of the persons chairing the human rights treaty
bodies
A/Res/52/100 The Fourth World Conference on Women follow-up, including
the Beijing Declaration and Platform of Action
A/Res/52/117 The Fiftieth anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights
A/53/36 (1998) Report of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights
A/53/38 Report of the CEDAW Committee
A/53/125 Report of the meeting of the persons chairing the human rights treaty
bodies
A/53/372 Report of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights on the
implementation of the Vienna Programme
A/53/539 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the human rights situation in
Afghanistan
A/Res/53/120 The Fourth World Conference on Women follow-up, including
the Beijing Declaration and Platform of Action
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A/Res/53/166 The Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action
A/Res/53/168 The 50th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights
A/54/36 (1999) Report of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights
A/54/38 Report of the CEDAW Committee
A/54/805 Report of the meeting of the persons chairing the human rights treaty
bodies
A/Res/54/133 Traditional practices affecting the health of women and girls
A/Res/54/135 Improvement of the situation of women in rural areas
A/Res/54/141 Follow-up to the Fourth World Conference on Women and full
implementation the Beijing Declaration and the Platform for Action
A/55/38 (2000) Report of the CEDAW Committee
A/55/44 Report of the CAT Committee
A/Res/55/2 The Millennium Declaration
A/Res/55/66 Elimination of crimes against women committed in the name of
honour
A/Res/55/71 Follow-up to Fourth World Conference on Women and the out-
come of the 23rd special session of the General Assembly
A/Res/55/78 The girl child
A/Res/55/162 Follow-up to the outcome of the Millennium Summit
A/Res/S-23/3 The General Assembly Resolution on Further Actions and Initia-
tives to Implement the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action
A/56/36 (2001) Report of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights
A/56/38 Report of the CEDAW Committee
A/56/44 Report of the CAT Committee
A/56/326 Report of the Secretary-General, Road map towards the imple-
mentation of the Millennium Declaration
A/56/576 Report of the Third Committee on the Advancement of women
A/56/583/Add.1 Report of the Third Committee on human rights questions
A/Res/56/95 Support by the UN system of the efforts of Governments to pro-
mote and consolidate new or restored democracies
A/Res/56/125 The Critical situation of the INSTRAW
A/Res/56/126 Situation of older women in society
A/Res/56/127 Improvement of the status of women in the UN system
A/Res/56/128 Traditional or customary practices affecting the health of women
and girls
A/Res/56/129 Improvement of the situation of women in rural areas
A/Res/56/130 The UNIFEM
A/Res/56/131 Violence against women migrant workers
A/Res/56/132 Follow-up to the Fourth World Conference on Women and full
implementation of the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action and the
outcome of the 23rd special session of the General Assembly
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A/Res/56/143 Torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment
A/Res/56/144 International covenants of human tights
A/Res/56/145 The International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of
all Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families
A/Res/56/147 Human rights education
A/Res/56/149 Enhancement of international cooperation in the field of human
rights
A/Res/56/150 The right to development
A/Res/56/153 Strengthening UN actions in the field of human rights through
the promotion of international cooperation and the importance of non-
selectivity, impartiality and objectivity
A/Res/56/155 The right to food
A/Res/56/156 Human rights and cultural diversity
A/Res/56/157 Elimination of all forms of religious intolerance
A/Res/56/158 National institutions for the promotion and protection of
human rights
A/Res/56/160 Human rights and terrorism
A/Res/56/161 Human rights in the administration of justice
A/Res/56/162 Effective promotion of the Declaration on the Rights of Persons
Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities
A/Res/56/163 Declaration on the Right and Responsibility of Individuals,
Groups and Organs of Society to Promote and Protect Universally Recognized
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
A/Res/56/164 Protection of and assistance to internally displaced persons
A/Res/56/166 Human rights and mass exoduses
A/Res/56/167 UN Decade for Human Rights Education
A/Res/56/168 Comprehensive and integral international convention to pro-
mote and protect the rights and dignity of persons with disabilities
A/Res/56/169 Situation of human rights in Cambodia
A/Res/56/170 Protection of migrants
A/Res/56/171 Situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran
A/Res/56/172 Situation of human rights in parts of South-Eastern Europe
A/Res/56/173 Situation of human rights in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo
A/Res/55/174 Situation of human rights in Iraq
A/Res/56/175 Situation of human rights in the Sudan
A/Res/56/176 Question of human rights in Afghanistan
A/Res/56/188 Women in development
A/Res/56/207 Implementation of the First UN Decade for the Eradication of
Poverty (1997–2006), including the proposal to establish a world solidarity
fund for poverty eradication
A/Res/56/211 Integrated and coordinated implementation of and follow-up to
the outcomes of the major UN conferences and summits in the economic
and social fields
A/Res/56/222 Special session of the General Assembly on children
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A/Res/56/230 Subregional Centre for Human Rights and Democracy in Cen-
tral Africa
A/Res/56/231 Situation of human rights in Myanmar
A/Res/56/232 Use of mercenaries as a means of violating human rights and im-
peding the exercise of the right of peoples to self-determination
A/Res/56/265 Third Decade to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination
A/Res/56/266 Comprehensive implementation of and follow-up to the World
Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related
Intolerance
A/Res/56/267 Measures to combat contemporary forms of racism and racial
discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance
A/57/18 (2002) Report of the CERD Committee
A/57/36 Report of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights
A/57/38 Report of the CEDAW Committee
A/57/44 Report of the CAT Committee
A/57/75-E/2002/57 Report of the Secretary-General on the integrated and
coordinated implementation of and follow-up to the outcomes of the major
United Nations conferences and summits, including the Millennium Sum-
mit
A/57/270 Report of the Secretary-General on the follow-up to the outcome of
the Millennium Summit
A/57/387 Report of the Secretary-General on Strengthening the United Nations:
An Agenda for Further Change
A/57/399 Note by the Secretary-General, Human rights questions: implemen-
tation of human rights instruments
A/57/496 Report of the Secretary-General on the Third United Nations Con-
ference on the Least Developed Countries
A/Res/57/270 Integrated and coordinated implementation of and follow-up to
the outcomes of the major United Nations conferences and summits in the
economic and social fields
ECOSOC and its Substantial Commissions
ECOSOC
*ECOSOCRes. 5(I) (1946)
*ECOSOC Res. 11 (II) (1946)
*ECOSOC Res. 48 (IV) (1947)
*ECOSOC Res. 845 (XXXII) (1961)
*ECOSOC Res. 1147 (XLI) (1966)
ECOSOC Res. 1235 (XLII) (1970) Commission on Human Rights and the
Subcommission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities
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are authorized to examine information relevant to gross violations of human
rights and fundamental freedoms.
ECOSOC Res. 1303 (XLVIII) (1970) Procedure for dealing with communica-
tions relating to violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms
*E/Res/1979/36
*E/1982/34
*E/Res/1984/37
E/1986/8 System-wide equality plan for the advancement of women
E/Res/1986/71 System-wide equality plan for the advancement of women
*E/Res/1987/2
*E/Res/1987/22
*E/Res/1990/15
*E/Res/1990/48
*E/Res/1991/18
*E/Res/1992/20
ECOSOC Agreed Conclusions 1995/1 on the coordinated follow-up of the UN
world conferences
E/1995/86 Report of the Secretary-General on the coordinated follow-up
ECOSOC Agreed Conclusions 1996/1 on poverty eradication
E/1996/2 The ECOSOC 1996 Agenda
E/1996/61 Eradication of poverty
E/Res/1996/6 Follow-up to the Fourth World Conference on Women
ECOSOC 1997 Report
ECOSOC Agreed Conclusions 1997/2 on gender mainstreaming
E/Res/1997/61 Implementation and follow-up of major UN conferences
E/1997/SR.21 Gender mainstreaming
E/1997/SR.22 Gender mainstreaming
E/1998/19 World conference follow-up
E/1998/60 Coordination of policies and activities of specialized agencies and
other bodies of the UN system related to follow-up to UN world conferen-
ces
E/1998/64 Implementation of the agreed conclusions of 1997 on mainstreaming
the gender perspective
372
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E/Res/1998/43 Mainstreaming a gender perspective into all policies and pro-
grammes in the UN system
ECOSOC Agreed Conclusions 2000/2 on the integrated follow-up to UN world
conferences
E/Res/2000/9 Situation of women and girls in Afghanistan
E/2001/27 – E/CN.6/2001/14 Report of the 45th Session on the Commission
on the Status of Women
E/2001/73 Note by the Secretary-General on the implementation of agreed
conclusions 2000/2 on the integrated and coordinated conference follow-up
E/Res/2001/1 Triennal comprehensive policy review of operational activities for
development of the UN system
E/Res/2001/2 The situation of and assistance to Palestinian women
E/Res/2001/3 Discrimination against women and girls in Afghanistan
E/Res/2001/4 Proposal for a multi-year programme of the work for the Com-
mission on the Status of Women
E/Res/2001/5 Agreed conclusions of the Commission on the Status of Women
on thematic issues
E/Res/2001/21 Integrated and coordinated implementation of and follow-up
to major UN conferences and summits
E/Res/2001/22 Integrated and coordinated implementation of and follow-up
to major UN conferences and summits
E/Res/2001/28 Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of In-
dependence to Colonial Countries and Peoples by the specialized agencies
and the international institutions associated with the UN
E/Res/2001/37 Global Code of Ethics for Tourism
E/Res/2001/38 Human rights education
E/Res/2001/41 Mainstreaming a gender perspective into all policies and pro-
grammes in the UN system
E/Res/2001/42 Global campaign for poverty eradication
E/2001/L.21 Draft resolution submitted by the Vice President of the ECOSOC
(Myanmar)
*E/2001/L.24/Rev.1
E/2001/L.28 Draft resolution submitted by Protugal and India (HIV)
*E/2001/L.29 Draft resolution submitted by Andorra, Australia, Belgium,
Brazil et cetera (Gender mainstreaming)
E/2001/L.32 Draft resolution submitted by the Vice President of the
ECOSOC (Global code of ethics)
E/2001/L.33 Draft resolution on Human Rights Education
E/2001/L.41 Draft resolution submitted by the Vice President of the
ECOSOC (Integrated follow-up to the world conferences)
E/2001/L.42 Draft resolution submitted by the Vice President of the
ECOSOC (Global campaing for poverty eradication)
*E/2001/SR.43
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E/Res/2002/4 Situation of women and girls in Afghanistan
E/Res/2002/23 Mainstreaming a gender perspective into all policies and pro-
grammes in the UN system
The Commission on Human Rights and Its Special Procedures, Including the Sub-
Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights
*E/CN.4/Res/1982/29
*E/CN.4/Res/1991/30
E/CN.4/Res/1992/72 Extrajudicial, summary and arbitrary executions
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1992/4 Preparations for the Vienna conference
E/CN.4/1993/122 Report of the 49th Session of the Commission on Human
Rights
E/CN.4/Res/1993/8 Rape and abuse of women in the territory of the former
Yugoslavia
E/CN.4/Res/1993/46 Integrating the human rights of women into the human
rights mechanisms
E/CN.4/Res/1993/71 Extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions
E/CN.4/1994/7 Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or
arbitrary executions
E/CN.4/Res/1994/45 Question on the integration of the human rights of
women throughout the UN system
E/CN.4/Res/1994/95 World Conference on Human Rights
*E/CN.4/1994/SR.49
*E/CN.4/1994/SR.51/Add.1
*E/CN.4/1994/SR.60
E/CN.4/1995/42 Preliminary report submitted by the Special Rapporteur on
violence against women
E/CN.4/1995/61 Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary
or arbitrary executions
E/CN.4/1995/93 Draft Declaration on the Right and Responsibility of Indi-
viduals, Groups and Organs of Society to Promote and Protect Universally
Recognized Human Rights
E/CN.4/1995/98 Report of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights
E/CN.4/1995/176-E/1995/23 Report of the Commission on Human Rights
E/CN.4/Res/1995/20 Violence against Women
E/CN.4/Res/1995/25 Traffic in women and girls
E/CN.4/Res/1995/85 Elimination of violence against women
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E/CN.4/Res/1995/86 Question of integrating the human rights of women
throughout the UN system
E/CN.4/Res/1995/93 Evaluation of the human rights programme of the United
Nations system, in accordance with the Vienna Declaration and Programme
of Action
E/CN.4/1996/53 Report of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women
E/CN.4/1996/105 and Annex Note by the Secretariat transmitting the Report
of an Expert Group Meeting on the Development of Guidelines for the
Integration of Gender Perspectives into the Human Rights Activities and
Programmes and the Report
E/CN.4/1996/177-E/1996/23 Report of the Commission on Human Rights
E/CN.4/Res/1996/17 Violence against women migrant workers
E/CN.4/Res/1996/24 Traffic in women and girls
E/CN.4/Res/1996/48 Question of integrating the human rights of women
throughout the UN system
E/CN.4/Res/1996/49 The elimination of violence against women
E/CN.4/Res/1996/74 Extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions
E/CN.4/Res/1996/83 Evaluation of the human rights programme of the UN,
in accordance with the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action
E/CN.4/1997/3 Report of the meeting of Special Rapporteurs
E/CN.4/1997/40 Report of the Secretary-General on integrating the human
rights of women throughout the UN System
E/CN.4/1997/47 Report of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women
E/CN.4/1997/60 Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary
or arbitrary executions
E/CN.4/1997/98 Report of the High Commissioner for Human Rights: build-
ing a partnership for human rights
E/CN.4/1997/150-E/1997/23 Report of the Commission on Human Rights
on its 53rd Session
E/CN.4/Res/1997/13 Violence against women migrant workers
E/CN.4/Res/1997/19 Traffic in women and girls
E/CN.4/Res/1997/43 Integrating the human rights of women throughout the
UN system
E/CN.4/Res/1997/44 The elimination of violence against women
E/CN.4/Res/1997/61 Extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions
E/CN.4/Res/1997/69 Comprehensive implementation of and follow-up to the
Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action
E/CN.4/1998/1 Provisional Agenda
E/CN.4/1998/45 Report of the meetings of the special rapporteurs
E/CN.4/1998/49 Report of the Secretary-General on the question of integrat-
ing the human rights of women throughout the UN system
E/CN.4/1998/54 Report of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women
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E/CN.4/1998/68 Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary
or arbitrary executions
E/CN.4/1998/104 Report of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights
on the comprehensive implementation of the Vienna Declaration and Pro-
gramme of Action
E/CN.4/1998/122 Report of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights
on the follow-up to the World Conference on Human Rights
E/CN.4/1998/177-E/1998/23 Report of the Commission on Human Rights
E/CN.4/Res/1998/17 Violence against women migrant workers
E/CN.4/Res/1998/33 Question of the realization in all countries of the eco-
nomic, social and cultural rights contained in the Universal Declaration and
in the ICESCR
E/CN.4/Res/1998/51 Integrating the human rights of women throughout the
UN system
E/CN.4/Res/1998/56 Fiftieth anniversary of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights
E/CN.4/Res/1998/68 Extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions
E/CN.4/Res/1998/78 Comprehensive implementation and the follow-up to
the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action
E/CN.4/1999/3 Report of the meeting of the special rapporteurs
E/CN.4/1999/9 Report of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights
E/CN.4/1999/39 Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary
or arbitrary executions
E/CN.4/1999/40 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human
rights in Afghanistan
E/CN.4/1999/49 Preliminary Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right to
education
E/CN.4/1999/67 Report of the Secretary-General on integrating the human
rights of women throughout the UN system
E/CN.4/1999/67/Add.1 Integrating the human rights of women into the
mechanisms of the UN
E/CN.4/1999/68 Report of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women
E/CN.4/1999/167-E/1999/23 Report of the Commission on Human Rights
E/CN.4/Res/1999/35 Extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions
E/CN.4/Res/1999/40 Traffic in women and girls
E/CN.4/Res/1999/41 Integrating the human rights of women throughout the
UN system
E/CN.4/Res/1999/42 Elimination of violence against women
E/CN.4/2000/1 Provisional agenda
E/CN.4/2000/3 Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or
arbitrary executions
E/CN.4/2000/5 Report of the meeting of special rapporteurs, representatives,
experts and chairpersons
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E/CN.4/2000/6 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right to education
E/CN.4/2000/33 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the human rights situa-
tion in Afghanistan
E/CN.4/2000/67 Report of the Secretary-General on integrating the human
rights of women throughout the UN system
E/CN.4/2000/68 Report of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women
E/CN.4/2000/167-E/2000/23 Report of the Commission on Human Rights
E/CN.4/2000/118-E/CN.6/2000/8 Joint work plan of the Division for the Ad-
vancement of Women and the Office of the High Commissioner for Human
Rights
E/CN.4/Res/2000/13 Women’s equal ownership, access to and control over
land and the equal rights to own property and to adequate housing
E/CN.4/Res/2000/31 Extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions
E/CN.4/Res/2000/44 Traffic in women and girls
E/CN.4/Res/2000/45 Elimination of violence against women
E/CN.4/Res/2000/46 Integrating the human rights of women throughout the
UN system
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2000/18 Report of the Secretary-General on the situation of
women and girls in Afghanistan
E/CN.4/2001/1 Provisional agenda
E/CN.4/2001/9 and Corr. 1 Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial,
summary or arbitrary executions
E/CN.4/2001/16 Report of the High Commissioner on the follow-up to the
World Conference on Human Rights
E/CN.4/2001/43 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human
Rights in Afghanistan
E/CN.4/2001/52 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right to education
E/CN.4/2001/70–E/CN.6/2001/3 Joint work plan of the Office of the Special
Advisor on Gender Issues and the Advancement of Women, the Division for
the Advancement of Women and the Office of the High Commissioner for
Human Rights
E/CN.4/2001/71 Report of the Secretary-General on integrating the human
rights of women throughout the UN system
E/CN.4/2001/73 Report of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women
E/CN.4/Res/2001/34 Women’s equal ownership, access to and control over
land and the equal rights to own property and to adequate housing
E/CN.4/Res/2001/45 Extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions
E/CN.4/Res/2001/48 Traffic in women and girls
E/CN.4/Res/2001/49 Elimination of violence against women
E/CN.4/Res/2001/50 Integrating the human rights of women throughout the
UN system
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/28 Report of the Secretary-General on the situation of
women and girls in the territories occupied by Afghan armed groups
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E/CN.4/2002/1 Provisional agenda
E/CN.4/2002/43 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human
rights in Afghanistan
E/CN.4/2002/60 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right to education
E/CN.4/2002/74 Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary
or arbitrary executions
E/CN.4/2002/81 Report of the Secretary-General on integrating the human
rights of women throughout the UN system
E/CN.4/2002/83 Report of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women
E/CN.4/2002/200-E/2002/23 Report of the Commission on Human Rights
E/CN.4/Res/2002/19 Situation of human rights in Afghanistan
E/CN.4/Res/2002/36 Extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary execution
E/CN.4/Res/2002/49 Women’s equal ownership, access to and control over
land and the equal rights to own property and to adequate housing
E/CN.4/Res/2002/50 Integrating the human rights of women throughout the
UN system
E/CN.4/Res/2002/51 Traffic in women and girls
E/CN.4/Res/2002/52 Elimination of violence against women
E/CN.4/Res/2002/68 Racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and ???????
tolerance
E/2003 (early version) Report of the Secretary-General on integrating the human
rights of women throughout the UN System
E/CN.4/2003/1/Add.1 Provisional agenda
E/CN.4/2003/3 Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or
arbitrary executions
E/CN.4/2003/9 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right to education
E/CN.4/2003/39 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human
rights in Afghanistan
E/CN.4/2003/72 Report of the Secretary-General on integrating the human
rights of women throughout the UN system
E/CN.4/2003/75 Report of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women
E/CN.4/Res/2003/22 Women’s equal ownership, access to and control over
land and the equal rights to own property and to adequate housing
E/CN.4/Res/2003/44 Integrating the human rights of women throughout the
UN system
E/CN.4/Res/2003/45 Elimination of violence against women
The Commission on the Status of Women
E/CN.6/1992/13-E/1992/74 Report of the Commission on the Status of
Women
E/CN.6/Res/36/1 (1992) Advancement of women and the family
E/CN.6/Res/36/3 (1992) Women in decision-making bodies
E/CN.6/Res/36/4 (1992) Integration of elderly women into development
E/CN.6/Res/36/5 (1992) Women and development
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E/CN.6/1993/18-E/1993/27 Report the Commission on Human Rights
E/CN.6/Res/37/4 (1993) Integration of the human rights of women
E/CN.6/1994/11 Follow-up to the Human Rights Conference
E/CN.6/Res/38/2 (1994) Mainstreaming the human rights of women
E/CN.6/1995/14-E/1995/26 Report of the Commission on the Status of
Women
E/CN.6/1995/5/Add.1-5 Reports from the regional preparatory meetings for
the Beijing Conference
E/CN.6/Res/39/3 (1995) Integration of women in the Middle East peace process
E/CN.6/Res/39/5 (1995) Mainstreaming the human rights of women
E/CN.6/Res/39/6 (1995) Traffic in women and girls
E/CN.6/Res/39/8 (1995) Integration of displaced rural women into
development processes
E/CN.6/Res/40/3 (1996) Mainstreaming the human rights of women
E/CN.6/1997/2 Report of the Secretary-General on the follow-up to the World
Conference on Human Rights and review of mainstreaming a gender per-
spective within the UN system
E/CN.6/1997/9-E/1997/27 Report of the Commission on the Status of Women
E/CN.6/Res/41/1 (1997) Release of women and children taken hostage in armed
conflicts, including those subsequently imprisoned
E/CN.6/Res/41/2 (1997) Older women, human rights and development
E/CN.6/Res/41/4 (1997) Violence against women migrant workers
E/CN.6/Res/41/5 (1997) Traffic in women and girls
E/CN.6/Res/41/6 (1997) Mainstreaming a gender perspective into all policies
and programmes in the UN system
E/CN.6/1999/10-E/1999/27 Report of the Commission on the Status of
Women
E/CN.6/2001/1 Provisional agenda
E/CN.6/2001/2/Add.1 The situation of women and girls in Afghanistan
E/CN.6/2001/14-E/2001/27 Report of the Commission on the Status of Women
E/CN.6/Res/45/2 (2002) Mainstreaming a gender perspective into all policies
and programmes of the UN system
E/CN.6/2002/2 Report of the Secretary-General on the follow-up to and im-
plementation of the Fourth World Conference on Women and to the Special
Session of the General Assembly Entitled Women 2000: Gender Equality,
Development and Peace for the 21st Century, and especially on mainstream-
ing a gender perspective in the entities of the UN system
E/CN.6/2002/13-E/2002/27 Report of the Commission on the Status of
Women
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The UN Human Rights Treaty Monitoring Bodies
HRI/GEN/2/Rev.1 Compilation of guidelines on the form and content of the
reports to be submitted by States Parties (Basic reference document)
HRI/MC/1996/1 Provisional agenda and annotations, chairpersons’ meeting
HRI/MC/1998/6 Report of the Secretary-General on integrating the gender
perspective into the work of the UN treaty bodies
CERD Committee general recommendations nos. 1-28 (1972-2002)
CERD/C/70/Rev.5 (2000) General Reporting Guidelines
CERD/C/60/CO/1 (Austria)
CERD/C/60/CO/4 (Croatia)
CERD/C/60/CO/5 (Denmark)
CERD/C/60/CO/10 (Papua New Guinea)
CERD/C/304/Add.91 (France)
CERD/C/304/Add.92 (Zimbabwe)
CERD/C/304/Add.93 (Denmark)
CERD/C/304/Add.94 (Malta)
CERD/C/304/Add.95 (Spain)
CERD/C/304/Add.96 (Tonga)
CERD/C/304/Add.98 (Estonia)
CERD/C/304/Add.99 (Lesotho)
Human Rights Committee general comments nos. 1–29 (1981–2001)
CCPR/C/66/GUI/Rev.2 Consolidated Guidelines for State Reports under the
ICCPR
CCPR/CO/69/KWT
CCPR/CO/72/PRK
CCPR/CO/74/SWE
CCPR/CO/75/VNM
CCPR/CO/75/YEM
CCPR/CO/79/Add. 3 (Belgium)
CCPR/CO/79/Add.9 (Burundi)
CCPR/CO/79/10 (Senegal)
CCPR/CO/79/Add.25 (Iran)
CCPR/CO/79/Add.30 (Romania)
CCPR/CO/79/Add.34 (El Salvador)
CCPR/CO/79/Add.39 (Cyprus)
CCPR/CO/79/Add.43 (Tunisia)
CCPR/CO/79/Add.48 (Paraguay)
CCPR/CO/79/Add.52 (Ukraine)
CCPR/CO/79/Add.62 (Zambia)
CCPR/CO/79/Add.67 (Peru)
CCPR/C/79/Add.2 (Ukraine)
CCPR/CO/79/Add.86 (Belarus)
CCPR/CO/79/Add.87 (Lituania)
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CCPR/CO/79/Add.103 (Austria)
CCPR/CO/79/Add.104 (Chile)
CCPR/CO/79/Add.122 (Republic of Korea)
ICESCR Committee general comments nos. 1–10 (1989–1998)
E/CN.12/1993/7 (Iran)
E/CN.12/1993/16 (Mexico)
E/CN.12/1994/4(Romania)
E/CN.12/1994/9 (Gambia)
E/CN.12/1994/16 (Austria)
E/CN.12/1995/17 (Algeria)
E/CN.12/1995/22
E/CN.12/1/Add.8 (Finland)
E/CN.12/1/Add.13 (Russian Federation)
E/CN.12/1/Add.70 (Sweden)
E/CN.12/1/Add.71 (Algeria)
E/CN.12/1/Add.72 (France)
E/CN.12/1/Add.74 (Colombia)
E/CN.12/1/Add.77 (Ireland)
E/CN.12/1/Add.81 (Slovakia)
E/CN.12/1/Add.82 (Poland)
E/CN.12/1/Add.83 (Georgia)
CEDAW Committee general recommendations nos. 1–24 (1986–1999)
CEDAW/C/7/Rev.3 Guidelines for the Preparation of Reports by States Parties
CAT Committee general comment no. 1 (1997)
CAT/C/CR/28/2 (Luxembourg)
CAT/C/CR/28/3 (Norway)
CAT/C/CR/28/7 (Uzbekistan)
CRC Committee reports of general days of discussion, document compiled by the
UN High Commissioner on Human Rights.
CRC Committee general comments nos. 1–5 (2001–2003)
CRC Committee general recommendations nos. 1–6 (1998–2003)
CRC/C/15/Add.1 (Bolivia)
CRC/C/15/Add.5 (Egypt)
CRC/C/15/Add.9 (El Salvador)
CRC/C/15/Add.18 (Pakistan)
CRC/C/15/Add.22 (Chile)
CRC/C/15/Add.27 (Paraguay)
CRC/C/15/Add.31 (Poland)
CRC/C/15/Add.36 (Nicaragua)
CRC/C/15/Add.40 (Sri Lanka)
CRC/C/15/Add.45 (Portugal)
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CRC/C/15/Add.54 (Lebanon)
CRC/C/15/Add.59 (Cyprus)
CRC/C/15/Add.62 (Uruguay)
CRC/C/15/Add.67 (Ethiopia)
CRC/C/15/Add.71 (New Zeeland)
CRC/C/15/Add.76 (Algeria)
CRC/C/15/Add.80 (Uganda)
CRC/C/15/Add.85 (Ireland)
CRC/C/15/Add.94 (Iraq)
CRC/C/15/Add.99 (Belize)
CRC/C/15/Add.103 (Barbados)
CRC/C/15/Add.108 (Nicaragua)
CRC/C/15/Add.112 (Mexico)
CRC/C/15/Add.117 (Costa Rica)
CRC/C/15/Add.121 (Grenada)
CRC/C/15/Add.126 (Norway)
CRC/C/15/Add.130 (Surinam)
CRC/C/15/Add.136 (Tajikistan)
CRC/C/15/Add.141 (Comoros)
CRC/C/15/Add.146 (Lithuania)
CRC/C/15/Add.150 (Dominican Republic)
CRC/C/15/Add.160 (Kenya)
CRC/C/15/Add.165 (Gambia)
CRC/C/15/Add.178 (Belgium)
CRC/C/15/Add.185 (Spain)
CRC/C/15/Add.190 (Sudan)
CRC/C/15/Add.194 (Poland)
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